Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-1799 SECTION: "R"(5)
April 10, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion to review the Magistrate's order granting Tammie Holley's motion to intervene. Because the Court finds that Holley's Supplemental Complaint in Intervention asserts only claims that are time-barred, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
I. Background
On September 11, 2000, a vehicle driven by Justin Vickers, an employee of the United States Marshals Service, rear-ended Tammie Holley's vehicle. On July 16, 2001, Holley, who is an attorney, presented a claim for $12,000 for personal injuries to the United States Marshals Service. On June 25, 2002, the United States Marshals Service mailed to Holley a final notice of denial of the claim. Holley was required by law to present her claims in federal court by December 24, 2002 — six months after the final notice of denial was mailed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Two weeks before the Marshals Service denied Holley's claim, on June 13, 2002, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed a complaint in this Court. (Rec. Doc. 1.) In the complaint, styled as above, State Farm represents that Holley sustained personal injuries in a car accident and incurred medical expenses in the sum of $4,796.00. ( Id. ¶ 4.) The complaint alleges that State Farm paid an amount to Holley, or on her behalf, equal to her incurred medical expenses. State Farm demands judgment against defendants in the sum of $4,796.00. ( Id. ¶ 7.) The complaint did not pray for any damages for Holley.
In November 2002, State Farm filed a First Supplemental And Amending Complaint in which it alleges that Holley incurred medical expenses in the amount of $5,478.00, that this amount was paid out by State Farm to or on behalf of Holley, and that State Farm demands judgment in the amount of $5,478.00. (Rec. Doc. 10.) The amended complaint further differs from the original complaint in two ways. First, it is styled differently. The plaintiff in the amended complaint is "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company As Subrogee of Tammie Holley." Second, whereas attorney Charles Green signed the original complaint as "Attorney for Plaintiffs," he signs the amended complaint as "Attorney for Plaintiff." Like the original complaint, the amended complaint does not pray for any damages for Holley.
On January 22, 2003, Green filed a motion to withdraw as counsel:
Now into court, comes Charles S. Green, Jr. and on suggesting to the Court that the law firm of Beahm Green is presently the attorney for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Tammie Holley, but desires to withdraw as counsel for Tammie Holley only, remaining as counsel for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as subrogee to the rights of Tammie Holley.
I.
The undersigned has attempted to notify Tammie Holley via certified mail . . . however the certified letter came back "unclaimed" a copy of which is attached hereto.
II.
Moreover, the undersigned was never retained by Tammie Holley to represent her interests and was mistakenly named a plaintiff due to a typographical error, but no claims were asserted on her behalf. The undersigned represents her insurer only, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
III.
On information and belief, Tammie Holley either has filed or will file the attached Intervention she forwarded to my office. . . .
(Rec. Doc. 14.) Defendant, United States of America, followed up on Green's motion by filing a Motion To Amend Caption on January 30, 2003. (Rec. Doc. 15.) The United States argues that Holley was erroneously styled a plaintiff due to a typographical error, and that Tammie Holley is not a party plaintiff. On January 31, Judge Porteous denied Holley's motion to enroll counsel, expressly noting that Holley is not a party plaintiff in the matter. (Rec. Doc. 19.)
On February 18, 2003, Tammie Holley filed a Partially Opposed Motion to Intervene. (Rec. Doc. 20.) In the Supplemental Complaint In Intervention, Holley seeks to recover for personal injuries and medical expenses beyond those that were paid to her or on her behalf by State Farm. (Rec. Doc. 33.) Defendant opposes Holley's motion to intervene on the ground that it is futile. Defendant asserts that Holley was required by law to present her claims in federal court by December 24, 2002, and that her motion to intervene is merely an attempt to circumvent the applicable statute of limitations by piggybacking on State Farm's action. Defendant further notes that on February 24, 2002, State Farm and the United States settled their dispute. (Rec. Doc. 21).
On March 14, 2003, the Magistrate denied defendant's Motion To Amend Caption and granted Holley's Partially Opposed Motion To Intervene. (Rec. Doc. 30.) The Magistrate provided no written reasons for her decision. Defendant now moves the Court to review the Magistrate's order granting Holley's motion to intervene.
