Opinion
February 4, 1928.
1. TAX BILLS: General and Special: Priority: Certiorari to Court of Appeals: Conflict in Principle. This court having decided in a former case that under the charter of Kansas City a special tax bill takes priority over a lien for general taxes, the question whether there is a conflict between said decision and the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, holding that under the charter of St. Joseph (a general statute) the lien for general taxes is superior to the lien of special tax bills, is for decision, if said opinion conflicts with the principles ruled by this court. The contention that this court must have ruled on the provisions of the charter of St. Joseph before it can be said that there is a conflict is untenable, if the two charters are the same in meaning, though somewhat different in the expressions used.
2. TAX BILLS: General and Special: Priority: Under Charter of St. Joseph: Right to Redeem. Under the charter of St. Joseph (Sec. 7731, R.S. 1919) providing that the title conveyed to the purchaser at a sale of lots for delinquent general taxes is an absolute estate in fee simple, "subject to all unpaid taxes which are a lien thereon," the interest of a purchaser at a sale under a judgment for general for general taxes, by virtue of certificates of purchase subject to the right of the owner to redeem, is determined by the title to be conveyed to the purchaser by the city treasurer on the termination of such right to redeem. And as the charter (Secs. 7723, 7726, 7733, R.S. 1919) further provides that before the owner of the land can redeem he must pay to the person holding the certificate of purchase, after the date of the certificate or deed, the amount paid by such person in satisfaction of all state, county or municipal taxes, general or special, the purchaser at the tax sale does not acquire a title free from the liens of outstanding special tax bills, but is permitted to protect his title by paying all such special liens.
3. ____: ____: ____: Charters of Kansas City and St. Joseph. The general words of the charter of St. Joseph and the somewhat more specific words of the charter of Kansas City are identical in meaning, and the decision of this court in Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186, holding that the title acquired by a purchaser at a sale under a judgment for delinquent general taxes is subject to the lien of outstanding special tax bills, is controlling in the construction of both charters.
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: Courts, 15 C.J., Section 518, p. 1092, n. 63. Taxation, 37 Cyc., p. 1477, n. 73.
To Kansas City Court of Appeals.
RECORD QUASHED.
W.B. Norris for relator.
(1) The question is not one involving the general principles of law of taxation, but the construction of the statutes in reference to the cities of the first class. The provisions of the statute in reference to the cities of the first class are similar to the provisions as found in the Kansas City Charter. Those provisions have been construed by this court in favor of the priority of the lien arising from special tax bills over the lien given to the city for general city taxes. Secs. 7731, 7753, 7795, 7796, 7797, 7722, 7723, 7726, 7733, R.S. 1919; Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186; Commerce Trust Co. v. Syndicate Lock Co., 208 Mo. App. 261. (2) Section 7797 provides that tax bill in this suit shall be a lien upon the property therein described continually for two years and no longer, unless suit is brought within such period to collect the same, in which case the lien shall continue until the determination of the legal proceedings. It is manifestly not the meaning of the law that a sale for city taxes during the life of the lien for a subsequent year shall discharge the lien of the tax bill, unless the charter of the city of St. Joseph expressly provides to the contrary. State ex rel. Rosenblatt v. Werner, 10 Mo. App. 41; City of Excelsior Springs to use of McCormick v. Henry, 99 Mo. App. 450. (3) There being no distinction between assessments made by the city for general purposes from assessments made for the purpose of special taxation, the defendant Landis bought the property under the general law of taxation subject to all prior liens given by the law for the protection of either liens for general taxes or liens for special taxes. Morey Eng. Const. Co. v. Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241; Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186.
Landis Duncan and John C. Landis for respondents.
