Opinion
67114-6-I
07-23-2012
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JAMEL LEE ADAMS, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Dwyer, J.
In this prosecution for the rape and attempted rape of the defendant's adopted sister, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that the defendant's and victim's mother physically abused the victim and other children in her home. The court also did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence condition prohibiting Adams' unsupervised contact with minors, but allowing such contact with his own children. We affirm.
I
Based on allegations that Jamel Adams sexually abused his adopted sister, L.S., the State charged him with attempted rape in the third degree. At trial, the State added a charge of third degree rape. The State also charged his mother, Sandra Sly, with physically abusing L.S. and her sister. Sly pleaded guilty to that charge.
Prior to Adams' trial, his counsel moved to exclude evidence that Sly physically abused L.S. The State argued that Sly's abuse was admissible because it left L.S. with no one to disclose Adams' abuse to, it tended to explain why L.S. would keep the abuse secret and lie to authorities, and it created an environment that provided Adams the opportunity to sexually abuse L.S. Defense counsel argued the evidence had little relevance because he was not going to make an issue of L.S.'s delayed reporting, her initial lies to police, or her return to Sly's home following the first sexual assault. Counsel further argued that the evidence would be highly prejudicial because jurors might conclude "the acorn does not fall far from the tree." The trial court admitted the evidence, ruling that it was relevant to explain L.S.'s actions and credibility, was not unduly prejudicial, and prejudice could be minimized with a limiting instruction.
At trial, the State's evidence established that Sandra Sly adopted L.S. and her sister when L.S. was nine years old. Sly had four biological children of her own, including Jamel Adams, and had foster children in the home during the charging period.
L.S. described a disciplinary hierarchy in the Sly family where the biological children were treated well, rarely got into trouble, and had few, if any, chores. The foster children got into trouble more often than the biological children, but not as much as the adopted children—L.S. and her sister—who were on the bottom of the hierarchy. L.S. testified that Sly hit her with a belt or a switch and made her squat against a wall in painful positions for long periods of time. She described an occasion where she fell over from the squat position and Sly threw a can at her head, cutting her above the eye. L.S. did not go to school or have friends outside the home.
L.S. testified that Adams sexually abused her on three separate occasions. The first incident, which L.S. described as the "toe picking incident, " occurred in the summer of 2007. One of L.S.'s chores was to "pick" Sly's toes with tweezers. When Adams asked L.S. to pick his toes one day, she complied because she did not want to get in trouble. According to L.S., Adams started to fondle her buttocks and pulled her onto the bed. He then pulled off her pajama bottoms, held her down, and forcibly raped her. When he was finished he told L.S. not to tell their mother.
The second incident occurred after foster children and L.S. were removed from the home due to allegations that Sly physically abused them. L.S. almost immediately ran away from her new placement and returned to the Sly home where she hid from authorities. L.S. testified that after she returned, she and Adams were watching television when he pulled her onto his lap and pulled her pants down. He then attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis.
The third incident occurred during a family trip to Portland, Oregon. L.S. fell asleep on a couch in their hotel room. When she awoke, she was alone with Adams. She tried to run into the bathroom but Adams grabbed her, pulled her pants off, and forcibly raped her. The charges against Adams did not rely on the Oregon incident.
The day the family returned from Portland, L.S. ran away from home and contacted police. L.S. then disclosed Adams' sexual abuse and Sly's physical abuse. She later made similar disclosures to Child Protective Services, the prosecutor's office, and the defense.
L.S. testified that she initially told police everything was "fine" and "fun" in the Sly household and did not mention sexual or physical abuse because she was "scared" and afraid of what Sly might do to her. On cross-examination, L.S. admitted having three theft convictions. Defense counsel also confronted L.S. with a number of changes and inconsistencies in the statements she made during the investigation.
The jury found Adams guilty as charged. The trial court's sentence included a condition prohibiting him from unsupervised contact with minors except for his biological children and stepchildren. Adams appeals.
II
Adams first contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Sly physically abused the children in her home. He contends the evidence had little relevance and was far more prejudicial than probative. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
Under ER 402, only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. ER 401 defines "'relevant evidence'" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." The threshold for admitting relevant evidence is low and even "minimally relevant evidence is admissible." State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). ER 403, however, requires the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." "'[U]nfair prejudice is that which is more likely to arouse an emotional response than a rational decision by the jury [and which creates]' . . . an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis." State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568, 584, 14 P.3d 752 (2000) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Gould, 58 Wn.App. 175, 183, 791 P.2d 569 (1990)). The trial court has broad discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial impact. State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 710, 921 P.2d 495 (1996). We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 78, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).
