Opinion
Nos. 57757-3-I; 58075-2-I.
February 19, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-1-09331-1, James D. Cayce, J., entered January 26, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, C.J., concurred in by Becker and Schindler, JJ.
Gregory Barquet and James White appeal their convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in the second degree. Both allege their trial counsel was ineffective by proposing jury instructions that erroneously identified the standards for self-defense. They assign error to the trial court's denial of their motions pursuant to Criminal Rule (CrR) 4.7 and 8.3. Both claim their sentences for assault in the second degree combined with the imposition of a deadly weapons enhancement violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Barquet individually argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that infringed on his constitutional right to remain silent. We affirm.
FACTS
Procedural Facts
On July 20, 2005, the State charged both Barquet and White with assault in the first degree. Originally, the trial date was set for September 26, 2005. In August, the State produced partial discovery, including police reports, witness statements (some identified anonymously), photographs, and the computer aided dispatch (CAD) log. The parties agreed to additional discovery items at a September 16, 2005, omnibus hearing. Because the State had not fully complied with the agreement nearly a month after the omnibus hearing, the trial court ordered that the State release the names and contact information of the anonymous witnesses from the police reports, the 911 tape, and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) report. As of November 3, 2005, the discovery items subject to the order had not been provided. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to CrR 4.7 and 8.3. The trial court declined to grant the motion finding no governmental misconduct or prejudice in the delayed production of some discovery items.
At trial, Barquet claimed he acted in self-defense to protect his family and used justifiable force. White also argued he acted in self-defense, but his theory of the case mainly focused on whether there was any kind of weapon involved in the fight. Following a jury trial, Barquet and White were convicted of assault in the second degree with a deadly weapons sentence enhancement. Barquet and White received standard range sentences. Both timely appealed.
Substantive Facts
On February 20, 2005, Shawnika Donald hosted a family barbeque at her Tukwila apartment. Among the attendees included Gregory Barquet (uncle of host), Laushonda Barquet (Gregory's daughter); Glenna Barquet (Gregory's mother); Jamie White (who had fathered a child with Shawnika), Shawnika's half sisters, Shakesha Donald and Shandra Livingstone; Damon Dewey (Shandra Livingstone's boyfriend but not invited by the host), and Jack McCorkell (a friend of Livingstone and Dewey who was also not invited by the host). Shakesha, Livingstone, Dewey, and McCorkell all arrived together.
For clarity and necessity we will refer to Glenna Barquet and Laushonda Barquet by their first names because they share the same last name with defendant Gregory Barquet.
A group of people convened in a back bedroom, where an argument ensued between White, Dewey, and Livingstone. Laushonda intervened in the dispute, telling Livingstone to get Dewey under control. At some point, Barquet entered the bedroom to investigate the dispute. After entering the room, Barquet told Dewey to leave the apartment. According to Barquet, Dewey then plowed into and tackled him. In contrast, a State witness testified that someone pushed Dewey into Barquet who in turn pulled out a knife. At this point, Livingstone tried to grab Barquet's arm to prevent him from using the knife, but he responded by saying "if you don't let go of my wrist, I'm going to slice you too, bitch." A struggle ensued and the two men fell against some furniture. Using the knife, Barquet stabbed at Dewey's neck, shoulders, and on the side of his body. Dewey, who had no weapon, continued to fight by punching Barquet with his fists. White joined the fight, pulling something that looked like a fishing weight on a chain out of his pocket and used it to hit Dewey on the back of the head. As a result of multiple injuries, Dewey's blood was "all over the floor."
Dewey managed to leave the apartment, but was stopped by White. According to Dewey, White said "if you say anything about me, me or Gregory, . . . you guys are through." Dewey left in a car with McCorkell, Livingstone, and Shakesha. Shortly after leaving the apartment, the car was stopped by Tukwila Police officers, who called for medical aid for Dewey. Dewey was subsequently transported to Harborview Medical Center where he underwent surgery for stab wounds. At trial, the attending physician testified the injuries to Dewey's neck, chest and shoulder were consistent with knife wounds.
While at Harborview Medical Center, Dewey gave a statement to police that originally identified his attackers as Laushonda and Glenna. He later recanted and named Barquet and White. Dewey testified that he gave the statement identifying the wrong attackers because he was frightened by the threat of revenge.
