Opinion
No. 107,478.
2013-08-29
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Tyler Rhea Scott BARNETT, Appellant.
Appeal from Finney District Court; Philip C. Vieux, Judge. Matthew J. Edge, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Brett Watson, assistant county attorney, John P. Wheeler, Jr., county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Finney District Court; Philip C. Vieux, Judge.
Matthew J. Edge, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Brett Watson, assistant county attorney, John P. Wheeler, Jr., county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Tyler Rhea Scott Barnett pled no contest to one count of aggravated criminal sodomy. Barnett filed a motion to withdraw his plea before sentencing. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Barnett argues the court abused its discretion in denying his motion by employing an improper legal standard—manifest injustice—when considering whether to permit him to withdraw his plea. For the reasons stated below, we find the district court properly employed the good-cause standard; thus, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Barnett's motion.
Facts
On July 15, 2011, the State filed a complaint alleging Barnett committed three acts of aggravated criminal sodomy from 2009 to 2011. Although Barnett was a minor when the acts occurred, the State filed a motion seeking to prosecute him as an adult.
Barnett and the State eventually entered into a plea agreement. Barnett stipulated to his certification as an adult, waived his preliminary hearing, and agreed to plead no contest to the first count alleged in the complaint. Barnett also recognized that he would be “subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender.” In turn, the State agreed to dismiss the second and third counts of the complaint with prejudice and to ask the district court to place Barnett on bond before his sentencing hearing.
At the plea hearing, Barnett personally confirmed with the district court that he had had enough time to visit with his attorney and was aware of the hearing's purpose. The court and Barnett then engaged in the following colloquy:
“THE COURT: I wanted to ask the defendant, though, this plea agreement, do you understand this requires you to register as a sex offender for life?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I do understand.
“THE COURT: Sixty or 70 years of registering.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that.
“THE COURT: Do you understand what all that entails?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Tell me what you think it means.
“THE DEFENDANT: It means that I can't live—I think that it is 100 yards from the school district. I can't be anywhere where there is kids. I won't be able to—how do I put this—get certain jobs. I won't be able to—I won't be able to expunge this off of my record. It is something that I have to live with because I made a mistake.”
Barnett went on to acknowledge that he knew he would have to register as a sex offender every year wherever he lives and that he would have to do this for the rest of his life. Thereafter, the court informed Barnett of the various trial rights he would waive by pleading no contest; Barnett confirmed he understood those rights, had discussed them with his attorney, and had all of his questions answered. Similarly, Barnett's counsel advised the court that counsel had consulted with Barnett about the plea agreement and that counsel felt there had been sufficient opportunity and contact with Barnett to answer all of his questions. The court then accepted Barnett's plea and found him guilty of one count of aggravated criminal sodomy. Although the State asked the district court to place Barnett on bond before his sentencing hearing, the court refused to release Barnett from custody based on the severity of Barnett's conviction and his potential sentence. The court recorded its findings from the hearing in a journal entry.
After the plea hearing, but before sentencing, Barnett filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of this motion, Barnett explained:
“ Since the time of his plea, defendant has had time to reconsider the ramifications of his plea, and, even if he is successful in obtaining a durational and dispositional departure from the Court, its negative effect on the rest of his life, including the possibility that he may inadvertently violate the registration requirements, subject himself to further prosecution, possible violation his probation [ sic ], incarceration on the underlying sentence, and after completion of his criminal sentence, be subject to civil commitment....” (Emphasis added.)
Barnett further explained he “now realizes that the primary reason he accepted the plea agreement ... was due to his desire to be with his family as soon as possible, some of whom were dealing with what seemed to defendant to be serious medical problems.”
The court held a hearing on Barnett's motion. During the hearing, defense counsel reiterated that Barnett accepted the plea to get out of prison quickly and be with his family, but that “his situation will not be good after sentencing.” When asked to elaborate, defense counsel stated that due to Barnett's “past contact with law enforcement, that with the requirement for registration, as strict as it now is, that his chance of successfully staying out of trouble and staying out of prison is between slim and none.” Counsel further explained that, although counsel had advised Barnett of the consequences of having to register as a sex offender, counsel “did not dig deep enough” to understand Barnett entered the plea because doing so was the only way he could get released before serving his anticipated sentence.
The district court ultimately denied Barnett's motion. It is from this decision that Barnett appeals.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews the district court's denial of a presentence motion to withdraw plea for abuse of discretion. Generally, the district court's decision is affirmed if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal standards. However, an abuse of discretion may be found if the district court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards. The defendant bears the burden of establishing the abuse of discretion. State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529, 541, 197 P.3d 825 (2008).
Analysis
The district court, for good cause shown and in its discretion, may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere at any time before sentence is adjudged. K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1). Good cause is a lesser standard for a defendant to meet than the showing of manifest injustice required to withdraw a plea after sentencing. State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836–37, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012); see K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1)–(2).
Kansas courts review the following three factors when considering whether the requisite good cause has been shown: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. These factors have become known as the “ Edgar factors,” in reference to State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006). While the Edgar factors are viable benchmarks for judicial discretion, they should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other factors. State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512–13, 231 P.3d 563 (2010).
