Summary
recognizing the "duty of courts to accord meaning to each word of a leglislative enactment if it is reasonably possible so to do"
Summary of this case from Church of God in N. Ohio v. LevinOpinion
No. 30613
Decided December 26, 1946.
Workmen's compensation — Ankylosed fingers — Award made only where ankylosis makes fingers more than useless — Section 1465-80, General Code.
1. Under the provisions of Section 1465-80, General Code, relating to workmen's compensation, an award for ankylosed fingers may be made only when the ankylosis "makes any of the fingers, thumbs, or parts of either more than useless."
2. To be more than useless such ankylosed fingers must be harmful or detrimental to the use of other parts of the hand.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin county.
ON REHEARING.
The relator was injured December 16, 1936, while in the employ of the Railway Express Agency, Inc. His right wrist was fractured and dislocated. This was followed by an atrophy of the forearm and hand together with a complete ankylosis of the wrist joint and a partially ankylosed claw hand.
As a self-insurer under the provisions of the workmen's compensation law of this state, the employer paid the relator compensation at the maximum rate of $18.75 per week for temporary total disability for the period of one year beginning with the date of the injury and extending to December 15, 1937, in the sum of $956.25. Thereafter, during a period of approximately four and one-half years from February 23, 1938, to September 1942, the relator was paid the further maximum sum of $4,000 as compensation for impairment of earning capacity. Subsequently the relator filed applications for compensation for permanent partial disability. These were dismissed by the Industrial Commission on the ground that the relator was not permanently and totally disabled and had been paid the maximum statutory amount of $4,000 for temporary partial disability.
Then the relator instituted the instant action in the Court of Common Pleas to obtain a writ of mandamus to require the respondent commission to award him compensation for the loss of his right arm, or, in the alternative, for the loss of his right hand or all of the fingers thereof, under the provisions of Section 1465-80, General Code. However, the relator agreed in the trial court to limit his prayer to an award for compensation for the loss of his right hand, or, in the alternative, all of the fingers thereof.
The trial court issued a peremptory writ commanding the respondent commission to award the relator compensation for the loss of his right hand.
On an appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law the judgment of the trial court was reversed, and a final judgment was rendered in favor of the commission.
The case came into this court by reason of the allowance of a motion to certify the record, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. State, ex rel. Bohan, v. Industrial Commission, 146 Ohio St. 618, 67 N.E.2d 536. However, the relator then filed an application for a rehearing on the ground that this court had limited its consideration to the relator's claim for compensation for the loss of the right hand and had not considered the alternative claim for compensation for the loss of all the fingers of the hand as a result of ankylosis. The application was allowed for the sole purpose of considering the latter claim.
Messrs. Stewart Beirne, for appellant.
Mr. Hugh S. Jenkins, attorney general, Mr. C.G.L. Yearick and Mr. Albertus B. Conn, for appellee.
The relator has been paid compensation for temporary total disability and for impairment of earning capacity. Is he now entitled to further compensation by reason of the ankylosis of all the fingers of his right hand?
The answer to this question concededly is found in the provisions of Section 1465-80, General Code, which read in part as follows:
"For ankylosis (total stiffness of) or contractures (due to scars or injuries) which makes any of the fingers, thumbs, or parts of either more than useless, the same number of weeks apply to such members or parts thereof as given above. * * *"
The difficulty arises by reason of the phrase "more than useless." What, if anything, does this language mean? The relator insists that the words "more than" should be disregarded as mere surplusage and meaningless. However, it is the duty of courts to accord meaning to each word of a leglislative enactment if it is reasonably possible so to do. It is to be presumed that each word in a statute was placed there for a purpose. But the relator urges that these words can serve no useful purpose for the reason that "useless" is an absolute term and hence does not lend itself to comparison. In other words, it is insisted that if a thing is useless it logically cannot be more than useless.
The respondent's answer to this reasoning is that, standing alone, the word useless is merely negative, while more than useless is an affirmative term meaning harmful or detrimental. For example, if only some of the fingers on the relator's hand were ankylosed they probably would, not only be useless but would also interfere with the use of the sound fingers.
If the phrase is to be accorded any significance, this would seem to be the logical explanation. But if the words are mere surplusage and meaningless, the General Assembly can delete them by the simple legislative process of amendment — a thing this court can not do in the exercise of its judicial power.
Unfortunately for the relator the record discloses no evidence tending to show that the ankylosed fingers are not only useless but also constitute an interference with the use of the other parts of his hand.
Under these circumstances the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed again.
Judgment affirmed.
TURNER, MATTHIAS and HART, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN and BELL, JJ., dissent.