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holding that the right of access to courts is located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment's provision securing the right to petition the government for redress of grievances and holding that the Colorado Constitution has an express right of access to courts
Summary of this case from In re Marriage of HartleyOpinion
No. 91SA175 No. 91SA129
Decided March 23, 1992.
Appeal from the District Court, City and County of Denver, Honorable John N. McMullen, Judge.
Marc Levy Associates, P.C., Marc R. Levy, Stuart D. Morse; Creamer Seaman, P.C., Thomas J. Seaman, Thomas J. Jirak, for Petitioner-Appellant.
No Appearance on behalf of Respondent-Appellee.
Creamer Seaman, P.C., Thomas J. Seaman, David P. Reiter, for Defendant-Appellant.
Kidneigh Kaufman, P.C., Larry L. McCray, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Eugene C. Cavaliere, Deputy Attorney General, Merrill Shields, Deputy Attorney General, Richard Djokic, First Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Howard, Assistant Attorney General, for Amicus Curiae Attorney General's Office.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals from two district court orders in two unrelated actions. In each action, State Farm challenged the constitutionality of section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), which requires binding arbitration of disputes arising under no fault insurance contracts. We simultaneously address both appeals, since the constitutional challenges to section 10-4-708(1.5) in each are substantially the same. We affirm the district court's finding that section 10-4-708(1.5) is constitutional.
Section 13-4-102(1)(b), 6A C.R.S. (1987), grants this court jurisdiction over appeals when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax No. 90CV11678
State Farm issued a car insurance policy to Earle Broadnax (Broadnax) prior to December 18, 1988. On December 18, 1988, and on September 7, 1989, Broadnax was involved in car accidents. Broadnax submitted claims to State Farm for personal injury protection benefits under his policy. A dispute regarding payment of benefits ensued, and Broadnax served State Farm with a Demand for Arbitration on April 3, 1990.
On November 6, 1990, State Farm filed a Petition to Stay Arbitration and sought a declaration that section 10-4-708(1.5) was unconstitutional. The district court denied the stay and found the statute to be constitutional.
Gaal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. No. 90CV9218
State Farm issued a car insurance policy to Rashel Engholm prior to October 14, 1988. On that date, Philipp Gaal (Gaal) was involved in an accident with Rashel Engholm and qualified for personal injury protection benefits under the policy. State Farm paid benefits to or on behalf of Gaal, but a dispute arose and Gaal served a Demand for Arbitration on State Farm.
Gaal was riding a bicycle when Engholm hit him with her car. Gaal made a claim under Engholm's policy, and on April 9, 1990, served State Farm with a demand for arbitration. On August 9, 1990, after arbitration, the arbitrators entered an award in favor of Gaal, awarding him lost wages, travel expenses, and attorney's fees.
An arbitration hearing was held in July 1990, at which State Farm argued that section 10-4-708(1.5) was unconstitutional. State Farm later filed an Application to Vacate the Arbitration Award in district court.
On March 25, 1991, the district court relied on its finding in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Broadnax that section 10-4-708(1.5) was constitutional, and denied State Farm's application. State Farm now seeks review of the district court's determination in each case.
Section 10-4-708(1.5) provides, in pertinent part, that in "[a]ny action for breach of contract brought pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall proceed to binding arbitration." Section 10-4-708(1.5) is part of the Motor Vehicle ("No Fault") Insurance Act (No Fault Act). §§ 10-4-701 to -724, 4A C.R.S. (1991 Supp.).
The No Fault Act requires automobile owners to have insurance policies which provide coverage to insureds for personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. § 10-4-706, 4A C.R.S. (1987 1991 Supp.). Insurers are obligated under the No Fault Act to provide direct benefits to insureds. Id. When the benefits sought exceed $2,500, insureds may bring an action in tort against another automobile owner or operator. § 10-4-714(1)(e), 4A C.R.S. (1987). When an insured is liable for benefits paid by another insurer, the No Fault Act requires insurers to resolve reimbursement issues through mandatory, binding arbitration. § 10-4-717, 4A C.R.S. (1987).
State Farm previously argued that intercompany mandatory binding arbitration was constitutional in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61, 63 (Colo. 1988).
