Opinion
M09MCR140204542S
04-29-2016
State of Connecticut v. Francis Anderson
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Elpedio N. Vitale, J.
The defendant, Francis Anderson, stands charged in a five-count information with assault in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(3), and reckless endangerment in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64(a). There are four separate counts charging reckless endangerment in the second degree, each identifying a different alleged victim. A bench trial on these charges was conducted on February 24 and February 26, 2016, as well as on April 1 and April 4, 2016.
General Statutes § 53a-60 provides in relevant part: " (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when . . . (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument . . ."
General Statutes § 53a-64(a) provides: " A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person."
On February 26, 2016, at the close of the state's case, the defendant moved, pursuant to Practice Book § § 42-40 and 42-41, for a judgment of acquittal on each count of the information, arguing that " the evidence presented by the State cannot reasonably permit a finding of guilty." The defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The court heard oral argument on the motion that same day, and the state thereafter filed a memorandum of law in opposition.
Practice Book § 42-40 provides: " Motions for a directed verdict of acquittal and for dismissal when used during the course of a trial are abolished. Motions for a judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. After the close of the prosecution's case in chief or at the close of all the evidence, upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, the judicial authority shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal as to any principal offense charged and as to any lesser included offense fnxor which the evidence would not reasonably permit a finding of guilty. Such judgment of acquittal shall not apply to any lesser included offense for which the evidence would renxonably permit a finding of guilty." Practice Book § 42-41 provides: " If the motion is made after the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the judicial authority shall either grant or deny the motion before calling upon the defendant to present the defendant's case in chief. If the motion is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so."
On March 10, 2016, the court, in an oral ruling, denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. By agreement of the parties, and pursuant to § 42-41, the defendant's case-in-chief was presented on April 1, 2016, in conjunction with evidence relevant to the defendant's affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. The state presented rebuttal evidence, which connxuded on April 4, 2016. At the close of all the evidence, the defendant again moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence as to the defendant's mental disease or defect precluded a finding that the defendant had the capacity to act " recklessly, " as defined by our statutes and case law. The court denied the motion in an oral ruling on April 4, 2016. The defendant further contended that, if the court concluded that the state had established the elements of each of the crimes chnxged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence presented through the defendant's witness, Dr. Andrew Meisler, nonetheless established the existence of a lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect, as defined in General Statutes § 53a-13. The defendant alleged that, at the time the defendant purportedly committed the proscribed act or acts, he had a mental disease or defect; and that, as a result of that mentnx disease or defect, he lacked the substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or control his conduct within the requirements of the law.
General Statutes § 53a-13 provides in relevant part:
The state claimed that the evidence presented, including the evidence presented through its witness, Dr. Catherine Lewis, failed to satisfy the defendant's burden of proving the existence of a mental disease or defect. More specifically, the state argued that any alleged abnormality suffered by the defendant at the time he committed the proscribed acts manifested itself only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct and nothing else, and thus is not a mental disease or defect within the meaning of the § 53a-13. The state additionally argued that the defendant has not met his burden of proving that he had a mental disease or defect at the time he allegedly committed the acts in question and therefore lacked the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or control his behavior within the requirements of the law.
In reaching its conclusions, the court has fairly and impartially considered all of the evidence received at trial; evaluated the credibility of the witnesses; assessed the weight, if any, to be given specific evidence and measured the probative force of conflicting evidence; reviewed all exhibits, relevant statutes, and case law; and has drawn such inferences from the evidence, or facts established by the evidence, that it deems reasonable and logical.
To the extent it is necessary to further so explicate, the court's credibility determinations for each witness were made, inter alia, on the basis of the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses--both nonexpert and expert--as well as all the other factors relevant for each witness with respect to the credibilitynxvaluation. See Lapointe v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 Conn. 225, 268-71, 112 A.3d 1 (2015).
I.
Findings of Fact
On the basis on the evidence received at trial and the reasonable and logical inferences drawn therefrom, this court makes the following findings of fact.
On Sunday, August 24, 2014, Joanne Aldrich was employed at Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting) in Middletown, Connecticut, and was working that day as a " forensic treatment specialist." Whiting is a state-run facility designated to treat patients suffering from mental illness who are facing, or have faced, criminal prosecution. The responsibilities of a forensic treatment specialist include addressing patients' needs and safety by observation and interaction, creating progress notes, and ensuring patient compliance with facility rules and regulations.
