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explaining "[t]he requirement that an appellate court search for any reasonable way to reconcile a jury's verdicts serves to avoid speculation into the jury's confidential deliberations and to safeguard the result of those deliberations, if at all possible."
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SCWC-17-0000543
08-31-2021
STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adrian-John C. BRINGAS, also known as Adrianjohn Bringas, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
Phyllis J. Hironaka, for petitioner Sonja P. McCullen, Honolulu, for respondent
Phyllis J. Hironaka, for petitioner
Sonja P. McCullen, Honolulu, for respondent
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, J., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CHANG, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY, WITH McKENNA AND WILSON, JJ., EACH DISSENTING SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J. I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Adrian-John C. Bringas was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of W, a minor. In its jury instructions, the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder, including third-degree assault. Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712 (2014), the statute defining third-degree assault, provides that the offense may be reduced to a petty misdemeanor if the fight or scuffle is the result of "mutual affray." Consistent with the statute and Hawai‘i Jury Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 9.21A, the circuit court submitted a special interrogatory to the jury on mutual affray. The interrogatory stated: "Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent?" The court instructed the jury that it must answer the special interrogatory only if it found Bringas guilty of the included offense of third-degree assault. The jury found Bringas guilty as charged of second-degree murder, yet answered the special interrogatory by placing an X on the line next to "no."
The Honorable Paul B.K. Wong presided.
HRS § 707-712(2) specifically provides: "Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor."
Bringas argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial because the jury's inconsistent verdict mandated vacatur. We disagree. There is a reasonable way to reconcile the jury verdict. The evidence in this case could have reasonably caused the jury to conclude that the altercation leading to the decedent's death began as mutual affray but ended in second-degree murder. Thus, the jury's answer to the mutual affray special interrogatory is reconcilable with its verdict that Bringas was guilty of second-degree murder. We thus affirm Bringas's conviction.
II. BACKGROUND
Bringas was charged by indictment with one count of murder in the second degree (Count I), in violation of HRS § 707-701.5, and one count of assault in the second degree (Count II), in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a), (b), and/or (d). As to the first count, the State alleged that Bringas intentionally or knowingly caused the death of W, a minor. As to the second count, the State alleged that Bringas intentionally or knowingly caused substantial injury to, recklessly caused substantial bodily injury to, and/or intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury with a dangerous instrument to C.U., the older brother of W. The following evidence was adduced at Bringas's jury trial in February 2017. It was undisputed that after an altercation on the night of April 12, 2016, Bringas stabbed W in the chest, resulting in W's death, and stabbed C.U. in the leg. The State alleged that Bringas was the aggressor, while the defense argued Bringas acted in self-defense.
HRS § 707-701.5 (2014) provided:
(1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656.
HRS § 707-711 (2014) provided in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if:
(a) The person intentionally or knowingly causes substantial bodily injury to another;
(b) The person recklessly causes serious or substantial bodily injury to another;
....
(d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument;
....
(2) Assault in the second degree is a class C felony.
Bringas testified that while riding his bike in Kalihi, the chain of his bike fell off near Ahonui Street, so he stopped to fix it using a fixed blade knife he was carrying in his backpack. After fixing his bike, W approached Bringas and offered him marijuana. The two had not previously met, and Bringas testified that the mood was "dark," and Bringas felt W was "check[ing] him" by asking him questions. Then, Eileen Prescott, a family friend of W, approached Bringas and W and began smoking with W, which Bringas testified "lightened the situation[.]"
Competing accounts of what happened next were adduced at trial. Bringas testified that he began to gather up the trash from his bag, and while doing so W and Prescott walked away. After walking over to a dumpster to deposit the trash, Bringas testified that he was hit hard from behind and fell to the ground. Bringas was unsure what had hit him and caused him to fall to the ground, but he was able to get back on his feet and ran away. However, he slipped and rolled his right ankle, causing him to fall again. While on the ground, an unidentified individual began punching and kicking Bringas. Bringas testified that he was able to get the person off of him and begin running again, but he was met on the street by two male individuals who attacked him. At this point, Bringas grabbed the knife out of his waistband. He shouted at the two men to "stop, get back," and noticed that Prescott had his backpack in her hand and his belongings were on the ground. Bringas recalled yelling at the two men and Prescott that they could have his belongings, "just let me go." He was then hit by an object one of the men was holding and fell to the ground again. While lying face down on the floor, Bringas "fe[lt] a presence on top" of him, again hitting and kicking him. Bringas recalled flailing his right hand – which held the knife – around his head in an effort to protect himself. After, "the attack just stop[ped]," and he ran away again. He ran as fast as he could down three more streets, jumping into the bed of a truck that pulled into a gas station.
Bringas testified that he placed the knife in his waistband, rather than returning it to his backpack, because he felt uneasy and threatened by the way W was speaking to him before Prescott approached them.
Prescott testified that she saw Bringas and W talking behind the trash can, and when she turned away to talk to her boyfriend, R.K., she overhead Bringas ask W if he wanted to "buy a dime," but W stated he didn't have any money. Soon after, she noticed Bringas and W shoving one another. According to Prescott, she saw Bringas grab a shiny object from his backpack before chasing W and stabbing him. Bringas began to walk back toward the dumpster when Prescott pointed Bringas out to R.K., who tackled Bringas and the two began to fight. R.K. testified the two stopped fighting when R.K. realized Bringas had a "shining object in his hand[.]" While R.K. retreated, Bringas ran in the opposite direction. R.K. saw C.U. and pointed Bringas out to C.U., and the two began to fight. R.K. testified that C.U. hit Bringas with an unidentified object, causing Bringas to fall to the ground, but C.U. testified that he could not remember whether he had used an object to strike Bringas. Shortly after C.U. and Bringas began fighting, C.U. felt blood rushing from a slit in his shorts; he realized he had been stabbed and ran away from Bringas. C.U. was unsure whether Bringas was following him. R.K. testified that he and another friend followed Bringas, but could not catch him. They retreated after Bringas exited the Kuhio Park Terrace area.
Following the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury as to the elements of murder in the second degree, stating that "if and only if you find the defendant not guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, or you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict ... then you must consider whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty" of the lesser included offenses: manslaughter, followed by assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and assault in the third degree. The jury was further instructed that, if assault in the third degree was proven, it was to "consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered in to by mutual consent[.]"
The court then read the mutual consent interrogatory to the jury as follows:
In Count [I] of the indictment, if you find that the prosecution has proven the offense of Assault in the Third Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must also consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered into by mutual consent, whether expressly or by conduct.
You must determine whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent. This determination must be unanimous and is to be indicated by answering "yes" or "no" on a special interrogatory that will be provided to you.
The verdict form for the first count consisted of six options: not guilty, guilty of murder in the second degree, guilty of manslaughter, guilty of assault in the first degree, guilty of assault in the second degree, and guilty of assault in the third degree. It also included the special interrogatory about mutual affray. The jury returned the verdict form marked as follows:
As to Count I:
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant not guilty.
_ X _ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty as charged of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Manslaughter.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the First Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the Second Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the Third Degree.
SPECIAL INTEROGATORY
Question:
Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent? (Your answer to this question must be unanimous.)
Answer:
Yes ___ No _ X _
As to Count II, which is not at issue here, the jury also answered the special interrogatory, marking "X" on the line next to "yes" even though it had not found Bringas guilty of assault in the third degree. The verdict form was returned as follows:
As to Count II:
_ X _ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant not guilty.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty as charged of the offense of Assault in the Second Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the Third Degree.
SPECIAL INTEROGATORY
Question:
Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent? (Your answer to this question must be unanimous.)
Answer:
Yes _ X _ No ___
The clerk read the jury verdict forms for each count without any reference to the jury's answers to the special interrogatory questions on each verdict form. Bringas was found guilty of murder in the second degree in Count I, and acquitted of all offenses in Count II.
We note that the better course would have been to inform counsel immediately of the jury's answers to the special interrogatory.
After reading the verdict forms, the court asked defense counsel if there was a request for a poll of the jury; defense counsel replied that there was not. The jury was excused to return to the jury deliberation room thereafter.
It appears defense counsel was not aware of the discrepancy between the finding of guilt and the answer to the mutual consent special interrogatory at that time.
Shortly after, the court noted to both parties that on the verdict form for Count I, the jury "convict[ed] the defendant of Murder in the Second Degree but also answered special interrogatory that is normally reserved for the Assault 3, Mutual Affray instruction[.]" The circuit court proposed that the jury return the following Tuesday to "give Court and counsel some time to research what, if anything, can be done at this point in time." The State indicated it was "fine" with that proposal, and Bringas's counsel likewise said he would "defer to the Court on how the Court wants to handle it," albeit noting that interviewing the jury could be "very messy[.]" However, after an off-the-record discussion, the circuit court decided to "reverse [its] previous order" for the jury to return the following Tuesday, and excused the jury. The circuit court asked the parties if there was "anything [they] want[ed] to place on the record" before adjourning, and counsel for Bringas stated there was "nothing."