The Aguilar decision is of particular importance to the present case. In Aguilar, the defendant sought to withdraw her plea before sentencing and alleged, in part, that her defense attorney had an impermissible conflict of interest because the attorney simultaneously represented both her and her codefendant. The district court denied the defendant's motion, however, and observed that the defense attorney was not ineffective because he had generally done a good job in court on prior occasions. 290 Kan. at 508–10.
Our Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court used the wrong legal standard—manifest injustice rather than good cause—in determining whether to permit the defendant to withdraw her plea. Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 515. In reaching this decision, the court expressed concern about district courts exclusively using the Edgar factors to determine whether good cause exists to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her plea:
“The Edgar factors remain viable benchmarks for judicial discretion but reliance on them to the exclusion of other factors has not only conflated the good cause and manifest injustice standards of K.S.A. 22–3210(d) but also may have overemphasized the role of plea counsel's competence in deciding presentence plea withdrawal motions. Although the Edgar factors permit counsel's competence or lack thereof to be one consideration when the motion is filed in the time period between conviction and sentencing, they should not be mechanically applied to demand that a defendant demonstrate ineffective assistance rising to the level of a violation of the Sixth Amendment....
“It is neither logical nor fair to equate the lesser K.S.A. 22–3210(d) good cause standard governing a presentence plea withdrawal motion to the high constitutional burden. The Edgar factors do not transform the lower good cause standard of the statute's plain language into a constitutional gauntlet. Merely lackluster advocacy—or, as here, evidence of an insurmountable conflict of interest among jointly represented codefendants that is ignored by a district judge—may be plenty to support the first Edgar factor and thus statutory good cause for presentence withdrawal of a plea. All of the Edgar factors need not apply in a defendant's favor in every case, and other factors may be duly considered in the district judge's discretionary decision on the existence or nonexistence of good cause.” Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 512–13.
Relying on Aguilar, Barnett argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering only the first Edgar factor—whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel—and, in doing so, applying it in a manner that required him to prove counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient as opposed to a performance that was merely lackluster, which would be sufficient to provide good cause to withdraw his plea.
But Barnett's case is easily distinguishable from Aguilar. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for both Barnett and the State properly and repeatedly cited the good-cause standard. After defense counsel referenced the Aguilar opinion, the district court properly noted that the good-cause standard was “not a bright line rule.” These facts show the court was certainly aware of the Aguilar opinion, and these facts also suggest that the court, in turn, did not rely exclusively upon the Edgar factors to determine whether Barnett demonstrated the good cause necessary to withdraw his plea. In the context of discussing the first Edgar factor, the district court stated:
“I talked with counsel, the defendant, I talked to everybody that I could talk to in the courtroom. And I'm convinced that [Barnett] was not given bad legal advice as to the ramifications of this matter. In fact, the Court even went further and gave [Barnett] more ‘legal advice,’ so to speak, as to the ramifications of these matters and discovered that [Barnett] had discussed these things with [counsel] and with others.”
The district court also noted that the plea agreement negotiated by counsel was a “fantastic bargain” that dismissed additional charges that would have “severely” compounded the charges pending before the court. The court found the deal negotiated by counsel to be especially beneficial given the unchallenged factual basis supporting the charges against Barnett proffered by the State at the plea hearing, which included prospective testimony from two victim witnesses and a sheriff's deputy.
In his plea agreement, Barnett acknowledged his lifetime duty to register as a sex offender. At his plea hearing, Barnett made clear that he had had enough time to consult with defense counsel and that he understood his duty to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. Defense counsel also told the court that he had consulted with Barnett about the plea agreement and had enough opportunity to answer all of his questions.
Of course, the district court thereafter refused to permit Barnett to be released on bond pending his sentencing hearing, which, as the court later suggested, may have motivated Barnett's decision to withdraw his plea. In his motion to withdraw plea, Barnett explained that he “has had time to reconsider the ramifications of his plea” and that he “now realizes that the primary reason he accepted the plea agreement ... was due to his desire to be with his family as soon as possible, some of whom were dealing with what seemed to defendant to be serious medical problems .” A change of heart is not a sufficient reason to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her plea. See Schow, 287 Kan. at 542 (agreeing with State that “defendant should not get relief from a plea decision simply because he or she determines, in hindsight, that it was not the most intelligent course of action”).
At the hearing on Barnett's motion to withdraw plea, defense counsel's arguments continued to suggest that Barnett sought to withdraw his plea because he had second-guessed his decision—not because defense counsel had failed to properly explain the consequences of the agreement. Although defense counsel told the district court that he “did not dig deep enough” to understand Barnett's motivations for accepting the plea, the facts in the record do not support Barnett's claim that the district court denied his motion to withdraw plea based in part, or in whole, on evidence that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. The district court judge stated:
“All of this together, everything that I've looked at, everything that I've discussed with the parties, with the attorneys, and the court transcripts, partial transcripts I've reviewed, the case file I reviewed, I'm still convinced this plea was fairly and understandingly made.
“Everybody that comes before this Court quite frankly, once they are convicted, does not feel as though they really wanted to go down that road.”
Having found no evidence that the district court relied on an improper legal standard in denying Barnett's motion to withdraw plea, we find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.