Opinion
No. E060421.
09-10-2015
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Objectors and Appellants. RSL FUNDING, LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FELICIA ALFORD, Defendant and Respondent
[Modification of opinion (239 Cal.App.4th 741; ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___), upon denial of rehearing.]
THE COURT.—The opinion filed in this matter on August 18, 2015, is modified as follows and the petition for rehearing is DENIED:
On page 3 [239 Cal.App.4th 744, advanced report, 2d full par., line 1], the first full paragraph should read: On July 12, 2013, Alford entered into a second contract with RSL in which Alford agreed to assign to RSL $25,000 of the $100,000 payment due on August 11, 2016, and $25,000 of the payment of $151,558.80 due on August 11, 2021, in exchange for a current payment of $22,500. RSL assigned its rights to receive the periodic payments to EHL. RSL filed a petition for approval of the transfer. State Farm filed an opposition to the petition, asserting, among other grounds, that (1) the proposed transfer would violate a California statute (Ins. Code, § 10139.5, subd. (e)(3)), which provides that an annuity issuer and settlement obligor may not be required to divide payments, and (2) the proposed transfer would materially increase State Farm's burdens and risks.
All further statutory references are to the Insurance Code unless otherwise indicated.
On page 4 [239 Cal.App.4th 745, advance report, 3d par., line 1], the second full paragraph beginning "State Farm contends . . .," should read: State Farm initially contended that the trial court's order requires it to split the $100,000 lump sum payment due on August 11, 2016, three ways, among (1) RSL ($25,000), (2) EHL, RSL's assignee in the 2012 transfer ($50,000), and (3) Alford ($25,000). At oral argument, State Farm's counsel conceded that because RSL had assigned both the 2012 and 2013 payments to EHL, it was required to make only two payments, not three.
On page 5, the third, fourth and fifth sentences in the first paragraph [239 Cal.App.4th 745, advance report, 5th par., lines 8-14] should read: "`One of the strongest indications of what construction should be given a statutory
provision may be found in the use of negative, prohibitory, or exclusionary words. Where statutory restrictions are couched in negative terms they are usually held to be mandatory. In the language of one court "there is but one way to obey the command `thou shalt not,' and that is to refrain altogether from doing the forbidden act."' (2A Sutherland, [Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972)] § 57.09, p. 661, fns. omitted.)" (People v. Harner (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1418 (dis. opn. of Kline, J.).)
On page 8 [239 Cal.App.4th 747, advance report, 4th par., lines 5-6], in the first paragraph, the sentence beginning, "RSL and State Farm agreed to an order similar . . .," should read: State Farm stated it would agree to an order in the form of the 2012 order, but RSL did not submit that proposed order to the trial court.
These modifications do not change the judgment.