Whiting is comprised of different units. On August 24, 2014, Aldrich was assigned to unit three and was working the second shift. Her hours were 2:45 to 11:15 p.m. Aldrich was responsible that evening for " rounds, " meaning that she was walking the floor of unit three every fifteen minutes to ensure that patients were in their bedrooms for the evening, as required by the unit rules. Sometime after 10 p.m., a patient was outside of his bedroom in violation of the unit rules and was acting in a loud and confused manner. The patient was standing by the exit door to unit three, near bedroom 301. Aldrich approached the patient and endeavored to convince him to return to his room; she was concerned that the individual would awaken other patients due to his conduct. Minutes after she approached the individual, she observed the defendant leave his bedroom, which was room DR303. At this time of the evening, all patients were required to remain in their rooms. Although the commotion caused the defendant to wake up, he ignored Aldrich and the patient and never approached them. The defendant's room was located approximately tnxrteen feet from where Aldrich and the patient were standing. A reasonable and logical inference to be drawn from this evidence is that the defendant conxciously chose not to confront these two individuals who were located in close proximity to his room.
Aldrich further observed the defendant walk away from the area where she was located, proceed down a hallway, and turn left at the nursing station (room 318). The defendant then proceeded down another hallway that ran perpendicular to the hallway where his bedroom was located. The location of these hallways was demonstrated by state's exhibit 1. The defendant's bedroom door had been closed prior to the time he exited, meaning the noise level was sufficient to permeate the closed door and awaken the defendant. He obviously chose to open the door and investigate further. Once the defendant turned left at the nursing station, Aldrich lost sight of him. Aldrich herself did not speak to the defendant after she observed him leave his room, and he did not say anything to her. Aldrich did not approach the defendant. Once the defendant turned left at the nursing station and proceeded down the adjacent hallway, his direction of travel was consistent with the location of the area where the employee " break room" was located; patients were not permitted in the break room.
At the same time that the defendant was proceeding down the hallway in the direction of the break room, four other forensic treatment specialists were present in said room and seated around two tables. Seated at the tables were David Latronica, Iris Fuqua, Darla White (then known as Darla Gybu), and William Hewitt.
The four forensic treatment specialists were engaged in conversation, cleaning up, and securing their personal belongings in anticipation of the end of their shifts. The dimensions of the room were approximately thirteen feet by thirteen feet. Each individual table measured approximately thirty inches wide by forty-eight inches long and were approximately twenty-nine inches tall. State's exhibit 2 depicts the configuration of the tables located in the break room on August 24, 2014. The tables were placed in such a manner that a portion of each table connected with the other. Located in close proximity to the tables was a shelf that contained several boxes and other items. The room also contained a sink and cabinets. The room had a door, which was open at that time. From the vantage point of the room's doorway, White was seated at the table on the left side, at the seat closest to the door, with Hewitt seated to her left. Fuqua was seated at the table on the right side of the door, with Latronica seated to her right. Lying on the tables were two duffel bags; one belonged to Fuqua, the other to White. Each bag contained various items, including such things as snacks, a lunch box, keys, notebooks, and clothing.
The defendant, a large and physically imposing man, appeared at the door to the break room without warning to its occupants. He did not immediately enter the room. The defendant was agitated and spoke in a loud voice. He was angry and began yelling that he had been awakened by a patient " down the hall" and complained that the individuals in the break room were " not doing" their jobs. He used profanity and threatening language and asked why they were not " helping that old lady" (Aldrich). According to state's exhibit 6, the defendant had traveled approximately eighty-two feet from his bedroom to the break room.
The court observed that Aldrich did appear to be significantly older than the aforementioned forensic treatment specialists located in the break room. The parties also acknowledged the court's observation during the April 1, 2016 proceedings.
As he continued to address the four individuals, the defendant fully entered the room, ultimately making contact with the tables. All four of the staff members eventually stood up. The defendant appeared to look directly at Latronica during his tirade. The defendant did not have a positive relationship with Latronica at that time. The four tried to calm the defendant down, without success. The defendant placed his hands on a table, but the individuals placed their hands on the same table in an effort to prevent the defendant from lifting or flipping it. The defendant thereupon grabbed both of the duffel bags from the tables and flung them in the air, and as a result, the contents of each bag were jettisoned about the small room.
Located close to the area where White was standing was a metal cart that was set on wheels and had a handle. The cart was used to convey food. The cart, which is state's exhibit 4, was approximately three inches higher than the tables. The defendant grabbed the cart by the handle and flung it toward White. The cart became airborne and struck White on the right side of her chest. She was standing at the time she was struck, and the impact of the cart caused her to fall back. White had attempted to block the cart with her arms. As White fell backward, she " went back into" the cabinets located in close proximity to where she was standing.
