Opinion
December 16, 1932.
1. JURISDICTION: Injunction of Proceeding in a Foreign State. A court of equity in a "proper case" may enjoin a person from prosecuting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction; by proper case is meant that the party seeking an injunction must make a clear showing that it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to permit the prosecution of such suit.
2. INJUNCTION: Foreign Jurisdiction: Federal Employers' Liability Act. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act a suit may be brought in the district of the residence of the defendant or in which the cause of action arose or in which the defendant may be doing business at the time of commencing the action, but under the Federal decisions the right to bring such action where the defendant is doing business is qualified by the jurisdiction of a court of equity to restrain the bringing of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction, provided the facts warrant such action.
3. INJUNCTION: Foreign Jurisdiction: Federal Employers' Liability Act. Where plaintiff, a resident of the State of Indiana, brought suit as administratrix under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the city of St. Louis, on account of the death of her husband which occurred in Indiana, the Circuit Court of Indiana had jurisdiction to restrain the plaintiff from prosecuting her suit in Missouri.
4. INJUNCTION: Foreign Jurisdiction: Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Indiana court having jurisdiction to entertain the injunction proceeding, whether or not the equity of the case warranted the granting of the injunction, was a question for the determination of the Indiana court and courts of other jurisdictions are powerless to question the validity of its decree.
5. JURISDICTION: Contempt: Injunction. Where the Circuit Court of Indiana cited for contempt a person enjoined by that court from prosecuting a suit in Missouri, having jurisdiction of the person cited, a circuit court of Missouri had no jurisdiction to enjoin the prosecution of the contempt proceeding.
PROVISIONAL RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.
Jones, Hocker, Sullivan Gladney and Frank Y. Gladney for petitioner.
(1) By procuring the restraining order below, Lena C. Meek has released errors that may have occurred in the injunction proceedings in the Indiana court. R.S. 1929, sec. 1506. (2) The injunction order and decree of the Indiana court is entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States. The injunction was issued by a court of general chancery jurisdiction after due service of process on Lena C. Meek, notice and a hearing; no appeal was taken and the judgment was and is final. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 455; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 452; 2 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.), sec. 858; 15 R.C.L. pp. 927-8. (3) The restraining order is void, for its necessary effect is to nullify the decree in Indiana, where it was issued. Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 419. (4) The power and authority of the Indiana court to issue a citation for contempt for disobedience of its decree is an inherent attribute of judicial power; without it the court would have no existence. State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 235. (5) The restraining order is void in that the circuit court has no colorable authority to interfere with or enjoin a contempt proceeding between nonresidents in a court of another state. State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 237; Debs Case, 158 U.S. 595; 32 C.J. p. 84; Johnston Mining Co. v. Morse, 90 N.Y.S. 107; Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 419. (6) The citation issued against Lena C. Meek is not a legal wrong. It is the exercise of a legal right in a lawful manner. It does not give rise to a cause of action, for its issuance does not violate any legal right of hers, nor breach any duty owing to her by the railroad company, 1 C.J. 965, secs. 56-7-8; Rice v. Railroad, 153 Mo. App. 53; Hailes v. Raines, 162 Mo. App. 59; Riddle v. Foreman, 178 S.W. 229. (7) The circuit court has no jurisdiction, at the instance of one nonresident, to enjoin another nonresident from prosecuting an action in a foreign jurisdiction which is the domicile of both plaintiff and defendant. Carpenter v. Hanes, 162 N.C. 46; Barrett v. Russell, 135 N.Y.S. 35. (8) The circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order against a foreign corporation, enjoining it from doing certain acts in the state of its domicile. State ex rel. v. Shain, 245 Mo. 78; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 15 How. 233; Kimball v. St. Louis S.F. Railroad Co., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N.E. 697; Hobbs v. Mining Co., 129 P. 781; Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 224.
Petitioner seeks our writ of prohibition directed to Honorable Albert D. Nortoni, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, presiding in Division Number Two thereof, commanding (1) the suspension of the execution of a restraining order issued against petitioner in cause No. 6281 pending in said court, and (2) that no further action be taken in said cause. Our provisional rule was issued to which respondent made return. Petitioner submitted the case on printed briefs and oral argument. Respondent has not favored us with either brief or argument.
