Opinion
June 29, 1929.
1. INSURANCE BOND: Proof of Shortage: Exhibits Omitted from Abstract. In a suit on a bond in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, given by a surety company to guarantee that a city clerk and collector would deliver and pay over all moneys received by him as such, where the petition alleged that such clerk and collector had collected about twenty-one thousand dollars belonging to the city which he failed and refused to turn over to the city, and wherein the surety offered no evidence, but contented itself with objections to the manner of showing the shortage and to offering a demurrer, and the trial court, sitting as a jury, had before it certain records kept by the clerk and stubs of receipts issued by him, offered as tending to show a shortage in his accounts, the presumption must be indulged in the appellate court, upon an appeal by the surety, that the contents of such records and stubs tended to support the finding that a shortage of ten thousand dollars existed, where the appellant has not set forth the contents of such exhibits in its abstract.
2. ____: Denial of Execution: Under Oath. The failure of the surety to deny under oath the execution of the fidelity bond sued on is a confession of its execution.
3. DEMURRER TO PETITION: Answering Over. If defendant fails to stand on his demurrer to the petition, and answers over after the demurrer is overruled, the petition must be adjudged sufficient unless it entirely fails to state a cause of action.
4. PLEADING: Suit on Bond of City Clerk and Collector: Ordinances. In an action on a bond given to guarantee that a city clerk and collector will deliver and pay over all moneys belonging to the city received by him as such, it is not necessary that the petition plead the ordinances creating the office of city clerk and ex officio collector and defining the duties of such collector in respect to moneys coming into his hands. The action is based on the alleged breach of the contract of suretyship, and not upon the ordinances, and such ordinances merely constitute evidence tending to show the breach.
5. ____: Suit on Bond Running in Name of State: Admissions: Good Common Law Bond. The fact that the bond ran to the State of Missouri, and the fact that it was executed to protect the city was defectively alleged, will not constitute a defense to an action on the bond, where it recites that the principal had been appointed clerk and collector of the city and that the avoidance of its penalty is conditioned upon the principal delivering and paying over all moneys received by him by virtue of his office, and the surety has failed to deny its execution under oath, for by such failure the surety admits its execution and all recitals therein. Although the bond did not by its express terms run in the name of the city, as required by statute (Sec. 8231, R.S. 1919), it was nevertheless a good common-law bond.
6. ____: ____: Defect of Parties: Waiver. Although an action on a bond, running in the name of the State and guaranteeing that a city officer will turn over to the city all moneys collected by virtue of his office, is not properly brought in the name of the State as plaintiff, the defect of parties or want of capacity in the State to sue at the relation and to the use of the city, being apparent on the face of the petition, is waived if not taken advantage of by demurrer.
7. ____: Contradictory. An allegation that the bond sued on, set out in haec verba in the petition, was given to protect the city, is not contradictory of the bond which does not expressly so state, where the bond cannot be construed to have been given for the protection of anyone else except such city, there being no contradiction between the exact language of the bond and the legal effect of the allegation.
8. ____: In Haec Verba. A petition is not fatally defective because it sets out the instrument sued on in haec verba, as well as by its legal effect, where such instrument and legal effect are in harmony.
9. EVIDENCE: Bond to Secure Fidelity of Officer: Proof That He was Officer. In an action to recover the penalty of a bond reciting that the principal "has been duly appointed city clerk and collector" of the city, a failure to deny its execution under oath is an admission that he was city clerk and collector, and therefore testimony of a witness that the principal was clerk and collector of the city between named dates does not relate to a fact at issue in the case, and to overrule an objection that the testimony is hearsay is not error.
10. ____: ____: Ordinances. It is not necessary, in the action on a bond given by a city collector, to plead ordinances providing for the assessment and collection of the city revenue and defining the duties of the collector with respect thereto and his oath of office and bond, and an objection to the introduction of the ordinances in evidence that they are inadmissible because not pleaded is properly overruled.
11. INDEMNIFYING BOND: Vexatious Delay: Wilful Refusal to Pay. As soon as the city collector absconded, the surety was notified of that fact and advised that his accounts were being examined and invited to and did send its representative to participate in the examination. Later its reply to a formal demand that the penalty of the bond be paid was that it was not indebted to the city in any sum whatever. No reason appears in the record why it disclaimed liability, unless it be that the bond ran in the name of the State instead of the city, and the defense on that point, made after the disclaimer, seems to be that the petition did not plead sufficient facts to declare upon the instrument as a common-law bond. It has never suggested any meritorious defense, and, at the trial, sought refuge in flimsy and far-fetched technicalities, and offered no testimony in its own behalf. Held, that these facts and circumstances were sufficient to authorize the trial court, sitting as a jury, to find that the surety did not entertain an honest belief that it was not liable on the bond, and that its refusal to pay the penalty of the bond, which was far less than the defalcation, was wilful and without probable cause, and to assess reasonable damages and attorney's fees for vexatious delay.
