Opinion
No. CR 04-1406 WJ.
July 29, 2005
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, filed October 28, 2005 (Doc. 18). Defendant requests that the Court impose sanctions against Sherry Far, (a.k.a Sherry Laney) for initiating a sham criminal prosecution against him. Having reviewed and considered the pleadings, the exhibits and the applicable law, the Court finds that sanctions are warranted and the motion should be granted in part.
Background
The criminal prosecution against Mr. Baker started with a civil case that has a long history. See, Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, Civil No. 96-437 WJ/LCS. A synopsis of the case is necessary to put the motion for sanctions in context.
A detailed history of this civil case is contained in this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order filed November 21, 2003 (Docket No. 96) in Civil No. 96-437. Other than the brief overview provided herein for purposes of the instant motion, there is no need for the Court to present again the entire history of this case. The Court hereby adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in that Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 96), findings set forth in Doc. 99 (Findings Order), Doc. 102 (Order Supplemental Injunction), and Doc. 110 (Mem. Opin. Order on partial damages and retention of jurisdiction) for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
I. History of the Civil Case (Civil No. 96-437)
The civil case started in 1996 when Plaintiffs Sherry Farr (a.k.a. Sherry Laney) and her livestock company co-owner, Kit Laney, filed the original Complaint seeking a declaration that they had valid property rights to federal public lands where Plaintiffs had historically grazed their cattle by obtaining grazing permits. Plaintiffs are and were the owners and operators of the partnerships Diamond Bar Cattle Company and Laney Cattle Company. See Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999). At some point, they allowed their grazing permits to expire. In the lawsuit, Plaintiffs took the position that they obtained their property rights under New Mexico law, and as a result, they did not need to obtain grazing permits from the federal government after the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The Complaint also sought a declaration that the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service had no jurisdiction over the rights to water and range on the allotments on which their cattle had grazed.
"Plaintiffs" is used in the civil case to refer to Sherry Farr and Kit Laney.
In April 1997, the Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. Civ. No. 96-437, Doc. 26. In the Memorandum Opinion and Order granting summary judgment, Judge Bratton held that Plaintiffs had no legal right of possession of the federal public lands on which their cattle had historically grazed, and enjoined Plaintiffs from grazing livestock in the Gila and Apache National Forests until they obtained authorization from the Forest Service. Judgment was entered in favor of the United States, awarding an amount for unauthorized grazing fees and other damages for Plaintiffs' unlawful grazing on National Forest Service lands. Plaintiffs were also ordered to physically remove livestock from National Forest Service lands according to a specified schedule. Civ. No. 96-437, Doc. 44.
When Judge Bratton died in 2002, the case was randomly assigned to the undersigned.
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in April 1997. In February 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge Bratton's summary judgment in favor of the Government. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiffs did not, nor did they ever, hold a vested property right to graze cattle on federal public lands. See, Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999). About two years later, in November 2001, the United States On November 26, 2001, the United States filed a Satisfaction of Judgment indicating that all livestock had been removed from the federal lands and that Plaintiffs had fully paid the damages in the 1997 judgment. Civ. No. 96-437, Doc. 54.
That should have been the end of the case. However, in April 2003, the second phase of the case began when unauthorized livestock which bore various brands registered to Plaintiffs were observed grazing on the same federal public lands on which Plaintiffs had been enjoined from using for this purpose. By this time, Plaintiffs had taken measures to legally distance themselves from their identity as Partnership Plaintiffs by either selling or otherwise transferring all of the partnership assets. Civ. No. 96-437, Doc. 96 at 5-7. The United States sought an order of contempt against Plaintiffs for violating the final judgment and injunction entered in the case.
Plaintiffs' various filings included, as examples: filing documents attempting to create in the Partnership Plaintiffs a fee interest in the disputed lands, filing of deeds from the Partnership Plaintiffs to the Laneys, and filing Notices of Dissolution of Partnership. Civ. 96-437, Doc. 96 at 15.
In response to the Government's seeking of a contempt order, Plaintiffs attempted to reargue that they had a fee simple interest in the land by virtue of vested water rights obtained through prior appropriation under New Mexico law, issues which had already been considered and decided against them by Judge Bratton and by the Tenth Circuit on appeal. They also argued that the 1997 judgment applied only to the Partnership Plaintiffs, who had not violated any Court Orders because the Partnership Plaintiffs had disposed of its assets, including livestock and brands, before the livestock were returned to the federal lands. Thus, they argued, the Partnership Plaintiffs could not have been responsible for the presence of the livestock on federal land. This Court found Plaintiffs' strategy and conduct to be "duplicitous attempt to evade the operation and effect of this Court's Orders and the judgment of the Tenth Circuit." The Court ultimately concluded that Plaintiffs Kit and Sherry Laney were in privity with the Partnership Plaintiffs primarily based on principles of equity. Civ. No. 96-437, Doc. 96 at 15.