The defendant then exited the break room. Lance Mack, a forensic nurse working that evening, was located in room 311, known as the " med room." Mack became aware of the incident and went to the break room, where he observed all four staff members, who appeared to be " shaken up." Mack next observed the defendant in the hallway near room 321, which is a bathroom. The defendant and Mack looked at each other before the defendant entered the bathroom. There was a conference room (room 320) located directly across the hallway from the bathroom; Mack entered this conference room believing that the defendant would " follow him in" because thnxtwo " had a good rapport" and " it was the logical thing to do." Mack left the door open, sat down at a table, and began some work. The defendant thereafter entered the conference room, just as Mack had anticipated, and sat down. The defendant told Mack that he had " lost his temper" nxnd went into the break room. The defendant added that he was " frustrated" with " being on the unit." The defendant then related the " series of events" to Mack in a " calm but pressured" manner. Mack observed that the defendant was concise but followed logical thought patterns. The defendant remained in the room for approximately ten minutes.
White experienced substantial pain in her chest as a result of the impact with the metal cart. In addition, she experienced pain in her neck and shoulder. After the incident, White left Whiting and returned home. The following day, White was still experiencing pain in the aforementioned areas, as well as a headache. She sought treatment that day from Steven Piserchia, a chiropractor. However, the severity of her symptoms caused her to seek further treatment from a spinal surgeon, Jonas Lieponis, M.D. She saw Dr. Lieponis on August 28, 2014. Dr. Lieponis had treated White previously for a prior injury. Ultimately, because conservative treatment failed to alleviate her symptoms, White underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) on October 8, 2014. The MRI revealed a herniated cervical disc at the L6-L7 level. Despite efforts to avoid surgery, she underwent cervical discectomy and a concomitant fusion at L6-L7. White is still being treated by Dr. Lieponis, and he does not believe she will be able to go back to work in her former capacity. White is unable to turn her head to the right, experiences numbness in her hands, and cannot lift or engage in outdoor activities with her children.
Additional facts will be provided as needed.
II.
Conclusions of Law
A. Count One: Assault, Second Degree
The defendant is charged in count one of the information with assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60(a)(3), which provides that " [a] person is guilty of assault in the second degree when . . . the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." To establish a violation of § 53a-60(a)(3), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant acted recklessly; (2) acting recklessly, the defendant caused serious physical injury to another person, in the present case, White; and (3) the defendant used a dangerous instrument in causing such injury.
To establish the first element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted " recklessly." " A person acts 'recklessly' with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3(13). Recklessness, unlike criminal negligence, requires more than merely failing to perceive a risk; State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 643, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); rather, it " involves a subjective realization of a risk and a conscious decision to ignore [it]." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. " The standard of conduct of a reasonable person in the same situation as the defendant is the doing of something that a reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances or omitting to do what a reasonably prudent person would not do under the circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Otto, 50 Conn.App. 1, 11, 717 A.2d 775, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 927, 719 A.2d 1171 (1998). When a defendant is charged with the commission of a crime for which the state must prove recklessness, evidence of mental impairment is relevant. State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 240-41, 487 A.2d 532 (1985).
To establish the second element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that White sustained a " serious physical injury, " and that the defendant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of such injury. " 'Serious physical injury' means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3(4). " Serious physical injury" is thus something more serious than mere " physical injury, " which General Statutes § 53a-3(3) defines as " impairment of physical condition or pain." It is necessarily more than a minor or superficial injury. " In order for legal causation to exist in a criminal prosecution, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was both the cause in fact, or actual cause, as well as the proximate cause of the victim's injuries . . . In order that conduct be the actual cause of a particular result it is almost always sufficient . . . that but for the antecedent conduct the result would not have occurred . . . [P]roximate cause requires that the forbidden result which actually occurs must be enough similar to, and occur in a manner enough similar to . . . the result or manner which his reckless . . . conduct created a risk of happening . . . that the defendant may fairly be held responsible for the actual result even though it does differ or happens in a different way from the intended or hazarded result . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guitard, 61 Conn.App. 531, 541-42, 765 A.2d 30, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 952, 770 A.2d 32 (2001).
To establish the third element, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a " dangerous instrument" in causing the serious physical injury to White. " 'Dangerous instrument' means any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury . . ." General Statutes § 53a-3(7). Even " an ordinary object may be a dangerous instrument"; State v. McColl, 74 Conn.App. 545, 554, 813 A.2d 107 (concluding that footwear could constitute " dangerous instrument"), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 953, 818 A.2d 782 (2003); when, " under the circumstances in which the object is used or threatened to be used, it has the potential for causing serious physical injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the state alleges that a metal cart was a dangerous instrument. The defendant, a large man of imposing physical stature, was awakened by an unruly patient who was loud and disruptive. Angry at having been awakened, he left his bedroom in violation of unit rules. Observing Aldrich, whom he considered to be " an old lady" but someone he had a good relationship with, unsuccessfully handling the situation, he set out to find the other staff members on duty. The defendant accurately believed them to have congregated in the break room. He walked eighty-two feet to the break room. He consciously avoided and chose not to confront the two individuals who had actually caused him to wake up; one was a patient like himself, and the other " an old lady" with whom he enjoyed a good relationship.
