Opinion
No. 83-1531
Decided June 20, 1984.
Workers' compensation — Permanent and total disability found, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
Appellant, Willard D. Hutt, was injured in the scope and course of his employment on September 20, 1971. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for "sprain of the lumbosacral joint; strain of the paravertebral lumbar muscles; aggravation of pre-existing degenerative condition of the spine."
On March 7, 1975 appellant quit work at the age of sixty-five, stating that he did so because he "hurt to [ sic] much, and didn't think * * * [he] could do a good job." He has received the maximum amount of temporary total disability compensation allowable. On January 21, 1982 appellant filed a motion with the Industrial Commission ("commission"), appellee, requesting that he be declared permanently and totally disabled.
Appellant was examined by Dr. D.D. Kackley, an orthopedic specialist, on February 18, 1982. Dr. Kackley reported that "this patient is totally impaired and is not capable of any part of his previous type of work activity." The medical reports of Dr. Patrick C. Trimble and Dr. Ben R. Wiltberger were submitted by appellant. Both Trimble and Wiltberger felt appellant was permanently and totally disabled. The motion was heard on July 27, 1982. The commission thereafter issued an order which stated in pertinent part:
"* * * [T]he Commission * * * find[s] that the claimant is not permanently and totally disabled; that therefore the Application is denied. The finding and award is based on the following medical reports: Dr. Blackburn, Dr. McCloud, Dr. Turner and Dr. Kackley * * *." (Emphasis added.)
Dr. J.H. Blackburn examined appellant on March 28, 1978. In his report he concluded that appellant had "no more than a 10% impairment based on * * * this claim." Dr. Blackburn did not address the issue of disability nor did he address the question of whether appellant was capable of returning to his former position.
Dr. W.J. McCloud examined appellant on September 4, 1979. In his report he concluded that appellant did "have loss of lumbar and reserve function that may be related in part to aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative condition in his spine." Dr. McCloud did not address the issue of permanent total disability.
Dr. Robert Turner examined appellant on April 11, 1980. In his report he stated that there was "no question that * * * [appellant] is permanently and totally impaired." Dr. Kackley, as noted above, reported that appellant was not capable of returning to his former position.
Appellant filed an action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County alleging that the commission's order constituted an abuse of discretion and requesting that the commission be ordered to find appellant permanently and totally disabled. The court of appeals denied the writ.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Mr. Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant.
Mr. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, Mr. Lee M. Smith and Mr. James E. Davidson, for appellee.
This case presents facts which are strikingly similar to those found in the case of State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481. In the instant case, as in that case, the reasoning forwarded by the commission in its order denying the claim and the reasoning now advanced upon appeal are markedly different. The order in the instant case simply stated that "the claimant is not permanently and totally disabled." The commission now argues that appellant is not permanently and totally disabled as the result of the allowed conditions, even though he may well be permanently and totally disabled as the result of previously existing conditions. "[T]his court has recognized that `* * * there must be a causal connection between an injury arising out of and in the course of a worker's employment and his harm or disability * * *[,]' Gilbert v. Midland-Ross (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 267, 270 [21 O.O.3d 168] * * *" ( id. at 482). The commission's order, however, does not state the reason for denying compensation was that appellant's disability was not causally related to his injury. Instead it states that appellant does not suffer from permanent total disability. Following the rule established in Mitchell, this unqualified conclusion will not be embellished but rather will be construed "in a single fashion." Id. at 483.
Mitchell also requires that the commission "specifically state which evidence and only that evidence which has been relied upon to reach their conclusion, * * *." Id. at 483-484. Inasmuch as the commission mentioned four specific medical reports, it may be assumed that this requirement has been met. However, as noted in the statement of the facts, none of those four reports supported the conclusion that appellant was not permanently and totally disabled.
This court recently reaffirmed that "[t]he purpose of permanent total disability benefits is to compensate a claimant for impairment of earning capacity. State, ex rel. General Motors Corp., v. Indus. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 282 [71 O.O.2d 255] * * *." State, ex rel. Jennings, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 101, 102. Any conclusion with regard to permanent total disability must therefore address the claimant's ability to work. See, also, the Medical Examination Manual issued by the commission on October 5, 1981, pursuant to R.C. 4121.38(B)(2), which states, at page vi, that permanent total disability "* * * is established when the injury has caused the injured worker to be unfit for sustained remunerative employment."
As noted in the statement of the facts, the reports of Drs. Blackburn and McCloud do not address appellant's ability to work. Moreover, the reports of Drs. Turner and Kackley state unequivocally that appellant is permanently and totally disabled. Therefore, none of the evidence relied upon by the commission supports or justifies its conclusion that appellant is not permanently and totally disabled. This constitutes a clear abuse of discretion and appellant is, therefore, entitled to a writ of mandamus. State, ex rel. Hutton, v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 9 [58 O.O. 2d 66].
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the writ prayed for is allowed.
Judgment reversed and writ allowed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.
HOLMES, J., dissents.
I dissent from the majority herein in that there was no abuse of discretion of the Industrial Commission in denying the relator's claim for permanent total disability. The record shows significant evidence upon which the commission could base its determination that the relator was not permanently disabled as a result of his allowed injury. There was, as noted by the court of appeals, considerable medical evidence indicating that relator's physical condition is related to his age, arthritis, and obesity — all of which are unrelated to his injury.
Although I basically agree that the principles set forth in State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, are laudatory (as I stated in my concurrence in that case), there is a point beyond which the application of those principles becomes unnecessary, or redundant. This is one of those cases in which the commission's order may be read and reasonably interpreted in light of the medical records presented.
Accordingly, the writ should be denied.