Summary
noting that speedy trial rights were created " to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; to minimize anxiety of the accused (not the convicted); and to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired"
Summary of this case from State v. LovellOpinion
No. 77-1142
Decided July 19, 1978.
Mandamus — To compel court to proceed with post-conviction relief — Writ denied, when — Necessity for speedy proceedings not shown.
IN MANDAMUS.
Relator, Harllel B. Jones, was convicted of second degree murder in 1972. He is presently free on bail set by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, after obtaining a writ of habeas corpus. That decision is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
With regard to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, relator, utilizing the available remedy of post-conviction relief in the state courts, filed a petition to vacate judgment in September of 1976. Relator also requested an evidentiary hearing.
The state, after taking an extension, filed an answer and motion for summary judgment. In August of 1977, the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County overruled the motion for summary judgment and "held in abeyance" all further matters until the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would be reached.
On October 7, 1977, relator filed a complaint in mandamus, or in the alternative, in procedendo, requesting this court to issue a writ requiring respondent Judges Leo M. Spellacy and James F. Kilcoyne of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County to proceed to judgment within 10 days upon the following matters:
(1) whether relator's motion to compel should be granted;
(2) whether the prehearing subpoena duces tecum sought to be issued should be authorized; and
(3) to schedule an evidentiary hearing to take place within 40 days from the date of judgment of this court.
Mr. Theodore E. Meckler, Mr. Richard L. Aynes, Messrs. Dworkin Stewart and Mr. Jeffrey Dworkin, for relator.
Mr. John T. Corrigan, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Robert E. Feighan, for respondents.
Relator asserts that the present delay in the Court of Common Pleas is violative of due process and equal protection and is severely prejudicial to him. However, relator is not languishing in jail, and the necessity for forced speed is not evident. While the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees a speedy trial, no such requirement attaches to proceedings subsequent to trial, primarily because the presumption of innocence at the trial level does not exist at the appellate or post-appellate levels. Speedy trial was originally guaranteed (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety of the accused (not the convicted); and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
These concerns are not compelling here. Relator has not demonstrated that his remedies at law are not adequate and hence mandamus will not lie.
Therefore, the writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ denied.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY and LOCHER, JJ., concur.