Opinion
No. 5-135 / 04-0181
Filed April 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, William C. Ostlund, Judge.
John Michael Burgoyne appeals his conviction, judgment, and sentence for burglary in the third degree. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Greta Truman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, and Nicola J. Martino, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
John Michael Burgoyne appeals his conviction, judgment, and sentence of burglary in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.6A, 713.1 (2003). Burgoyne claims (1) the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the element of intent to commit theft, (3) his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of his fingerprint card, and (4) the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Because we agree with Burgoyne that the district court committed reversible error in erroneously instructing the jury on the intent element of burglary, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On March 24, 2003, Burgoyne's employment as a construction worker with Shriver Construction Company (Shriver) was terminated. On the morning of April 1, Shriver's office manager, Ann Butler, arrived at the office building and discovered the window of her interior office door had been broken out. Butler then discovered some of the items on her desk had been disturbed while others were missing. She contacted the police.
A trial information was filed alleging Burgoyne, having no right or license to enter Shriver's office building, did so, with the intent to commit a theft therein. Burgoyne was charged with burglary in the third degree. Following a trial, the jury found Burgoyne guilty as charged.
At his trial Burgoyne testified that he had arrived at the Shriver office building in the early morning hours of April 1 with the intent to ask the owner of Shriver, Scott Shriver, for his job back. Burgoyne stated he waited outside, in the cold for a while and then decided to try one of the doors to the building. Finding the back door unlocked, Burgoyne testified he entered the building with the assumption that if the door was unlocked, someone must be inside. Burgoyne next indicated that because he found that no one was present, he sat and waited for Scott to arrive. Burgoyne then admitted that he grew impatient and angry and broke out Butler's office door window and took $200.00 as well as some other items of nominal value from her office.
II. Jury Instruction
We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005). The basic crime of burglary, for which Burgoyne was convicted, is defined in Iowa Code section 713.1 as follows:
Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure . . . not being open to the public . . . commits burglary.
(Emphasis added). Thus, in order to establish the intent element of burglary, the State was required to establish that Burgoyne had the intent to commit theft at the time he entered Shriver's office building. See State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004) ("[T]o prove burglary, the State was required to establish that the defendant, at the time he broke the passenger window or at the time he entered . . . had the intent to commit a felony or assault therein."); State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000) ("In order to sustain a conviction for burglary the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, [the defendant] had formed the intent to commit an assault at the time of entry."). Jury Instruction 12 provides:
The State need only prove the defendant formed the intent to commit a theft at some time while he was unlawfully on the premises.
This instruction allowed the jury to find Burgoyne guilty of burglary if it found he developed the intent to commit theft after entering Shriver's office building. Consequently, this instruction was an incorrect statement of the law.
However, error in giving jury instructions does not warrant reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996). An error in instructing the jury is presumed prejudicial unless the contrary appears beyond a reasonable doubt from a review of the whole case. State v. Engle, 590 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
Jury Instruction 12 defined the only element of burglary contested by Burgoyne. Burgoyne's entire defense was premised on the fact that, under the statutory definition of burglary, he could not be convicted of burglary if he did not possess the intent to commit theft until after he had entered Shriver's office building. In fact, Burgoyne essentially admitted that he possessed the intent to commit theft after he had entered the building, as he admitted to theft. State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1994) (noting the intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft at the time a defendant enters a premises may be inferred from a defendant's acts following entry). Consequently, Burgoyne was prejudiced by the proffered instruction as it allowed the jury to convict him even if it found he did not develop the intent to commit theft until after he had entered Shriver's office building.
III. Conclusion
Having determined Burgoyne suffered prejudice as a result of the erroneous jury instruction, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, we need not address the other alleged errors raised by Burgoyne on appeal.