II. Discussion
A magistrate judge may hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Federal law affords a magistrate judge broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive pretrial matters. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). In a nondispositive matter, a district court will reverse a magistrate judge's ruling only if the party challenging the decision can demonstrate that the determination was clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. Id.; see also Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1995). The parties agree that the denial of a motion to intervene is considered a nondispositive motion. See, e.g., The Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. M/V FLORA, 2000 WL 134698 (E.D.La. 2000).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. Holley does not articulate an argument supporting intervention of right under Rule 24(a). The Court will therefore focus on whether she is entitled to permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). In regard to Rule 24(b), defendant does not dispute that Holley's claims have a question of law or fact in common with those previously brought by State Farm. Defendant's argument is that the motion is futile.
Defendant also asserts that the motion to intervene is untimely. Because the Court finds that intervention is futile, the Court does not reach defendant's arguments as to timeliness.
Defendant's argument as to futility is premised on the notion that Holley's deadline for presenting the claims that she asserts in the Supplemental Complaint in Intervention was December 24, 2002, or two months before Holley moved to intervene. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); (Def.'s Mot. to Review, Ex. 2). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has affirmed denials of motions to intervene when the amended complaint in intervention asserts only claims that are time barred. See Crowley Maritime Corporation v. Panama Canal Commission, 849 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1988); Atkins v. General Motors Corporation, 701 F.2d 1124, 1130 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983); WRIGHT MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1914 ([T]he proposed pleading must state a good claim for relief). In Crowley, for example, Jan Rolstad suffered leg injuries during a mooring operation in the Panama Canal outside of the Canal's locks. At the time, he was employed on a barge owned by Crowley Maritime Corporation and operated by Puget Sound Tug Barge Company. Rolstad, Crowley and Puget Sound all filed claims relating to the incident against the Panama Canal Commission. The Commission denied these claims. Crowley and Puget Sound timely pursued their claims against the Commission in federal court; Rolstad did not. Later, after the window on Rolstad's ability to pursue the claims in federal court had closed, the district court denied Rolstad's motion to intervene. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and rejected Rolstad's assertion that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Crowley, 849 F.2d at 954. The Court is thus bound by Crowley to conclude that it is appropriate to deny a motion to intervene when the intervenor seeks to raise claims that are time barred.
Holley does not dispute the December 24, 2002 deadline. Rather, Holley's position in her Partially Opposed Motion To Intervene and in her opposition to defendant's motion to review the Magistrate's order is that she is already a party plaintiff and that her claims were already in this lawsuit. This is a position that the Court has already rejected. (Rec. Doc. 19.) In denying her motion to enroll counsel, the Court expressly noted that Holley is not a party plaintiff in this lawsuit. Holley, an attorney, did not file a motion to reconsider that decision. Now, she seeks to attack that determination without even mentioning it. The Court stands by Judge Porteous' prior determination.
Although the original complaint listed Holley as a plaintiff, it did not state any claim for damages on her behalf. Any judgment obtained under either the original complaint or the amended complaint, if any, is owed by the United States to State Farm, not to Holley. State Farm's attorney represented to the Court that he was never retained by Holley, that he did not state any claim for relief on her behalf, and that the inclusion of Holley as a party plaintiff in this matter in the original complaint was a typographical error. (Rec. Doc. 14.) Notably, Holley does not represent that she ever retained Green. Nor does she represent that she relied on him to assert her claims. Rather, the record indicates that she recognized that she was not a party plaintiff before Green withdrew as counsel. Before Green withdrew, Holley drafted a Motion to Intervene; she did not draft a motion to amend the complaint to state claims on her behalf. ( Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds, as Judge Porteous already had, that Holley was not a party plaintiff in this matter. It follows that Holley did not assert her claims until February 2003, which is two months after her December 2002 deadline. She articulates no other reason why her claims are not barred by § 2401(b). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Magistrate's order is clearly erroneous and contrary to law. The Court grants defendant's motion and reverses the Magistrate's order granting Holley's motion to intervene.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion. Holley's Motion to Intervene is denied.