A reasonable and logical inference from the evidence is that the defendant consciously made a decision to confront the individuals he felt were actually to blame for the commotion that woke him up. The blame he ascribed to them was their failure to come to the aid of Aldrich despite the commotion and her age. He accurately predicted that the staff, who he felt should have been " doing their jobs" and assisting Aldrich, had congregated instead in the break room. He knew the patient with whom Aldrich was dealing to have significant mental limitations and therefore did not feel it was appropriate to confront him.
Upon entering the break room, he loudly and profanely berated the staff members present for " not doing their jobs" in their failure to assist Aldrich. He did not like Latronica as the result of past interactions. He unsuccessfully attempted to lift a table immediately adjacent to the four staff members. Undeterred, he then grabbed and flung two duffel bags located on the table, causing their contents to be jettisoned around the room. Unsatisfied with that result, he immediately located and then flung in the air a metal food cart toward White, hitting her directly in the chest. White was located in very close proximity to the defendant. The defendant then exited the room, and subsequently presented himself to Mack in the med room, where he sat down and " concisely" and with a logical thought pattern relayed the events in the break room.
The defendant introduced evidence of mental impairment through Dr. Meisler in an effort to negate the element of recklessness. Rebuttal evidence was introduced by the state through Dr. Lewis. The court concludes, however, that the direct and circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable and logical inferences drawn therefrom, demonstrate that the defendant possessed the mental capacity to understand and appreciate the gravity of the risk involved in flinging a metal cart toward a person located in close proximity to him. See State v. Patterson, 131 Conn.App. 65, 27 A.3d 374 (2011), aff'd, 308 Conn. 835, 68 A.3d 83 (2013); State v. Gracewski, 61 Conn.App. 726, 733-34, 767 A.2d 173 (2001).
In Patterson, the Appellate Court clarified that, " in order for a defendant to possess the mental state of recklessness, he or she must be aware of the risk created." State v. Patterson, supra, 131 Conn.App. 71. Evidence of mental incapacity thus will be relevant where it tends to show that the defendant was or was not aware that the proscribed conduct posed a risk of harm. This principle is exemplified by the particular facts in Patterson . In that case, the defendant had been convicted of posing a risk of injury to a child by depriving the child of fluids for several days, which resulted in the child's death from dehydration. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim on appeal that, in light of her diminished mental capacity, there was insufficient evidence that she possessed the mental state required for conviction under the relevant statute, which has a recklessness mental element. In so doing, the court noted that " [t]he defendant, on the morning of the victim's death, observed the victim's body and correctly indicated to emergency personnel that the child was dehydrated. From this, the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant understood the causal relationship between depriving the victim of liquids and the physiological condition known as dehydration that he suffered as a result. The defendant's decision to deprive the victim of fluids for four days, in light of her understanding that dehydration could result, demonstrates a reckless disregard for the possibility that the victim might be harmed by her actions." State v. Patterson, supra, 77.
The court has considered all of the evidence relevant to this issue, including the testimony and reports provided by each of the experts. After such consideration, the court concludes that the defendant's conduct both before and following White's assault demonstrates his awareness of, and consciousness disregard of, the substantial risk that his conduct would result in serious physical injury. The court finds that the defendant possessed the mental capacity to understand and to appreciate the gravity of the risk in violently throwing a metal cart toward White, and the ability to consciously choose to disregard such risk. The evidence from both Dr. Meisler and Dr. Lewis, in their testimony and reports, reflects that the defendant was interviewed in connection with the events of August 24, 2014. According to the defendant and the state, such testimony was offered for two purposes: on the issue of " recklessness" as an element of the offenses charged, and additionally for the purpose of addressing the affirmative defense that was raised. During his interviews in connection with this case, the defendant indicated to Dr. Lewis, and apparently as well in some fashion to Dr. Meisler, that " [he] didn't intend to hurt anyone." A reasonable and logical inference from that statement is that it evidences the defendant's tacit acknowledgment that he in fact was aware of the risk that his conduct may have resulted in injury to White or others. While certainly not dispositive of the issue, the comment is a piece of additional evidence that, in the context of all the events that occurred in the break broom and all of the other evidence presented, serves to further confirm his awareness of the risks and consequences of his actions.
The evidence demonstrated that he had a motive for engaging in the conduct at issue. The evidence lacked any basis to conclude that the defendant, at the time of the incident, suffered from any substantial cognitive defects, delusions, compulsions, phobias, or psychosis. He has some ability to think abstractly and evidenced a sufficient fund of knowledge given his level of education regarding current events and ongoing issues.
Applying the definition of " recklessly, " as delineated in the statute and case law, as well as the definition of " dangerous instrument, " the court finds proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of those elements.
