Opinion
23-0651
10-25-2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY ALLEN ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant
Katherine R.J. Scott of New Point Law Firm, PLC, Ames, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, John Telleen, Judge.
A defendant appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to eluding. AFFIRMED.
Katherine R.J. Scott of New Point Law Firm, PLC, Ames, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
BADDING, JUDGE.
Jeremy Allen Adams appeals the sentence imposed following his written plea of guilty to eluding, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(3)(a)(2) (2022). He claims the court (1) failed to give him credit for time served in jail in Illinois, (2) did not announce the potential for sentence reduction under Iowa Code section 901.5(9), and (3) abused its discretion in imposing a prison term rather than placing him on probation so that he could participate in drug court in Illinois.
Because Adams appeals his sentence, not his guilty plea, he has established good cause to appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2020) ("[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.").
We review these claims for correction of errors at law. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002); State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527, 528 (Iowa 2000). "We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure." Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724.
1. Credit for Time Served
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that Adams "will have credit on his sentence for any time served in the Clinton County Jail in connection with this matter." The court's written judgment entry stated the same. Adams claims the sentence is defective because the court did not include credit for time he served in jail in Rock Island, Illinois, before sentencing in this case. He asks for a remand "to determine the amount of mandatory credit to which" he is entitled under Iowa Code section 903A.5(1). We do not agree that the issue requires remand.
At sentencing, the prosecutor noted: "[I]t looks like he was incarcerated in Iowa for only [seventy-seven] days and then had to be-our office agreed to transport him to Illinois where he's facing charges there."
As the State points out, our supreme court has held that the district court is not required to "announce the credit to which the defendant is entitled for time served" at sentencing or as part of a written judgment entry. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d at 530 ("Neither the plain language of section 901.6 nor the practicalities of sentencing, outlined above [in relation to section 903A.5], dictate such a requirement."); State v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) ("Sections 901.6 and 903A.5 and [Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)(c) do not require a judicial accounting of credit for time served."). "[T]he fact that many judges include such a statement in the sentencing colloquy is essentially immaterial. The important concern, from the defendant's perspective, is that the proper credit is calculated pursuant to statute and incorporated into the sentence ultimately served." Hawk, 616 N.W.2d at 530. At this point, the court has not denied Adams credit for time served. Cf. Dotson v. State, No. 15-0335, 2016 WL 3269558, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016) (reviewing postconviction-relief application where applicant sought credit for time served in another state); State v. Peel, No. 08-0327, 2009 WL 2170252, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2009) (reversing order expressly denying defendant credit for presentence time served in Texas after Iowa arrest warrant was issued). So we find no error of law to correct.
The rule, formerly numbered as rule 23, provides: "The defendant shall receive full credit for time spent in custody under the sentence prior to correction or reduction."
If Adams believes he is entitled to credit, he is not without recourse. He may file a motion in the district court for jail credit and present evidence to support his contention. Or he may file a postconviction-relief claim.
2. Public Announcement
Adams also claims the district court erred in failing to publicly announce that his "term of incarceration may be reduced from the maximum sentence because of statutory earned time, work credits, and program credits" and that he "may be eligible for parole before the sentence is discharged," as required by Iowa section 901.5(9)(a) and (b). Our supreme court has held "the requirement to announce the potential for sentence reduction under section 901.5(9) . . . serves no function in imparting information to the defendant that is necessary for a valid plea and sentencing." State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Iowa 1994); accord State v. Henderson, 946 N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 2020) ("Henderson correctly notes that the court did not inform him about statutory earned-time credit under section 901.5(9), but this does not warrant resentencing."). We again find no error of law on this point.
3. Sentencing Decision
Adams finally claims the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison instead of probation. In doing so, Adams argues the court did not consider that probation would have allowed him to enter drug court in Illinois, where he would be required to participate in substance-abuse treatment and subject to strict supervision. While the court did not specifically mention Adams's prospects for drug court in Illinois, that "does not necessarily mean it was not considered." State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) ("We review a sentence for an abuse of discretion based on the entire record, and look to see if the reasons articulated by the trial court are sufficient to enable us to determine if an abuse of discretion occurred.").
Before pronouncing sentence, the court heard recommendations from the State and defense counsel, including the attorney representing Adams in Illinois. As that attorney explained,
if he were accepted into drug court, he would have strict supervision and a team of people, including the Judge, supporting him and doing everything they could to make sure he doesn't fail. Now that involves a lot of work for Mr. Adams as well. And if he fails, of course, he fails big. So if the Court sentences him to probation today, that would allow him to participate in this program.
And Adams told the court, "[I]f I happen to get drug court or whatever happens when I'm released-I'm still trying to maintain my sobriety and get out and do right."
The court then stated:
Thank you.... [I]n sentencing you, it's my duty to consider the nature of the-the nature of the crime, the effect that the crime has upon members of the community, your willingness to accept change and treatment, and what's available to me in the community to assist you in that process. I look at the least restrictive alternatives first, and then I proceed to the more restrictive alternatives.
With respect to the presentence investigation report, I do not give any considerations to matters in that report that do not show an adjudication of guilt or a plea of guilty. In your particular case, you have a very lengthy criminal history. Rarely-rarely a year has gone by without you committing another crime. Less restrictive alternatives have been repeatedly tried without success.
You've been given probation or community based corrections many times without success. I do find that your actions here demonstrate a danger to the community. I need to protect the community. This was a very, very dangerous and damaging crime. We're lucky people weren't killed. I appreciate the fact that you undoubtedly do have a substance abuse problem. And I am-I am happy for you, and I encourage you to continue to work towards kicking that problem.
But I actually think that incarceration is-not only for protecting the community and because least restrictive alternatives have been tried, I think incarceration will be good for you. In terms of that, it will help you get-hopefully, kick the habit. They say people
that are addicts oftentimes need to reach rock bottom before-before they change. Perhaps this will assist you in that. But in the interest- and in the interest of deterrents, general and specific, I think incarceration is appropriate.
These reasons were neither clearly untenable nor unreasonable. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724 ("An abuse of discretion will not be found unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable."). We accordingly find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
AFFIRMED.