Opinion
I.D. No. 9906013775
Submitted: March 12, 2001
Decided: July 17, 2001
Upon the State's Appeal from Court of Common Pleas — REMANDED.
Allison Peters, Esquire, Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street, 7th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801. Deputy Attorney General for the State.
F. Phillip Renzulli, Esquire, 1020 N. King Street, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801. Attorney for Appellee-Defendant-below.
ORDER
This case is an object lesson as to why rules of procedure are important. After a bench trial in the Court of Common Pleas, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Before and during trial, Defendant did not challenge the traffic stop that precipitated his prosecution, except to mention it in passing in his closing argument. Nevertheless, after he was tried and convicted, Defendant filed post-trial motions challenging the traffic stop.
While his post-trial motions were pending, Defendant filed an appeal to this court. Instead of suspending further litigation in the Court of Common Pleas, Defendant and the State continued litigating Defendant's post-trial motions, even while the appeal was pending. And the Court of Common Pleas decided the post-trial motions in Defendant's favor. Defendant, understandably, then withdrew his appeal. Now, the State has perfected its appeal from the Court of Common Pleas' decision granting Defendant's post-trial motions and vacating Defendant's conviction.
The State now challenges the Court of Common Pleas' subject-matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the State challenges the timeliness of Defendant's de facto suppression motion, coming after the verdict. Finally, the State contends that the decision to suppress the fruits of the traffic stop was incorrect substantively.
I.
The first thing the court must do is address the case's procedural history. That requires the court to determine whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's post-trial motions, after Defendant appealed his conviction. If the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to consider the motions, then this court must decide whether the Court of Common Pleas was procedurally correct that Defendant's post-trial suppression motion was timely. If it comes down to it, the Court finally will decide whether the Court of Common Pleas' decision, which ultimately granted suppression in Defendant's favor, was substantively correct as a matter of law.
CCP Grim. R. 12(b): Pretrial motions. Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion . . . The following must be raised prior to trial . . . (3) Motions to suppress evidence.
II.
After a "general" police broadcast, Defendant, Frederick Bloomingdale, was stopped for driving under the influence on May 28, 1999. On October 13, 1999 he was charged with violating the DUI statute. On March 7, 2000, the Court of Common Pleas held a bench trial and found Defendant guilty. No suppression motion was filed before or during trial. Post-trial, on March 14, 2000, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay the Sentence, a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Acquittal, and a Motion for a New Trial. These are the motions that, in effect, challenge the traffic stop. On March 20, 2000, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. On July 7, 2000, the Court of Common Pleas vacated the guilty verdict, granted Defendant's suppression motion and dismissed the charges. The State appealed on December 20, 2000 under 10 Del. C. § 9902(c) and (d). Both sides have now submitted briefs.
III. A. The State
As mentioned, the State argues that the Court of Common Pleas acted outside its jurisdiction when it granted Defendant's post-trial motions after Defendant already had perfected his appeal in this court. The State also maintains that Defendant's post-trial motions filed with the Court of Common Pleas, are "in substance a Motion to Suppress evidence post trial." The State further argues that Defendant's "Motion to Suppress" is procedurally barred since the Defense "did not [after the officer's testimony] nor at any time before the close of evidence, notice, discuss or alert the court of a suppression issue or motion." Lastly, it contends that "Jones v. State does not bar the admission of the [officer's] testimony provided at trial."
Del. Supr., 745 A.2d 856 (1999).
B. Defendant
Defendant argues that the three motions were submitted to the Court of Common Pleas before Defendant filed his appeal to this court and they "toll the time for the filing of an appeal, thereby allowing the Court below to procedurally consider and dispose of the pending motions." Thus, Defendant maintains that the trial court acted within its discretion to consider the traffic stop when it did. Regarding the suppression motion's timeliness, Defendant contends that the issue "may be raised and considered at trial for cause shown under Rule 12(f)." Finally, Defendant alleges that the DUI stop was "unconstitutional under both Jones v. State and Florida v. J.L."
CCP Grim. R. 12(f).
120 S.Ct. 1375, 529 U.S. 266, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).
IV.
As presented, this case is a procedural maze. It involves post-trial motions and two appeals to this Court. The first appeal is Defendant's March 20, 2000 appeal of his conviction. The second is the State's December 20, 2000 appeal from the July 7, 2000 order suppressing the Defendant's DUI stop, vacating Defendant's conviction and acquitting him.As to Defendant's original appeal, the general rule in Delaware is that, "proper perfection of an appeal divests the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause of action." Although the rule allows "that in some instances the trial court may exercise its jurisdiction as to collateral or independent matters," that exception does not apply here. Usually, litigants may only litigate in one court at a time. Allowing trial and appellate courts to maintain concurrent jurisdiction over the same issues is inefficient and it invites confusion.
