Opinion
2014 KA 0737
11-07-2014
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LEANDRE DWAYNE BELL
Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney Cristopher J.M. Casler, ADA Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Thibodaux, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Leandre Dwayne Bell
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 12-10-0057, SECTION I, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE ANTHONY MARABELLA, JUDGE Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney
Cristopher J.M. Casler, ADA
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Bertha M. Hillman
Thibodaux, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Leandre Dwayne Bell
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND WELCH, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFKMED.
KUHN, J.
The defendant, Leandre Dwayne Bell, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of second degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30.1, three counts of possession of a firearm and/or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, violations of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty on each count. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to appoint a sanity commission. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged on all counts. The trial court imposed sentences of life imprisonment at hard labor on both convictions of second degree murder, sentences of fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor on each of the three convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and a sentence of seventy-five years imprisonment at hard labor for the armed robbery conviction. The trial court ordered that all six sentences be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to appoint a sanity commission. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
July 27, 2010 Offenses
On July 27, 2010, Erika Turner (the first murder victim) was shot. That evening, Renard Smith and his son, Brandon Smith, were at their residence on Yorktown Drive in Baton Rouge when they heard gunshots and a woman yelling for help. They found Turner in a neighbor's front lawn as she collapsed. They called 911 and attempted to apply pressure to the victim's gunshot wounds while they waited for emergency assistance. Turner died the next day from the gunshot wounds. Jennifer Turner Howard, the victim's sister, testified that the victim was forty-four years old, mentally challenged, and lived at home with their disabled parents. Howard further testified that the victim was carrying a new purse when she left home and that she routinely walked to stores located on College Drive. The victim no longer had the purse when she collapsed after being shot. Witnesses observed a small, dark-colored vehicle with a curved roof fleeing the area at the time of the shooting. The police obtained surveillance footage from several businesses on College Drive between I-10 and Perkins Road. The footage from separate surveillance cameras at Circle K, where some of the employees knew the victim, included footage of the victim exiting from the rear of a dark blue, four-door Dodge Neon before entering the Circle K to purchase some items, as well as the victim getting back into the car after making her purchases.
Additionally, Farrenton Joshua testified that he and the defendant were riding down Washington Street on July 27, 2010, when Erika Turner (the victim), whom he had not previously met, asked for a ride. They stopped at the Circle K, and after the victim purchased some items, she gave Farrenton some money for gas. The victim gave Farrenton directions to an address, and when they arrived at the residence, she exited the car. Farrenton further testified that the defendant unexpectedly stepped out of the car after Turner, met her at the back of the vehicle, pulled out a revolver, and told her to give him her purse. The victim gave the defendant her purse before fleeing. The defendant followed her into a nearby yard. Farrenton heard the gunshots, saw the victim fall on the ground, and watched as the defendant continued to shoot her. The defendant got back in the car and they fled from the scene. Farrenton testified that he did not report the shooting because the defendant threatened him and he was afraid of the defendant.
September 4, 2010 Offenses
On September 4, 2010, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Corporal Jeremy Bourgeois of the Baton Rouge City Police Department (BRPD) was dispatched to the scene of an armed robbery at the LaQuinta Inn located on Acadian Thruway in Baton Rouge. When Corporal Bourgeois arrived at the scene, he interviewed Demarcus Collins (the armed robbery victim) and other potential witnesses. According to Collins' 911 call, his written statement, and his subsequent police interviews, he was robbed at gunpoint while attending a party at the LaQuinta Inn by two black males wearing white t-shirts. The perpetrators demanded that Collins empty his pockets and took the money that he had. One of the perpetrators' t-shirt was further described as having "Kool-aid stains." The get-away vehicle was described as a four-door, blue Dodge Neon with a dent on the right side. As Corporal Bourgeois was leaving the LaQuinta Inn, the BRPD sent out a dispatch at approximately 5:00 a.m. reporting shots being fired on West Roosevelt Street, and several police officers proceeded to that area.
BRPD patrol Officer Douglas Chutz was one of the officers who responded to the dispatch. He was nearby at the time and arrived at the scene of the West Roosevelt shooting within six minutes of the dispatch. Upon arrival, he found a deceased black male, who had been shot and was later identified as Christopher Domingue (the second murder victim), lying in the roadway near railroad tracks. There was a bicycle next to the body. As he began to secure the scene, Officer Chutz advised other responding units that he had observed a dark compact vehicle (like the LaQuinta Inn get-away vehicle) exiting a nearby apartment complex parking lot (approximately 100 to 150 yards from the body) at a high rate of speed with its wheels squealing and its headlights turned off.
The police located the blue Dodge Neon just after it had been parked, determined that the defendant (wearing a white t-shirt with large "Kool-Aid" or pink stains) and Farrenton Joshua were the occupants, and apprehended them from the residence on the corner of West Garfield and Indiana Streets. The police also recovered two firearms (a semi-automatic and a revolver with an empty notation) from a garbage can in the residence.