Bringas filed a motion for a new trial contending that "the jury was ... confused and did not fully understand the jury instructions," as demonstrated by their answer to the special interrogatory. He argued that a new trial was "required in the interest of justice under [Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] Rule 33[ ] given the overwhelmingly apparent confusion and misunderstanding regarding the instructions and verdict forms" and that "the verdict appear[ed] to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury, under HRS § 635-56."
HRPP Rule 33 (2012) provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interests of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury, the court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period. The finding of guilty may be entered in writing or orally on the record.
HRS § 635-56 (2016) provides:
In any civil case or in any criminal case wherein a verdict of guilty has been rendered, the court may set aside the verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury; or the court may in any civil or criminal case grant a new trial for any legal cause.
After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court concluded that "a new trial [was] not required in the interest of justice and ... accordingly and respectfully [denied Bringas's] motion for new trial." The circuit court entered judgment against Bringas for murder in the second degree and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of life with the possibility of parole.
Bringas appealed his conviction to the ICA arguing, as relevant here, that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to resolve the jury's inconsistent verdicts prior to having them read in open court, erred in choosing which part of the verdict forms to read and which to omit, and abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New Trial."
The ICA affirmed Bringas's conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Bringas's motion for a new trial. Although the ICA recognized that "the jury did not follow the Circuit Court's instruction to answer the special interrogatory question only if it did not reach a verdict on a greater offense," it nonetheless concluded that "the superfluous answering of the special interrogatory did not undermine or cast any doubt upon the jury's verdict, much less create an irreconcilable inconsistency with the jury's verdict that Bringas was guilty of Murder Second."
Bringas filed an application for writ of certiorari with this court, presenting the following three-part question for our review:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in (1) affirming the circuit court's failure to resolve the jury's inconsistent verdicts prior to having them read in open court; (2) concluding the circuit court did not err in choosing which part of the verdict forms to read and which to omit; and (3) holding
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bringas's motion for a new trial.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a general matter, the granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ... The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.
State v. Stone, 147 Hawai‘i 255, 270, 465 P.3d 702, 717 (2020) (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Bringas challenges the circuit court's reading of the verdicts without first addressing the jury's mistake in answering the special interrogatory. Bringas argues that once the court became aware of the "obvious inconsistencies" in the verdicts, "it should have halted the reading, made counsel aware of the problem and/or sought supplemental briefing on resolutions to the problem. The court should then have reinstructed or otherwise clarified with the jury the meaning of their verdict choices." This error, Bringas contends, warranted a new trial because the jury's verdict in Count I was irreconcilable and the judge had dismissed the jury. For the following reasons, Bringas's arguments lack merit.
A. The Circuit Court Was Not Required to Reconvene the Jury to Address or Resolve Its Inconsistent Verdict
Bringas contends that the circuit court failed to follow "procedure[ ]" by discharging the jury without first having them resolve or address the obvious inconsistencies with their verdict. Bringas does not argue that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, but instead asserts that the circuit court erred in "completely failing to address" the jury's answer to the special interrogatory despite concluding that Bringas was guilty of murder in the second degree. In support of this contention, Bringas cites Dias v. Vanek, 67 Haw. 114, 679 P.2d 133 (1984).
Dias involved the purchase of real property. Shortly after moving in, the buyers discovered extensive termite damage in the master bedroom that was not immediately visible because the damaged wall had been covered with wallpaper. Dias, 67 Haw. at 115-16, 679 P.2d at 134. The buyers sued the sellers for recission of the purchase contract and the refund of all sums paid, including a $20,000 down payment, and the sellers counterclaimed for breach of contract. Id. at 116, 679 P.2d at 135. After trial, a jury concluded that the inspector's negligent inspection and the sellers’ concealment of the damaged wall resulted in $16,850.56 in damages to the buyers for a post-purchase inspection and fumigation costs. Id. However, the jury also awarded the sellers $6,263 in damages for breach of the sale agreement; the verdict was ambiguous as to whether this award was in addition to or in lieu of the $20,000 down payment. Id. The circuit court, upon motion by the buyers for the return of their down payment, and after the jury had already been discharged, concluded that the sellers were entitled to retain the down payment, in addition to the $6,263 damages awarded by the jury. Id. This court reversed, recognizing that the "[d]etermination of the proper amount of damages ... is within the exclusive province of the jury," and "when the pertinent instruction is read in conjunction with the verdict form, it appears that the jury may have intended that the damages of $6,263 were inclusive rather than exclusive of the $20,000 down payment." Id. at 117-18, 679 P.2d at 135-36 (citation omitted).
Dias is distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, the jury instructions in Dias were themselves ambiguous. Regardless of the amount awarded by the jury to the sellers, it would have remained unclear, partly due to the court's instructions to the jury, whether the jury intended for the award to include the $20,000 down payment. Additionally, the jury's verdict was consistent with the court's instructions despite failing to clearly resolve a crucial factual issue that remained "within the exclusive province of the jury[.]" Id. Thus, whether the jury intended for the sellers’ damages award to be inclusive of the $20,000 award was unclear, and the court invaded the province of the jury by amending the damages award to reflect a verdict that was not clearly what the jury intended. By contrast, here, the jury's verdict clearly evinces the jury's intent to find Bringas guilty of second-degree murder. And the jury's answer to the special interrogatory – although contrary to the circuit court's instructions – does not make the intent to find Bringas guilty of second-degree murder for the stabbing of W ambiguous or unclear.
Additionally, Bringas cites to this court's language in Dias that the "remedy of an ambiguous verdict is to have the jurors return to clarify the verdict," and when "the jury ha[s] been discharged ... the only available remedy is a remand for a new trial[.]" Dias, 67 Haw. at 118, 679 P.2d at 136. As such, Bringas argues that Dias provides a specific "procedure[ ]" that a circuit court should follow when presented with an ambiguous jury verdict. However, the verdict here is not ambiguous – the jury clearly found Bringas guilty of second-degree murder for the stabbing of W. Moreover, while Bringas is correct that we explained in Dias that the "preferred remedy" is to have the jury reconvene to clarify its verdict, we also concluded that the court "may ... amend a jury verdict when the intention of the jury is clear." Id. at 117, 679 P.2d at 135 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court not to reconvene the jury to address its verdict finding Bringas guilty of second-degree murder and subsequently answering the special interrogatory on mutual affray.
In addition to Dias, Bringas also cites Kanahele v. Han, 125 Hawai‘i 446, 263 P.3d 726 (2011), in support of his argument that the circuit court is required to reconvene the jury when confronted with an allegedly-inconsistent verdict. However, in relying on Kanahele, Bringas conflates a verdict that is improper as a matter of law with one that is contrary to the circuit court's instructions, but nonetheless remains reconcilable. In Kanahele, a personal injury case, this court concluded that the jury's verdict awarding damages in the amount of $1 in general damages but special damages of $12,280.41 was improper and remanded for a new trial on damages. 125 Hawai‘i at 457, 263 P.3d at 737. This court explained that "it is well established" that a jury verdict that awards special damages but not general damages is "improper," and thus we "invalidated" the jury's verdict, concluding that a general damages award of $1 was the legal equivalent of awarding no general damages. Id. at 456-457, 263 P.3d at 736-37 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The circuit court in Kanahele thus erred in entering the jury's verdict because the awarded remedy was improper as a matter of law. In contrast, Bringas's verdict reflected that the jury did not follow the circuit court's instructions regarding when to answer the special interrogatory on mutual affray, but the jury's failure to follow the instructions did not render its verdict improper as a matter of law. The answer to the special interrogatory does not conflict with or disprove any element of murder in the second degree as mutual affray is not a defense to murder in the second degree.
Thus, the circuit court's decision not to address the jury's mistake in answering the special interrogatory despite finding Bringas guilty of second-degree murder was not an abuse of discretion, nor was it a departure from prescribed or mandatory procedure.
B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Bringas's Motion for A New Trial
Bringas contends that "a new trial should have been granted ‘in the interest of justice’ " and points to HRS § 635-56 and HRPP Rule 33 in support of this argument. HRS § 635-56 states:
In any civil case or in any criminal case wherein a verdict of guilty has been rendered, the court may set aside the verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury; or the court may in any civil or
criminal case grant a new trial for any legal cause.
(Emphasis added.)
Since the verdict "reflected a misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury," Bringas argues the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. However, that the jury misunderstood the court's instructions does not mean that the verdict must be set aside. The jury returned a reconcilable verdict reflecting a theory of the case that the evidence at trial supported, and we therefore affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial.
