Opinion
Case No. 20020664-CA.
Filed April 3, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Olof A. Johansson.
John E. Laherty, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and John M. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
N.M. appeals from a final order of the Third District Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to C.V., pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 2001), on grounds of abuse, neglect, unfitness, and incompetence. We affirm.
N.M. presents two issues for consideration. First, N.M. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings of fact. Second, N.M. challenges the juvenile court's denial of reunification services. We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for clear error. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680.
After reviewing the record, we determine sufficient evidence exists to support the juvenile court's material findings and its decision to terminate N.M.'s parental rights. N.M. has a history of substance abuse spanning five years. Prior to the time C.V. was removed from her custody, N.M. made only one attempt at recovery, which was unsuccessful. While N.M. was pregnant with C.V., her parental rights to two other children were terminated due to substance abuse. C.V. was removed from N.M.'s custody when he was only six months old. At the time of C.V.'s removal, N.M. gave the police officer a used hypodermic needle she had in her purse. Moreover, between the time C.V. was removed from her custody in February 2002 and the time of her termination hearing in August 2002, N.M. made only one phone call to her caseworker regarding her son and never sent him any cards or gifts.
Accordingly, we hold that sufficient evidence existed to support the juvenile court's material findings. Further, those findings support the juvenile court's decision to terminate N.M.'s parental rights for abuse, neglect, unfitness, and incompetence. See, e.g., In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 14, 995 P.2d 17 (affirming juvenile court's termination of parental rights despite mother's recent efforts to remedy her drug addiction); In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (affirming juvenile court's termination of parental rights where mother completed parenting classes and maintained regular visits with her child during incarceration, completed a sixteen-week substance abuse class, and had not used drugs for eighteen months).
N.M. asserts several errors in the court's findings. Since we have determined sufficient evidence exists to support the material findings and the juvenile court's decision to terminate N.M.'s parental rights, we do not address whether every finding was adequately supported.
Next, N.M. challenges the court's decision not to order reunification services. The decision to order reunification services lies within the sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 956 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). Accordingly, we review the juvenile court's decision not to order reunification services for abuse of discretion.
Courts are not required to provide reunification services before terminating parental rights. See In re M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Indeed, there is a presumption that reunification services should not be provided to a parent whose "rights have been terminated with regard to any other child." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-311(3)(b)(vii) (2002). It is undisputed that N.M.'s parental rights were terminated with regard to two other children. Thus, we must presume that the juvenile court was correct in denying reunification services. N.M. contends the juvenile court should have ordered reunification services because she was attending drug therapy, taking random urinalysis tests, and complying with the provisions of her drug court probation agreement.
In determining whether to order reunification services, a court should consider "[f]ailure of the parent to respond to previous services or comply with any previous treatment plan." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-311(4)(a) (2002). As mentioned above, N.M. did not comply with court-ordered services in regard to her first two children. Thus, we cannot say the court abused its discretion when it refused to offer reunification services to N.M. Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.