(1) The opinion of respondents is not subject to review by this court. It construes the statutes governing cities of the first class which have not been previously construed by this court. Therefore, its decision whether right or wrong is final. State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Winters v. Trimble, 290 S.W. 115; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 267 S.W. 379. (a) It is evident that a review of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is sought in order to determine, in addition to the claim of an alleged contravention with a ruling of the Supreme Court, whether statutes have been misinterpreted or errors in the construction of the law other than those of conflict have been committed. This court will not do so. Courts of appeals within the limits of their jurisdiction as defined by the organic law are supreme. State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 267 S.W. 379. (b) The opinion is not in conflict with the decision of this court in Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186. (2) Even if respondents failed to follow the opinion of Good v. Johnson, the writ should be quashed for respondents have correctly construed the charter governing cities of the first class as it relates to taxation. State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 283 S.W. 57. (a) The lien of the general taxes levied by the city of St. Joseph is a perpetual lien against all interest in the real estate. Art. 10, sec. 1, Mo. Constitution; Secs. 7709, 12757, 12964, 12965, R.S. 1919. (b) The charter granted by the legislature to cities of the first class does not grant holders of special tax bills a lien superior to the lien of general taxes. Sec. 7731, R.S. 1919. (c) General taxes unless there is legislative enactment to the contrary are liens superior to all other liens. Finkelstein v. Baxter, 114 Mo. 493; Browne v. Browne, 124 Mo. 791; Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Gitchill v. Kleider, 84 Mo. 472; Merriweather v. Overly, 228 Mo. 218; Rhorer v. Oder, 124 Mo. 24; Keething v. Craig, 73 Mo. 507; Jaicks v. Oppenheimer, 264 Mo. 693.
Relator seeks to quash the record of the Kansas City Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County in the case of Marion O. Land, doing business as Land Construction Company v. Michael Costello and W.A. Landis. The facts are as follows:
On August 4, 1923, the city of St. Joseph issued two tax-bills to plaintiff against lots 3 and 4 in Block 29, St. Joseph Extension Addition to the city of St. Joseph. The bills were each for $215.16, for paving Highland Avenue abutting on said lots. On January 17, 1925, the city of St. Joseph sold the lots to Walter A. Landis for general taxes for the year 1924. It is admitted the paving was in accordance with the contract and specifications; that the bills are for the proper amount, and are in all respects regular and according to law. It is further admitted the general taxes were lawfully levied, were delinquent, the sale was in all respects regular and according to law, that the City Treasurer of St. Joseph on the day of the sale issued to Landis certificates of purchase in due form on payment by him of the amount bid for the lots, and that said certificates have not been redeemed.
Plaintiff sued in two counts to enforce the liens of the special tax-bills. Landis answered by general denial, and further answered that he purchased the lots at a sale duly and regularly held by the city of St. Joseph for delinquent general taxes for the year 1924 and prior years, received proper certificates of purchase, and that the title so obtained by him is in no wise affected by the lien of the tax-bills set forth in the petition, but is superior thereto.
The question for solution was the priority of the liens. The trial court, without a jury, held that under the charter of the city of St. Joseph, a city of the first-class, the lien of the special tax-bills, which attached August 4, 1924, took precedence over the lien for general taxes for the year 1924. Judgment was rendered for $291.17 against each lot. Defendant Landis appealed. The Court of Appeals gave priority to the lien for general taxes and reversed the judgment, citing Jaicks v. Oppenheimer, 264 Mo. 693, 175 S.W. 972; Const. Co. v. Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241, 146 S.W. 1142; Mo. Real Estate Loan Co. v. Burri, 202 Mo. App. 242, 216 S.W. 570; Commerce Trust Co. v. Syndicate Lock Co., 208 Mo. App. 261, 232 S.W. 1055, 235 S.W. 150.