1. Before Vacating a Criminal Conviction, the Court Must First Search for a Reasonable Way to Reconcile Any Inconsistencies in the Verdict
As a preliminary matter, we address Bringas's contention that the jury verdict was "irreconcilably inconsistent." This standard comes from Carr v. Strode, in which this court held, "A conflict in the jury's answers to questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory." 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, the court must first "search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort" before it vacates the jury's verdict and remands the case for a new trial. Id. (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 828 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
A "special verdict," which was at issue in Carr, is distinct from a "special interrogatory," at issue here. A "special verdict" is "[a] verdict in which the jury makes findings only on factual issues submitted to them by the judge, who then decides the legal effect of the verdict." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A "special interrogatory" is "[a] written jury question whose answer is required to supplement a general verdict." Id. The mutual affray defense question to the jury was required to supplement the jury's general verdict of guilty on third-degree assault, were it to reach that verdict. Nonetheless, the test set forth in Carr applies to allegedly inconsistent special interrogatories, as well as special verdicts; the two are treated similarly in the law. See 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1526 (2020) ("The findings in special verdicts and special interrogatories submitted with a general verdict cannot be internally inconsistent. However, a verdict will not be considered irreconcilably inconsistent if supported by any reasonable hypothesis. A jury's special findings are inconsistent with a general verdict only where they are clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict when, as a matter of law, the special finding when taken by itself would authorize a judgment different from that which the general verdict will permit." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)).
Bringas argues – for the first time during oral argument – that Miyamoto v. Lum, 104 Hawai‘i 1, 7, 84 P.3d 509, 515 (2004), not Carr, sets the appropriate standard for courts to review jury verdicts. However, this misconstrues the holding of Miyamoto. In Miyamoto, this court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petitioner's motion for a new trial because "our review of the record indicate[d] that the jury instructions conflicted with the instructions on the special verdict form and misled the jury." Id. at 9, 84 P.3d at 517. The jury in Miyamoto concluded that defendant Kenneth Lum's negligence was not the legal cause of plaintiff Nobuo Miyamoto’s injury. Id. at 6, 84 P.3d at 514. However, the jury nonetheless awarded Miyamoto general and special damages totaling $18,446. Id. This court held:
Although Bringas cited to Carr as supporting authority in his opening brief filed in the ICA, he concedes in his certiorari application that Carr does not support the conclusion Bringas asks us to reach today. Instead, in his application Bringas argues that this court should rely on, inter alia, Dias v. Vanek, 67 Haw. 114, 679 P.2d 133 (1984), and Kanahele v. Han, 125 Hawai‘i 446, 263 P.3d 726 (2011). However, as discussed in the previous section, those cases are distinguishable.
[I]f the answers to Question 6 and 8 are ignored, we are left with a verdict finding that Lum's actions were not the legal cause of Nobuo's injuries; thus, Lum would prevail. However, if the answer to Question 1 is ignored, we are left with a verdict finding that Lum's actions contributed twenty-five percent to Nobuo's "present condition," amounting to $18,446 in damages; thus, Nobuo would prevail. Inasmuch as ignoring the answer to Question 1 "requires the entry of a judgment different
from that which the court has entered" ... the verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent.
Id. at 9, 84 P.3d at 517.
The Miyamoto court carefully scrutinized the verdicts and concluded that there was no reasonable way to reconcile them. Miyamoto’s holding is thus consistent with the mandate in Carr that the court is bound to search for a reasonable way to reconcile the verdicts before vacating a conviction on that ground.
Although Miyamoto and Carr are civil cases, the principle that appellate courts should attempt to first reconcile seemingly-inconsistent verdicts before vacatur finds broad support in the criminal context. E.g., State v. Holmes, 106 Wash.App. 775, 24 P.3d 1118, 1121-22 (2001) (concluding that a general verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree robbery under the statutory alternative of being armed with a deadly weapon was not irreconcilably inconsistent with a special verdict rejecting a sentencing enhancement for being armed with a deadly weapon); State v. Connolly, 518 A.2d 458, 459 (Me. 1986) (disagreeing with the defendant's contention that "the verdicts are irreconcilably inconsistent" because she was charged with two counts of drug trafficking, but only found guilty of one count); State v. McClary, 679 N.W.2d 455, 461 (N.D. 2004) (asking whether allegedly-inconsistent verdicts can be "rationally reconciled"); State v. Lopez, 126 Idaho 831, 892 P.2d 898, 902 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he threshold question in this case is whether the verdicts are reconcilable on a rational basis[.]" (citation omitted)); United States v. Pierce, 940 F.3d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that courts of appeal should first "attempt to harmonize" a jury's verdict of guilt that directly conflicts with answers to special interrogatories, so as to find a "fair reading" that renders the verdicts "consistent" (citations omitted)); United States v. McBride, 962 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that a verdict and special interrogatory were not "irreconcilably inconsistent" because "[i]t is possible to give effect to both the ‘guilty’ verdict and the answer to the special interrogatory").
We agree that requiring appellate courts to first attempt to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict is appropriate. Moreover, a reviewing court advances important public policy considerations when it attempts to preserve a jury's seemingly inconsistent verdict before vacatur. "Public policy demands that the sanctity of jury deliberations be vigorously guarded to ensure frankness and open discussion. The purpose for providing secret deliberations is to ensure the impartiality of the jury." Oahu Publ'ns, Inc. v. Ahn, 133 Hawai‘i 482, 498-99, 331 P.3d 460, 476-77 (2014) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). Accordingly, the jury trial process is structured so as to preserve the integrity of jury deliberations. Cf. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 823 ("Courts have always resisted inquiry into a jury's thought processes." (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) )). The requirement that an appellate court search for any reasonable way to reconcile a jury's verdicts serves to avoid speculation into the jury's confidential deliberations and to safeguard the result of those deliberations, if at all possible. Indeed, in protecting the sanctity of a jury's verdict, other courts – including the United States Supreme Court – take a more restrictive approach and will not consider an appeal of a jury's verdict solely because of alleged inconsistencies. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) ("Consistency in the verdict is not necessary."); see also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345, 102 S.Ct. 460, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) (recognizing that "[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside." (citations omitted)); Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010) ("Jury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable."). We do not endorse the view that inconsistent verdicts are per se unreviewable. Rather, a court tasked with determining the effect of an inconsistent verdict should "attempt to harmonize" the inconsistencies in the verdict so that they are reconcilable. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 821. However, we point to Dunn and similar cases to highlight the sanctity with which a jury verdict is treated in American law, and appellate courts’ general unwillingness to speculate as to the jurors’ thought processes. Consistent with these principles, our rule respects the jury's verdict when possible, which can be done when the record supports a reasonable way to harmonize seemingly-inconsistent verdicts.
The dissents instead would conclude that "[a] verdict in a criminal case should be certain and devoid of ambiguity." Wilson, J., Dissent at 149 Hawai‘i at 456, 494 P.3d at 1189 (citing Yeager v. People, 170 Colo. 405, 462 P.2d 487, 489 (1969) ); see also McKenna, J., Dissent at 149 Hawai‘i at 446–47, 494 P.3d at 1179–80. Respectfully, the dissents misconstrue the language in Yeager, which is not in conflict with this opinion. In Yeager, the defendant was charged with, relevant here, the unlawful sale of narcotics "with the intent to induce and aid another to unlawfully use and possess narcotic drugs[.]" Id. at 487. However, the jury "declined to sign either of the [verdict] forms provided by the court, and proceed[ed] to" prepare and sign their own verdict form which stated: "We, the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do upon our oaths, find the defendant guilty of unlawfully and feloniously selling a narcotic drug as charged in the first count[.]" Id. at 488. The Colorado Supreme Court vacated Yeager's conviction, concluding that "the verdict prepared ... by the jury relating to count one is at best, ... unclear as to whether the jury was finding that the defendant not only sold a narcotic drug but also possessed" intent to induce and aid another to unlawfully use and possess narcotics. Id. at 489. Thus, the jury's verdict was ambiguous, in that it "did not include all the essential elements of the offense charged." Id. at 488. But Colorado law is also clear that "consistency of verdicts is not required." People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 560 (Colo. 1995). In other words, verdicts may be devoid of ambiguity and nevertheless be inconsistent.
In fact, in Frye, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that the verdicts were irreconcilable but, adopting the federal rule, nonetheless allowed them to stand. 898 P.2d at 566 ("We reject such an implausible explanation and conclude that the verdicts are indeed inconsistent."); id. at 570 (upholding the inconsistent verdict). The court reasoned that "an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally will not undertake." Id. at 569 (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 66, 105 S.Ct. 471 ) (quotation marks omitted).
