Opinion
Case No. 20020891-CA.
Filed September 5, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Andrew A. Valdez.
John E. Laherty, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Gary L. Bell, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R.App.P. 29(a)(3).
Even if the juvenile court erroneously admitted the out-of-court statement, any such error was harmless, given that the court's "best interest" finding did not hinge on whether or not Appellee's fiancé would, in fact, adopt the children. See, e.g., In re W.A., 2002 UT 127, ¶ 36 n. 11, 63 P.3d 607 (defining harmless error as one "`sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings'") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2092 (2003). Rather, the court's "best interest" finding was supported by other evidence, namely, that "[t]he minor children are well cared for, happy and in a stable family situation."
Specifically, the juvenile court stated: "The Court does find that it's in the best interests of the children to be adopted by the petitioner's fiancé, if in fact that's the course that they want to take." (Emphasis added.)
We will overturn a juvenile court's factual findings only if they are shown to be "clearly erroneous," i.e., "if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Accord In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 20, 995 P.2d 17, cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Even disregarding the out-of-court statement, the juvenile court's factual findings as to the best interests of the children were supported by sufficient evidence.
Appellant's other arguments go to the weight and credibility afforded Appellee's testimony. Even if we could reach a different result on this issue, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, to which "we defer . . . because of its `"advantaged position with respect to the parties and the witnesses"' in assessing credibility and personalities." In re J.N., 960 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citations omitted).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.