Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0042
02-23-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Allan Lawrence Blazer, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Carr Law Office PLLC, Kingman By Sandra Carr Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015CR202000636 The Honorable Aaron Demke, Judge Pro Tempore The Honorable Douglas R. Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Carr Law Office PLLC, Kingman By Sandra Carr Counsel for Appellant
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Sklar and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, VICE CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Allan Blazer appeals from his conviction and sentence for trafficking in stolen property in the second degree. He asserts he was denied his right to self-representation and his right to a speedy trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Blazer. State v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, ¶ 2 (2022). In June 2020, the state charged Blazer with trafficking in stolen property in the first degree after he pawned a generator that had been stolen from a shed in Bullhead City. Approximately two years later, he was arrested in Colorado and returned to Arizona.
¶3 Following a two-day jury trial, Blazer was convicted of trafficking in stolen property in the second degree and sentenced to 6.5 years in prison. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Discussion
I. Self-Representation
¶4 Blazer argues the trial court committed structural error by denying his repeated requests to represent himself and "forc[ing] him to proceed to trial with an attorney that he did not want and with whom he substantially disagreed as to the defense strategy." We review the denial of a defendant's request for self-representation for an abuse of discretion, State v. Underwood, 255 Ariz. 86, ¶ 9 (App. 2023), assessing whether, when considering the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling, reasonable evidence supports it, State v. Ibeabuchi, 248 Ariz. 412, ¶ 15 (App. 2020). Wrongful denial of self-representation is structural error requiring reversal without a showing of prejudice. Underwood, 255 Ariz. 86, ¶ 9.
¶5 A criminal defendant has a fundamental, constitutional right to self-representation. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Such a defendant may proceed as a self-represented party if he makes a timely and unequivocal request to proceed pro se and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel. State v. Dunbar, 249 Ariz. 37, ¶¶ 11, 14 (App. 2020); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1(c). "[O]nce it is determined that a competent waiver has been made[,] it is not within the province of the trial judge to thrust counsel upon the defendant." Underwood, 255 Ariz. 86, ¶ 10 (first alteration added, second alteration in Underwood) (quoting State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 145 (1967)).
¶6 However, the right to self-representation exists "only so long as the defendant is able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol." State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, ¶ 8 (2012) (quoting State v. Whalen, 192 Ariz. 103, 106 (App. 1997)). Indeed, a trial court may terminate a defendant's self-representation if he "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. Serious and obstructionist misconduct occurs when a defendant "demonstrate[s] a contemptuous refusal to comply with court orders," "threaten[s] the dignity of the courtroom," or "def[ies] or undermine[s] the court's authority and ability to conduct the proceeding in an efficient and orderly manner." Underwood, 255 Ariz. 86, ¶ 13; see Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, ¶ 15; see also State v. Hidalgo, 241 Ariz. 543, ¶ 44 (2017) (court may revoke a defendant's self-representation if he "fails to comply with court rules or orders").
¶7 At Blazer's arraignment in March 2022, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Mr. Blazer. Are you All[a]n Lawrence Blazer?
MR. BLAZER: Are you addressing the- the debtor or the secured party creditor? My name is All[a]n, I'm the secured party creditor, third-party intervener in the matter, here over in the matter of title or over property to the person whose name you have listed on the charging instrument, but that name is not me.
I'm only here for a settlement and adjustment of the account.
THE COURT: This is CR-2020-636, in the matter of All[a]n Lawrence Blazer. You're saying-you're saying that's not you?
MR. BLAZER: I'm the secured party creditor in this case.
THE COURT: Stop telling me about that. Tell me what your name is.
MR. BLAZER: My name is my private property, my common law copyrighted property, and I don't give that private property away for financial gain.
The court asked Blazer whether he wanted to be represented by an attorney, and Blazer replied that he did not. The court subsequently appointed a public defender "on a provisional basis" until it could "go through the colloquy to decide whether or not [Blazer] waives his legal right to an attorney."
¶8 Later that month, at a pretrial conference, the trial court asked Blazer if he wanted "an attorney representing [him] in this matter." Blazer replied, "I am appearing in persona, in proprias persona in my sovereign capacity. I represent myself. I speak for myself." The court scheduled a hearing to determine whether Blazer could represent himself.
¶9 At the hearing, the trial court explained it would determine whether Blazer was "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving [his] right to be represented and whether [he was] competent to represent [him]self." The court asked Blazer for his age, and Blazer responded:
Let me begin by stating for the record that I appear before this court in propria[] persona. I appear by special appearance only in my private capacity. I'm a free sovereign man, and I do not consent to this hearing.