Applying these principles here, Sly's physical abuse of the children was relevant to L.S.'s credibility because it tended to explain why she initially lied to police and delayed reporting Adams' offenses. Cf. State v. Grant, 83 Wn.App. 98, 106-07, 20 P.2d 609 (1996) (defendant's history of domestic violence was relevant to assessing victim's credibility); State v. Wilson, 60 Wn.App. 887, 888-90, 808 P.2d 754 (1991) (evidence of prior acts against the victim is relevant to explain the victim's delay in reporting the abuse and to rebut the implication that the current molestation did not occur). The evidence was also relevant to show that conditions in the home, including the physical abuse and disciplinary hierarchy, created an environment that Adams could exploit.
Adams claims the evidence was not relevant to L.S.'s delayed reporting or lies to police because his trial counsel said he would not make an issue of L.S.'s delayed reporting and "offered to stipulate" to the exclusion of L.S.'s initial lie to police. But as the trial court correctly observed,
it's there for the jury to consider. The first time we ever heard that she reported it was months or years . . . later.
So, whether you argue it or not, it's still evidence in the case that [the jury] can consider.
Furthermore, the State has no obligation to accept such a stipulation and "'can proceed to prove its case in the manner that it sees fit, subject to the restrictions of [the] rules of evidence.'" State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 652, 904 P.2d 245 (1995) (quoting State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 598-99, 757 P.2d 889 (1988)).The court did not abuse its discretion under ER 401 and 402.
In any event, the so-called "stipulation" in this case would not have prevented the jury from deducing from the evidence that L.S. delayed in reporting the offenses.
The court was also within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence was highly probative of L.S.'s credibility and post-offense conduct. It was also probative of the State's theory that the environment in the home provided Adams with the opportunity to exploit L.S. While the evidence carried some prejudice, there was no danger of unfair prejudice. Significantly, the evidence did not reveal any misconduct by Adams; rather, it only revealed misconduct by his mother. In addition, the court offered to give an instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence, but the defense declined the instruction. See State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn.App. 620, 628, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987) (relevant factors under ER 403 include potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction). In these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion under ER 403.
Adams' claim that there was no evidence indicating his awareness of the physical abuse is contrary to the record. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence of the pervasive physical abuse and L.S.'s resulting injuries, including black eyes, that Adams must have been aware of the abuse.
A case cited by Adams—State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 757, 202 P.3d 937 (2000) – is distinguishable. In Fisher, the trial court ruled that evidence of Fisher's physical abuse of his former stepchildren was admissible in his child molestation prosecution, but only if defense counsel made an issue of the victim's delayed reporting. 165 Wn.2d at 746. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that the defendant's physical abuse "was admissible conditioned upon the defense's making an issue of [the victim's] delayed reporting." Fisher, 165 Wn.2d at 746. That condition makes sense when the evidence concerns physical abuse inflicted by the defendant. The extreme prejudice generated by such evidence may substantially outweigh its probative value if no issue is made of delayed reporting. Here, however, the evidence was far less prejudicial since it concerned abuse inflicted by the defendant's mother, not the defendant. And as discussed above, the evidence was highly probative of L.S.'s delayed reporting and initial lies to police. Fisher is thus inapposite, and the trial court's ruling was within its discretion regardless of whether the defense argued the delayed reporting issue to the jury.
Adams also contends the court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence condition that precludes contact with "[a]ny minors without supervision of a responsible adult who has knowledge of this conviction. With [the] exception of biological children and step child." Adams argues that this condition "is not a reasonable crime related prohibition" and that it violates his First Amendment right to freedom of association. The State responds that the condition is crime related and narrowly crafted so as not to unnecessarily burden Adams' constitutional rights. We agree with the State.
Under RCW 9.94A.505(8), a sentencing court "may impose and enforce crime-related prohibitions and affirmative conditions as provided in this chapter." Crime related prohibitions are defined as "an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted." Former RCW 9.94A.030(13) (2007). No causal link need be established between the condition imposed and the crime committed, so long as the condition relates to the circumstances of the crime. State v. Llamas–Villa, 67 Wn.App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). Conditions that burden fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn and "'reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and the public order.'" State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 347-50, 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (concluding that a prohibition on a convicted sex offender's contact with minors was not a justified limitation on freedom of association rights where the victim was not a minor (quoting State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993))); State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 34, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (crime-related prohibitions affecting fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn). We review the imposition of crime-related prohibitions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ancira, 107 Wn.App. 650, 653, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001).
The prohibition at issue here is crime-related. Adams was convicted of a sex offense involving a minor. Prohibiting unsupervised conduct with minors relates directly to the circumstances of Adams' offense. The prohibition is also narrowly tailored in that it allows supervised contact with minors and does not apply to Adams' own children. There was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.