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: Appeal and Error, 4 C.J., Section 2666, p. 737, n. 54; Section 2952, p. 969, n. 56. Fidelity Insurance, 25 C.J., Section 32, p. 1116, n. 63. Municipal Corporations, 43 C.J., Section 1232, p. 729, n. 78, 79. Parties, 47 C.J. Section 346, p. 186, n. 42; Section 383, p. 200, n. 59.
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court. — Hon. G.A. Wurdeman, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Ralph Baxter and John H. Haley for appellant.
(1) The petition alleges that "the city of Maplewood is a city of the third class organized under the alternative or commission form of government" and that "George D. Komar at all the times herein mentioned was the duly appointed and qualified city clerk and collector for the city of Maplewood." A city under alternative or commission form of government has only administrative officers and employees, and such officers and employees are required to perform duties in two or more departments as determined by the counsel, and the creation of all such offices and the duties thereof shall be by ordinance. Sec. 8379, R.S. 1919; Laws 1921, p. 492. Courts do not take judicial notice of acts of the city counsels. Without an ordinance creating such office, there was none. So far as the petition is concerned, there was no such office, as no ordinance creating the same is pleaded. St. Louis v. Roche, 128 Mo. 541; State ex rel. v. Sherman, 42 Mo. 210; Bowie v. Kansas City, 51 Mo. 454; Inhabitants v. Robinson, 75 Mo. 192; Tarkio v. Loyd, 179 Mo. 605. If such officer had any authority or powers, it was "by virtue" of ordinance and there is a total failure to plead any ordinance or ordinances under which "by virtue of appointment" it became his duty and authority to collect certain license fees, taxes, or anything. Absent such ordinance, there were no such duties, or even a legal right. No ordinance prescribing such duties is pleaded. Such allegations are mere conclusions of law. Hoester v. Sammelmann, 101 Mo. 624; Sec. 8231, R.S. 1919. Without pleading any facts, which if proved, might show that the bond, although made to the State of Missouri, was in reality to "protect the city of Maplewood" and then to merely plead the bond in haec verba renders the statement that the bond was "entered into to protect the city of Maplewood" but the statement of a legal conclusion, with the plain terms of the bond reciting the contradictory statement that the principal and surety are "firmly bound unto the State of Missouri." The terms of the bond itself and the conclusion stated in the petition are contradictory and without some other or explanatory facts being pleaded, the petition certainly does not state a cause of action grounded on the bond pleaded. (2) To make the matter worse, the petition also sets out and pleads in haec verba the certificate of its city attorney as follows: "I hereby certify the above bond to be in due form according to law and the ordinance." It is obvious from the face of the petition that the bond is not in due form of law as provided by statute, and no ordinance providing for the form set out in the petition in haec verba is pleaded. "A petition which sets out the contract relied on in haec verba, instead of pleading it by its legal effect is demurrable. If the contract is inartificially drawn so that its meaning or effect is obscure, it is but all the more important that the pleader advancing it should take the responsibility of stating its legal effect." Estes v. Shoe Co., 155 Mo. 583; Anderson v. Gaines, 156 Mo. 669; Reilly v. Cullen, 159 Mo. 328. (3) If the money he collected belonged to the city, it belonged to the city by reason of having been collected by authority of an ordinance or ordinances authorizing its collection by such officer and was collected "by virtue" of some ordinance prescribing the powers and duties of such officer. No such ordinance is pleaded and it is impossible to determine the source of such collections and whether made within the scope of such officer's powers and duties. And the ordinance prescribing the duties and requirements not being pleaded, it is impossible to determine what would have been a "turning the same over in accordance to the duties and requirements of his office under the ordinances of the city of Maplewood." Such allegations are but ambiguous conclusions of the pleader and it is impossible for one to determine whether or not there was a compliance with the ordinance. (4) Courts do not take judicial notice of the ordinances of municipalities, and if a party relies on an ordinance, he should set it out in his pleading. The allegations of the petition such as "the money was collected by virtue of his office," "that by plaintiff signing the bond and the said officer violating the condition of said bond that defendant became indebted to plaintiff" are simply the averment of legal conclusions, not the statement of issuable facts and not therefore traversable and are as no statement at all. Gibson v. Railroad, 225 Mo. 482. (5) The court erred in admitting the so-called ordinances, resolutions, books, records and tax stubs of the city of Maplewood