The disputes thus governed by section 10-4-708(1.5) arise from the statutory right of insureds to recover benefits directly from insurers. § 10-4-708(1), 4A C.R.S. (1987). As an insurer, State Farm is in essence contesting its statutory obligation to disburse benefits. Section 10-4-708(1.5) was enacted on June 1, 1989, and took effect on January 1, 1990. Approximately one year later, section 10-4-708(1.5) was amended to provide parties with the option of resolving disputes through either binding arbitration or actions in contract. § 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1991 Supp.). State Farm challenges section 10-4-708(1.5) as it applied to Broadnax's and Gaal's disputes, which arose between January 1, 1990, and July 1, 1991. Our consideration of State Farm's challenges is thus limited to the version of section 10-4-708(1.5) which existed prior to the 1991 amendment.
Act approved June 1, 1989, ch. 82, sec. 6, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 458-61.
I.
State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), extinguishes its right of access to courts because the section removes State Farm's statutory cause of action for disputes arising under the No Fault Act from a trial to jury before a district court, without providing a right of de novo review by a district court following an adverse arbitration award. After careful consideration of the constitutional guarantee, we find no violation of State Farm's right of access to courts.
The right of access to courts in the Colorado Constitution provides as follows: " Equality of justice. Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay." Colo. Const. art. II, § 6. State Farm also asserts its rights to access under article II, section 3, which provides as follows: " Inalienable rights. All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." Colo. Const. art. II, § 3.
A.
The Right of Access to Courts
State Farm's contention posits that the right of access to courts guarantees Colorado litigants a trial to jury before a district court for disputes arising under the No Fault Act, and that the scope of appellate review be de novo. While we have previously evaluated the scope of the right of access to courts, we have not passed on the contentions raised by State Farm in the context of mandatory binding arbitration of disputes arising under the No Fault Act. In resolving this inquiry, we thus look to the law of other jurisdictions for guidance.
This court has construed the constitutional right of access as guaranteeing that courts will be available to effectuate rights if they accrue under law. Sigman v. Seafood Limited Partnership, 817 P.2d 527, 533 (Colo. 1991) (relying on O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344 (1972)). This court has simultaneously recognized that the right of access provision does not prevent the legislature from changing laws which create rights. Id.; see also Curtiss v. GSX Corp., 774 P.2d 873, 876 (Colo. 1989).
The United States Constitution does not expressly provide for a right of access to courts. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985); see also Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir. 1985). Rather, the federal right of access to courts has been located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the First Amendment's provision securing the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 853 (10th Cir. 1985) (relying on Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)).
Nordgren, 762 F.2d at 853 (relying on Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971, and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
Nordgren, 762 F.2d at 853 (relying on Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971).
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the right of access to courts and the guarantees of due process have developed in response to challenges by defendants involuntarily haled into the formal judicial process. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1970). Thus, whether litigants are afforded adequate constitutional access to courts often sounds in due process under federal analysis. See, e.g., id.; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 n. 5 (1982). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in construing prison inmates' right of access, has stated that "[a]ccess to the courts `encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him.'" Nordgren, 762 F.2d at 853 (quoting Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that "[b]efore a `compelling interest' standard of strict scrutiny is applied, the right that plaintiffs seek to vindicate by access to the courts must be a fundamental right." Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 403 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381) (holding that statute of limitations in products liability action did not deprive homeowners of access to courts through due process).
The Boddie Court determined that welfare recipients unable to pay fees prerequisite to bringing a divorce action were deprived of their access to courts.
In considering whether a litigant was denied due process under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, the Logan Court found that right of access cases "provide[d] an analogous method of analysis supporting [its] reasoning here." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 n. 5 (1982).
Colorado, however, is one of thirty-seven states which diverged from the federal constitutional model by creating an express right of access to courts independent of constitutional due process guarantees. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 674 (citing Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579, 615 n. 218 (1981)); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996, 999 (Ala. 1982).
In evaluating the right of access under the Alabama Constitution, Justice Shores has noted that the origins of the right
"can be traced back to the Magna Charta. Although its language is broad enough to be subject to varying interpretations, it can generally be said to incorporate into our constitution a fundamental principle of fairness, a perhaps vaguely conceived but important notion of limitation on the power of government to infringe upon individual rights, and to act arbitrarily. What those rights are, what degree of infringement is permitted, and with how much justification, are inquiries which have been the subject of long-standing debate . . . ."