DISCUSSION
1. Jury Instructions
Barquet and White contend they were denied effective assistance of counsel when their attorneys proposed jury instructions that inaccurately stated when a person is entitled to act on appearances under the law of self-defense. Specifically, they claim their attorneys were deficient when they proposed Barquet and White could only act in self-defense if they feared "great bodily harm" rather than "injury" or "great personal injury."
Self-defense is proper when a person who reasonably believes he or she is about to be injured, uses force attempting to prevent an offense against oneself or another and employs not-more-than-necessary force to do so. RCW 9A.16.020. Self-defense is evaluated by the jury both objectively and subjectively. State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 899-900, 913 P.2d 369 (1996). The objective portion of the evaluation requires the jury to determine what a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would have done. The subjective perspective requires jurors stand in the shoes of the defendant and consider all the facts and circumstances known to him or her. State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 238, 850 P.2d 495 (1993). The degree of force allowed in self-defense "is limited to what a reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the conditions as they appeared to the defendant." State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 474, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997); accord State v. Bailey, 22 Wn. App. 646, 650, 591 P.2d 1212 (1979).
The defendants proposed jury instructions relating to a claim of self-defense. The court gave these instructions. Jury instruction 22, WPIC 17.02, defined self-defense in an assault case, stating a defendant may use force toward a person when he or she "reasonably believes that he or she is about to be injured," so long as the force used is "not more than is necessary." The parties do not dispute this instruction. Instruction 23 said the defendant did not have a duty to retreat, and may "stand his ground and defend against such attack by the use of lawful force." Jury instruction 24, the act on appearances instruction, read:
A person is entitled to act on appearances in defending himself or another, if that person believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that he or another is in actual danger of great bodily harm, although it afterwards might develop that the person was mistaken as to the extent of the danger. Actual danger is not necessary for the use of force to be lawful.
The self-defense instructions did not define the term "great bodily harm". Instead, the only definition of great bodily harm appeared in the elements of assault in the first degree, the charge brought against Barquet and White. Instruction 12 read, "[g]reat bodily harm means bodily injury that creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or that causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ."
In Walden, the Washington Supreme Court held "great bodily harm" was the improper instruction when a defendant is charged with first degree assault with use of deadly force and claims self-defense against an unarmed victim. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 478-79. The court held the instructions were erroneous because they prohibited the jury from considering the defendant's subjective perspective of the facts and circumstances. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 477. Specifically, in that case, the court held that the definition would seem to "exclude ordinary batteries" even if the defendant reasonably believed the battery at issue would result in great personal injury. Id. at 477. Instead, the court said jury instructions should use the term "great personal injury" when a defendant uses a deadly weapon to commit an assault and claims he acted in self-defense. The term great personal injury means an injury that the defendant reasonably believed based on the facts and circumstances, known at the time, would produce severe pain and suffering if it were inflicted upon either the defendant or another person. See 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 17.04 at 203 (2d ed. 1994) (WPIC); 11 WPIC 2.04.01 at 28 (supp. 2005). Here, the State concedes defense counsel proposed erroneous jury instructions and in doing so was deficient.
Next, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Barquet and White must show a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the attorneys' deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987). Barquet and White allege the error was prejudicial because a reasonable jury could have found from these facts that Barquet and White feared personal injury from Dewey and acted in self-defense.
As a threshold matter, the parties disagree about what standard should have been included in the act on appearances instruction. First, Barquet and White argue that they were entitled to an instruction stating they could act on appearances if they were "about to be injured" pursuant to RCW 9A.16.020(3). The State correctly points to Walden, where the Supreme Court clearly held when a defendant uses deadly force "great personal injury" is the proper standard. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 477; see State v. Marquez, 131 Wn. App. 566, 127 P.3d 786 (2006). The law does not allow the use of deadly force any time a defendant perceives her or she is about to be injured. Instead, the law permits a defendant to use the amount of force necessary to protect oneself or another. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 474. Thus, the heightened standard of "great personal injury" is proper because Barquet and White, like Walden, were charged with assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon.
Applying the standard "great personal injury," a reasonable jury could not have found Barquet and White acted in self-defense because they reasonably feared Dewey would inflict "severe pain and suffering." Barquet testified that Dewey had threatened: to "whoop White's ass" and that Barquet had been "plowed" into or "tackled" by Dewey. Others testified that Dewey punched Barquet when he was being stabbed. These actions may have caused a battery, but there is no evidence that Barquet could have thought he was protecting himself and others from "severe pain and suffering." Barquet also admits that Dewey made no threatening gestures or statements to anyone else. In terms of his own actions to protect himself, Barquet testified that he never personally feared Dewey. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could not have believed Barquet and White acted in self-defense based on a fear of "great personal injury" to themselves or others.