In her dissent, Justice McKenna additionally cites Barnhill v. State, 41 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1949) and Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802, 68 N.W.2d 698 (1955). McKenna, J. Dissent at 149 Hawai‘i at 446–47, 494 P.3d at 1179–80. Respectfully, these cases are factually distinguishable and do not support as sweeping a rule as the dissent suggests. Barnhill involved the distinct question of whether, to convict a defendant of a repeat violation of a liquor law, the jury must explicitly find "the historical fact of the former conviction." 41 So.2d at 331. While the Florida Supreme Court held that an explicit finding was required, it further explained that "with respect to jury verdicts in criminal cases generally the rule appears to be that while a verdict must be certain and impart a definite meaning free from ambiguity, all fair intendments should be made to sustain it." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Florida Supreme Court recognized, as do we, that verdicts should be sustained when reasonably possible. Likewise, Hyslop involved a situation in which the jury returned a guilty verdict in open court, but the record contained a not-guilty verdict form that had been partially erased in an apparent attempt to "cancel" it. 68 N.W.2d at 702. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the guilty verdict, noting that "[a]ll presumptions exist in favor of the regularity and correctness of the orders and judgments of courts of general jurisdiction," and "[i]f, upon the whole record, so construed, it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury found the defendant ... guilty of the charge contained in the indictment, the verdict is sufficiently definite." Id. at 701-02 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, although Hyslop is factually distinguishable from the instant case, it recognizes that verdicts should be evaluated in light of the entire record before vacating them.
Here, Bringas's verdict in Count I was free and devoid of ambiguity – the verdict clearly conveys the jury's intention to convict Bringas of second-degree murder. That Bringas and W entered a scuffle by mutual affray does not negate any element of that offense.
We therefore conclude that Carr provides the correct standard, and the court is bound to "search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort" before granting a new trial. 79 Hawai‘i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 (citation omitted).
2. The Jury's Inconsistent Verdict is Reconcilable
Bringas argues that the ICA erred in concluding that the jury's inconsistent verdict in Count I was reconcilable. This argument is unpersuasive. Second-degree murder requires that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person." HRS § 707-701.5. Third-degree assault is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and the statute criminalizing third-degree assault includes the mitigating defense of "mutual affray," which reduces the offense to a petty misdemeanor: "Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor." HRS § 707-712(2). Mutual affray is not a defense to second-degree murder.
Prescott testified that she saw Bringas and W fist fighting, then watched Bringas grab a shiny object from his backpack as W was running away, chase after W, and stab him. Similarly, R.K. testified that he saw W and Bringas punching each other, then saw W run away from Bringas; he further testified that he noticed a shiny object in Bringas's hand. Given this testimony, the jury's finding of guilty on the second-degree murder count is consistent with its finding that the State did not disprove the mutual affray defense to third-degree assault. Prescott and R.K.’s testimonies support the conclusion that W and Bringas entered into the initial fight by mutual consent and that Bringas then chased after W and stabbed him, rendering Bringas guilty of second-degree murder. The jury's findings that there was a mutual affray and that Bringas subsequently committed second-degree murder were consistent, and the jury's verdicts are thus reconcilable.
Although the jury's verdict as to Count II are not challenged on appeal since Bringas was acquitted, those, too, reflect a similarly coherent view of the evidence. Prescott testified that just after the altercation between Bringas and W, she pointed out Bringas to C.U., W's brother, and C.U. grabbed Bringas. Prescott further testified that Bringas stabbed C.U. during the fight that ensued. Similarly, R.K. testified that he pointed out Bringas to C.U., saw C.U. hit Bringas with an object, and then saw the two of them fight before C.U. walked away; he later learned that C.U. had been stabbed. Thus, the evidence supported the jury's finding that the prosecution had disproved mutual affray with regard to C.U. Bringas did not mutually enter into the fight with C.U.; rather, C.U. grabbed him. However, the jury could have chosen to credit Bringas's contention that he stabbed C.U. in self-defense after C.U. grabbed him, and thus acquitted Bringas of second-degree assault with respect to C.U.
The jury could reasonably conclude both that there was a mutual affray and that the circumstances of the mutual affray were not such that Bringas could reasonably believe that deadly force was necessary to protect himself. Indeed, the text of the jury's verdicts indicates they concluded exactly that. Regardless of how the altercation between Bringas and W began, the jury's guilty verdict on second-degree murder supports the conclusion that the defendant used unjustifiable force to finish that altercation.
In his dissent, Justice Wilson suggests that answering the special interrogatory supports the idea "that the jury similarly misunderstood the self-defense instruction in Count 1 and mistakenly assumed self-defense would apply only if ... the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that W, not Bringas initiated the altercation." Wilson, J., Dissent at 149 Hawai‘i at 455, 494 P.3d at 1188. However, recognizing the "sanctity of jury deliberations," Oahu Publ'ns, Inc., 133 Hawai‘i at 498, 331 P.3d at 477, we resist "inquiry into [the] jury's thought processes" in reaching its verdict, Pierce, 940 F.3d at 823, and there is nothing in the record here to suggest the jury was confused about self-defense.
The Colorado Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in People v. Brooks. There, the jury found the defendant guilty of "menacing" – an element of which is the use of a deadly weapon – but returned a special interrogatory finding that the defendant "did not use, or threaten the use of, a deadly weapon" during the burglary for which he was also charged. 471 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Colo. App. 2020). These verdicts were reconcilable because, "[b]ased on the evidence at trial, the jury could well have determined that, though [the defendant] did not have a weapon when he entered the home, once inside he obtained the weapon from somewhere inside the home and then threatened the victim with it." Id. at 1176. Nothing about the jury's response to the special interrogatory "negate[d] any element of the offense of menacing." Id. at 1177.
United States v. Pierce is also instructive. There, the district court had set aside a guilty verdict for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute four types of narcotics and concluded that the conviction was inconsistent with the jury's findings on a special interrogatory form concerning the weight of the narcotics; the jury had marked that the government had "not proven" that the defendant "conspired to possess with intent to distribute" the four narcotics. Pierce, 940 F.3d at 819. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the verdicts were "metaphysically impossible to reconcile." Id. at 824 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the court recognized, "To enter a guilty verdict, the court would have needed to overlook the special verdict findings that [the defendant] did not conspire to distribute any of the drugs at issue in the case." Id. at 823 (quoting United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 2012) ). In other words, the special interrogatory was irreconcilable with the general verdict because it was impossible to "give[ ] full effect" to both. Shippley, 690 F.3d at 1195.
The general verdict and special interrogatory in this case do not present a "metaphysical impossib[ility]," Pierce, 940 F.3d at 824, but instead resemble the verdict at issue in Brooks. While the jury's finding that Bringas and W entered into a mutual affray would have reduced the third-degree assault charge to a petty misdemeanor, "the response to the special interrogatory regarding [mutual affray] did not negate any element of the offense of [second-degree murder]." Brooks, 471 P.3d at 1177. And because the evidence supports that the jury "could well have determined" that the confrontation began as mutual affray but ended in second-degree murder, it is possible to "give[ ] full effect" to both the special interrogatory and the general verdict based on the evidence in this case. Shippley, 690 F.3d at 1195. The verdict is not irreconcilably inconsistent.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the jury without first having them rectify the inconsistent jury verdict, or by denying Bringas's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the ICA's November 13, 2018 judgment on appeal is affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION OF McKENNA, J.
I respectfully dissent. By finding Bringas guilty of murder in the second degree, but by then answering a question it was to answer only if it found Bringas not guilty of the same offense, the jury delivered an ambiguous and inconsistent verdict.
The majority initially concedes that the verdict was inconsistent. See title of Section IV.A of the majority opinion, "The Circuit Court Was Not Required to Reconvene the Jury to Address or Resolve Its Inconsistent Verdict." It then analyzes two civil cases cited by Bringas, Dias v. Vanek, 67 Haw. 114, 679 P.2d 133 (1984), and Kanahele v. Han, 125 Hawai‘i 446, 263 P.3d 726 (2011). The majority then posits the Bringas verdict, which it earlier characterized as "inconsistent," is not "ambiguous," because "the jury clearly found Bringas guilty of second-degree murder for the stabbing of W." See majority opinion.