and erred in admitting incompetent, improper and illegal testimony. The court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer at the close of plaintiff's case. (6) The court opened the flood gates and any and all things deemed evidence by plaintiff poured in and conclusion was builded upon conclusion to prove material facts in the case. (7) There was a total failure to prove, not even an effort made in that direction, that although the bond was given to the State of Missouri, in reality it was payable to city of Maplewood. It was not proved that Komar was the duly appointed and qualified clerk and collector, or either of such officers. It was not proved that he actually collected any money belonging to the city. It was not proved that he converted any of the city's funds to his own use. (8) The court erred in finding and adjudging any sum in favor of plaintiff for vexations delay and erred in adjudging any sum in favor of plaintiff for attorney's fee. The record in this case considered, it surely cannot be seriously contended that defendant was not entitled to litigate the questions in court without being penalized therefor. The bond is unusual, but is the form approved by the city attorney and doubtless prepared by him. The "shortage" so far as the evidence goes may have just as well occurred before the execution of the bond in controversy, and defendant has the right to require that it be proved when it occurred. Shoe Co. v. Assurance Co., 277 Mo. 422; Roofing Tile Co. v. Ins. Co., 277 S.W. 352.
S.E. Eaken and Joseph G. Williams for respondent; Walter F. Stahlhuth and Hensley, Allen Marsalek of counsel.
(1) The petition states a cause of action. (a) It was unnecessary for plaintiff to plead, in the petition, ordinances creating the office of city clerk and collector, or ordinances imposing the duty upon such officer to collect money due the city, because the action was not based on the violation of ordinances. Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503; Kenney v. Ry. Co., 261 Mo. 97; Cullegan v. Studebaker, 67 Mo. 372; Collins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 283; Secs. 1220, 1239, 1244, R.S. 1919. (b) The petition alleges that Komar was duly appointed, qualified and acting city clerk and collector; that as such it was his duty to collect all moneys due the city from licenses, permits and taxes, under its ordinances, and the statutes of this State; that in the performance of his duty as such officer he collected about $21.000, etc.; that he failed and refused to turn said money over to the city, in accordance with the duties and requirements of his office, "under the ordinance of the city of Maplewood and the law of the State." These allegations, by reasonable intendment, plead that Komar was required by ordinances of the city to collect and account for the moneys referred to. Devers v. Howard, 88 Mo. App. 259; Iron Co. v. City, 138 Mo. 608; State ex rel. McKown v. Williams, 77 Mo. 463. (c) The fact that the bond pleaded in the petition does not comply with Section 8231, requiring city officers to give bond to the city, does not invalidate it as a common-law obligation. State ex rel. Jean v. Horn, 94 Mo. 162; Barnes v. Webster, 16 Mo. 258; State ex rel. v. Cochrane, 264 Mo. 581. (d) Pleading a written instrument in haec verba instead of by its legal effect, does not render the pleading demurrable; in either case the court will put its own construction on the instrument. Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70; Johnson v. Rys. Co., 247 Mo. 352; State ex rel. v. Williams, 77 Mo. 463; Clark, Code Pleading, Sec. 45, p. 189; Pattison, Code Pleading (2 Ed.) secs. 161-8, pp. 179-186. (2) Defendant waived the alleged defects in the petition, if any, by answering over. (a) If, as defendant claims, the petition was not sufficiently specific in its reference to the ordinances creating Komar's position and duties, or in pleading facts showing that the bond was given for the protection of the city of Maplewood, the defendant waived the defect by answering over. Angel v. Portageville, 168 Mo. App. 16. (b) The pleading of the bond in haec verba in the petition was at the most a formal defect, which, under the statute, was cured by the judgment. Sec. 1550, R.S. 1919. (3) The suit was properly brought in the name of the State of Missouri at the relation of the city of Maplewood. (a) Such is the positive requirement of our statutes. Secs. 1005, 1018, R.S. 1919. (b) If, on the other hand, the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to maintain this suit, the defect was apparent on the face of the petition, and the failure of defendant to demur on that ground waives the point. Sec. 1226, R.S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Surety Co., 294 S.W. 126; Mechanics Bank v. Gilpin, 105 Mo. 17; State ex rel. v. U.S.F. G. Co., 236 Mo. 352. (4) Upon the record defendant is estopped to question Komar's appointment or authority. (a) The bond pleaded in the petition recites that "whereas, the above bounden, George D. Komar, has been duly appointed City Clerk and Collector of the City of Maplewood." It is conditioned upon his duty to deliver