Id. at 999 (citation omitted).
While the thirty-seven constitutional provisions are "essentially similar," their application has varied. Under the Louisiana constitutional guarantee, for example, the legislature is free to allocate access to the formal judicial system using any system or classification which is not totally arbitrary so long as access to the system is not essential to the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 485 (La. 1981) (finding no violation where employee was denied right to sue in tort under worker's compensation statute).
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985).
The Utah access to courts provision "guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 675. Utah courts construe the constitutional right of access to courts by examining its history and plain language, in addition to its functional relationship to other constitutional provisions. Id. The Utah Supreme Court has accordingly noted that the right of access provision and the due process clause "are related both in their historical origins and to some extent in their constitutional functions." Id. The two provisions are thus "complementary and even overlap, but they are not wholly duplicative. Both act to restrict the powers of both the courts and the legislature." Id.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, conversely, has interpreted the constitutional right of access as "merely a declaration of a general fundamental principle." Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663 (1977). In Prendergast, the court upheld the legislature's power to impose special procedures before resort to courts. Id. The court noted that Nebraska courts have "the primary duty . . . to safeguard [the provision's] declaration of rights and remedies." Id.
In Colorado, the access to courts provision guarantees that courts will be available to effectuate rights that accrue under law. O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 195, 493 P.2d 344, 346 (1972); Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1989). This court has stated that "[g]enerally, a burden on a party's right of access to the courts will be upheld so long as it is reasonable." Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1096. We have recently observed that the right of access under the Colorado Constitution "protects initial access to the courts." State v. DeFoor, No. 90SA351 (Colo. Feb. 3, 1992). In examining initial access to courts, we are in essence examining access to the formal judicial process.
In Firelock, we evaluated the constitutionality of the Mandatory Arbitration Act. The Mandatory Arbitration Act was then a pilot project that imposed mandatory arbitration on all civil actions filed in any one of eight judicial districts, where the amount of money damages sought did not exceed $50,000. Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1092-93. Firelock argued that its right of access to courts was violated by forced arbitration and by the requirement that a party who requested a trial de novo was required to pay arbitration costs if the party did not improve its position by at least ten percent. Id. at 1096. In concluding that Firelock's right of access was not violated, we noted that many burdens on the right of access to courts were "present within our system of justice." Id. In the present disputes, the district court distinguished Firelock on two grounds. First, the district court noted that the Mandatory Arbitration Act had a broad application: to all civil actions where the damages sought were $50,000 or less. Section 10-4-708(1.5), conversely, has an extremely narrow focus, applying only to disputes of personal injury protection benefits under the No Fault Act. Secondly, the district court noted that the Mandatory Arbitration Act imposed arbitration where there was no agreement to arbitrate disputes, while § 10-4-708(1.5) requires arbitration only where contracts to resolve disputes incorporated arbitration by operation of law. Section 10-4-708 serves different purposes than the Mandatory Arbitration Act. Titled "Prompt payment of direct benefits," it establishes a limited time frame in which insurance companies must quickly pay claims due under insureds' personal injury protection provisions of their automobile insurance contracts. Personal injury protection is required in Colorado; it guarantees that victims of automobile accidents will be adequately compensated in a timely fashion. §§ 10-4-702 to -708, 4A C.R.S. (1987 1990 Supp.). Personal injury protection insurance assures compensation without regard to fault in any accident. See § 10-4-706(1)(b), 4A C.R.S. (1987).
B. [24] The Right of Access As Applied to Statutory Claims Arising Under the No Fault Act
In the present case, State Farm calls on this court to evaluate its access to the judicial process as set out in the No Fault Act. Disputes arising under the No Fault Act proceed to binding arbitration before resorting to courts. § 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Each party to the arbitration selects an arbitrator, and these two arbitrators select a third. Id. The arbitrators then set a time and place for a hearing, with the mutual consent of the parties. Id. Arbitrators may issue subpoenas for witnesses and compel production of evidence. Arbitrators must file an order with the insurance commissioner within ten days of the hearing. Id. Such order may be vacated, modified, or corrected pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act.