The majority also opines that pursuant to Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995), the court must first "search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort" before it vacates the jury's verdict and remands the case for a new trial. Id. (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 828 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
I believe it is inappropriate for the majority to apply opinions construing allegedly inconsistent or ambiguous verdicts in civil cases to verdicts in criminal cases. There are significant differences between civil and criminal cases. The standards of proof differ -- preponderance of the evidence compared to beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, in a criminal case, it is the government's burden to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a civil case, it might make sense for a court to attempt to "search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case." In a criminal case, however, it is not a court's function to search for a way to sustain a conviction; it is the government's function to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, I do not agree that our decision should be based on a civil rule that a jury's verdict will only be set aside if it is "irreconcilably inconsistent." Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503. Rather, our decision should be based on the rule applied by some courts that the verdict should be free from ambiguity and must be vacated if it does not convey the meaning and intention of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Yeager v. People, 170 Colo. 405, 462 P.2d 487, 489 (1969) (stating that a verdict in a criminal case should be certain and devoid of ambiguity and holding that if a verdict does not convey beyond a reasonable doubt the meaning and intention of the jury, it must be vacated); see also Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802, 68 N.W.2d 698, 702 (1955) (stating that the jury's verdict in a criminal case should be free from ambiguity in light of the whole record); Barnhill v. State, 41 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1949) (noting that the general rule in criminal cases is that a verdict must be certain and free from ambiguity). In this case, the verdict was not free from ambiguity and did not convey the meaning and intention of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority suggests that the verdict in this case is free from ambiguity and is reconcilable because the jury could have reasonably concluded both that there was a mutual affray and that the circumstances of the mutual affray were not such that Bringas could have reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to protect himself. This analysis, however, ignores the court's clear instruction to the jury that it was to consider mutual affray only if it found Bringas not guilty of murder in the second degree as well as its lesser-included offenses. Thus, the verdict is inconsistent and ambiguous, and it must be vacated because it does not convey beyond a reasonable doubt the meaning and intention of the jury.
DISSENTING OPINION BY WILSON, J.
Adrian-John C. Bringas ("Bringas") was convicted of murder in the second degree. The jury returned a verdict form indicating that Bringas was guilty as charged. However, the jury responded incorrectly to a special interrogatory question relating to the defense of mutual consent. The jury was properly instructed that they were to answer the special interrogatory question if and only if they found Bringas not guilty of murder in the second degree and other lesser included offenses, or if they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to these offenses and instead found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault in the third degree. Although the jury was instructed to consider the mutual affray instruction only if they found the defendant not guilty, the jury indicated on the jury verdict form that they found Bringas guilty of murder, and in violation of the court's instructions they answered the special interrogatory. Their answer stated that the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a fight between Bringas and the decedent was not entered into by mutual consent. Consistent with the jury's improper answer is its conclusion that Bringas did not cause the fight; a conclusion also consistent with his defense of self-defense.
Bringas moved for a new trial on the basis that the answer to the special interrogatory on the verdict form demonstrated that the jury had misunderstood their instructions; the Circuit Court of the First Circuit ("circuit court") denied his motion. The Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") affirmed Bringas’ conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying his new trial motion and that the answering of the special interrogatory was merely "surplusage[.]" State v. Bringas, No. CAAP-17-0000543, 2018 WL 4927734, at *9 (App. Oct. 11, 2018) (mem.).
By both finding Bringas guilty of the charge of murder in the second degree and answering a question that it was instructed to answer only if it found him not guilty of the same offense, the jury delivered an "irreconcilably inconsistent" verdict. Miyamoto v. Lum, 104 Hawai‘i 1, 8, 84 P.3d 509, 516 (2004) (quoting Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) ). Convictions supported by irreconcilable verdicts cannot stand. See Territory v. Thompson, 26 Haw. 181, 184 (1921).
I. BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2016, Bringas was charged by indictment in the circuit court with one count of murder in the second degree (Count 1), in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 707-701.5, and one count of assault in the second degree (Count 2), in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a), (b), and/or (d). As to the first count, the State alleged that Bringas intentionally or knowingly caused the death of W, a minor. As to the second count, the State alleged that Bringas intentionally or knowingly caused substantial injury to, recklessly caused substantial bodily injury to, and/or intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury with a dangerous instrument to C.U., the older brother of W.
HRS § 707-701.5 (2014) provided:
(1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656.
HRS § 707-711 (2014) provided in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if:
(a) The person intentionally or knowingly causes substantial bodily injury to another;
(b) The person recklessly causes serious or substantial bodily injury to another;
....
(d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument;
....
(2) Assault in the second degree is a class C felony.
At trial, the State and the defense presented evidence describing a series of altercations that occurred on or near Ahonui Street in Kalihi on April 12, 2016. It was undisputed that during these altercations, Bringas stabbed W in the chest, causing his death, and stabbed C.U. in the leg. The State argued that Bringas was the aggressor, while the defense argued that he acted in self-defense.
The Honorable Paul B.K. Wong presided.
Elaine Prescott, a family friend of C.U. and W, testified that around 10:00 p.m. on April 12, 2016, she saw W and Bringas talking behind a dumpster. When she turned around to talk to her boyfriend, R.K., she overhead Bringas ask W if W wanted to "buy a dime[,]"; W said he didn't have any money. When she turned back around, Bringas and W were fist fighting and shoving. She saw Bringas grab a "shining" object from his backpack, chase after W, and stab him. As Bringas was walking back toward the dumpster, Prescott pointed Bringas out to R.K., who then tackled Bringas, and the two of them fought. After R.K. and Bringas stopped fighting, Prescott and R.K. saw C.U. Prescott pointed out Bringas to C.U., while Bringas was trying to walk away, and told C.U. to grab him. C.U. and Bringas fought. During the fight, Bringas stabbed C.U. in his right leg. Prescott walked back to W, knelt next to him, and tried to limit the bleeding with his shirt.
R.K. testified that he was walking away from Prescott when he heard a commotion behind him; when he turned back around, he saw W and Bringas throwing punches at each other. Prescott pointed Bringas out to R.K. after W stopped fighting with Bringas and while Bringas was running away. R.K. then fought with Bringas but ran away when he saw a "shining" object in Bringas’ hand. He then pointed out Bringas to C.U., saw C.U. hit Bringas with an object, and then saw the two of them fight before C.U. walked away. He later found out that C.U. had been stabbed. When Bringas walked away from C.U., R.K. and another friend chased him down the street.
C.U. testified that he ran over to Prescott and R.K. when he heard a girl screaming, confronted Bringas, saw that Bringas had something in his hand, hit him, and then started fighting with him. When Bringas was on his knees after being hit, he grabbed C.U.’s left hand and stabbed him in the leg. After C.U. was stabbed, he tried to run away.
Three additional witnesses testified that they saw W lying on the ground; one said W was on his own at first, while the two others testified that they saw a girl next to W, either shouting or crying with his head in her lap. All three witnesses also testified that they saw Bringas being chased and attacked while trying to defend himself; one said Bringas was being chased by one male, while the two others said they saw him being chased by two males.
Two police officers testified about their interactions with Bringas following the altercations. Officer Scott Matsumura testified that he talked to Bringas while Bringas was sitting in the bed of a truck at a nearby gas station and bleeding from fresh wounds; Bringas seemed uncooperative and unhappy to see him. Officer Nicholas Schlapak ("Officer Schlapak") testified that he also talked to Bringas at the gas station, and that Bringas seemed uncooperative, but that Bringas had told him that he got "mobbed" and "robbed" of his wallet and his bag and that "[i]t was self-defense." Officer Schlapak also accompanied Bringas to the hospital, where he heard Bringas tell the nurses he had received his injuries from falling down. An emergency medicine physician, Dr. Gregory Suarez ("Dr. Suarez"), also testified that Bringas told him he had been attacked. Dr. Suarez described Bringas as generally being uncooperative at the hospital. Dr. Suarez received information from EMS staff that Bringas had been assaulted with an unknown sharp object and struck twice in the head.
Bringas testified in his own defense. He testified that the chain of his bike fell off when he was riding on Ahonui Street, so he stopped and attempted to fix it with a fixed blade knife he was carrying in his backpack. After he fixed his bike, W walked up to him, asked him what happened, and offered him some marijuana to smoke. W also offered to sell him some drugs, but Bringas declined. Prescott came up and smoked with W, which Bringas said "lightened the situation[.]" As Bringas started gathering up trash from his bag and from the repairs to his bike, W and Prescott walked away.
Bringas testified that after he walked over to a dumpster to deposit the trash, he was hit from behind and fell to the ground. He tried to run, but kept falling and getting punched, kicked, and stomped. Two men confronted him in the middle of the street, and came towards him with something in their hands. He pulled the knife he had been using to fix his bike out from his waistband and told them to get back. He saw Prescott holding his backpack with its contents on the ground, and assumed he was being robbed, so he told them they could take his bag but asked them to let him go. Bringas was hit and fell to the ground again.
Bringas testified that the two men hit him with something all over his body, and that he tried to block his head and flailed his knife around in an attempt to ward them off. He tried to run away but was pursued by two males, one of whom hit him with something; he was pinned to the ground and beaten again, and swung the knife again to get them off. He ran as fast as he could down three more streets and jumped into the bed of a truck which pulled into a gas station. Police officers arrived, and although he was happy to see them, Bringas testified that he wasn't cooperative because his mind was "scrambled," and he couldn't talk or speak. He told the officers that he had been mugged or robbed. An ambulance came and took him to the hospital, where he had difficulty talking and understanding what was going on.