Regarding the element of " serious physical injury, " the court also finds this element to be proven. The testimony from Dr. Lieponis established that White sustained a herniated cervical disc at L6-L7 and was required to undergo a cervical discectomy and fusion. Although White had a prior injury and surgery to her cervical spine, said injury was at L5-L6, which is a different level. The uncontroverted evidence was that this prior injury to a different level had been stabilized at the time of this incident and solid arthrodesis had occurred, and that she had since returned to work. Thus, the prior surgery had been successful. There was no other evidence presented suggesting some other event or circumstance as the cause of White's serious injury at L6-L7 of her cervical spine.
" The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 657, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010). " [I]t does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
To the extent the defendant argues that the preexisting injury at a completely different cervical level impacts the element of causation and serious physical injury, the court has considered and rejects said claim. As our Supreme Court stated in State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 233, 405 A.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 1248, 59 L.Ed.2d 475 (1979), " [e]very person is held to be responsible for the natural consequences of his acts, and if he commits a felonious act and [a certain result] follows, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove other causes cooperated to produce that result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Similarly, " the [defendant's] knowledge or ignorance of the victim's peculiar physical condition is immaterial so far as the issue of causation is concerned, because there was no intervening cause." R. Perkins, Criminal Law (2d Ed. 1969) § 9, p. 727. Finally, the court in this vein is cognizant of the defendant's apparent ancillary claim that the prior injury may also constitute an " intervening cause" impacting the state's proof of causation. Again, to the extent that argument is made, the court has considered the evidence in light of State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 659 A.2d 683 (1995), and State v. Kurzatkowski, 119 Conn.App. 556, 564-65, 988 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010), and concludes that said argument is without merit.
The court therefore finds proven each of the elements of the first count, assault in the second degree.
B. Counts Two through Five: Reckless Endangerment, Second Degree
The defendant is charged in counts two through five of the information with reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-64(a), which provides: " A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person." Counts two through five relate to the four forensic treatment specialists who were confronted by the defendant in the break room, namely, White, Fuqua, Latronica, and Hewitt, respectively. To establish these violations, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant acted recklessly and (2) the defendant's recklessness created a risk of physical injury to White, Fuqua, Latronica, and Hewitt. At oral argument, the state specified that the conduct at issue in these counts relates to the duffel bags located on the tables in the break room. The state alleges that the defendant grabbed both of the bags and flung them in the air, causing their contents to be jettisoned about the room, placing White, Fuqua, Latronica, and Hewitt at risk of physical injury.
The first element the state must prove is that the defendant acted " recklessly." Having previously discussed the meaning of " recklessly" with respect to the first count, and having also considered the claims raised by the defendant with respect to evidence of his alleged mental impairment, the court will not unnecessarily repeat its analysis as to this element with respect to counts two through five. The court has employed the same analysis with these counts, and that analysis applies with equal weight and effect.
The second element is that the defendant's recklessness created a risk of physical injury to another person. " Physical injury" means " impairment of physical condition or pain." General Statutes § 53a-3(3). It is unnecessary for any person to have been actually injured by the defendant's conduct; see State v. Batista, 101 Conn.App. 623, 637 n.14, 922 A.2d 1116 (noting that " [a]ctual injury . . . is not an element of reckless endangerment"), 284 Conn. 918, 933 A.2d 721 (2007); or for the defendant to have intended to injure or endanger any person, but there must be proof that another person was actually put at risk of physical injury. See State v. Thomas, 56 Conn.App. 573, 578, 745 A.2d 199 (holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove reckless endangerment where defendant shot pistol into ground but there was no evidence of presence of other people in vicinity), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 953, 749 A.2d 1204 (2000).
The defendant's conduct with respect to these counts occurred in a relatively small room. Its dimensions were approximately thirteen feet by thirteen feet. The two tables located therein measured approximately thirty inches wide by forty-eight inches long and were approximately twenty-nine inches tall. Shelves containing boxes were also located in close proximity to the tables. White, Fuqua, Hewitt, and Latronica were all present in the room, in close proximity to the tables and the duffel bags. The evidence and the reasonable and logical inferences drawn therefrom demonstrate that each staff member was placed at risk of physical injury by the defendant's act of throwing the duffel bags, in that each was at risk of being struck by the duffel bags, their contents, or items knocked off the shelves located close to the tables.
Applying the definitions of " recklessly" as delineated in the statute and case law, as well as the definition of " physical injury, " the court finds proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of these elements with respect to counts two through five.
III.