Later that day, Collins identified the defendant and Farrenton from a photographic lineup as the armed robbery perpetrators. State witness Shelsea Ashford also completed a photographic identification of the defendant and Farrenton. Ashford testified that while attending the party, Collins approached her and told her he had been robbed. Although Ashford testified that she did not see the robbery take place, she confirmed that she saw the defendant and Farrenton at the party.
Corporal Bourgeois testified that while at the scene, he noticed Collins seemed to have consumed alcohol, but was not intoxicated such that it prevented him from providing a clear account of the incident. Sergeant Tillmon Cox of the BRPD armed robbery division testified that Collins did not seem to be intoxicated at the time of the photographic lineup. During the trial, Collins testified that he could not recall the incident and that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time. Although Shelsea Ashford testified that she did not witness the robbery, according to Sergeant Cox, she told the police at the scene of the robbery that she saw the robbery take place and that she personally knew Farrenton. Collins' 911 call reporting the incident was played for the jury.
Farrenton testified that he left the LaQuinta Inn party and was waiting for the defendant in the car when he came out with a bag and the same revolver that he had used on July 27th. They drove to Farrenton's cousin's apartment on Roosevelt Street and began arguing outside in the complex. Farrenton observed the defendant angrily walk away toward the railroad tracks and subsequently heard gunshots. Farrenton testified that he thought the defendant was just shooting in the air until his cousin informed him that someone had fallen to the ground. When the defendant returned, Farrenton questioned him as to why he had shot the victim (later identified as Domingue). According to Farrenton, the defendant indicated that when the victim asked him where he could find some crack, he decided to "mess over" the victim. After the defendant shot the victim, he fell off the bicycle he was riding. As the defendant rummaged through the victim's pockets, the victim continued to move, so the defendant kept shooting him. The defendant followed Farrenton to his sister's car, and Farrenton took him to his grandmother's house where they were both apprehended by the police.
Niquel Joshua (Farrenton's sister and the defendant's cousin), who was the owner of the blue Dodge Neon, testified that she allowed her brother to use her car that day. She was at one of the apartments in the complex on Roosevelt Street when the defendant and Farrenton arrived, and she came outside after learning that the defendant and Farrenton were outside arguing. When she first observed them, they were on the basketball court arguing about the robbery and money. Niquel watched as the defendant "emptied the gun" into the victim, Domingue, before he and Farrenton left the scene of the shooting in her vehicle and went to her grandmother's house around the corner.
Defendant's pretrial statements and trial testimony
After his arrest, the defendant waived his rights and made a video-recorded statement wherein he confessed to the September 4, 2010 shooting and robberies, consistent with statements and trial testimony presented by the State witnesses. However, the defendant maintained that although he was the only one who shot Domingue (indicating that he shot the victim five times), both he and Farrenton searched through Domingue's pockets, and Farrenton had his gun out although he did not fire it. While incarcerated, the defendant gave another video-recorded interview wherein he confessed to the robbery and shooting of Turner on July 27, 2010. The defendant gave a description of Turner and indicated that before the attack, he and Farrenton sold her some crack cocaine, and she smoked it while with them.
At trial, the defendant denied killing Turner and stated that the police gave him all of the details about her murder before his second interview, which took place while he was incarcerated. He further testified that on September 4, 2010, he had been consuming alcohol, took ecstasy and Xanax, and passed out while in the car with Farrenton. He admitted to attending the party at the LaQuinta Inn, but denied committing or seeing the robbery. The defendant further testified that Farrenton woke him up at the railroad tracks on Roosevelt Street. He admitted to taking items from Domingue, but denied shooting him or having a gun at the time, claiming that Farrenton pulled a gun out on Domingue. He testified that he was still under the influence of drugs at the time of his arrest and police interview and that his confession was at the suggestion of the police.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to appoint a sanity commission. The defendant notes that he has a sixth grade education, is schizophrenic and bipolar, and that his attorney informed the trial court that his medical records indicate that his severe psychological issues could prevent him from understanding what happened to him. The defendant further contends that he did not understand the charges against him, could not remember what happened, and could not understand the information provided by his attorney.
