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State, ex Rel. Unger, v. Quinn

Supreme Court of Ohio
Feb 14, 1984
9 Ohio St. 3d 190 (Ohio 1984)

Opinion

No. 84-3

Decided February 14, 1984.

Elections — Criminal law — Unfair campaign practices — R.C. 3599.091 — Exclusive original jurisdiction of court of common pleas — Case may not be transferred to municipal court pursuant to Crim. R. 21, when — Writ of procedendo granted.

IN PROCEDENDO.

This is an original action in procedendo before the court on stipulation of the parties "* * * that the within cause be submitted to the court for determination upon the petition and answer without further briefing or pleading." The parties have stipulated that the defendant in the underlying criminal action herein must be brought to trial on or before March 10, 1984, pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2).

The petition and answer reflect agreement as follows: (1) relator, James R. Unger, is the duly acting and qualified Prosecuting Attorney for Stark County; (2) the Stark County Grand Jury on December 9, 1983, returned indictment against one James E. Thorpe for violation of R.C. 3599.091, a misdemeanor of the first degree; (3) an indictment and charge were docketed with the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, the judges thereof being respondents herein, and assigned case No. 83-3470; (4) prior to assignment, the administrative judge on or about December 15, 1983, by entry, purportedly pursuant to Crim. R. 21, ordered such case transferred to the Alliance Municipal Court for prosecution; and (5) R.C. 3599.091(C) provides that courts of common pleas have exclusive original jurisdiction over prosecutions under R.C. 3599.091.

Relator asserts that such transfer was unlawful and seeks vacation of same, and prays that respondents be ordered to proceed to try the case to final judgment. Respondents contend they have the discretionary right to transfer the case under Crim. R. 21 because the offense is a misdemeanor and that venue appears properly in the Alliance Municipal Court.

Mr. James R. Unger, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Dale T. Evans, for relator.

Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths Dougherty Co., L.P.A., and Mr. Ronald W. Dougherty, for respondents.


The issue before this court is whether Crim. R. 21, which permits the administrative judge of a court of common pleas to timely transfer misdemeanor cases filed therein by indictment or information to a court of record of the jurisdiction in which venue appears, is applicable to violations of R.C. 3599.091.

R.C. 3599.091, effective October 1, 1976, or subsequent to the Criminal Rules, relates to unfair campaign practices, and divisions (A) and (B) thereof detail the elements of the designated offenses. Division (C) provides for a specific procedure "[b]efore any prosecution may commence * * *." Such procedure requires that complaints be first presented to the Ohio Elections Commission which is charged with responsibility to investigate and issue findings. Where probable cause is found that a violation has occurred, division (C) requires that a copy of such findings and evidence be transmitted "* * * to the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate county. Notwithstanding any provision of Chapters 1901., 1905., 1907., and 2931. of the Revised Code, the common pleas court has exclusive original jurisdiction over prosecutions under this section."

R.C. 3599.091 thus requires a specific procedure, not only for the initial probable cause determination, but also for transmittal of findings and evidence only to the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate county, notwithstanding that other officials might well be the object of such transmittals in misdemeanor cases. The statute then grants "exclusive original jurisdiction" to the court of common pleas. Arguably, that phrase, standing alone, might mean simply that the prosecutions must originally be brought in the court of common pleas and thus, as here, be deemed to have been complied with, notwithstanding any subsequent transfer.

However, the statutory grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to the court of common pleas is immediately followed by the qualifying phrase, "over prosecutions under this section." This phrase clarifies any ambiguity that would be found in the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction." Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed. 1979), defines "prosecution" as "[a] criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime. * * *" Thus, the specialized procedures and the jurisdictional grant to the courts of common pleas "over prosecutions under this section" demonstrate a legislative intent that all prosecutions for violations of R.C. 3599.091 be conducted in their entirety in the same court of common pleas.

For reason of the foregoing, the writ is allowed, and the order of transfer of December 15, 1983 is hereby vacated, and respondents are ordered to proceed to trial of the underlying criminal action.

Writ allowed.

CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.

W. BROWN and HOLMES, JJ., dissent.


Summaries of

State, ex Rel. Unger, v. Quinn

Supreme Court of Ohio
Feb 14, 1984
9 Ohio St. 3d 190 (Ohio 1984)
Case details for

State, ex Rel. Unger, v. Quinn

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE, EX REL. UNGER, PROS. ATTY., v. QUINN ET AL., JUDGES, COURT OF…

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Feb 14, 1984

Citations

9 Ohio St. 3d 190 (Ohio 1984)
459 N.E.2d 866

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