Affirmative Defense: Lack of Capacity Due to Mental Disease or Defect
Having found proven the elements of the crimes charged, the court's next task is to determine whether the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect, as provided by § 53a-13. Section 53a-13 provides in relevant part: " (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law. Insofar as relevant to this case, the statute further provides as follows in subsection (c) " As used in [§ 53a-13], the terms mental disease or defect do not include (1) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, or (2) pathological or compulsive gambling." Thus, in order to prove this affirmative defense, the defendant must establish two elements: (1) he had a mental disease or defect at the time that he allegedly committed the proscribed act or acts; and (2) as a result of that mental disease or defect, he lacked the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.
Although it did not appear to be explicitly argued or referenced, the court is also cognizant of the language contained in State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88, 102-03, 755 A.2d 202 (2000).
With regard to the first element, although it is focused on the defendant's mental condition at the time he committed the acts in question, his mental condition before and after he committed the acts in question may also be considered, to the extent that it bears upon and tends to shed light on his mental condition at the time of the commission of the acts charged against him. Mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind that substantially affects mental or emotional processes or substantially impairs behavioral controls. The term " behavioral controls" refers to the process and capacity to regulate and control one's conduct and actions. The statute does not define the terms " mental disease" or " defect, " except to say that the terms do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. Therefore, if the defendant had an abnormality that was evidenced only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct and was not manifested or evidenced by anything else, it would not be a mental disease or defect within the meaning of the statute, and it would be unnecessary for the court to further consider the affirmative defense. Whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect is a question of fact for the court's determination, considering all the evidence from expert and nonexpert witnesses bearing on this issue.
Determining that the defendant had a mental disease or defect, however, is not enough; the court must also determine whether the second element of the defense has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The second element of the affirmative defense can be established under either the cognitive prong or the volitional prong. " Under the cognitive prong [of the insanity defense], a person is considered legally insane if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the . . . [wrongfulness] of his conduct . . . Under the volitional prong, a person also would be considered legally insane if he lacks substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Madigosky, 291 Conn. 28, 39, 966 A.2d 730 (2009). Although the defendant need only proceed under one of the prongs, both renxire that the defendant lacked substantial capacity. A substantial capacity is a significant or material capacity, not a minor or inconsequential capacity. A determination must thus be made as to whether the defendant's incapacity was substantial.
Under the cognitive prong, a defendant may be relieved of criminal responsibility where he lacked substantial capacity to understand both intellectually and emotionally that his actions were wrong. This does not include a person whose faculties were impaired in some measure but were still sound enough for him to understand that his conduct was wrong. Not every mental deficiency or abnormality leaves a person without substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. It is only when he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate that a particular act or course of conduct was wrong that this part of the affirmative defense excuses him from criminal liability.
Under the volitional prong, the defendant is relieved from criminal liability if his mental disease or defect results in a lack of substantial capacity to keep his conduct within the requirements of the law, even though he may appreciate its wrongfulness. A person whose faculties are impaired but is still able to control his conduct, however, cannot claim a lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. To be relieved of criminal liability pursuant to this affirmative defense, the defendant must lack substantial capacity to keep his conduct under control and thus keep it within the requirements of the law.
In support of the affirmative defense, the defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Meisler. Dr. Meisler is currently employed as a psychologist at the VA Connecticut Healthcare System, and he additionally engages in private practice and consulting in clinical psychology. He conducts evaluations and engages in therapy with teens and adults. In addition, he conducts psychiatric disability evaluations of veterans seeking disability ratings for psychiatric conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety disorders. He has previously testified " dozens of times" as an expert witness in criminal matters involving, inter alia, competency to stand trial, mental disease or defect, mitigation due to mental illness, and cognitive impairment. His testimony, on each occasion when it occurred in a criminal matter, was on behalf of the defense. During Dr. Meisler's testimony, the defendant introduced defense exhibits F through I, which consist of reports that address the defendant's mental capacity and which therein also recount past evaluations. Dr. Meisler explained the various records that informed his testimony, including his review of records obtained from Whiting from the period of July 1, 2014, to September 1, 2014, regarding the defendant's hospitalization. Those records included a detailed summary documenting the defendant's status and treatment from early in his admission there in 2013. Dr. Meisler previously evaluated the defendant in May 2013, in connection with another court proceeding, and defense exhibit F details the various reports Dr. Meisler reviewed in connection with that evaluation. In summary, Dr. Meisler reviewed records regarding the defendant encompassing the time period from age twelve to the present time. Dr. Meisler also interviewed the defendant twice, on May 5, 2015, and November 30, 2015, in conjunction with his evaluation and testimony in this case.
In Dr. Meisler's opinion, the defendant suffers from " complex post-traumatic stress disorder" (complex PTSD), which Dr. Meisler asserted encompasses people who sustained a prolonged childhood trauma. According to the " literature, " this disorder is marked by prolonged childhood trauma, and those afflicted have a reaction to tense situations consisting not simply of " stress and anxiety and distressing memories, " but rather a more profound disturbance in the way they relate to others and the world. Such individuals have difficulty with " rage reactions, " " impulse control, " and " interpersonal functioning." Dissociation is common with individuals with complex PTSD. Dr. Meisler described dissociation as a mental state where an individual is " not disconnected from reality, but disconnected from his present surroundings in that the individual acts in a way not completely connected from that which is going on around him." Such individuals can be reacting to a " flashback" during which they relive a past memory. He further described it as a " detachment from present reality."