A defendant lacks the mental capacity to proceed when, due to a mental disease or defect, he lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or assist in his defense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 641. Determining a defendant's mental competency to proceed depends on "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). The issue of mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; the burden lies with the defendant to establish that he lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and that he is unable to assist with his defense in a meaningful way. State v. Bickham, 404 So.2d 929, 934 (La. 1981). Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 642, when the question of the defendant's mental capacity is raised, "there shall be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, except the institution of prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to proceed." However, the fact that the defendant's capacity to proceed is called into question does not, for that reason alone, require the trial court to order a mental examination of the defendant; rather, it must have reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's capacity. La. C.Cr.P. art. 643; State v. Guidry, 449 So.2d 41, 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
In State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129, 1138 (La. 1977) (on rehearing), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth factors that the trial court must take into consideration when determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed. The decision as to a defendant's competency to stand trial should not turn solely upon whether he suffers from a mental disease or defect, but must be made with specific reference to the nature of the charge, the complexity of the case and the gravity of the decisions with which he is faced. Appropriate considerations in determining whether the accused is fully aware of the nature of the proceedings include: whether he understands the nature of the charge and can appreciate its seriousness; whether he understands what defenses are available; whether he can distinguish a guilty plea from a not guilty plea and understand the consequences of each; whether he has an awareness of his legal rights; and whether he understands the range of possible verdicts and the consequences of conviction. Facts to consider in determining an accused's ability to assist in his defense include: whether he is able to recall and relate facts pertaining to his actions and whereabouts at certain times; whether he is able to assist counsel in locating and examining relevant witnesses; whether he is able to maintain a consistent defense; whether he is able to listen to the testimony of witnesses and inform his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements; whether he has the ability to make simple decisions in response to well-explained alternatives; whether, if necessary to defense strategy, he is capable of testifying in his own defense; and to what extent, if any, his mental condition is apt to deteriorate under the stress of trial. In its determination of competency, the trial court may seek the opinion of medical experts, but the ultimate decision rests solely with the trial court. State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d 801, 805 (La. 1989).
Given the presumption of sanity under Louisiana law, the defense bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. State v. Rogers, 419 So.2d 840, 843 (La. 1982). Appointing a sanity commission is neither a perfunctory matter nor a ministerial duty of the trial court. The appointment of a sanity commission is not guaranteed to every accused. State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 892, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). The appointment of a sanity commission rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Guidry, 449 So.2d at 44.
During the pretrial police interviews, the defendant indicated that he knew how to read and write and provided lucid and very detailed accounts of the incidents in question. He further specifically stated that the police had treated him with respect. During the initial interview, which took place on September 4, 2010, after the defendant's arrest for the offenses committed on that date, the defendant provided specific details leading to Domingue's murder. The second interview took place on September 15, 2010, while the defendant was incarcerated. In that interview, the defendant provided a physical description of Turner and fully outlined the July incident from the point that he and Farrenton came into contact with Turner until the defendant shot her multiple times. After confessing in great detail, the defendant asked the police if they were going to arrest him. Thus, the defendant was able to recall and relate all of the facts pertaining to his actions on the two dates that the offenses were committed.
At the pretrial sanity hearing on October 18, 2011, the defendant was questioned by the trial court and specifically provided his date of birth, confirmed that he was aware of the charges, and specified that he was charged with second degree murder and armed robbery. However, the defendant stated that he could not remember what happened. The defendant's attorneys informed the court that the defendant had a mental illness, schizophrenia, and bipolar mood swings. They further indicated that they had not previously met with the defendant because he had been incarcerated in North Louisiana. The trial court concluded that there was no indication that the defendant was unable to assist the lawyers in his defense and denied the defendant's motion to appoint a sanity commission.
At trial on June 21, 2012, the defendant provided specific details on direct examination regarding his encounter with Domingue. Consistent with the trial testimony of other State witnesses, he recalled that a train was passing when he and Farrenton first approached Domingue, who was on a bicycle. The defendant further testified that Farrenton got out of the vehicle, and while the defendant was looking at his clothes that were in a bin in the back seat of the car, he saw Farrenton talking to "some man that was on a bicycle." The defendant further testified that Farrenton had his gun pointed towards the man and was telling him to "give it up, give it up." The defendant further testified that he then got out of the car and took "cigarettes and a lighter and things like that" from the man as he was being instructed by Farrenton. The defendant added, "But at the time I didn't know that, you know, someone was fixing to get shot or anything." During subsequent direct and cross-examination, he explained the discrepancies regarding his level of culpability between his trial testimony and pretrial interviews by noting that, at the time of the interviews, he believed and trusted the police officers when they told him they would help him. He further explained that he was aware of the officers' high ranks and their friendship with the chief of police. After the trial, another hearing on the matter took place when the defendant reurged his motion to appoint a sanity commission. At that point, the defendant stated that he could not recall the charges or why he was in jail and indicated that he was unable to understand some of the information provided by his attorney.
Our review of the record reveals that the defendant had the ability to comprehend and appreciate his rights, the capacity to understand the proceedings against him, and the ability to assist in his defense. The defendant provided specific details regarding the dates in question. During his trial testimony, the defendant minimized his participation in the offenses, but still had a clear understanding of the events and demonstrated an ability to understand the proceedings. The defendant failed to rebut the presumption of sanity and failed to establish his incapacity to stand trial by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to appoint a sanity commission.
The defendant's sole assignment of error lacks merit.
REVIEW FOR ERROR
Initially, we note that our review for error is pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, which provides that the only matters to be considered on appeal are errors designated in the assignments of error and "error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence." La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). In imposing the sentences on the three convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court failed to impose mandatory fines of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. See La. R.S. 14:95.1(B). Although the failure to impose the fines is error under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), it certainly is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant. Because the trial court's failure to impose the fines was not raised by the State either in the trial court or on appeal, we are not required to take any action. As such, we decline to correct the illegally lenient sentences. See State v. Price, 05-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 123-25 (en banc), writ denied, 07-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.