Following the close of evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury. As to the first count of the indictment, the jury was instructed as to the elements of murder in the second degree and instructed that if and only if it found the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree, or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, it was to consider the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The jury was then instructed as to the elements of manslaughter. It was instructed that if and only if it found the defendant not guilty of manslaughter, or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, it was to consider the lesser included offense of assault in the first degree. The jury was similarly instructed with regard to the lesser included offenses of assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree. In other words, the jury was instructed to consider the offense of assault in the third degree if and only if it found Bringas not guilty of murder in the second degree, manslaughter, and the two greater assault offenses, or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on all the greater offenses. After being instructed as to the elements of assault in the third degree, the jury was instructed that, if assault in the third degree was proven, it was to "consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered into by mutual consent[.]" The court specifically read the mutual consent interrogatory to the jury as follows:
HRS § 707-712 (2014) provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the third degree if the person:
(a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person; or
(b) Negligently causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument.
(2) Assault in the third degree is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.
In Count 1 of the indictment, if you find that the prosecution has proven the offense of Assault in the Third Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must also consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered into by mutual consent, whether expressly or by conduct.
You must determine whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent. This determination must be unanimous and is to be indicated by answering "yes" or "no" on a special interrogatory that will be provided to you.
For the second count, the jury received instructions defining the elements of assault in the second degree and the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. As with the first count, the jury was again instructed that if the government proved assault in the third degree it was to "consider whether the fight or scuffle was entered into by mutual consent." Once again, the jury was advised that it would receive a special interrogatory asking it whether the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight was not entered into by mutual consent. The jury was also instructed that self-defense is a defense to the offenses of murder in the second degree, manslaughter, and all three assault offenses.
The verdict form for the first count consisted of six options--not guilty, guilty of murder in the second degree, guilty of manslaughter, guilty of assault in the first degree, guilty of assault in the second degree, and guilty of assault in the third degree--and one special interrogatory about mutual consent. The jury returned the verdict form with "x" marks indicating both that they found Bringas guilty of murder in the second degree and that the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight was not entered into by mutual consent. The verdict form for the first count read as follows:
As to Count I:
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant not guilty.
_ x _ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty as charged of Murder in the Second Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Manslaughter.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the First Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the Second Degree.
___ WE THE JURY in this case, find the Defendant guilty of the included offense of Assault in the Third Degree.
SPECIAL INTEROGATORY
Question:
Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight or scuffle was not entered into by mutual consent? (Your answer to this question must be unanimous.)
Answer:
Yes ___ No _ x _
On the verdict form for the second count, the jury indicated both that Bringas was not guilty of either assault in the second or third degree and that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight was not entered into by mutual consent.
The verdict forms were received by the clerk of the court from the jury foreperson. Before reading the verdict, the clerk turned to the judge and engaged in a conversation only heard by the judge. At that time the clerk informed the judge of the conflict between the finding of guilt and the answer to the interrogatory. The court did not inform the attorneys of the conflict and instead instructed the clerk to read the verdict. The clerk read the jury verdict forms for each count without any reference to the jury's answers to the special interrogatory questions on each verdict form. Bringas was found guilty of murder in the second degree in Count 1, and found not guilty of assault in the second degree and all other included offenses in Count 2:
We agree with the Majority that the better course would have been to inform counsel immediately of the conflict posed by the special interrogatory. Informed of the conflict, counsel would have been equipped to request further reading of the instructions and continued deliberations.
During the later hearing on Bringas’ motion for a new trial, defense counsel raised to the court his recollection that when the verdict was received and read, the court appeared to have been made aware of the jury's answering of the special interrogatory questions:
If I could recall, Your Honor, the chronology of events, the Court received a communication that the jury had reached a verdict. We convened, the foreperson was identified, the foreperson provided that the envelope with the verdict forms within it, the Court received it first. At that point in time the Court, I'm assuming, read the verdict and then handed it to the court clerk.
The court clerk then read the verdict and there was a pause. And I picked up on that pause and I was a little bit curious. I believe at that point in time the court clerk leaned over to Your Honor, I guess to inquire on what to do with that. Now, I wasn't privy to that conversation, that conversation was off the record, but I can only assume or imagine that the Court instructed the court clerk not to read that portion of the verdict form. And I'm just guessing so I don't know, Your Honor.
So the -- the court clerk went on to read the verdict and, again, the verdict that was read was simply what appeared, I guess, on the top boxes of both verdict forms. So that would be the second box on the Murder, which is the defendant is guilty as charged of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree and then the second verdict being the jury in this case finds the defendant not guilty. And neglected to read on both verdict forms the special interrogatory at the bottom.
Neither the court nor the State responded to or disputed this recollection.
THE COURT: Has the jury reached a verdict in this case?
THE FOREPERSON: It has.
THE COURT: Okay. And have the verdict forms been signed and dated?
THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: [Foreperson], can you please hand the verdict form in that folder to [the clerk] and you may be seated.
Will the clerk of the court please read the verdict of the jury.
THE CLERK: State of Hawaii, Circuit Court of the First Circuit, case number 1PC 161000617, State of Hawaii versus Adrian-John C. Bringas. Verdict.
"As to Count 1, we, the jury in this case, find the defendant guilty as charged of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree.
As to Count 2, we, the jury in this case, find the defendant not guilty.
Dated 2/17/17. Signed [Foreperson]," Your Honor.
After the reading of the verdict, the court asked defense counsel if there was a request for a poll of the jury; deprived of the knowledge of the failure of the jury to follow the court's instructions, defense counsel replied that there was not. The court then adjudged Bringas guilty of murder in the second degree as to the first count and not guilty as to the second count. The jury was excused to the jury deliberation room.
After a discussion about sentencing and a recess, the court went back on the record outside the presence of the jury. Pursuant to an off-record discussion, the court raised the fact that on the verdict form for the first count the jury had "convict[ed] the defendant of Murder in the Second Degree but also answered special interrogatory that is normally reserved for the Assault 3, Mutual Affray instruction[.]" The court proposed that the jury be ordered to return the following Tuesday to "give Court and counsel some time to research what, if anything, can be done at this point in time." Neither the State nor the defense objected to the court's proposal. Defense counsel did, however, note for the record that there had been a pause when the court clerk had read the verdict, that defense counsel had inquired about it with the court clerk, and that the clerk had informed him that "there was a sort of a peculiarity on the verdict form." The court responded to defense counsel by stating: "you were correct to do so [counsel]."
The jury returned to the courtroom and the court began discussing a time at which they would be able to return the following Tuesday. However, after going off the record during this scheduling discussion, the court announced that it was reversing its previous order for the jury to return the following Tuesday, and instead excused the jury. The State and the defense did not object to having the jury excused.
Bringas filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that "the jury was ... confused and did not fully understand the jury instructions[,]" as demonstrated by their answering of the special interrogatory. He argued that a new trial was "required in the interest of justice under [Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure ("HRPP")] Rule 33 given the overwhelmingly apparent confusion and misunderstanding regarding the instructions and verdict forms" and that "the verdict appear[ed] to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury, under HRS § 635-56."
HRPP Rule 33 (2012) provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial if required in the interests of justice. If trial was by the court without jury, the court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period. The finding of guilty may be entered in writing or orally on the record.
HRS § 635-56 (2016) provides:
In any civil case or in any criminal case wherein a verdict of guilty has been rendered, the court may set aside the verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bias, prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding of the charge of the court on the part of the jury; or the court may in any civil or criminal case grant a new trial for any legal cause.
The circuit court concluded that "a new trial [was] not required in the interest of justice and ... accordingly and respectfully [denied] [Bringas’] motion for new trial." The court entered judgment against Bringas for murder in the second degree and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of life with the possibility of parole.
Bringas appealed his conviction to the ICA. His first point of error on appeal was that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to resolve the jury's inconsistent verdicts prior to having them read in open court, erred in choosing which part of the verdict forms to read and which to omit, and abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New Trial."
The ICA affirmed Bringas’ conviction, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Bringas’ motion for a new trial. Bringas, 2018 WL 4927734, at *9. Although the ICA held that "the record is clear that the jury did not follow the Circuit Court's instruction to answer the special interrogatory question only if it did not reach a verdict on a greater offense[,]" id. at *6, it concluded that "the superfluous answering of the special interrogatory did not undermine or cast any doubt upon the jury's verdict, much less create an irreconcilable inconsistency with the jury's verdict that Bringas was guilty of Murder Second[,]" id. at *8. The ICA additionally held that "the unnecessary answering of the special interrogatory" was "surplusage that can be disregarded." Id. at *9.