In Dr. Meisler's opinion, the defendant has difficulty with impulse control and mood regulation and has difficulty with interpersonal functioning. At a 2013 hearing on an unrelated matter involving the defendant, Dr. Meisler indicated that the defendant's behavior can be " not planned or thought out" and that his behavior reflected that he " did not have the conscious capacity to chose to do, or not do, or control." Dr. Meisler also referenced certain diagnoses and conditions described in the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's " Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (DSM-5).
In a report authored by Donald Grayson, M.D., following his own assessment of the defendant, and reviewed by Dr. Meisler in connection with his current evaluation and testimony, Dr. Grayson did not diagnose the defendant with PTSD. Dr. Meisler acknowledged this during his testimony. Dr. Meisler also acknowledged that " there was some truth" to the statement that " if you treat Mr. Anderson well, he will treat you well." Similarly, Dr. Meisler acknowledged reviewing a Department of Correction report in which the defendant informed department staff that, if he was placed in a restricted unit of some kind, then he would harm either himself or another inmate. Dr. Meisler further acknowledged that such a statement constituted a threat. Other exhibits revealed that the defendant has multiple criminal convictions and has received a substantial number of disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. Insofar as his diagnosis of complex PTSD is concerned, Dr. Meisler conceded that it is not actually a diagnosis in the DSM-5 and, further, that it was not contained in an earlier edition, the DSM-4.
Dr. Meisler also conceded that the defendant did not suffer from hallucinations or somnambulism (sleepwalking) and also that there was no evidence that, on the day in question, the defendant woke up from a nightmare. He further acknowledged that, when the defendant chose not to confront Aldrich or the unruly patient in the hallway near his bedroom, he was not in a dissociative state, nor so when he entered the break room to confront the staff. His conduct, in ignoring Aldrich and his fellow patient by walking down the hallway and confronting other staff was a " volitional act." Dr. Meisler testified that the defendant " had a reason and an intent" for going into the break room and confronting the staff. He also chose to leave the break room without engaging in any further assaultive conduct, including any conduct directed toward Latronica, a person he already disliked even prior to this incident.
Dr. Meisler's testimony, when considered in light of the foregoing behaviors, served to undercut his conclusions with regard to their relevance as to the existence of a mental disease or defect and, more specifically, what he characterized as complex PTSD. The defendant chose to do, or not to do, a variety of things during the events in question. The evidence demonstrates that his choices appeared connected to the circumstances he took issue with.
The state offered additional testimony from Dr. Lewis for the purpose of opposing the defendant's affirmative defense. Dr. Lewis is currently a professor of psychiatry in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Connecticut Health Center. She is engaged in teaching, clinical work, and forensic work, and she acts as a consult liaison. Dr. Lewis has testified more than fifty times in matters related to this type of defense, and she has in that regard been retained by the prosecution, defense, and also by courts in states where that procedure is utilized. Dr. Lewis interviewed the defendant for a total of eight hours in connection with her testimony. State's exhibit 10 reflects her report, which includes all of the prior mental health evaluations and other records of the defendant that she reviewed in connection with her testimony, again spanning from age twelve to the present time.
According to Dr. Lewis, the defendant was first diagnosed with PTSD in 2005 while placed in Whiting. There had been no such diagnosis issued as a consequence of his treatment at Riverview Hospital (Riverview) prior to Whiting. He was found at Riverview to be conduct-disordered. Thereafter, when the defendant transitioned from Whiting back into the community, he was engaged in services at Capitol Region Mental Health Center (Capitol Region). The defendant's experience at Capitol Region is noteworthy in that Capitol Region observed that the defendant could be appropriate, polite, and cooperative but that he also engaged in multiple aggressive behaviors. He would thereafter minimize his aggressive behaviors. Although he did not consistently attend required group sessions, Capitol Region noted that he " doesn't hit people and he is working." He had conflicts with some people and got along with others. While at Capitol Region, it is evident that the defendant wanted things " on his terms." Upon discharge, Capitol Region diagnosed the defendant with, inter alia, PTSD. Dr. Lewis' lengthy report documents the defendant's extensive criminal legal history, commencing in 1981, and includes his repeated misconduct and assaultive behavior while in the custody of the Department of Correction. He has been imprisoned on multiple occasions and has also been in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services at Whiting. There are allegations of continued misconduct against staff and other residents at that facility as well.