This phase of the case ended in December 2003 when the Court enjoined Plaintiffs from placing or allowing livestock on Forest Service lands, and ordered them to remove all trespassing livestock within 30 days, failure of which would result in the Forest Service being allowed to "immediately remove or have removed" any trespassing livestock, impound and haul it to an auction facility and publish a notice of sale. Doc. 102 (Contempt Order), ¶¶ 2, 3. When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court's directive to remove the livestock on their own, the Forest Service, pursuant to the Court's Contempt Order, hired private contractors to help with the roundup and removal of the unauthorized livestock. Defendant Baker was one of the contractors hired by the Forest Service to help with the gathering and transport of the trespassing livestock.
II. Criminal Prosecution of Defendant (Crim. No. 04-1406)
Defendant Baker contends that the criminal prosecution Ms. Farr filed against him was part of a coordinated effort of harassment and intimidation by Ms. Farr and Kit Laney to block the impoundment of livestock by the Forest Service, and interfere with this Court's judgments and Orders in Civil No. 96-437.
Ms. Farr filed a criminal complaint against Baker in Catron County Magistrate Court in June 2004, alleging that on March 26, 2004, Baker was selling, transferring, or delivering livestock (horses) he did not own, in violation of a New Mexico statute prohibiting such conduct. See, Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 to Baker Decl. and June 30, 2004 Libby Decl. Baker retained counsel to defend him from Farr's criminal prosecution. In July 2004, Defendant removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) on grounds that he was working for and being directed by the U.S. Forest Service to gather livestock, as authorized by this Court's Contempt Order. This Court determined that removal was proper under federal statute, notified the state court to "proceed no further," and set an evidentiary hearing for August 25, 2004, which was reset for September 30, 2004. Doc. 4.
On August 10, 2004, Defendant moved to dismiss Ms. Farr's criminal complaint on grounds of federal sovereign immunity and failure to allege facts necessary to commence a criminal action or serve as the basis for a finding of probable cause. Doc. 7. Two weeks later, Ms. Farr filed a pleading captioned "Nolle Prosequi," Doc. 13, which the Court construed as a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint without prejudice, and denied because it failed to justify why her criminal complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. Doc. 14.
On September 28, 2004, two days before the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, Ms. Farr filed a motion to dismiss her criminal prosecution with prejudice, to which Defendant had no objection. As a result, this Court dismissed Ms. Farr's criminal prosecution against Defendant, with prejudice, on September 29, 2004. Doc. 17. Defendant now moves for sanctions in the form of attorney fees and additional expenses against Ms. Farr for the bringing of what he describes and considers to be a sham criminal prosecution against him.
III. Ms. Farr's Request for Extension of Time for Supporting Memorandum
Ms. Farr has responded to Defendant's motion for sanctions. However, her pleading is captioned as a "Response by Movant Sherry Farr to Motion for Sanctions and for Leave to File Supporting Memorandum within 30 days." Doc. 19. The request is denied for two reasons. First, the request is not properly before the Court as a separate motion. See, Court's Admin. Order 92-88 (requiring separate pleadings for each requested relief). Second, and more to the merits of the request, while Ms. Farr requests an extension of time in the pleading's caption, she does not mention her request for an extension anywhere in the body of the pleading. The pleading appears to be a response in which Ms. Farr sets forth her reasons for opposing Defendant's motion for sanctions. In fact, the Court is left with the distinct impression that Ms. Farr inadvertently captioned her pleading as a "Response" as well as a request for an extension of time to mirror the caption on Defendant's pleading, without intending to ask for additional time to file a supporting memorandum. My conclusion rests on a liberal construction of the text of Ms. Farr's pleading, in that it appears to adequately state Ms. Farr's position with regard to Defendant's motion for sanctions.
Discussion
Defendant requests sanctions pursuant to the Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as well as its inherent powers. The question is whether sanctions are appropriate, and if so, from what statute or authority should they issue?