and pay over "all moneys received by him, by virtue of his offices." The execution of this bond by defendant was admitted by its failure to deny execution, upon oath, in its answer, and also by its vice-president, who testified. Sec. 1415, R.S. 1919; Brown Mfg. Co. v. Gilpin, 120 Mo. App. 130. (b) Defendant is bound at every stage of the proceeding by the admissions made by its answer, and any question of failure to plead or prove facts so admitted is eliminated from the case. Dittmeier v. Laughlin (Mo. App.), 253 S.W. 777; Milward v. Railroad Co., 207 Mo. App. 345; Davidson v. Land Co., 253 Mo. 223; Priess v. County, 231 Mo. 332; McKenzie v. Rys. Co., 216 Mo. 19. (c) The defendant's admission that it executed the bond conclusively establishes, for all purposes in this suit, the facts recited therein, for a surety is estopped to deny the truth of the recitals of its bond. State ex rel. v. Williams, 77 Mo. 468; Lionberger v. Krieger, 88 Mo. 167; Smith ex rel. v. Rogers, 191 Mo. 334; State ex rel. v. F. D. Co. (Mo.), 298 S.W. 91. (5) Damages and attorneys' fees for vexatious delay were properly awarded. The defendant did not deny the execution and delivery of its bond. It was estopped to deny the position and authority of Komar, and by its counsel affirmatively admitted the shortage during the trial. It offered no evidence whatever to sustain its general denial, and its attitude throughout the case is well shown by the great number of unfounded objections made by its counsel, and his statement. "We don't care how your Honor rules; all we ask is for the privilege of making a record in conformity with our theory of the case." Defendant had no substantial defense to this suit, and under such circumstances the court was justified in awarding damages and attorneys' fees. Hayward v. Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 287 S.W. 1084: Prindle v. F. C. Co. (Mo. App.), 233 S.W. 252.
This is an action upon a bond executed by appellant as surety for George D. Komar, clerk and collector of the city of Maplewood. The trial was by the judge of the Circuit Court of St. Louis county sitting as a jury. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $11,991.78, defendant was granted an appeal to this court. Omitting formal parts, the bond sued on was as follows:
"Know all men by these presents, that we, George D. Komar, as principal, and the Southern Surety Company of Des Moines, Iowa, as surety, are held and firmly bound unto the State of Missouri, in the full and just sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for the payment of which well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
"Signed with our hands and sealed with our seals and dated this 7th day of May, 1924.
"The condition of the above obligation is such, that
"Whereas, the above bounden George D. Komar has been duly appointed City Clerk and Collector of the City of Maplewood, St. Louis County, Missouri.
"Now therefore, if the said George D. Komar will execute all process to him directed and deliver and pay over all moneys received by him, by virtue of his offices and discharge the duties according to law, then this obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect."
The petition alleged in substance that Komar was clerk and collector of Maplewood when said bond was executed and during the time it was in force and as such it was his duty to collect all moneys due said city from licenses, permits, taxes, etc., from any and all sources, payable to the city under its ordinances and the statutes of Missouri, and that said bond was given to protect said city.
It is then alleged that, while said bond was in force, Komar in his official capacity collected about $21,000 belonging to said city and failed and refused to turn same over to said city, as he was required to do under the ordinances of the city and the laws of the State and converted said money to his own use, in violation of the conditions of said bond, and that Komar was insolvent and the shortage could not be collected from him. By reason of such facts and the execution of said bond, it is alleged that appellant became indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $10,000, the penalty of the bond.
Then follow allegations upon which plaintiff based its claim for an allowance of damages and attorneys' fees in an additional sum of $3500, because of alleged vexatious refusal of appellant to pay the principal sum of said bond.
After its demurrer to said petition had been overruled, appellant filed its answer, which was an unverified general denial. At the conclusion of the evidence by plaintiff, appellant offered an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. This was refused. Appellant then rested its case without offering further evidence. Thereafter the following entry of record appears:
"Trial by court resumed and concluded, submitted. Finding and judgment for plaintiff in sum of $10,000, penalty of bond and $391.78 interest and court finds there is vexatious delay and judgment for plaintiff in addition for $600 damages and $1,000 attorney fees, total $11,991.78 and costs against defendant and execution to issue for said sum."