The Uniform Arbitration Act in turn confers jurisdiction on Colorado courts to enforce and enter judgments on arbitration awards. § 13-22-219, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Parties may apply to courts to confirm arbitration awards made pursuant to section 10-4-708(1.5). § 13-22-213, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Parties may also apply to courts to vacate awards where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or where an award was procured by fraud, corruption, or other undue means. § 13-22-214, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Parties may also apply to courts to modify or correct arbitration awards where there was an evident mistake or where the award was premised on a matter not submitted to the arbitrators. § 13-22-215, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Finally, parties may appeal such court orders "in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in civil actions." § 13-22-221, 6A C.R.S. (1987).
In determining whether this dispute resolution scheme secures State Farm's right of access to the judicial process, we are guided by the requirements of due process. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that due process requires some form of hearing — the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1975).
Under the statutory scheme, State Farm clearly has the right to a hearing in which State Farm can present all the evidence, and raise all the defenses available to it. State Farm also has the right to resort to the formal judicial system should it find an arbitrator's order adverse to its interest. We thus conclude that State Farm is not deprived of its access to the judicial process under the Colorado Constitution.
We are not alone in our determination. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has observed that "it is too late in the day to argue that compulsory arbitration, per se, denies due process of law. . . . Congress may require arbitration so long as fair procedures are provided and ultimate judicial review is available." Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 1983). Where a party "may come to the district court to enforce, vacate or modify an arbitrator's award, [the party] is not denied meaningful access to the Courts." Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding compulsory, binding arbitration, in reliance on Republic Industries).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly upheld a statutory scheme mandating arbitration providing judicial review substantially similar to that available in the present case. Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 591 A.2d 101, 109 (1991). In so doing, the court noted:
"Indeed, a de novo scope of review of factual questions would be inconsistent with the purposes of the compulsory arbitration provision of that section, namely, avoiding congestion of the courts with piecemeal litigation and leveling the playing field by avoiding the risks that insurers would use their superior economic resources by subjecting contested claims for coverage to undue litigation. To subject factual findings made by arbitrators . . . to de novo review by the court would, in many cases, make those proceedings merely way stations to the courts, and would thereby create the very risks that the compulsory arbitration provision was designed to avoid."
Id. We similarly have noted that the No Fault Insurance Act seeks to reduce tort litigation, and that arbitration serves that end. We conclude that State Farm has not been deprived of its right of access under section 10-4-708(1.5).
See Baumgart v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Colo. 330, 332, 607 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61, 65 n. 5 (Colo. 1988).
State Farm did not, in either action, raise the issue of quid pro quo. The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, considered and rejected a quid pro quo challenge in Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 591 A.2d 101, 111-12 (Conn. 1991). Based on the "safeguards surrounding the arbitration process" and "the aggregate benefits associated with compulsory arbitration," the court found that the judicial review available to the parties provided a reasonable alternative to remedies available for common-law breach of contract. Id.
II.
State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), violates the parties' rights to a jury trial as guaranteed by section 23 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution, and by Rule 38 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. State Farm relies on our holding in Firelock that the Mandatory Arbitration Act did not violate parties' rights to trial by jury because it provided de novo review in the district court. Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1097 (Colo. 1989).
Section 23 of Article II provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases; but a jury in civil cases in all courts . . . may consist of less than twelve persons, as may be prescribed by law."
In Firelock, we recognized that "trial by a jury in a civil action is not a matter of right under the Colorado Constitution." Id. C.R.C.P. 38 provides a right to trial by jury, however, in actions where money is claimed due on contract. Like all rules of civil procedure, C.R.C.P. 38 does not always apply to civil actions; it is subject to the limitations set out in C.R.C.P. 81(a), which provides that "[t]hese rules do not govern procedure and practice in any special statutory proceeding insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice provided by the applicable statute."
"In interpreting C.R.C.P. 81(a), we have held that the rules of civil procedure do not apply where there is a special statutory proceeding which sets forth remedies (and the rules of civil procedure are inconsistent or in conflict therewith)." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61, 65 (Colo. 1988) (citing Brown v. Hansen, 177 Colo. 39, 493 P.2d 1086 (1972); City of Westminster v. District Court, 167 Colo. 263, 447 P.2d 537 (1968); Wright v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 258, 365 P.2d 691 (1961)). In Cabs, Inc., we determined that arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act is a special statutory proceeding. 751 P.2d at 65. We found that the Uniform Arbitration Act was made applicable, by statute, to disputes between insurance companies regarding reimbursement and that the rules of civil procedure generally did not apply. Id. at 64-65.