II. Whether Sanctions are Appropriate
Defendant offers evidence that Ms. Farr's filing of a criminal complaint against him was part of a campaign of harassment by herself and Kit Laney against those individuals who were hired by the Forest Service to help in the roundup and impoundment of the unauthorized cattle, and carried out with the purpose of interfering with the judgments and orders of this Court in theDiamond Bar civil case. Actions taken by Ms. Farr included: a letter from herself and Kit Laney addressed to a cattle auction stating that sale of their cattle was unauthorized and illegal (Ex. P); a newspaper advertisement threatening any federal employees or agents with criminal prosecution in attempting to take or move their cattle (Ex. Q); filing a pleading stating that Ms. Farr and Kit Laney did not consent to the Court's Order relating to the removal of the cattle Doc. 114 in Civil 96-437, stricken by the Court); a three-page "Notice" addressed to "John Doe/Forest Service Contractor for the Removal of Our Cattle" which states that removal of their cattle was an act of trespass, and threats that complaints against these contractors would be filed with the New Mexico Livestock Code (Ex. S).
Because Defendant seeks sanctions against Ms. Farr, the Court does not include those actions taken only by Kit Laney, which could be viewed as part of the campaign of harassment and intimidation carried out in order to obstruct the Court's Orders in this case.
Ms. Farr's efforts to thwart the execution of this Court's Orders culminated in the filing of criminal actions against at least two of the Forest Service contractors in Catron County Magistrate Court. The first was her prosecution of Isaiah Baker, which began this case. The other was against Neddy Archuleta.See, Exs. M N. It appears unlikely that Ms. Farr had any knowledge of Defendant Baker's actions on the day on which she alleges he was in violation of a state statute. On the day Defendant was supposed to have been selling, transferring or otherwise delivering horses, he was actually working at the Forest Service camp doing mechanical repairs. The only contact with the horses was to provide them with feed and water. Baker Decl., ¶¶ 2-5, 8; June 30, 2004 Libby Decl, ¶¶ 6-9 (both attached to Defendant's Notice of Removal, Doc. 1). It is also probable that Ms. Farr obtained Defendant's name and address from the Catron County Sheriff's Office, whose deputies were observed stopping Forest Service employees and asking for their identification. July 12, 2004 Libby Decl., ¶ 7 (attached as Ex. 3 to Govt's Reply to Laneys' Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 120 121).
The case against Mr. Archuleta was dismissed by the Magistrate Court for "lack of prosecution." Ex. N. Kit Laney also filed a complaint in Catron County Magistrate Court against contractor Neddy Archuleta in March 2004, alleging a violation of the same state statute as used by Ms. Farr against Mr. Baker. Ex. J. Mr. Archuleta removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (Criminal No. 04-1836 WJ), which was ultimately dismissed for Laney's failure to prosecute. Crim. No. 04-1836, Doc. 5.
Ms. Farr claims that she did not file the criminal prosecution against this Defendant for unreasonable or vexatious purposes, and that she moved to have the case dismissed because of "practical considerations." She states that it would have been difficult to bear the inconvenience and extra travel expense for herself (at least 6 hours from her home) and witnesses (who live in the Catron County area). Defendant points out that she never raised these objections when the case was removed. Ms. Farr has nothing to say about Defendant's description of her actions and motivations leading up to this case.
Defendant points out that Ms. Farr's concerns about travel did not extend to Mr. Baker, who would have had to travel eight hours from Durango, Colorado, to defend himself. Mot. at 5, n. 6.
The Court finds there is some merit to Defendant's contention that Ms. Farr's decision to dismiss her prosecution of Mr. Baker might have something to do with this Court's familiarity with the history of the underlying civil case. The Court is not required to consider the criminal prosecution of Mr. Baker in a vacuum and ignore the backdrop events, especially when they have some relevance to Defendant's request for sanctions — which I find they do. Based on my review of the facts in the underlying civil case and in the instant prosecutorial "spin-off" case, of Ms. Farr's conduct in both cases which attempted to forestall and frustrate the execution of this Court's Orders, and the arguments made in the parties' pleadings, I find that sanctions are warranted against Ms. Farr.
III. What Standard Should be Used in Imposing Sanctions
A. Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that "[a]ny attorney or person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." Sanctions under § 1927 are appropriate "for conduct that, viewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney's duties to the court." Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987).