The pertinent facts are, in substance, as follows:
On January 11, 1930, James C. Meek was in the employ of the railroad company, petitioner herein, as a switchman on its lines through the State of Indiana. The railroad is incorporated under the laws of Indiana. For more than five years next preceding January, 1930, Meek and his wife, Lena C. Meek were citizens of Indiana, residing in the city of Frankfort. On January 11, 1930, while in the employ of the railroad as aforesaid, and while in the line of his duty, Meek received injuries in consequence of which he died. On March 3, 1930, his widow, Lena C. Meek, was appointed administratrix of his estate by the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana. On March 14, 1930, she, as such administratrix brought suit against the railroad company in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband. On April 15, 1930, the railroad company filed a bill in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, asking an injunction against Lena C. Meek, administratrix, to restrain her from prosecuting said damage action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. That court issued a temporary restraining order and set the cause for final hearing on April 28, 1930. Said administratrix was duly notified of said final hearing but made default. On final hearing the Indiana Circuit Court rendered a decree permanently enjoining said administratrix from prosecuting said suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. No appeal was taken and that decree became final.
Notwithstanding the restraining order, said administratrix proceeded to prosecute said cause in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and on March 18, 1932, obtained a verdict in her favor in the sum of $25,000. On March 26, 1932, the railroad company appeared in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, and moved said court to issue a citation for contempt against said administratrix, which citation said court issued, returnable on April 4, 1932. On March 28, 1932, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Division No. 2, issued an order against the railroad company, enjoining said company, its agents, servants and attorneys from prosecuting the citation for contempt issued by the Indiana Circuit Court. On April 1, 1932, the railroad company petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition against the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, prohibiting it from entertaining jurisdiction of the proceedings to enjoin the railroad company from prosecuting the contempt proceedings in the Indiana Circuit Court. Our provisional rule was granted, to which respondent made return and the case is before us for final disposition.
It is settled law that, in a proper case, a court of equity having jurisdiction of the person may enjoin such person from prosecuting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. By a "proper case" we mean that the party seeking such an injunction must make a clear showing that it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to permit the prosecution of the suit in a foreign jurisdiction. 14 Ruling Case Law, page 411, section 112, states the rule thus:
"It is a doctrine, well recognized and universally conceded, that the courts of one country can exercise no jurisdiction or control over the courts of another country. Proceeding on this theory, the rule also prevailed at one time, that a court could not restrain a citizen within the jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in a court of a foreign nation. Gradually, however, recognition was given to the distinction between endeavoring to control the action of a foreign court, by a mandate directed to it, and controlling the action of a resident, over whose person the court had undisputed jurisdiction, until, according to later decisions, unqualified approval is given to the doctrine that, in a proper case, if the court has jurisdiction of the person it may enjoin him from prosecuting such a suit. The courts in these cases proceed on the theory that the restraint operates on the person of the litigant who, as a resident within the jurisdiction of the court from which the mandate is issued, may be compelled to recognize and obey its laws and the decrees of its tribunals."
The same author, in Section 114 at page 413 states the principles underlying the rule, as follows:
"The jurisdiction rests on the authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction, to restrain them from doing inequitable acts to the wrong and injury of others and on the power of the state to compel its own citizens to respect its laws, even beyond its own territorial limits. The court proceeds on the theory that as long as a citizen belongs to a state, he owes it obedience; and, that as between states, the state in which he is domiciled has jurisdiction over his person, and his personal relations to other citizens of the state. In the exercise of this power there is no attempt to render the foreign tribunal subject to the control or direction of the local court or to in any way, exercise a supervisory power over it. There is a clear distinction between an injunction against the proceedings of a court in another state, and the power and authority of such court and one to restrain the personal action of a citizen. In the first case the court has no jurisdiction, while in the other it proceeds in personam against the defendant, directing him to proceed no further in the action, without regard to the fact that the res of the controversy may be outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court, for in such a case the court has the power to compel a party to do all the things necessary according to the lex loci rei sitae which he could do voluntarily to give full effect to the decree against him."
Two questions are presented by the record in this case, (1) did the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, have jurisdiction to enjoin Lena C. Meek, administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband from prosecuting her suit against the railroad in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband, and (2) if that court had such jurisdiction, did the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis have jurisdiction to enjoin the railroad from further prosecuting the contempt proceedings in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana.