In the present case, section 10-4-708(1.5) dictates that disputes under the No Fault Act shall proceed to binding arbitration pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act. Since the Uniform Arbitration Act is a special statutory proceeding within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 81(a), it follows that State Farm does not have a right to a trial by jury under C.R.C.P. 38 for its disputes. We conclude that State Farm has not been deprived of any right to trial by jury.
III.
State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), imposes arbitration without its consent, in violation of Article XVIII, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
Section 3 of Article XVIII provides as follows:
"It shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitrators, to be appointed by mutual agreement of the parties to any controversy who may choose that mode of adjustment. The powers and duties of such arbitrators shall be as prescribed by law."
State Farm cites In re Bill Relating to Compulsory Arbitration, 9 Colo. 629, 21 P. 474 (1886), where we were called on to review "A Bill for an Act to provide for the amicable adjustment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employees, and to authorize the creation of a Board of Arbitration." In a per curiam opinion, we stated "that section 3, article XVIII, neither contemplates nor admits of a law providing for the compulsory submission of differences to arbitration. A submission of differences to the decision of arbitrators must be by mutual agreement of the parties to the controversy." Id. at 630, 21 P. at 475. State Farm relies on this language as sole support for its contention that the General Assembly impermissibly imposed arbitration on resolution of their dispute under section 10-4-708(1.5). We disagree.
Section 3 of Article XVIII does not expressly prohibit mandatory, binding arbitration. We have previously concluded that section 3 of Article XVIII did not prohibit the General Assembly from requiring parties to submit their disputes to non-binding arbitration in all civil actions under the Mandatory Arbitration Act. Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Colo. 1989).
Further, the provisions of the No Fault Act are incorporated into insurance policies written in Colorado. Marquez v. Prudential Property Casualty Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 29, 33 (Colo. 1980). State Farm, thus, when writing or renewing insurance contracts from January 1, 1990, through July 1, 1991, incorporated the provisions of section 10-4-708(1.5) into its policies as a matter of law. Both insurance policies contain automatic renewal clauses. State Farm did not dispute that the policies were not renewed in 1990. We cannot conclude that State Farm did not consent to mandatory arbitration of disputes pursuant to section 10-4-708(1.5).
Broadnax's policy provided as follows: "4. Renewal. "Unless within 59 days of the policy effective date, we mail or deliver a notice of cancellation to you, we agree: "a. to continue it in force until the end of the current policy period; and "b. to renew the policy for the next policy period at the rates then in effect unless we mail to you written notice of our intention not to renew. The notice will be mailed to your last known address at least 30 days before the end of the current policy period. The mailing of it shall be sufficient proof of notice. "These agreements to continue and renew are void: "a. if you fail to pay the premium when due; or "b. if any of the following: "(1) you, "(2) your spouse, "(3) any relative, or "(4) any other person who usually drives your car "have had his or her driver's license under suspension or revocation or have been convicted of driving without having a valid driver's license during the 180 days just before the effective date of the policy or during the policy period." (Emphasis in original.) The policy under which Gaal was entitled to personal injury protection benefits is identical to Broadnax's policy.
We have observed that "[a]rbitration provides an efficient, convenient alternative to litigation," Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d at 65 n. 5, and "it has long been the policy of this state to foster and encourage the use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution." Judd Constr. Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922, 924 (Colo. 1982) (citing Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985)); Columbine Valley Constr. Co. v. Board of Directors, 626 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1981); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 P. 680 (1925); and Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 3).
We again note that one of the General Assembly's primary purposes in passing the No Fault Act was "to reduce the amount of tort litigation arising out of automobile accidents," Baumgart v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Colo. 330, 332, 607 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1980), and to provide prompt resolution of disputed payments. Were we to adopt State Farm's position and rely solely on an opinion issued in 1886, we would be required to overlook both the current demands on the Colorado judicial system and the need for prompt payment of personal injury protection benefits that we have acknowledged when encouraging the use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. We decline to take that approach. Accordingly, we find that section 10-4-708(1.5) does not contravene section 3 of Article XVIII.