In the Jaicks case we only determined the question of priority between special tax-bills issued against the same land by authority of the charter of Kansas City. In the Construction Company case we only determined the question of priority between the lien of a special tax-bill and a prior deed of trust. The point here involved was not under consideration in those cases. In the course of the opinions we stated the general rule as follows: "A general tax which has primarily for its object the support of the government is of greater dignity and more important than a tax-bill issued for public improvements, and, therefore, entitled to priority." The Court of Appeals disposed of the instant case by application of the general rule. It was held that charters of cities of the first-class contained no provision modifying or qualifying the general rule. In passing on the question, the court said:
"It is urged by plaintiff that such ruling is not in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186, 252 S.W. 363. In that case the court was discussing and applying the charter of Kansas City, which expressly provided all tax-bills for special improvements shall vest in the purchaser thereof an absolute estate in fee simple in real property as described therein, and adds:
"'And shall convey all the right, title and interest of the former owner or owners . . . free from any and all encumbrances of whatsoever kind or nature subject, however, to all unpaid state, county and city taxes, general and special or assessments which are a lien thereon.'
"It is agreed, or, at least, not disputed, that the charter of St. Joseph contains no such provision as is found in the Kansas City Charter on this point. We hold that under the rulings in the Burri and Trust Company cases, above referred to, the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and it is so ordered."
Relator contends the last controlling decision of this court on the question is the case of Good v. Johnson, supra, and that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with our decision in this case.
In the Good case we held that the qualified voters of Kansas City were authorized to determine the question of priority as between a lien for general city taxes and a special tax-bill issued by the city in payment of street improvements. We further held that the qualified voters of said city had fixed the priority in favor of the special tax-bill. In so ruling we fixed the rule for all cities having similar charter provisions relating to priority as between a lien for general city taxes and a special tax-bill issued by the city in payment of street improvements. In determining such a question of similarity in the instant case we do so without reference to an agreement of the parties as to the provisions of the St. Joseph Charter relating to the priority of such liens. If the opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with the principles ruled by this court in the Good case, then we have a conflict of opinions. Therefore, the contention that this court must have ruled on these provisions of the St. Joseph Charter before there is or can be conflict is untenable. With this understanding, we turn to the sections of the charters to determine the question.
The Kansas City Charter provides that the title conveyed to the purchaser at a sale for delinquent general taxes is an absolute estate in fee simple, subject to all unpaid state, county, and city taxes, general and special taxes or assessments which are a lien thereon. [Sec. 39, Art. V, Kansas City Charter, 1909.]
The St. Joseph Charter provides that the title conveyed to the purchaser at a sale for delinquent general taxes is an absolute estate in fee simple, subject to all unpaid taxes which are a lien thereon. [Sec. 7731, R.S. 1919.] (Italics ours.) The interest of Landis in the lots by virtue of the certificates of purchase, subject to the right of the owner to redeem, is determined by the title to be conveyed to him by the city treasurer on the termination of such right of redemption.
It will be noted that the Kansas City Charter specifically names the unpaid taxes, the liens of which are given priority over the title conveyed for delinquent taxes, while the St. Joseph Charter uses only general terms in fixing such priority. If the general terms of the St. Joseph Charter cover the same unpaid taxes as the specific terms of the Kansas City Charter (and there is nothing to indicate that such was not the intention of the Legislature), then the same principles of law govern.
It is further provided in the St. Joseph Charter that before the owner of the land can redeem he must pay to the person holding the certificate of purchase or the deed the amount paid after the date of the certificate of purchase by such person in satisfaction of all state, county or municipal, general or special taxes. [Secs. 7723, 7726, 7733, R.S. 1919.]
These provisions of the charter are inconsistent with the idea that the purchaser at the tax sale acquires a title free from the liens of tax-bills. They permit the purchaser to protect his title by paying all special tax-bills outstanding against the land. If a purchaser at a tax sale acquires a title free from the lien of special tax-bills, there would be no reason for providing that he may pay outstanding special tax-bills. The Kansas City Charter has similar provisions providing for the payment of outstanding special tax-bills by the purchaser at a tax sale and providing that the owner of the land before he can redeem must pay to the purchaser the amount paid in satisfaction of all outstanding special tax-bills. [Secs. 33, 34 and 39, Art. V, Kansas City Charter, 1909.]
The provisions of the charters relating to the priority of the liens under consideration are almost identical, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the opinion of this court in the Good case, and its record should be quashed. It is so ordered. All concur.