No one can read this record without concluding that appellant, in effect, admitted that Komar was short more than $10,000 in his accounts with the city during the life of the bond. Objections were made to the manner of showing such shortage, but Abstract: the shortage itself must certainly be regarded as Exhibits. proven, if not admitted. The trial judge had before him certain records kept by Komar and stubs of receipts issued by him, which were offered in evidence as tending to show collections by Komar and a shortage in his accounts, and appellant has not seen fit to set forth the contents of such exhibits in its abstract. The presumption must, therefore, be indulged that such contents tend to support the finding made by the court that a shortage of not less than $10,000 existed. [Williams v. Webb, 127 Mo. 150, l.c. 152, 29 S.W. 998; Reed v. Peck, 163 Mo. 333, l.c. 336, 63 S.W. 734; Sinclair v. Railroad Co. (Mo. App.), 253 S.W. 380.]
The failure of appellant to deny under oath the execution of the bond sued on confessed the execution thereof. [Sec. 1415, R.S. 1919.] The bond was drawn by appellant's own agent. Denial It recited that Komar had been duly appointed as city Under collector and obligated appellant to make good any Oath. failure of Komar to pay over all moneys received by him by virtue of said office.
The demurrer to plaintiff's evidence must be regarded as well overruled, if the evidence complained of was properly admitted. Such admission of evidence, together with assignments of error in overruling appellant's demurrer to the petition and adjudging that plaintiff was entitled to damages and attorney's fees for vexatious refusal to pay, are urged here as grounds for reversal of the trial court's judgment.
As appellant did not stand on its demurrer to the petition and answered over after such demurrer was overruled, said petition must be adjudged sufficient, unless it entirely fails to state a cause of action. The petition is said to be fatally insufficient because it failed to plead ordinances of the city of Demurrer to Maplewood creating the office of city clerk and ex Petition. officio city collector and defining the duties of said city collector in respect to moneys coming into his hands. The action was based upon alleged breach of appellant's contract of suretyship and not upon any ordinance of the city. Such ordinances merely constituted evidence tending to show that such breach of contract occurred and it was not necessary to plead them in the petition. [Bailey v. Kansas City, 189 Mo. 503, l.c. 514, 87 S.W. 1182; Kinney v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 261 Mo. 97, l.c. 113, 169 S.W. 23.] Ordinances Pleading setting forth the duties of the city collector were Ordinances. put in evidence. The cases cited by appellant have been examined. They are not in conflict with the rule announced in the cases above cited. The assignment is without merit.
It will be noted that the bond ran to the State of Missouri instead of the city of Maplewood. It is said that the conclusion alleged in the petition, that said bond was in fact given to protect the city of Maplewood, was not a sufficient Bond in allegation of that fact and that the facts proving that Name of the bond was executed for that purpose should have been State. alleged.
The recitals of the bond were that it was executed upon the condition that Komar had been appointed collector of Maplewood and avoidance of its penalty was conditioned upon said Komar delivering and paying over all moneys received by him by virtue of his office. By its failure to deny execution of the bond under oath, appellant admitted its execution and all the recitals thereof. Appellant therefore admitted that Komar had been appointed city collector and that its obligation was that Komar should deliver and pay over all moneys coming into his hands as such collector. Such payment was to the city, for none other could reasonably have been intended under the language used in the bond.
Although said bond did not by its express terms run to the city as required by Section 8231. Revised Statutes 1919, which is conceded to apply here, it was good as a common-law bond. [Barnes to Use of Hayes v. Webster, 16 Mo. 258; State ex rel. Jean v. Horn, 94 Mo. 162, 7 S.W. 116; State to Use v. Cochrane, 264 Mo. 581, l.c. 593, 175 S.W. 599, and cases cited.]
And further, though the action was not properly brought in the name of the State of Missouri at the relation and to the use of the City of Maplewood (Sec. 1005, R.S. 1919), the defect of parties plaintiff or the want of capacity in plaintiff to sue, Defect of if any, was apparent on the face of the petition and Parties. such alleged defect was waived because not taken advantage of by demurrer. [Secs. 1226 and 1230, R.S. 1919.]
