Summary
In Temke, we reversed a court of appeals judgment granting a writ of mandamus because the court had rendered its decision before an answer admitting or denying the material facts had been filed.
Summary of this case from State, ex Rel. Mazzaro, v. FergusonOpinion
No. 76-655
Decided February 23, 1977.
Mandamus — To compel allowance of testimony at preliminary hearing — Relator's burden of proof.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
On March 26, 1976, a preliminary hearing in the criminal case underlying this controversy was held before appellant, Judge Peter Outcalt, in the Hamilton County Municipal Court. At the hearing, only testimony in support of the criminal charge against relator-appellee Robert H. Temke, defendant therein, was heard. At the conclusion of that testimony, counsel for appellee advised the court of his desire to call witnesses on appellee's behalf, pursuant to Crim. R. 5(B)(3). The court refused to allow appellee to present testimony.
On March 29, 1976, appellee filed an original action in the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County requesting a writ of mandamus ordering appellant to permit appellee to present testimony, and requesting an order prohibiting the transfer of appellee's case to the Grand Jury. Appellee also moved for an injunction to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the hearing.
On March 30, 1976, appellant moved to dismiss the complaint. A transcript of the Municipal Court proceeding was filed with the Court of Appeals on April 5, 1976.
Thereafter, apparently on April 7, 1976, a "hearing" was held on the complaint and, on April 9, 1976, an entry overruling appellant's motion to dismiss and ordering a writ of mandamus to issue was journalized. The Court of Appeals held that appellant's refusal to permit appellee to offer evidence pursuant to Crim. R. 5(B)(3) constituted a failure to perform a mandatory duty incumbent upon appellant as a judge of the Hamilton County Municipal Court.
On April 12, 1976, appellant filed his answer in the Court of Appeals, denying all the allegations contained in appellee's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition. On April 13, 1976, appellee filed a motion to strike appellant's answer, for the reason that the proceeding had been terminated by the entry of April 9, 1976; this motion was overruled on April 23, 1976.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.
Messrs. Jacobs, Kleinman, Martin Seibel and Mr. Kenneth F. Seibel, for appellee.
Mr. Thomas A. Luebbers, city solicitor, Mr. Paul J. Gorman and Ms. Delores J. Hildebrandt, for appellants.
Ninety-four years ago, this court enunciated a well-settled rule that in a mandamus proceeding to compel an officer to perform an act which it is claimed the law enjoins upon him as a duty, all the facts necessary to put him in default must be demonstrated. State v. Cappeller (1883), 39 Ohio St. 455, 460 (quoting Cincinnati College v. La Rue, 22 Ohio St. 469). The court has reaffirmed this principle over the years. Ohio, ex rel. v. Moore (1883), 39 Ohio St. 486, 487 (citing La Rue and Cappeller); Dye v. State, ex rel. Davis (1906), 73 Ohio St. 231, 241, 76 N.E. 829 (quoting La Rue). Relators in mandamus must plead and prove the existence of all necessary facts. State, ex rel. Baker, v. Hanefeld (1938), 134 Ohio St. 540, 541, 18 N.E.2d 404 (citing La Rue). Absent the demonstration of the clear legal duty to perform as demanded mandamus will not lie. State, ex rel. Myers, v. Chiaramonte (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 230, 240, 348 N.E.2d 323.
R.C. 2731.06 provides, in relevant part:
"When the right to require the performance of an act is clear and it is apparent that no valid excuse can be given for not doing it, a court, in the first instance, may allow a peremptory mandamus."
Appellee submits that under the above statutory language, the Court of Appeals properly could determine that appellee's writ should have issued, absent any hearing whatsoever. However, it has been held relative to G.C. 12288, the statutory forerunner of R.C. 2731.06, that a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue in the first instance only when material facts are admitted disclosing that relator is entitled to relief as a matter both of law and fact. State, ex rel. Gulf Ref. Co., v. DeFrance (1950), 89 Ohio App. 334, 338, 101 N.E.2d 782. An alleged right to performance is unclear when the facts underpinning the claimed right are not admitted and it has not been established that no valid excuse can be given for nonperformance of the alleged duty.
We do not reach the question of what, if any, effect a statute may have upon the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction in mandamus reposing in a Court of Appeals.
Appellee concedes that during the hearing below, the court indicated from the bench that it was prepared to make a ruling without a further evidentiary hearing or trial. Furthermore, appellant did not even file his answer until April 12, 1976. Thus, at the time the writ was issued, the factual contentions of appellee had not been admitted and it had not been proven that no valid excuse could be given for nonperformance of the alleged duty. A Municipal Court transcript merely filed with the Court of Appeals as part of the record does not constitute evidence before the court such as to prove hitherto undemonstrated factual allegations in an action for mandamus.
Under the state of the instant record, we do not decide whether appellant failed to comply with Crim. R. 5(B)(3), or whether an action in mandamus is an appropriate method of enforcing such compliance.
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, W. BROWN, SWEENEY and LOCHER, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE and P. BROWN, JJ., concur in the judgment.