I do not consent to being illegally and unlawfully detained, incarcerated. I'm a sovereign political powerholder as decreed by
your-as lawfully decreed by your constitution, article 2, a constitution that is controlling over you.
¶10 When asked if he wanted to be represented by an attorney, Blazer responded, "Judge, I have no need to answer you in this matter. It's none of your business whether I want counsel or not. The reason is none of your business." Blazer further asserted, "I am not a person regulated by the state. I do not hold any position or office where I'm subject to the legislature. The state legislature does not dictate what I do." The court warned Blazer that if he wanted to represent himself, he would "need to answer the questions that [it] ask[ed him], and [he would] need to listen to the things that [it said] to [him]." Blazer again responded that he had "no need to answer" the court. As the court began to order hearing and trial dates, Blazer interrupted, reasserting his "sovereign" status. The court denied Blazer's request for self-representation based on his refusal to answer its questions and appointed an attorney to represent him.
¶11 Blazer's appointed attorney subsequently requested an examination pursuant to Rule 11.2(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., "to determine whether . . . Blazer is competent to stand trial and to investigate his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense(s)." The court granted the request. At the examination, Blazer refused to answer questions or otherwise participate. The examining psychologist concluded that, although there was "some evidence" that Blazer was competent to stand trial and aid in his own defense, he "would probably not do so willingly."
¶12 In June, Blazer asserted that he and his appointed attorney had "reached insurmountable differences" and requested that the trial court appoint a different attorney. At the hearing on Blazer's request, he asserted, "I've made it perfectly clear since the onset of this case that I appear in propria persona in my private capacity by special appearance only, and I represent myself. I don't need the Public Defender's Office to represent me." When the court attempted to clarify whether Blazer was asking for appointment of a new attorney or "simply to represent [him]self," Blazer responded, "I would ask the court to appoint an attorney as assistance of counsel, but I do represent myself. I appear in propria persona."
¶13 The trial court denied Blazer's request for a new attorney, reasoning that, although it was "pretty certain" there was some sort of conflict between Blazer and his appointed counsel, the same conflict was "likely to exist" if it were to appoint a new attorney. The court granted defense counsel's motion to set the case for a settlement conference, but the conference was ultimately vacated based on Blazer's unwillingness to cooperate.
¶14 Shortly before trial, Blazer indicated he wanted to fire his attorney and again asked the court to appoint new counsel. After a hearing, the court again denied Blazer's request, concluding, in part, that "a new attorney would likely have the same conflict." Blazer then apologized to the court for his previous behavior, stating it was "not [his] intention to dishonor [the] court." Blazer continued, "[A]s a secured party creditor and authorized representative of the defendant . . ., I accept all charges for value. I do not intend to argue the facts of this case, and I request that all bonds be released to me so that I may discharge these charges and set off this account." The court interpreted Blazer's statement as an expression of willingness to plead guilty and scheduled a status conference.
¶15 At the status conference, the trial court asked Blazer whether he wanted to plead guilty to the charged offense. Blazer asserted he was "asking for fees to be waived so that [he could] plead to the charge on behalf of the defendant as identified on the charging instrument." He continued, "[B]ut that's not me, and I do not intend to challenge the facts because I can't argue them, and the defendant is guilty, and I'm here for settlement and adjustment of the account." The court asked, "So you are not Allan Lawrence Blazer?" Blazer responded, "I'm the secured party creditor. I have evidence of my perfected registration in the form of a UCC-1 financing statement, a security agreement between the secured party and the debtor, power of attorney, common law copyright notice and a hold harmless and indemnity agreement." The court stated, "[W]e'll probably before we could do any sort of change of plea, have to have Mr. Blazer himself present in court," before discussing trial logistics. At the conclusion of the conference, Blazer stated he wanted to "personally serve the state" with "a conditional acceptance for value for request for proof of claim basically stating that [he] will accept all these charges." After the court responded that it was "not going to entertain that motion," Blazer stated, "This is not a motion, sir. This is just a conditional acceptance for value. Fucking kangaroo court." Appointed counsel subsequently represented Blazer at trial.
¶16 On appeal, Blazer asserts he was "capable of making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel," asserting he had been "well spoken" during court proceedings and had submitted pro se pleadings demonstrating he is capable of reading, writing, and citing procedural rules and caselaw. Further, he claims the state's notice regarding his prior convictions established he "had some familiarity with criminal proceedings."