[2, 3] The action brought by Lena C. Meek in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis was based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Section 6 of that act, as amended by Act. April 5, 1910. Section 1, provides that: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant may be doing business at the time of commencing the action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states. . . ." Because of the provisions of this statute, it might be said that the railroad was doing business in the city of St. Louis at the time Lena C. Meek, administratrix, brought her action there and for that reason she had a right to bring and maintain such action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. But we are bound by Federal decisions on this question which hold that the right given by this statute to bring an action in the courts of any district where the defendant is doing business at the time of commencing the action, is qualified by the jurisdiction of a court of equity to restrain the bringing of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction, provided the facts in the case warrant such action. Many decisions, both State and Federal so hold. In the recent case of Ex parte Crandall, 53 F.2d 969, the facts there in judgment are an exact counterpart of the facts in the case at bar. In that case it appears that an Indiana Court of Equity appointed Inez B. Crandall administratrix of the estate of her husband, who met his death while operating a locomotive engine for the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company, which was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky and engaged in intrastate and interstate commerce in the states of Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and others. The administratrix brought an action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, against the railroad company to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband. The petition alleged that at the time Crandall met his death, the railroad was engaged in interstate commerce. The railroad company petitioned the Indiana Court of Equity to enjoin said administratrix from further prosecuting the action which she had brought in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, charging among other things that Crandall was at the time of his death, and for some years previous had been, a resident of Evansville, Indiana, that at the time said administratrix brought said action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, she was a resident of Evansville, Indiana. The petition also alleged facts showing that the prosecution of the suit in Missouri would entail a heavy burden upon the railroad and upon commerce. The Indiana court enjoined said administratrix from further prosecution of the suit in the St. Louis Circuit Court. In violation of the injunction, she proceeded with the prosecution of her suit in the Missouri court, for which the Indiana court adjudged her in contempt and ordered her to pay "the State of Indiana the sum of $500, and that she be committed to the Indiana Women's Prison for a period of three months, and that both fine and imprisonment shall be supended upon dismissal of the suit mentioned in the information filed." No appeal was taken from this order, and the sheriff imprisoned the petitioner. She thereupon secured a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court. Upon final hearing that court upheld the action of the Indiana court, discharged the writ, and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the Sheriff of Vanderberg County, Indiana. [Ex parte Crandall, 52 F.2d 650.] On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. [Ex parte Crandall, 53 F.2d 969.] On application to the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, that court denied the writ on February 23, 1932. [Crandall v. Habbe, 285 U.S. 540, 52 Sup. Ct. 312, 76 L.Ed. 933.]
Concerning the right of Indiana citizens to begin actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a foreign jurisdiction, the court in Ex parte Crandall, 53 F.2d 969, 971, said:
"The general right of Indiana citizens to begin actions of this nature, wherever service of process on the defendant could be had, was always potentially qualified by the jurisdiction of equity to restrain the citizen from commencing the action in a foreign jurisdiction where to do so would unreasonably, inequitably, and unfairly harass, oppress, or defraud the defendant. The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not assume to remove this qualification, and in our judgment does not exempt the citizen from invocation against him of this equitable jurisdiction under facts which would in general justify its application."
The facts involved in the case brought by Lena C. Meek, administratrix, against petitioner in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, bring that case squarely within the rule announced in Ex parte Crandall, supra. We therefore hold that the Indiana Circuit Court had jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding to enjoin said administratrix from prosecuting that suit in the St. Louis Circuit Court. Having jurisdiction to entertain the injunction proceedings, whether or not the equities of the case warranted the granting of the injunction was a question for the Indiana court to determine, and the courts of other jurisdictions are powerless to question the wisdom or validity of its decree in that behalf.
The final question is whether or not the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis had jurisdiction to enjoin the railroad company from prosecuting the citation for contempt in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana. If not, our provisional rule in prohibition should be made absolute.
The Indiana court had jurisdiction to enjoin Lena C. Meek, administratrix from prosecuting her suit in the St. Louis Circuit Court, and to adjudge her in contempt for proceeding with the prosecution of that suit in violation of the injunction. If, as we have held, the decree of the Indiana court enjoining the prosecution of the suit in the St. Louis Circuit Court, was a valid decree, the railroad company, being an interested party, was entitled to institute any lawful proceeding looking to the enforcement of that decree. "As a general rule proceedings for contempt to enforce a civil remedy and to protect the rights of parties litigant should be instituted by the aggrieved parties, or those who succeed to their rights, or some one who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected." [13 C.J. p. 59, sec. 82.] The contempt proceedings were instituted by the railroad company. When these proceedings were instituted, the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the right of the railroad company to prosecute the proceedings to a termination, at once attached. It is familiar law that where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a party to prosecute the proceedings therein, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court. [Stevens v. Central National Bank of Boston, 169 U.S. 432, 39 N.E. 68.] For this reason the St. Louis Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the railroad company from prosecuting the contempt proceedings in the Indiana court.
The provisional rule heretofore issued should be made absolute. It is so ordered. All concur.