Regardless of the instructional error, based on these facts, a reasonable jury would not have found that Barquet and White acted in self-defense. Self-defense is only available when a defendant uses force equivalent to the threat posed, based on subjective and objective facts. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 474; State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 779, 966 P.2d 883 (1998). The jury found that Barquet was armed with a deadly weapon, a knife. No one testified at trial that Dewey had any sort of weapon or that Barquet and White believed he was armed. Further, there was no evidence of a pre-existing reason for Barquet and White to fear Dewey. Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, the force used by Barquet and White far exceeded the threat posed by Dewey, and allowed as necessary under Washington law of self-defense. Correct jury instructions would not have altered the result, so the instructional error was harmless.
2. Discovery
Barquet and White argue the trial court abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the case based on CrR 4.7 and 8.3, when the prosecutor did not provide timely discovery. At issue are three discovery items: a copy of the 911 tape, NCIC records of convictions of the victim, who would be a State witness, and the names and contact information of two people who gave statements to the police. The trial court, while declining to dismiss, found there was untimely discovery by the prosecutor. It did not however find prosecutorial misconduct or that the State's conduct resulted in prejudice affecting the defendants' rights.
On appellate review, a trial court's decision pursuant to CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3 will only be overturned upon "a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
A. Criminal Rule 4.7
Washington CrR 4.7 aims to provide parties with "adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trials, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of due process." State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 728, 733, 829 P.2d 799 (1992). To effectuate this policy, CrR 4.7(a) requires a prosecutor to disclose the following no later than the omnibus hearing:
(i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses;
. . . .
(vi) any record or prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting attorney of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.
. . . .
(3) Except as is otherwise provided as to protective orders, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defendant's counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney's knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged.
If a prosecutor fails to comply with these requirements, a court may issue sanctions. CrR 4.7(h)(7)(i) provides:
(i) if at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, dismiss the action or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Given the plain language of the rule, Washington courts have repeatedly recognized that an appropriate remedy to discovery violations is discretionary.
Dismissal is an extraordinary remedy. State v. Smith, 67 Wn. App. 847, 851-852, 841 P.2d 65 (1992).
Barquet and White argue that the trial court's denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion because it was the only appropriate remedy to address the prosecutor's violations of CrR 4.7.
Here, the appellants have not established that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting dismissal as the appropriate sanction under CrR 4.7(h)(7)(i) based on the State's delay in providing (1) the unredacted names of two individuals who gave statements to the police, but would not be called at trial, (2) a copy of the 911 tape, and (3) the NCIC report of Dewey, the victim who would testify on behalf of the State. First, based on the plain language of the statute, the discovery of the unredacted names of individuals, whom the State was not going to call as witnesses, was not required by CrR 4.7(a)(i). Second, the defendants have failed to establish why dismissal would be an appropriate sanction when a vast majority of discovery, including the 911 tape, were provided by the prosecution before the date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the delay in defense counsels' obtaining a copy of the 911 tape appears to be a result of their own failure to respond to the State's request for a blank tape. Third, although, the NCIC report had not been provided to defense counsel as of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the delay was the result of statements by White's attorney to the prosecutor. According to the prosecutor, White's counsel told her he already had the records of Dewey's convictions and would provide them to Barquet's attorney. Under these circumstances, there is no evidence that the trial court's decision not to dismiss based on CrR 4.7 was unreasonable.
B. Criminal Rule 8.3(b)
Additionally, Barquet and White claim the trial court abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the case under CrR 8.3 for the "furtherance of justice."
The rule allows:
(b) On Motion of Court. The court, in the furtherance of justice, after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial. The court shall set forth its reasons in a written order.
Whether dismissal is an appropriate remedy is a fact specific inquiry that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. State v. Sherman, 59 Wn. App. 763, 770-771, 801 P.2d 274 (1990).