¶17 Blazer also asserts his conduct "did not justify depriving him of his right to self-representation" because, at the self-representation hearing, he "politely waited until the court asked him a question" and made "clear statement[s] that he represented himself" as a sovereign citizen. Even if his conduct could be considered "serious and obstructionist misconduct," Blazer claims, the court failed to provide him with "clear and unambiguous warnings that continuing such behavior could result in the revocation of his right to proceed pro se." See Whalen, 192 Ariz. at 107-08.
¶18 The state responds that Blazer's "complete lack of willingness to participate in a Faretta colloquy," his "failure to state he wanted to represent himself at his hearing on self-representation," and his "deliberate uncooperative conduct with the court" resulted in forfeiture of his right to proceed pro se.
¶19 The trial court acted well within its discretion in not permitting Blazer to represent himself. Blazer's refusal to cooperate with the court and answer basic questions at the self-representation hearing- despite being warned that he needed to cooperate and being given multiple opportunities to do so-did not evince a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. See Dunbar, 249 Ariz. 37, ¶ 11; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
¶20 Additionally, Blazer argues the "arraignment court lacked authority to appoint counsel" for him over his objection, asserting the court failed to "inquire into the required factors" set forth in the comment to a previous version of Rule 6.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P., before finding him indigent and appointing representation. Specifically, he contends he "did not assert that he was indigent" and "did not complete Form 5(a)" as required for a finding of indigency. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.4, 41 (defendant shows indigency by completing "a financial resources form approved by the Supreme Court," such as Form 5(a)). We review a trial court's determination as to a defendant's indigency for an abuse of discretion. Tripati v. Tucker, 222 Ariz. 372, ¶ 3 (App. 2009).
¶21 Contrary to Blazer's assertion, after he was arrested in early 2022, he filled out and signed Form 5(a) averring he had no assets or monthly income and had $1,000 in monthly expenses. He also indicated he did not have, and did not plan to hire, an attorney to assist him. Additionally, in accompanying paperwork, Blazer indicated he was "homeless." On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in determining Blazer was indigent.
II. Speedy Trial
¶22 Blazer claims his right to a speedy trial under Rule 8.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P., was violated when he was not brought to trial within 150 days of his arraignment. He asserts he was prejudiced because the delay "facilitated the state in presenting a last-minute witness who undermined [his] defense." We will uphold a trial court's ruling concerning speedy trial rights "unless an appellant demonstrates that the court abused its discretion and that prejudice resulted." State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 136 (1997). "Whether a trial court abused its discretion and prejudice resulted depends upon the facts of each case." State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, ¶ 16 (App. 2007). Pursuant to Rule 8.2(a)(1), a defendant in custody must be tried "[n]o later than 150 days after arraignment." "[A] defendant may waive speedy trial rights by not objecting to the denial of speedy trial in a timely manner." Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 138.
Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial, see U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24, because Blazer's argument focuses solely on his right under Rule 8, we only address whether his state procedural right to a speedy trial was violated, see State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139 (1997) (Rule 8 speedy trial right is procedural and not fundamental); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim).
¶23 Blazer was arraigned on March 3, 2022. In April, the court set trial to begin on September 12. On June 8, Blazer asserted he did "not wish to waive his right to speedy trial" under Rule 8 in his motion "to dismiss ineffective assistance of counsel," a motion the court subsequently struck from the record. In August, defense counsel requested a four-week continuance to allow the parties to participate in a settlement conference, and the court continued the trial date to October 17. On September 22, after the settlement conference had been vacated, Blazer asserted the trial "ha[d] already been scheduled . . . well beyond [his] speedy trial deadline" and objected to any further continuances. Nevertheless, the court found that neither party was ready to proceed to trial on October 17 and continued the trial until October 31. Defense counsel did not object to the continuance and stated she had planned to ask for "at least a two-week delay." Trial subsequently began on October 31.
¶24 Even assuming Blazer timely asserted his right to a speedy trial under Rule 8 and has established on appeal that he was deprived of that right, he fails to show prejudice. Indeed, his only argument that he was prejudiced is directed at the state's use of the delay to secure additional witness testimony. That is not the type of prejudice required. Prejudice must be based on some way in which the delay hampered Blazer's defense, and he has made no such allegation. See State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 515 (1982) ("Appellant must show that he was prejudiced by being prevented from presenting some defense, rather than by the state's being allowed to make its case."); State v. Vaughan, 124 Ariz. 163, 164 (App. 1979) ("That he was subjected to enhanced punishment by delay that allowed the state to obtain material on his prior convictions is not the prejudice required."); Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, ¶ 16 ("A defendant who fails to establish that his defense was prejudiced . . . has not established prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of his conviction."). Blazer's argument fails.
Disposition
¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Blazer's conviction and sentence.