Summary
remanding to Industrial Commission
Summary of this case from Grine v. Sylvania City School Dist.Opinion
No. 89-971
Submitted June 5, 1990 —
Decided August 22, 1990.
Workers' compensation — Temporariness of disability must be addressed by commission, when.
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 88AP-637.
Claimant-appellant and cross-appellee, June Coyer, received extensive temporary total disability compensation following her 1974 industrial injury incurred during her employment with appellee and cross-appellant, Western Electric Company, now known as AT T Technologies, Inc. ("AT T"). After nearly two hundred weeks of temporary total compensation, AT T, pursuant to R.C. 4123.56, requested a medical examination of claimant by the Industrial Commission ("commission"). The statute then provided in part:
"After two hundred weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the claimant shall be scheduled for an examination by the industrial commission medical department for an evaluation to determine whether or not the temporary disability has become permanent. Where the employer has elected to pay compensation direct, the employer shall notify the medical section immediately after payment of two hundred weeks of temporary total disability and request that the claimant be scheduled for examination by the medical section."
On March 12, 1987, claimant applied for permanent total disability compensation. On May 27, 1987, in response to AT T's "two-hundred-week motion," a commission district hearing officer ordered:
"* * * Temporary Total Compensation is to be paid from date of last payment and to continue upon submission of medical proof pending processing of claimant's request for Permanent Total Disability filed 3-12-87.
"* * *
"The employer's C-86 [motion] filed 4-11-86 is found to be moot to the extent that the requested examinations have now taken place. The continuation of Temporary Total Compensation is based upon the medical evidence on file and upon the facts that claimant, age 66 has a 10th grade education and has reportedly only been employed as a factory worker. * * *
"This order is based on the medical reports of Drs. Blatnik, Dillahunt, Korb, Orr."
The order was administratively affirmed.
AT T filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in continuing temporary total compensation. The appellate court found that the commission did not address whether claimant's disability was temporary or permanent. It thus issued a limited writ that vacated the commission order and remanded the cause to the commission for further consideration.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal and cross-appeal as of right.
Porter, Wright, Morris Arthur and Karl J. Sutter, for appellee and cross-appellant AT T.
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant and cross-appellee Coyer.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Jeffrey W. Clark, for appellee Industrial Commission.
AT T's "two-hundred-week motion" asked the commission to expressly designate claimant's disability as temporary or permanent. The commission continued temporary total disability compensation but did not specifically indicate that claimant's condition was temporary. This deficiency led the appellate court to return the cause to the commission to definitively address the permanency question. We affirm that decision.
Claimant suggests that by continuing temporary total compensation, the commission inherently declared that her condition was temporary. We disagree. At the time the relevant order was issued, temporary total disability compensation was often continued, regardless of permanency, if the claimant had applied for, and seemed likely to receive, permanent total disability compensation. See State, ex rel. Eaton Corp., v. Lancaster (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 534 N.E.2d 46. Review of the present commission order does not exclude the possibility that such reasoning was employed.
Claimant also contends that a temporary total disability determination must encompass those non-medical disability factors set forth in State, ex rel. Stephenson, v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946. The nature of temporary total disability, however, discourages such a conclusion. The purpose of permanent total disability benefits, which were at issue in Stephenson, is to compensate for impaired earning capacity. Id. at 170, 31 OBR at 372, 509 N.E.2d at 949. By contrast, the purpose of temporary total benefits is to compensate for loss of earnings. State, ex rel. Ramirez, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 634, 23 O.O. 3d 518, 520, 433 N.E.2d 586, 589. The Stephenson factors did not prevent claimant from earning a particular wage before her injury. Since it is these actual earnings which temporary total benefits are designed to replace, the Stephenson factors are irrelevant.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.