Rather than confirming the prior PTSD diagnoses, Dr. Lewis instead opined that the defendant meets the criteria for antisocial personality disorder. Her evaluation and review of the records indicate that the defendant " breaks laws, he does not always tell the truth." DSM-5 specifies a lack of remorse additionally for this diagnosis, and Dr. Lewis concluded that the defendant " rationalizes" having hurt others. Furthermore, in connection with this diagnosis, the defendant met the criteria for childhood conduct disorder before age fifteen, as evidenced by records documenting bullying, threatening, intimidation, and engaging in physical fights with others during the relevant time period. Parenthetically, in this regard, Dr. Meisler, the defendant's witness, also conceded that, with respect to the DSM-5 criteria for antisocial personality disorder, the defendant " technically" met the criteria for antisocial personality disorder as listed in DSM-5.
Dr. Lewis further opined that the defendant did not meet the criteria for PTSD, although there is not much dispute that the defendant was neglected and likely abused in childhood. She currently treats and has knowledge and experience regarding PTSD and has written about it. Dr. Lewis noted that very few diagnoses are " as much geared on self-report" than PTSD. In treatment contexts, less collateral information is gathered in support of a diagnosis as compared to the forensic context. To demonstrate this point, she alluded to the lack of a historical record of " real time" events in the defendant's past that would support a PTSD diagnosis. The defendant provided Dr. Lewis with " consistent accounts" of his version of the events of August 24, 2014, " that made sense, " though his accounts differed in some respects from the accounts provided by the staff members involved. When interviewed by Dr. Lewis in connection with her evaluations, the defendant " did not endorse symptoms" consistent with PTSD. Of significance in this regard was the fact that the defendant clearly recalled all of the individuals involved as all of the events of August 24, 2014, unfolded. That fact is thus inconsistent with sleepwalking, a " dissociated rage, " or a flashback. The defendant told Dr. Lewis that he bypassed Aldrich and the patient she was involved with (commenting to Dr. Lewis, in reference to this patient, that " that man is crazy") and proceeded down a hallway where he heard laughter from Latronica. He was " already angry with" Latronica. His account of what occurred in the break room, although different in respects to the accounts of the staff members, nevertheless was consistent with each rendition he provided and was inconsistent with psychosis or flashback; it was a detailed account.
The fact that he told Mack that " he didn't intend to hurt anyone in there" is also inconsistent with a dissociative state; a discussion about a level of intent would be contrary to such a circumstance, as it demonstrates clear thinking and decision-making. Furthermore, the violence exhibited by the defendant was not indiscriminate. The defendant bypassed two potential targets, thus making the judgment that Aldrich and the unruly patient were not the people who deserved to be dealt with. He heard laughter from a person he was already upset with. Dr. Lewis therefore opined that, when the defendant continued on toward Latronica, it is " more consistent with holding a grudge or beef, which we see in antisocial personality disorder and then carrying out an angry response." Dr. Lewis also confirmed that, although Dr. Meisler diagnosed complex PTSD, that diagnosis " does not even appear in the DSM."
As referenced earlier, the defendant's background is replete with instances of repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial behavior. State's exhibit 10 demonstrates that the defendant has numerous prior criminal convictions and corresponding prison sentences. While incarcerated as a result, he amassed not only additional criminal charges, but incurred administrative sanctions within the Department of Correction based on his continued assaultive and aggressive conduct. In addition, he currently has pending additional criminal charges based on allegations arising from his alleged conduct while in the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services.
Although there does not appear to be a serious dispute that the defendant experienced abuse and neglect in his childhood, there likewise does not appear to be any serious dispute that the defendant has engaged in repetitive antisocial acts. Thus, the court finds, after a careful review of all the evidence, that the defendant's mental condition at the time he committed the acts in question is consistent with antisocial personality disorder rather than complex PTSD. The court further finds, after a careful review of all the evidence and relevant statutory and case law, that the defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect. The defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of proving that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law. The court additionally finds that any abnormality the defendant possessed was manifested only by repeated or otherwise antisocial conduct, which, according to § 53a-13(c), is incompatible with the meaning of the term " mental disease or defect."
For the foregoing reasons, the court returns verdicts as follows to the charges contained in the information:
Count One: Assault, second degree, in violation of § 53a-60(a)(3):
GUILTY
Count Two: Reckless endangerment, second degree, in violation of § 53a-64(a):
GUILTY
Count Three: Reckless endangerment, second degree, in violation of § 53a-64(a):
GUILTY
Count Four: Reckless endangerment, second degree, in violation of § 53a-64(a):
GUILTY
Count Five: Reckless endangerment, second degree, in violation of § 53a-64(a):
GUILTY
(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law. * * * (c) As used in this section, the terms mental disease or defect do not include (1) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, or (2) pathological or compulsive gambling.