Raduiski for Taylor v. Delaware State Hospital, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 562, 567 (1988) (citing Eller v. State, Del. Supr., 531 A.2d 948, 950-951 (1987); Moore v. Moore, Del. Supr., 144 A.2d 765, 767 (1958); King v. Lank, Del. Super., 61 A.2d 402, 404 (1948)).
Id.
In his Order suppressing the State's evidence and vacating Defendant's guilty verdict, the trial judge states:
since the defendant on March 15, 2000 filed a motion for stay and a motion for a new trial, and such a motion tolls the time for the filing of an appeal, the Court may properly consider defendant's motion filed in connection with these proceedings. Normally, however, the filing of an appeal to the Superior Court would divest this Court of jurisdiction. However, in this instance since there was a pending motion for a new trial when the appeal was filed, this Court has jurisdiction to dispose of the pending motions.
Whether the filing of an appeal tolls the deadline has no bearing on whether the trial court loses jurisdiction when an appeal actually has been filed. The tolling provision is directed to the appellate court's jurisdiction. It does not give the trial court authority to consider a case that no longer is before it.
The reason why post-trial motion practice tolls the time for perfecting appeals is to help prevent what happened here. Having filed post-trial motions, Defendant did not need to protect his appellate rights further. The time for appealing was tolled. When Defendant unilaterally chose to take an appeal, he automatically abandoned his post-trial motions in favor of his appeal. To rule otherwise allows a system to exist where the appellate court cannot be assured that it is not wasting its resources or, worse, working at cross purposes.
On remand these issues are ripe. They have not been procedurally defaulted.
As stated above, Delaware law is clear regarding a trial court's jurisdiction after a perfected appeal. An appeal is perfected when noticed. Here, Defendant noticed his appeal to this Court on March 20, 2000. Therefore, on March 20, 2000, the Court of Common Pleas lost jurisdiction. The Court of Common Pleas' July 7, 2000 decision is out of order, literally, and the case must be remanded for reconsideration by the Court of Common Pleas.
See 4 G.J.S. § 395 (1993).
At first blush, remanding the case many seem pointless because the Court of Common Pleas has considered Defendant's motions and ruled on them. The remand, however, is not merely a formality. Based on how Defendant presented the suppression question and how the trial court considered it, it is not clear that the State had a fair opportunity to make a full factual record. Moreover, as noted below, the Court of Common Pleas may wish to reconsider its legal conclusions.
V.
Concerning the suppression motion's timeliness, it is difficult to understand why Defendant did not challenge his traffic stop before the State rested at trial, at the latest. Assuming that Defendant had no reason before trial to challenge the stop, after the arresting officer testified, Defendant surely knew that the stop was questionable. Allowing the trial court to announce a verdict before challenging the stop smacks of Defendant's maneuvering for advantage. Nevertheless, the trial court's willingness to consider suppression after the verdict is discretionary. Even though it invites mischief, the trial court's decision was not necessarily an abuse of discretion. On remand, the Court of Common Pleas may revisit this issue, or not.
See CCP Grim. R. 12(b).
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, this case is REMANDED. If the Court of Common Pleas continues to hold that the suppression question was not time barred, then the Court of Common Pleas shall give the State a formal opportunity to make a record and argue the issue fully. The remand gives the Court of Common Pleas the opportunity to revisit the stop. In its review, the Court of Common Pleas may consider State v. Boyea and State v. Lownes .
Vt. Supr., 765 A.2d 862 (2000) (Distinguishing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), DUI stop upheld where officer received general bulletin based on anonymous tip and without officer's corroborating "erratic driving.") See also State v. Melanson, N.H. Supr., 665 A.2d 338 (1995); State v. Tucker, Kan. Ct. App., 878 P.2d 855 (1994); State v. Markus, Iowa Ct. App., 478 N.W.2d 405, 408 (1991); People v. Rance, N.Y. App. Div., 644 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1996); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy. Utah App. Ct., 943 P.2d 231, 236 (1997).
S.D. Supr., 499 N.W.2d 896 (1993) (Affirming denial of motion to suppress because anonymous telephone tip provided "sufficient degree of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion for law enforcement to make a valid Terry stop.")
IT IS SO ORDERED.