Ms. Farr contends that she did not file the criminal complaint against Mr. Baker to be vexatious and that she did not multiply the proceedings in any case. However, whether or not Ms. Farr's conduct fits under the categories of prohibited conduct under § 1927, the reason the Court is not inclined to impose sanctions under § 1927 is because of Ms. Farr's pro se status. Although the issue is undecided in this circuit, generally speaking, sanctions under § 1927 do not apply to pro se non-lawyer litigants. See, Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1992) (§ 1927 does not apply to pro se litigants unless litigant is an attorney); Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets, Inc, 883 F2d 1184 (3rd Cir. 1989) (error for trial court to impose attorney's fees against unsuccessful discrimination plaintiff since the plaintiff, as a litigant in the action, was not subject to suit under § 1927); Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates Inc, 765 F2d 511, 517 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1985) (§ 1927 does not apply to pro se litigant); FTC v. Alaska Land Leasing Inc, 799 F2d 507 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court could not assess sanctions against non-attorney under § 1927); but see, Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 1927 applies to pro se litigants); Colo. Judicial Dept v. Fleming, 726 F.Supp. 1216, 1219 (D.Colo. 1989) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides courts with power to sanction abusive pro se litigants).
There is a certain appeal to Defendant's argument that Ms. Farr acted in a lawyer-like capacity in this case, under the state's non-attorney prosecutor provision. However, the Court need not resolve the issue, and can simply resort to some other authority to impose sanctions. See, e.g., In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd., Inc. 40 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining to decided the issue under § 1927, since sanction imposed by bankruptcy court on pro se litigant could be affirmed under Court's inherent power); Ayala v. Holmes, unpubl. opin., 2002 WL 110414, 29 Fed. Appx. 548, 550-51 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting "conflict among the circuits on the question whether § 1927 applies to pro se litigants," and choosing to "look elsewhere for authority rather than choose sides"; Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 316 (7th Cir. 1997) (sanctions imposed on pro se inmate where court noted conflict among circuits on issue regarding sanctions under § 1927, and ultimately resorted to authority in courts' inherent powers).
New Mexico's non-attorney prosecutor provision allows private citizens acting in their own behalf to file criminal complaints against persons in the magistrate court that has jurisdiction over the alleged offense. N.M. Magistrate Ct.R.Cr.P.6-108 (2004).
B. Sanctions under Court's Inherent Power
A federal court has the inherent right to manage its own proceedings. It has authority under its own inherent powers to deter frivolous and abusive litigation and promote justice and judicial efficiency by imposing monetary sanctions. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980);Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1987);Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (recognizing the well-acknowledged inherent power of a court to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices). Such sanctions may include the imposition of attorney fees. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (court must exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate sanction, which may range from dismissal of a lawsuit to an assessment of attorney's fees);Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980);Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (recognizing the well-acknowledged inherent power of a court to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices). Although the "American Rule" prohibits the shifting of attorney's fees in most cases, an exception allows federal courts to exercise their inherent power to assess such fees as a sanction when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; when the party practices a fraud upon the court; delays or disrupts the litigation; or hampers a court order's enforcement.Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citations omitted). A court may resort to its inherent power to impose sanctions even if much of the misconduct at issue is also sanctionable under statute or rules of court, but inherent powers must be exercised with restrain and caution "because of their very potency." Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991).
Ms. Farr's pro se status does not preclude an imposition of sanctions under the Court's inherent powers. See, Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2nd Cir. 1986) (awards made under § 1927 are made only against attorneys or other persons authorized to practice before the courts while an award made under the court's inherent power may be made against an attorney, a party, or both); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (recommending that court follow statutes and rules when applicable, but when "neither the statute nor the rules are up to the task," court may safely rely on its inherent power).
I find that Ms. Farr's conduct throughout the litigation ofDiamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, Civil No. 96-437, and in subsequent criminal prosecutions including the present case, showed a disregard for the orderly process of justice. Ms. Farr stubbornly and repeatedly ignored this Court's findings and conclusions on the underlying civil matters; attempted to block and circumvent the execution of this Court's Contempt Order authorizing impoundment by publishing public threats and mailing intimidating letters; and abused the judicial system by bringing contrived Magistrate Court criminal prosecutions complaints against Forest Service contractors, like Mr. Baker in this case. Given its background and context, I regard Ms. Farr's criminal prosecution against Defendant Baker as frivolous and oppressive litigation brought in bad faith, and view her criminal prosecution of Mr. Baker as an example of her attempts to hamper the enforcement of a Court Order. Accordingly, I conclude that sanctions are appropriate under this Court's inherent power to promote justice and judicial efficiency, the latter being particularly significant in a federal district court already burdened with an unusually heavy case load resulting from law enforcement activities along the U.S./Mexico Border.
IV. Reasonableness of Fees and Other Expenses
Defendant seeks sanctions against Ms. Farr in the form of an award of attorney fees, as well as other expenses incurred by Defendant Baker as a result of defending this case. Defendant is seeking a total of $8,909.34. While the Court agrees that such an award is warranted, the reasonableness of the sanction must still be determined.
