Opinion
No. 5-292 / 04-1561
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Fredrick E. Breen, District Associate Judge.
Angela Allen appeals from her convictions and sentences, following guilty pleas, for introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility, and for possession of contraband in a correctional institution. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy N. Schott, County Attorney, and Sarah J. Livingston and Ricki L. Osborn, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
The State accused Angela Marie Allen of bringing marijuana into the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. As part of a plea agreement, Angela Allen pled guilty to introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.8 (2003), and possession of contraband (a controlled substance) in a correctional institution, in violation of section 719.7. Both are class D felonies. The district court sentenced Allen to indeterminate five-year terms of incarceration on each count, with the terms to be served consecutively. Allen now appeals, asserting her counsel was ineffective (1) by allowing Allen to waive her right to file a motion in arrest of judgment despite the lack of a factual basis for her guilty plea to introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility, and (2) by failing to ensure her guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. After considering the arguments of the parties and reviewing the record, we conclude Allen is entitled to relief based on her first contention, but not on her second. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Scope and Standards of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 2002). To prevail on her appeal, Allen must prove (1) her counsel breached one or more essential duties, and (2) she suffered prejudice due to those breaches. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). Regarding the first element, Allen must rebut the presumption that her counsel provided competent representation. State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987). To show prejudice, she must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
II. Alleged Lack Factual Basis For a Guilty Plea to Introducing a Controlled Substance into a Detention Facility.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the rules of criminal procedure require the district court to ensure the plea is supported by a factual basis. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). Additionally, if a defendant pleads guilty to a crime for which no factual basis exists, defense counsel renders ineffective assistance. Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 579. Allen asserts her plea of guilty to a charge of violating section 719.8 is not supported by a factual basis. While conceding the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility is a "correctional institution or institution under the management of the department of corrections" under section 719.7, she asserts the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility is not a "detention facility," as the term is used in the current version of section 719.8.
The supreme court has previously recognized that "detention facility," as the term was used in Iowa Code section 719.8 (1989), was ambiguous and susceptible of broad or narrow meanings. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 464 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa 1990). There, the court determined a county jail was a detention facility. Id. Here, we must determine whether "detention facility" includes the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. We conclude it does not.
General Rules For Interpreting and Construing Statutes.
When working with a statute, our primary object is to determine and "give effect to the legislature's intent." T K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 1999). We read all portions of an enactment together and "we do not give undue importance to an isolated part." State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984). We presume the "entire statute is intended to be effective," see Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (2003), and we avoid any interpretation, construction, or application that would make any portion of a statute "superfluous or redundant." Hauan, 361 N.W.2d at 338; see also T K Roofing, 593 N.W.2d at 162 ("redundant or irrelevant").
We must consider an act's legislative history. Iowa Code § 4.6(3). Specifically, we must consider language stricken from an act prior to enactment, for this provides "an indication the statute should not be construed to include it." Chelsea Theater Corp. v. City of Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Iowa 1977). We also must consider prior versions or enactments of the statute under consideration. Iowa Code § 4.6(4); Christianson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 557 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa 1996).
Finally, we note that criminal laws are to be strictly construed. State v. Selestan, 515 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
The Statutes At Issue.
In relevant part, Iowa Code section 719.7 prohibits introducing contraband "into, or onto, the grounds of a correctional institution or institution under the management of the department of corrections." Iowa Code § 719.7(3)(b) (2003). "Contraband" includes controlled substances and intoxicating beverages. Id. § 719.7(1)(a). The Fort Dodge Correctional Facility is under the control of the Department of Corrections. See id. § 904.102(9). Section 719.8 prohibits, in relevant part, introducing "a controlled substance or intoxicating beverage into the premises of" a "detention facility." Id. § 719.8.
Prior to 1999, section 719.7 prohibited providing "an intoxicating beverage to an inmate at a detention facility, correctional institution, or an institution under the management of the department of corrections" or introducing such a beverage into such premises. Iowa Code § 719.7 (1997). Similarly and prior to 1999, section 719.8 prohibited making a "controlled substance" available to "an inmate at a detention facility or correctional institution, or at an institution under the management of the Iowa department of corrections" or introducing such a substance into such premises. Id. § 719.8.
