Summary
affirming robbery conviction where defendants took a rifle from the unconscious victim, after beating him during a property dispute
Summary of this case from United States v. DavisOpinion
No. 631PA84
Filed 4 June 1985
Robbery 4.2 — common law robbery — evidence sufficient Defendant's motions to dismiss a charge of common law robbery and to set aside the verdict were properly denied where the evidence at trial tended to show that defendant rang the doorbell of Marty and Ravonda Hedrick at about 7:00 p.m. on 4 March 1983; defendant told Mr. Hedrick that he had something for Mr. Hedrick to see at the back of the house; Mr. Hedrick went through the house to the sun deck at the rear of the house; defendant's father came around the corner of the house and they both began to curse Mr. Hedrick and accuse him of spinning the wheels of his jeep in defendant's father's yard; Mr. Hedrick retreated into his house, pursued by defendant and his father; Mr. Hedrick got his .22-caliber rifle and ordered defendant and his father to leave; defendant knocked the rifle out of Mr. Hedrick's hands; defendant's father picked up the rifle and threatened to kill Mrs. Hedrick if she called the law; defendant grabbed a spindle from a bannister and beat Mr. Hedrick about the head; Mr. Hedrick blacked out, and defendant and his father started to leave; and defendant's father gave defendant the gun as they were leaving and defendant threw it into the back seat of his car, saying "Daddy, he won't shoot us now." G.S. 15A-1414 (b)(2) (1983).
ON defendant's petition for discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reported at 70 N.C. App. 477, 319 S.E.2d 683 (1984), finding no error in the judgment entered by Morgan, J., at the 11 July 1983 session of Superior Court. DAVIDSON County. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 May 1985.
Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James Peeler Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Philip B. Lohr for defendant.
Justice VAUGHN did not participate in the decision of this case.
Justice EXUM dissenting.
The sole issue before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motions to dismiss the charge against him at the close of the state's evidence and at the close of all the evidence. We hold that the Court of Appeals did not err and that judgment was properly entered against defendant by the trial court.
A defendant's motion for dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case raises the question of whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and of the defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 296 S.E.2d 649 (1982). In determining this issue the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and the state is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. Id.; State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 215 S.E.2d 578 (1975). If there is substantial evidence — whether direct, circumstantial, or both — to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, a case for the jury is made and a motion to dismiss should be denied. E.g., State v. Cook, 273 N.C. 377, 160 S.E.2d 49 (1968). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980).
In the present case defendant was charged by an indictment proper in form with common law robbery. As this Court stated in State v. Black, 286 N.C. 191, 193, 209 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1974) "[r]obbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence against his will, by violence or putting him in fear." Defendant contends that because there was insufficient evidence of a felonious taking or a taking with violence, the trial court erroneously denied his motions to dismiss. The felonious taking element of common law robbery requires "a taking with the felonious intent on the part of the taker to deprive the owner of his property permanently and to convert it to the use of the taker." State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 168, 136 S.E.2d 595, 599-600 (1964).
Taken in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence at trial tended to show that on the evening of 4 March 1983 Marty and Ravonda Hedrick and their two children were at home in Davidson County. About 7:00 p.m. defendant, Bobby Bates, rang the doorbell of the Hedrick house, and Mr. Hedrick went to the door. Mr. Hedrick did not recognize the defendant, who asked him to come around to the back of the house because, defendant said, he had something for Mr. Hedrick to see. Mr. Hedrick complied and went through the house to the sun deck on the back of the house. As he did so defendant's father, Howard Bates, came around the corner of the house. Howard and Bobby Bates then began to curse Mr. Hedrick and accused him of spinning the wheels of his jeep in Howard Bates's yard. Mr. Hedrick then told the Bateses he wanted no trouble and began to retreat up the steps into his house, but defendant and his father pursued him into the house. Mr. Hedrick went up the stairs into his bedroom, got his .22-caliber rifle, returned to the kitchen, and ordered defendant and his father to leave. About this time defendant knocked the rifle out of Mr. Hedrick's hands and struck him. The rifle fired, and the bullet went through the kitchen counter top. Howard Bates picked up the rifle and pointed it at Mrs. Hedrick. Mr. Hedrick asked his wife to call "the law," but defendant's father repeatedly threatened to kill her if she did so. From the blow struck by defendant, Mr. Hedrick fell about ten feet down some stairs, against a bannister. Defendant grabbed a spindle from the bannister and beat Mr. Hedrick about the head. Mr. Hedrick blacked out. Defendant then started to leave the house. His father, taking the rifle with him, followed shortly. Defendant's father testified that he gave defendant the gun as they were leaving the house. As defendant and his father got into defendant's car, defendant threw the rifle into the back seat. According to defendant's father, defendant then stated, "Daddy, he won't shoot us now." Defendant and his father then drove away. The rifle was never returned. The sheriff's department was then called, and Mr. Hedrick was taken to the emergency room for treatment.
We hold that the trial court properly denied defendant's motions to dismiss the charge against him. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 296 S.E.2d 649. Our holding is also in accord with the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979) (dismissal allowed only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict as being contrary to the weight of the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1414 (b)(2) (1983). "Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion." State v. Whitley, 311 N.C. 656, 666, 319 S.E.2d 584, 591 (1984). Accord, State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 314 S.E.2d 529 (1984); State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E.2d 822 (1977). Defendant has failed to come forward with any showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, this assignment of error is meritless.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice VAUGHN did not participate in the decision of this case.