A court will generally determine what fee is reasonable by first calculating the lodestar — the total number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate — and then adjust the lodestar upward or downward to account for the particularities of the suit and its outcome. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). In adjusting the lodestar, there is no precise rule or formula. The Court has discretion in making this equitable judgment. Id. at 436-37.
Defendant raises an issue which is worth considering, although it can be summarily dispensed with. Defendant Baker was represented by attorneys employed by the National Wildlife Federation ("NWF"), a non-profit conservation organization, as well as private counsel acting pro bono. NWF was a party to the underlying civil case of Diamond Bar.
The fact that representation was undertaken pro bono does not preclude an award of fees when imposed as a sanction. In taking on Mr. Baker's defense, counsel's time and attention was diverted from other legal services. Further, if an award of fees was not allowed for pro bono representation, there would be an incentive to pursue abusive litigation if the opposing side is acting pro bono, or against individuals represented by pro bono counsel.
See, Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Com'n, 242 F.3d 227, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2001) (courts have consistently held that entities providing pro bono representation may receive attorney's fees where appropriate, even though they did not expect payment from the client and, in some cases, received public funding) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893-95 (1984) (upholding use of prevailing market rates to calculate attorney's fee award to Legal Aid Society in civil rights action)) (other citations omitted); In re Hunt, 238 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2001) (fact that debtor had obtained pro bono representation was not "special circumstance" for declining to award attorney fees); see also, S.E.C. v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that if attorney fees to pro bono organizations are not allowed, "it would more than likely discourage involvement by these organizations in [cases against the government]," effectively reducing access to the judiciary. . . ."); Mammano v. Pittston Co. 792 F.2d 1242, 1245 (4th Cir. 1986) (public interest law firm, as well as private firm, may be entitled to recover fees after prevailing in Title VII action); but see, In re Hedetneimi, 297 B.R. 837 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.,2003) (debtor was not responsible for award of attorney fees as damages for bank's willful violation of automatic stay, where she was represented pro bono, and was not responsible for payment of attorney fees, absent showing of any other actual damages).
Defense counsel Thomas D. Lustig, Esq., expended 93 hours at an hourly rate of $150.00/hour, resulting in a total "lodestar" fee of $13,950. See Ex. O, attachment 1. Mr. Lustig states that this amount reflects an adjustment to exclude any unnecessary, irrelevant or duplicative hours, including time expended by associate and local counsel, and law student interns. This amount does not include any time expended on the case by local counsel or co-counsel. Ex. O, ¶ 6. Also, based on an agreement between Defendant and his attorneys, if attorney fees are awarded, they shall be paid to the National Wildlife Federation. Ex. O, ¶ 1. Counsel then further reduced the $13,950 lodestar amount to reflect the prevailing market rate for defense of similar criminal cases in the District of New Mexico, resulting in a fee amount of $8,000.
In addition to attorney fees, counsel also seeks recovery of personal expenses by Defendant Baker in the amount of $909.34, consisting of $409.34 in telephone charges associated with his defense, and ten hours of lost work at $50.00/hour. Ex. O, Attachment 1, ¶ 8; Attachment 2. Charges which include incidental and necessary expenses, and which are normally billed in addition to attorneys' hourly charges, should be included in fee allowances if the expenses are reasonable. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 556 (10th Cir. 1983) (overruled on other grounds,Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council For Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987)).
The Court approves of defense counsel initiating a downward adjustment of the lodestar fee amount. However, given the relatively short run of the case in federal court, the Court finds that it should be further adjusted to an amount of $6,000. In addition, Plaintiff should be reimbursed for the expenses he has had to pay out of pocket for his defense, which would include $409.34 for telephone charges. However, I find no basis for allowing Mr. Baker's lost wages as an expense incurred as a result of his criminal prosecution. Thus, the total sum of the fee award is $6,000 in attorney fees and $409.34 for reimbursement of Defendant's expenses.
Conclusion
This Court finds that sanctions are warranted against Ms. Farr for bringing a criminal prosecution against Defendant Baker, in light of her conduct in this case as well as the events leading up to the criminal prosecution, as described above. Ms. Farr's pro se status precludes the imposition of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, although sanctions are allowed against pro se parties under this Court's inherent powers. Sanctions in the form of a fee award is appropriate, and the Court concludes that an award in the amount of $6,000 in attorney fees and $409.34 for reimbursement of Defendant's expenses is reasonable and just.THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 18) is hereby GRANTED IN PART in that Isaiah Baker is hereby awarded judgment against Sherry Farr in the total amount of $6,409.34.