In 1999, proposed legislation would have amended section 719.7 and repealed section 719.8. See original S.F. 101, 78th G.A. (Iowa 1999). The proposed section 719.7 would have criminalized introducing, conveying, making, obtaining, and possessing contraband, including controlled substances and intoxicating beverages, at "a secure facility for the detention or custody of juveniles [or a jail], detention facility, correctional institution, or institution under the management of the department of corrections." The proposed legislation was significantly revised prior to passage. In its end form, it enacted sections 719.7 and 719.8 in their current language: one targeting its prohibition of controlled substances and intoxicating beverages toward correctional institutions or institutions under the management of the department of corrections (section 719.7) and one targeting a similar prohibition toward detention facilities (section 719.8). See 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 163, §§ 1-2 (and codified at Iowa Code §§ 719.7-.8 (2001)) (amended version of S.F. 101).
With this background in mind, we conclude "correctional institution or institution under the management of the department of corrections" and "detention facility" are mutually exclusive terms. First, we note the prior versions of both section 719.7 and section 719.8 used each of these terms. We attach significance to that fact. See, e.g., Christenson, 557 N.W.2d at 261. If the "detention facility" is interpreted to include the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility and similar facilities, then "correctional institution or institution under the management of the department of corrections" would be superfluous. We decline to read these statutes in that manner. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d at 338.
Additionally, we note the statutory predecessors were written in the disjunctive. In the prior versions of sections 719.7 and 719.8, the legislature connected "detention facility" and other institutions and facilities with the word "or." See Iowa Code §§ 719.7, .8 (1999). The use of the disjunctive "or" suggests the terms have "separate meanings." T K Roofing, 593 N.W.2d at 163. We conclude the legislature, when it revised sections 719.7 and 719.8 while retaining these terms, intended these terms to retain their separate meanings. See, e.g., Christenson, 557 N.W.2d at 261.
Moreover, we must ascribe some meaning to the legislature's decision not to include all such facilities in one statute. See, e.g., Chelsea Theater Corp., 258 N.W.2d at 374. By providing a statute for each, the legislature made a decision to treat detention facilities separately from correctional institutions and institutions under the control of the Department of Corrections. It is impermissible for this court to interfere with this decision "under the guise of construction," Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep't, 335 N.W.2d 439, 444 (Iowa 1983), especially considering this is a criminal statute, which must be construed narrowly, see Selestan, 515 N.W.2d at 359.
Finally, we do not think this conclusion leads to an absurd result, see Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1989), or frustrates the objects the legislature sought to accomplish, see Hauan, 361 N.W.2d at 338. Rather, we conclude the two statutes target two similar but distinct harms. We must honor that distinction.
Were we viewing the phrase "detention facility" in isolation, we would have no difficulty in concluding the phrase encompassed the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. However, we cannot read this, or any other statutory fragment, in isolation. Rather, we must read it in its proper context. See T K Roofing, 593 N.W.2d at 162. When we do so, we are compelled to arrive at a different conclusion. Having concluded the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility is not a "detention facility," as that term is used in section 719.8, there is no factual basis for Allen's plea of guilty to violating that section. Counsel breached an essential duty. See Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 579. Moreover, in this context, we need not consider Strickland prejudice, for prejudice is inherent. Id.
In State v. Mitchell, 650 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Iowa 2002), our supreme court was confronted by the question of whether a county jail was a "correctional institution" under section 719.7(3) (1999). After construing the statute, the court concluded the facts alleged did not state a violation of the statute upon which the charge was based. See Mitchell, 650 N.W.2d at 620. Therefore, it concluded Mitchell's guilty plea lacked a factual basis and vacated his conviction. Id. at 620-21 (citing State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999)). In doing so, the court made the following observation: "There will be cases in which the interpretation of the statutes present a close case involving good-faith professional judgment. Nevertheless, we adhere to our view that all such convictions must be vacated." Id. at 621. We believe this observation is particularly suited to the present case, and conclude Mitchell controls our disposition.
We reverse Allen's conviction for violating section 719.8 and remand for dismissal of that charge.
III. Alleged Failure to Ensure Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea.
Allen alleges her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the district court failed to advise her that she could receive consecutive sentences. A defendant must be so advised before a plea will be considered knowing and voluntary. State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Iowa 1998).
Although conceding Allen was not properly advised about the potential for consecutive sentences and apparently acknowledging Allen's counsel breached an essential duty, the State argues Allen has failed to show Strickland prejudice. We agree, for two reasons. First, given our disposition of Allen's first contention, there will be no "consecutive" sentences to serve. Second, assuming we found a factual basis for the alleged violation of section 719.8, Allen has failed to show or even claim there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors," she "would have not pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985). The "conclusory claim of prejudice," see Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 579, that Allen makes on this point is insufficient as a matter of law. Id. IV. Conclusion.
We have considered all issues presented. We reverse Allen's conviction for violating Iowa Code section 719.8 and remand for a dismissal of that count of the indictment. The remainder of the district court's judgment is affirmed.