Appellant contends that the "terms of the bond itself and the conclusion stated in the petition are Contradictory contradictory and without some other or Pleading. explanatory facts being pleaded, the petition certainly does not state a cause of action grounded on the bond pleaded."
We are unable to agree with appellant that the instrument as set out in haec verba contradicts the allegations of the petition as to its legal effect. The bond does not expressly state that it was given to protect the city of Maplewood, as the pleader charged its legal effect to be, but, as we have above suggested, the bond itself could not be construed to have been given for the protection of anyone except the city of Maplewood. There certainly is no contradiction between the exact language of the bond and its legal effect as pleaded. We do not understand appellant to be contending that the petition is fatally insufficient, merely because it sets out an instrument in haec verba, as well as by its legal effect, where such tenor and legal effect are in harmony. We rule the petition to be sufficient after judgment.
We deem it proper to notice some of the objections urged by the appellant to the admission of evidence. Many of the objections were lodged to questions and answers which could not possibly have prejudiced appellant's defense and we will not unnecessarily lengthen this opinion in their consideration.
Mayor Burks was asked whether or not Komar held any official position in Maplewood from May 7, 1924, to March 30, 1925. The objection lodged to this question was: "We object to that question for the reasons: Not the best evidence; pure Officer: conclusion: It would be a position created by Admitted ordinance not pleaded." This objection was overruled by Answer. and the witness answered, "He was City Clerk and Collector." The bond drawn and signed by appellant's agent recited this fact and the execution of the bond was not denied under oath. The fact that Komar was collector was not a fact at issue in the case.
Objection was offered to the introduction of ordinances providing for the assessment and collection of the revenue of the city of Maplewood and defining the duties of the collector in respect thereto and his oath of office and bond. The ground of the objection was that such ordinances had not been Ordinances. pleaded in the petition. As above ruled, it was not necessary to plead said ordinances, because the action was based upon the breach of the bond and not upon the ordinances and such ordinances were merely evidence tending to prove such breach. There is no merit in assignments of this character.
A further point is made because accountant Muren fixed the shortage of $16,166.27 between the dates of May 7, 1924, and April 30, 1925, when it appears that Komar was not acting as collector after March 30, 1925. This seems to us Inadvertence. to have been a mere inadvertence on the part of the witness. The records and stubs were shown to have been made by Komar while he alone was acting as collector and Mr. Muren's testimony was that the shortage he found was shown by such records and stubs. April 30, 1925, was within the period covered by the bond. We find no merit in this assignment.
Finally, it is contended that the trial court erred in assessing damages and attorneys' fees against appellant for vexatious refusal to pay the bond. The record discloses that, as soon as Komar absconded, appellant as his surety was notified of that fact and advised that his accounts were being Vexatious examined and appellant was invited to and did send its Delay. own representative to participate in examining Komar's accounts. Later its reply to the formal demand of the city that the penalty of the bond be paid was a curt statement that appellant "is not indebted to the city of Maplewood in any sum whatever," together with notice that the letter making the demand had been referred to appellant's counsel. It stands practically admitted that Komar's shortage during the life of the bond largely exceeded its penalty. No reason whatever appears of record why appellant disclaimed liability to the city, unless it be that the bond ran to the State instead of to the city. The defense on that point appears to be that the petition did not plead sufficient facts to declare properly upon the instrument as a common-law bond. The claim put forth by the city gave every appearance from the beginning that it was a bona-fide and meritorious claim. Appellant has never suggested any meritorious defense and, at the trial, sought refuge in the most flimsy and far-fetched technicalities and offered not a syllable of testimony in its own behalf.
Although the rule is well established in this State that an insurance company or a bonding company has the right "to entertain an honest difference of opinion as to its liability, or as to the extent of such liability, under the contract of insurance, and to litigate that difference" (Non-Royalty Shoe Company v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 277 Mo. 399, l.c. 422, 210 S.W. 37; State ex rel. Life Insurance Co. v. Allen, 295 Mo. 307, l.c. 320, 243 S.W. 839), yet it made no showing of non-liability in whole or in part. We are satisfied that there was sufficient proof of facts and circumstances in this record which authorized the trial judge to find that appellant did not entertain such honest belief concerning its non-liability upon the bond and that its refusal to pay the penalty thereof was wilful and without probable cause. Those were clearly questions for the trier of the facts, if there were facts and circumstances in evidence justifying the drawing of such a conclusion. We find no reason in the case at bar for interfering with the trial court's action in that respect.
The judgment appears to be for the right party and in a proper amount and is affirmed. All concur.