Bringas filed an application for writ of certiorari with this court, presenting the following three-part question for our review:
Whether the ICA gravely erred in (1) affirming the circuit court's failure to resolve the jury's inconsistent verdicts prior
to having them read in open court; (2) concluding the circuit court did not err in choosing which part of the verdict forms to read and which to omit; and (3) holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bringas’ motion for a new trial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. It is well-established that an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.
State v. Austin, 143 Hawai‘i 18, 29, 422 P.3d 18, 29 (2018) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Jury's Inconsistent Verdicts Are Irreconcilable.
If the jury's responses on a verdict form are "fatally in conflict" in light of the entire verdict, then the verdict must be set aside. See Dunbar v. Thompson, 79 Hawai‘i 306, 312, 901 P.2d 1285, 1291 (App. 1995) (quoting Vieau v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 3 Haw. App. 492, 499, 653 P.2d 1161, 1166 (1982) ).
The Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i undertook an analysis of inconsistent verdicts among multiple defendants in Thompson, 26 Haw. at 184. In that case, Thompson and his three co-defendants were charged with larceny in the first degree arising from the theft of cattle. Id. at 181-82. The co-defendants were "jointly indicted and tried before the same jury, for the same offense" and the evidence was "identically the same against all[,]" id. at 184, yet the jury found Thompson guilty as charged and his co-defendants not guilty, id. at 182. The Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i reversed Thompson’s conviction, holding that the jury's verdicts were "neither responsive to the evidence, in accord with reason nor reconcilable with their oaths as jurymen," and that a jury could not "be permitted to make a difference in their cases by a purely arbitrary finding." Id. at 184. We have previously cited Thompson when considering inconsistent verdict arguments in both criminal and civil cases. See State v. Gager, 45 Haw. 478, 484, 370 P.2d 739, 743 (1962) ; Kapiolani Commercial Center v. A & S P'ship, 68 Haw. 580, 584, 723 P.2d 181, 184 (1986) ; see also Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts in a Federal Criminal Trial, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 999, 1002 n.18 (1960) (assuming, based on Thompson, that Hawai‘i would take the position that an inconsistency between an acquittal and a conviction in the trial of a single defendant on multiple counts would constitute reversible error).
Since Territory v. Thompson, our inconsistent verdict jurisprudence has developed mainly in the context of civil cases. In such cases, we have consistently held that "[a] conflict in the jury's answers to questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory." Miyamoto, 104 Hawai‘i at 8, 84 P.3d at 516 (quoting Carr, 79 Hawai‘i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 ). "The theory, however, must be supported by the trial court's instructions to the jury." Id. (quoting Carr, 79 Hawai‘i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 ). This requirement is consistent with the general rule that "juries are presumed to be reasonable and follow all of the trial court's instructions." Myers v. South Seas Corp., 76 Hawai‘i 161, 165, 871 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1994). "Answers to a special verdict ‘are to be construed in the context of the surrounding circumstances and in connection with the pleadings, instructions, and issues submitted.’ " Miyamoto, 104 Hawai‘i at 8, 84 P.3d at 516 (quoting Dunbar, 79 Hawai‘i at 312, 901 P.2d at 1291 ).
Before concluding that a verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent, "the court must search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort before it is free to dismiss the jury's verdict and remand the case for a new trial." Carr, 79 Hawai‘i at 489, 904 P.2d at 503 (quoting Toner v. Lederle Lab'ys, 828 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1987) ). However, if the court cannot arrive at a coherent reading of the verdict, "then the answers are fatally in conflict" and must be set aside. Dunbar, 79 Hawai‘i at 312, 901 P.2d at 1291 (quoting Vieau, 3 Haw. App. at 499, 653 P.2d at 1166 ). For example, in Myers, the jury was given an instruction that would not have permitted it to make a finding of negligence without a concurrent finding of legal cause. 76 Hawai‘i at 164, 871 P.2d at 1234. When the jury found that the defendant corporation was negligent, but not the legal cause of the decedent's injuries, this court held that it had "returned an irreconcilable verdict[.]" Id. Likewise, in Costales v. Rosete, the jury provided irreconcilably conflicting answers to special verdict questions where it answered them in a "mathematically inconsistent" manner, apportioning fault in one question differently than it divided up general damages in another. 133 Hawai‘i 453, 467, 331 P.3d 431, 445 (2014).
In the present case, had the jury properly followed its instructions, it would not have answered that it found Bringas guilty of murder in the second degree while also answering the special interrogatory question. Contrary to the Majority's holding, the jury's verdict as to the first count was irreconcilably inconsistent because it indicated that the jury made two entirely conflicting findings. The jury stated that it found Bringas guilty as charged of murder in the second degree. But, in conflict, it also answered the special interrogatory question, which it was instructed to do if and only if it found Bringas not guilty of murder in the second degree, or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to whether he was guilty of murder in the second degree. As noted, the jury could not consider whether Bringas engaged in a mutual affray unless it found him not guilty of murder in the second degree or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on that charge. It is impossible to reconcile the clear instruction that Bringas could only be found to have entered into a mutual affray if he were not guilty of murder with the jury's opposite conclusion that he did enter into a mutual affray but was nonetheless guilty of murder.
Whatever actually caused the jury to act as it did is irrelevant to our determination of this case. As the Supreme Court of Alaska held in the course of reversing a conviction based on inconsistent verdicts in a criminal trial:
[W]e can see no basis to assume ... that inconsistent verdicts are the product of a jury's disposition toward treating the accused leniently; nor can we see a basis for assuming that, in allowing inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal trials to stand, we run only "the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise." The truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any way of telling, how many inconsistent verdicts are attributable to leniency, to compromise, or, for that matter, to outright confusion on the part of the jury.
DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 377 (Ala. 1970) (quoting United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1967) ); see also Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619, 630 (2008).
Jury confusion and irreconcilable conflict as to the application of the mutual consent instruction also arose as to the assault in the second degree charge in Count 2. Again, the jury's answering of the special interrogatory in Count 2 was in conflict with the instruction that it should do so only if it found Bringas guilty of assault in the third degree. The jury acquitted Bringas of assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree, but nonetheless incorrectly answered the mutual consent special interrogatory. The jury answered that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Bringas had not entered into the fight or scuffle by mutual consent. In so doing the jury verdict supported the conclusion that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bringas did not initiate the fight; the fight was started by C.U., and Bringas acted in self-defense. Thus, the jury's verdict is consistent with the mistaken understanding that self-defense applied as a defense only if it was proven that Bringas did not start the altercation. Under this mistaken view, self-defense was not an applicable defense if Bringas consented to the fight.
In Count 1, the jury's answer to the mutual affray interrogatory found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bringas and W did not enter the altercation mutually. Thus, unlike Count 2, the jury concluded in Count 1 that Bringas was mutually responsible for the altercation that led to W's death. The conflict--between the jury's answering of the interrogatory and the court's instruction on mutual affray--in Count 2 supports the conclusion that the jury similarly misunderstood the self-defense instruction in Count 1 and mistakenly assumed self-defense would only apply if, as in Count 2, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that W, not Bringas initiated the altercation. In other words, the flawed application of the mutual consent instruction to the assault in the second degree charge in Count 2 is consistent with the jury's incorrect application of the mutual consent instruction to Bringas’ claim of self-defense in Count 1. Unlike Count 2, in Count 1 the jury found the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight was not entered into by mutual consent. It is consistent with the jury's incorrect application of the mutual affray instruction to Bringas’ claim of self-defense in Count 2, that the jury similarly improperly concluded it must reject Bringas’ self-defense claim to the second-degree murder charge in Count 1 because the fight with W was a mutual affray and thus not initiated solely by W. Underlying such a rejection of Bringas’ self-defense claim is the false assumption that self-defense cannot apply to a mutual affray. Had the jury correctly followed the jury instructions, it would have only considered the mutual consent interrogatory if it found Bringas guilty of assault in the third degree. No misunderstanding by the jury that self-defense was unavailable to Bringas if he entered into a mutual affray would have been possible. Therefore, the conflicts between the jury's verdict and its answers to the mutual affray special interrogatories evinces a violation of Bringas’ right to have the jury consider the self-defense instruction without regard to whether he entered into the fight by mutual consent.