IV.
State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), impairs its existing contract rights in violation of Article II, section 11, of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
Section 11 of Article II provides that "[n]o. . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. . . shall be passed by the general assembly." State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5) violates this provision because the insurance contracts at issue were entered into before the General Assembly changed the statutory scheme for resolution of payment disputes.
As State Farm correctly notes, section 11 of Article II prohibits legislation that applies retroactively. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Colo. 1990); Martin v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 707 P.2d 348, 351 (Colo. 1985). There is, however, no retroactive application in this case. The enacting legislation in this case provides that "[s]ections 1 and 3 of this act shall take effect January 1, 1990, and shall apply to insurance policies that are delivered or issued for delivery or renewal on or after said date." Act approved June 1, 1989, ch. 82, sec. 6, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 461. Both policies contained renewal clauses, and the policies were in force between January 1, 1990, and July 1, 1991. The policies thus fell within the prospective application of section 10-4-708(1.5). State Farm's rights under the contract were not impaired.
V.
State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), violates its right to equal protection of the laws because the section imposes a restriction of the fundamental right of access to courts. State Farm further contends that a strict scrutiny standard of review must be applied since a fundamental right is involved.
State Farm did not articulate how § 10-4-708(1.5) creates an impermissible classification.
We do not find a violation of State Farm's right to equal protection of the laws under section 10-4-708(1.5). As previously discussed, we did not find that State Farm's right of access to courts was unreasonably restrained. In the absence of a fundamental right, we will apply a rational basis test to equal protection challenges. Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo. 1987).
Under the rational basis inquiry, statutory classifications must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. Additionally, statutes analyzed under the rational basis test are presumed constitutional. Id. The party challenging the statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
We have already recognized the state's interest in reducing tort litigation arising out of automobile accidents and in prompt payment of personal injury protection benefits. Baumgart v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 199 Colo. 330, 332, 607 P.2d 1002, 1003; § 10-4-708, 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). This state prefers arbitration as a method for resolving disputes because it "promotes quicker resolution of disputes by providing an expedited opportunity for the parties to present their cases before an unbiased third party." Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1099 (1989). By promoting quicker resolution of disputes, arbitration thus reduces the parties' costs. Id. Section 10-4-708(1.5)'s dispute resolution scheme is rationally related to legitimate interests in expediting dispute resolution, reducing parties' costs, and securing prompt payment of benefits. In Firelock, we rejected an equal protection challenge to the Mandatory Arbitration Act. Id. We said that
"[w]hen the governmental interest served by arbitration is considered in light of the burden placed on the parties, we have no trouble concluding that the [Mandatory Arbitration] Act promotes a legitimate governmental interest and the procedures created by the [Mandatory Arbitration] Act are reasonably related to that interest."
Id.
We reject State Farm's equal protection challenge.
VI.
Lastly, State Farm contends that section 10-4-708(1.5), 4A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), impermissibly limits district court jurisdiction under section 9 of Article VI of the Colorado Constitution because there is no provision for meaningful review and because the arbitrator's decision is binding on all parties. We disagree.
Section 9 of Article VI provides, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he district courts shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law."
Again, State Farm relies on our decision in Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Colo. 1989), in support of its argument. In Firelock, we did not find that the Mandatory Arbitration Act violated section 9 of Article VI on the grounds that "arbitrators do not perform a judicial function because they do not possess the final authority to render and enforce a judgment" and because the decisions at issue in Firelock were non-binding. Id., 776 P.2d at 1094.
Under the scheme contemplated by section 10-4-708(1.5) and the Uniform Arbitration Act, arbitrators do not have authority to enforce their own decisions, and parties must apply to the courts for confirmation of arbitrators' awards. § 13-22-213, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Only district courts can enforce agreements and enter judgments on awards under the scheme. § 13-22-219, 6A C.R.S. (1987).
VII.
With respect to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax, we affirm the district court's denial of State Farm's Petition to Stay Arbitration and Declaratory Judgment. With respect to Gaal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., we affirm the district court's denial of State Farm's Motion to Reconsider, and affirm the district court's entry of award.
JUSTICE KIRSHBAUM dissents, and JUSTICE LOHR joins in the dissent.