Two things must be shown before a court can require a dismissal under CrR 8.3(b). First, a defendant must show arbitrary action or governmental misconduct. State v. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d 745, 762, 682 P.2d 889 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Governmental misconduct, however, "need not be of an evil or dishonest nature; simple mismanagement is sufficient." State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 239, 937 P.2d 587 (1997). Absent a showing of governmental misconduct, a trial court cannot dismiss charges under CrR 8.3(b). Second, CrR 8.3 requires a defendant show actual prejudice affected his right to a fair trial. Such prejudice includes the right to a speedy trial and the "right to be represented by counsel who has had sufficient opportunity to adequately prepare a material part of his defense." State v. Price, 94 Wn.2d 810, 814, 620 P.2d 994 (1980).
Barquet and White contend that the State's discovery violations amounted to misconduct based on simple mismanagement. The State concedes it was dilatory in providing some of the discovery items to the defense attorneys, but argues that it did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct based on mismanagement. A failure to comply with all discovery requests in a timely manner is not necessarily misconduct that requires reversal. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d at 763. Only where discovery items were material to the case, did the prosecutor's delay in providing discovery constitute misconduct. Sherman, 59 Wn. App. at 770-771.
Although the prosecution was not required to provide the names of anonymous witness from the CAD report, it did agree to do so at the omnibus hearing. The reason for the State's delay in providing those names is unclear from the record. According to defense counsel, the prosecutor said she was simply too busy to check the redacted names. As previously described, however, the delay in defense counsel receiving the 911 tape and NCIC report was a result of their own failure to respond to requests they provide a blank tape and a miscommunication between the parties about whether the prosecutor needed to turn over the NCIC report. Defense counsel has not established the delay in the discovery of either the 911 tape or the NCIC report were a result of prosecutorial misconduct.
Even if the prosecutor committed misconduct in not timely complying with the request for the names of two anonymous witnesses, Barquet and White fail to show that they suffered actual prejudice. First, Barquet and White claim they were prejudiced because they were unable to contact the two individual witnesses. For at least one of the witnesses, her name and contact information was included in the original CAD log. Second, although Barquet and White claim they were unable to reach another witness because her phone number had been disconnected by the time the prosecutor supplied it, they admitted they had the contact information for the mother of that witness. As of the hearing on November 18, 2005, they had not pursued this alternative means of contacting the potential witness. Barquet and White also claim they were prejudiced because the one witness had made potentially exculpatory statements but they were unable to investigate. The actual statements had been given to defense counsel prior to the omnibus hearing. The value of the witness to the defense is unclear. According to the prosecutor, the defense counsel overstated the importance of the witness:
Nichole saw something that was different than what the victim is saying, but from the statement that she [defense counsel Ahern] has, it is clear that Nichole — this witness was not out there the entire time period, did not see the entire event, that Nichole is out there for a moment with the witnesses (inaudible) to the time that they left, she saw a portion of it.
In the hearing, defense counsel did not dispute this assessment. Further, the witness was not called at trial.
The record supports the decision of the trial court not to dismiss the case under CrR 8.3. Because dismissal is an extraordinary remedy and Barquet and White have not established actual prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion to dismiss.
3. Sentence Enhancements
Barquet and White contend that the imposition of additional time to their sentences pursuant to RCW 9.94A.533 violates the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions. RCW 9.94A.533(4) requires that the sentencing court impose additional time to an offender's standard range sentence "[i]f the offender or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010." Barquet and White specifically argue they were convicted of second degree assault for attacking Dewey with a knife and their sentences for that crime were enhanced for use of that knife. According to defendants, this amounts to double punishment for the same crime, a violation of the Constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.
This court rejected a similar argument squarely in State v. Nguyen, 134 Wn. App. 863, 142 P.3d 1117 (2006); accord State v. Tessema 139 Wn. App. 483, 493, 162 P.3d 420 (2007). In Nguyen the court noted Washington law has long held that sentence enhancements do not violate double jeopardy. Unless the question involves a duplicate trial, a double jeopardy analysis requires an inquiry into legislative intent. Nguyen, 134 Wn. App. at 868. Barquet and White argue however that in light of Blakely v. Washington, legislative intent must be reexamined, especially in regards to whether voters considered the problem of redundant punishment when they approved the initiative. As articulated by the court in Nguyen, nothing in Blakey implicates the double jeopardy analysis. Nguyen, 134 Wn. App. at 868. Moreover, in Nguyen and more recently in Tessema, this court noted that the intent of the legislature is clear: the use of deadly weapons to commit crimes "shall result in longer sentences unless an exemption applies." Tessema, 139 Wn. App. at 493. Because both Nguyen and Tessema are dispositive, the additional time added to both Barquet's and White's sentences for second degree assault combined with the deadly weapons enhancement does not violate double jeopardy.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).