In response to the Dissent's position that "the jury misunderstood the self-defense instruction and mistakenly assumed self-defense would only apply if, as in Count 2, the State had proven that Bringas had not consented to the fight[,]" the Majority states that "recognizing the ‘sanctity of jury deliberations,’ Oahu Publ'ns. Inc., 133 Hawai‘i at 498, 331 P.3d at 477, we resist ‘inquiry into [the] jury's thought processes’ in reaching its verdict, Pierce, 940 F.3d at 823, and there is nothing in the record here to suggest the jury was confused about self-defense." Majority at 149 Hawai‘i at 445, n.16, 494 P.3d at 1178, n.16. Respectfully, we do not need to "inquir[e] into [the] jury's thought processes" because the jury's conflicting actions (a failure to follow clear instructions), demonstrate that the jury misunderstood the self-defense instruction. Furthermore, if the conflicting responses of the jury are given their due, Bringas’ conviction for murder in the second degree and the response to the special interrogatory that could only be answered if the jury found him guilty of assault in the third degree cannot be reconciled.
The jury misapplied the mutual consent interrogatory by requiring Bringas to prove he did not enter into a mutual affray. Were the jury to properly apply the court's instruction, it would not have reached the mutual consent instruction in either Count 1 or Count 2 and therefore have properly understood that Bringas’ could succeed on his self-defense claim notwithstanding a finding that the fight was entered into by mutual consent.
The Majority finds no conflict between the verdicts. Majority at 149 Hawai‘i at 441, 494 P.3d at 1174. However, the decision of the jury to consider whether the fight occurred by mutual consent specifically conflicted with the instruction that it should only do so if Bringas was guilty of assault in the third degree. The Majority posits that the jury's mistaken application of the law was justified because the jury thought their duty was to determine whether the fight arose by mutual consent, regardless of whether the defendant was guilty of murder in the second degree or any of the lesser included offenses. But such a mistake by the jury demonstrates that the irreconcilable conflict may have prejudiced Bringas; the jury would have wrongly applied the law and deprived Bringas of his due process right to a proper application of both the self-defense instruction and the mutual consent special instruction. See Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 453, 848 P.2d 966, 972 (1993) (holding that "the right to a fair jury trial includes the right to have all charges clearly presented to the jury in order to obviate the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact[.]"). Briones also involved a conflict between a jury verdict (attempted first-degree murder) and the failure of the jury to follow jury instructions (that it should not find the defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder and guilty on Counts II and III, second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, respectively). Briones, 74 Haw. at 453, 848 P.2d at 972. The Majority declines to recognize the analogous conflict in the instant case between the verdict of second-degree murder and the jury's wrongful understanding of the mutual consent special interrogatory read to it by the court.
Thus, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Bringas’ motion for a new trial and subsequently convicting him of murder in the second degree. B. The Devoid of Ambiguity Standard Should Apply to Criminal Case Verdicts.
As noted, the standard applied in Hawai‘i to answers to jury interrogatories bearing ambiguity in criminal cases arose from the territorial court of Hawaii in 1921. Territory v. Thompson, 26 Haw. 181, 184 (1921). To receive a new trial, a defendant found guilty by a jury that responds with ambiguity to jury instructions must show that the answers were irreconcilably inconsistent and that there is no theory upon which the answers can be reconciled: "[a] conflict in the jury's answers to questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory." Miyamoto, 104 Hawai‘i at 8, 84 P.3d at 516.
Since Thompson, courts have examined the importance of protecting the accused's right to a guilty verdict devoid of ambiguity. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Yeager v. People, held that "[a] verdict in a criminal case should be certain and devoid of ambiguity." 170 Colo. 405, 462 P.2d 487, 489 (1969). In Yeager, the defendant was charged with the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug (cannabis) and the unlawful possession of cannabis. Id. After deliberation, the jury signed the guilty verdict form provided by the court for the second count (unlawful possession of cannabis). Id. However, for the first count (unlawful sale of a narcotic drug), the jury drafted and signed its own verdict form rather than signing one of the two forms provided by the court. Id. Before the Supreme Court of Colorado, the defendant argued that his conviction for the first count (unlawful sale of a narcotic drug) should be reversed because the jury's verdict form for the first count (unlawful sale of a narcotic drug) did not include the intent element for proving unlawful sale of a narcotic drug. Id. at 488.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the first count must be reversed because intent was required for count one unlawful sale of a narcotic drug, and "[t]he verdict prepared and returned by the jury relating to count one is at best, we believe, unclear as to whether the jury was finding that the defendant not only sold a narcotic drug but also possessed the particular specific intent above referred to." Id. (emphases added). Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that "[i]n any event, when the language of the verdict permits such uncertainty, defendant's conviction cannot be permitted to stand[,]" because "[a] verdict in a criminal case should be certain and devoid of ambiguity." Id. at 489. Other jurisdictions agree that, "[t]he enforcement of the criminal law and the liberty of the citizen-are worthy of exactitude." State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 47, 40 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1946) (emphasis added); see also State v. Douglas, 197 N.C.App. 215, 676 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2009) (stating that "[v]erdicts and judgments in criminal actions should be clear and free from ambiguity or uncertainty [because] enforcement of the criminal law and the liberty of the citizen demand exactitude.") (emphasis added).
The Majority contends that the Dissent "misconstrue[s] the [devoid of ambiguity] language" in Yeager. Majority at 149 Hawai‘i at 443–44, 494 P.3d at 1176–77. Respectfully, the Majority oversimplifies and misconstrues Yeager by concluding that "the jury's verdict was ambiguous, in that it ‘did not include all essential elements of the offense charged.’ " Majority at 149 Hawai‘i at 444, 494 P.3d at 1177. Contrary to the Majority's contention, the Yeager court's "devoid of ambiguity" analysis did not focus exclusively on the issue that the verdict "did not include all the essential elements of the offense charged." Rather, the Yeager court discussed the ambiguity of the jury's verdict phrase "as charged in the first count of the information" in relation to the intent element, as follows:
In this regard the Attorney General argues that the inclusion by the jury in their verdict of the phrase ‘as charged in the first count of the information’ means that the sale of the narcotic drug was determined by the jury to have been made in the manner described in count one. If that be the correct analysis of the situation, it is still a bit difficult to fathom why the jury nonetheless declined to sign the ‘guilty’ form of verdict given them by the court. That would have been the obvious thing to do if the jury had really been of the view that the defendant was guilty ‘as charged in the First Count of the Information.’ On the other hand, the defendant argues that the phrase ‘as charged in the First Count of the Information’ is subject to the interpretation that the jury was of the view, and mistakenly so, that the first count of the information merely charged the defendant with the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug, irrespective of the intent with which the sale was made. And indeed, it could very well be said that by its choice of words the jury did in fact intend to find the defendant guilty of merely selling a narcotic drug and by its purposeful omission declined to find that at the time of the sale he also intended to induce or aid another to use or possess the drug in question. In any event, when the language of the verdict permits such uncertainty, defendant's conviction cannot be permitted to stand.
Yeager, 462 P.2d at 489. As in Yeager, the verdict in this case "permits such uncertainty[,]" because the jury stated that it found Bringas guilty as charged of murder in the second degree but also answered the special interrogatory question, which it was instructed to do if and only if it found Bringas not guilty of murder in the second degree or if it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on those offenses, and the jury acquitted Bringas of assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree, but nonetheless incorrectly answered the mutual consent special interrogatory.
The Majority also states that "Colorado law is also clear that ‘consistency of verdicts is not required.’ " Majority at 149 Hawai‘i at 444, 494 P.3d at 1177 (citing People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 560 (Colo. 1995) ) (emphasis in original). Respectfully, the Colorado Supreme Court limited its holding in Frye to "circumstances such as those presented here[.]" Frye, 898 P.2d at 571 (holding that "consistency in verdicts is unnecessary in circumstances such as those presented here[.]"). Based on the Court's language limiting application of Frye to "circumstances such as those presented here," the holding in Frye does not create a broad rule that verdicts may be inconsistent. We do not argue that all inconsistent verdicts are ambiguous. Rather, we contend that in this criminal case, the verdict was not "certain and devoid of ambiguity."
The "devoid of ambiguity" standard reflects a constitutionally grounded recognition that the deprivation of liberty at stake in a criminal case merits a higher standard of protection from an ambiguous jury verdict than in a civil case where a pecuniary interest is at stake. As Justice McKenna emphasizes in her dissent, the accused in a criminal case faces a loss of the fundamental right of liberty, as compared to pecuniary consequences posed by a civil case. Adoption of the "devoid of ambiguity" standard would permit retrial of ambiguous jury verdicts in criminal cases that would otherwise be without consequence under the standard applied by the territorial court of Hawai‘i in Thompson.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under either the "irreconcilable conflict" standard applied one hundred years ago in Thompson, or the "devoid of ambiguity" standard that evinces a greater concern for the liberty interest at stake in criminal cases, Bringas’ did not receive a fair trial. He should receive a new trial with answers to jury interrogatories that are devoid of ambiguity. The ICA's judgment on appeal and the judgment of the circuit court should be vacated, and this case should be remanded with instructions granting a new trial.