RCW 9.94A.533 was passed initially as part of the Hard Time for Armed Crime Act of 1995 by a popular vote of Washington voters and was designed to provide increased penalties for criminals using or carrying deadly weapons in the commission of crimes.
4. Pre-Arrest Silence
Barquet argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she improperly elicited testimony regarding his silence to police. Barquet's attorney did not object to the testimony at trial.
The defendant bears the burden of establishing the conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 701, 903 P.2d 960 (1995). Even if the defendant meets this burden, [t]he conviction will be reversed only if `there is a substantial likelihood that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct affected the verdict.'" State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 887, 822 P.2d 177 (1991). If defense counsel fails to object, move for mistrial, or request a curative instruction, appellate review is normally only appropriate if the prosecutorial misconduct is "so flagrant and ill intentioned that no curative instructions could have obviated the prejudice engendered" by the misconduct. State v. Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 504, 507, 755 P.2d 174 (1988); State v. Kenrick, 47 Wn. App. 620, 638, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987). If prosecutorial misconduct affects a separate constitutional right, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the conduct is subject to the stricter standard of constitutional harmless error. State v. Traweek, 43 Wn. App. 99, 107-108, 715 P.2d 1148 (1986); State v. Davenport, 100 Wn.2d 757, 761 n. 1, 675 P.2d 1213 (1984). Before an error maybe held harmless, an appellate court must find that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based on an evaluation of the totality of the evidence presented. State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 5, 633 P.2d 83 (1981).
A defendant's pre-arrest silence in regards to inquiries by police officers may not be used by the State in its case in chief as substantive evidence of guilt. State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 241-242, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996). In Easter, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for impermissible use of pre-arrest silence when a police detective testified about the defendant's evasive answers after a car accident and the State emphasized this pre-arrest silence many times during closing argument. However, pre-arrest silence is permissible to impeach or where silence is not used as substantive guilt. In State v. Lewis, the Supreme Court held permissible the testimony from a police detective indicating that if defendant was innocent, "he should just come in talk to me about it." 130 Wn.2d 700, 703, 927 P.2d 235 (1996). Because the detective never indicated the defendant refused to talk with him, it was not used as substantive evidence of guilt. Id. at 706.
Barquet analogizes the prosecutor's questions to State v. Keene. In that case, Division Two of this court reversed a conviction when the prosecutor both questioned a police detective about pre-arrest silence and when the prosecutor repeatedly reminded the jury of the defendant's silence during closing arguments. State v. Keene 86 Wn. App. 589, 938 P.2d 839 (1997). In Keene, a police detective testified that she had called defendant several times but he did not return calls, even after indicating that "if I hadn't heard from him by the 22nd I would need to turn it over to the prosecuting attorney's office." Id. at 592. During the closing arguments, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the repeated calls to the defendant, the threat of prosecution, and subsequent inaction by the defendant. Id. The prosecutor ended, by referring to Keene's silence: "It's your decision if those are the actions of a person who did not commit these acts." Id.
The questioning by the prosecutor in this case, does not rise to the level of an impermissible use of Barquet's pre-arrest silence. Following questioning by defense counsel about whether Barquet had ever changed his statements about the events on the night of February 20, 2005, the prosecutor, Taylor, asked: "You never made a statement to the police, right?" Barquet responded, "No." And Taylor followed up by asking, "So you never had any prior testimony — never, no prior statements to change, correct?" Barquet then answered, "I never made no statement to the police, no." Taylor immediately ended her questioning and made no subsequent reference to Barquet's pre-arrest silence.
Taylor's questioning was not used in the State's case in chief as substantive guilt, but to clarify Barquet's earlier testimony. The prosecutor made no comment connecting or implying Barquet was guilty because he had not contacted police or made a statement about the incident. Further, unlike Keene, here, the testimony in question was given by the defendant, not a police detective. Barquet was able to clarify on redirect that the police never contacted him. Even if Taylor's questioning infringed on Barquet's constitutional right to remain silent, Barquet has failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice. We conclude therefore, the questioning was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Barquet and White each assert additional grounds for reversal, assigning error to the misidentification by police of Barquet's mother, the trial court's denial of a dictionary to jurors during deliberations, ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of a speedy trial, and improper guilty plea negotiations. The additional grounds provide no basis for reversal.
We affirm.