Opinion
June 12, 1933.
1. SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law. The constitutional provisions in Section 11, Article X, limiting the rate of taxation for school purposes is self-enforcing, but the Legislature, within the terms of said section, may enact legislation classifying school districts.
2. SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Consolidated School Districts. A consolidated school district, organized under Sections 9351 to 9353. Revised Statutes 1929, having six directors and containing a village which might have been incorporated as a town but was not, though a plat of the village had been filed, was not a city or town school district but falls within class two of Section 9194, Revised Statutes of 1929, and could not authorize a rate of taxation for school purposes exceeding sixty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation of the property in the district.
3. SCHOOL DISTRICTS: State Aid. Section 9358, Revised Statutes 1929, making provision for State aid whenever any school district votes one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation and certain conditions exist, does not apply to a consolidated district which is a mere consolidation of common school districts.
Appeal from Wayne Circuit Court. — Hon. E.M. Dearing, Judge.
REVERSED.
Davis Damron for appellant.
(1) No consolidated school district composed of common school districts, none of which have ever been organized into a city or town district, and in which there has never been a city of any class, or an incorporated city, town or village, can levy a tax for school purposes to exceed sixty-five cents on each $100 assessed valuation of the property therein. Sec. 11, Art. 10, Mo. Const.; Secs. 9194, 9325-6, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. Reynolds, etc., v. Rickenbrode, 4 S.W.2d 435. (2) The Patterson Consolidated District, by organization under the provisions of Sections 11257-8-9, Revised Statutes 1919 (now Secs. 9351-2-3, R.S. 1929), and by classification under Subdivision 2 of Section 11123, Revised Statutes 1919 (now Sec. 9194, R.S. 1929), is nothing more or less than a consolidated school district, and as such must be classified as one of the "other districts" mentioned in Section 11, Art. 10 of the Missouri Constitution, and which is restricted to a tax levy of not to exceed sixty-five cents on each $100 valuation for school purposes. (3) The restricting provisions of Section 11, Article 10, Missouri Constitution, are self-enforcing. St. Joseph Board of Pub. Schools v. Patten et al., 62 Mo. 444; State ex rel. Van Brown v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 537; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 572; McGrew v. Railway, 230 Mo. 496.
R.B. Osborn and Wm. T. Powers for respondent.
(1) The general provisions in Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri left it open for the Legislature to classify school districts in such way as to bring appropriate classes within the provision of the Constitution relating to tax limit. Sec. 11, Art. X, Const. of Mo.; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Rickenbrode, 4 S.W.2d 437, 319 Mo. 486. (2) The restrictive provisions of Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri are self-enforcing, but the provision permitting an increase of rate by submission to a vote requires legislation to render it operative; and it is in connection with the proviso permitting an increase in the constitutional limit that we are concerned in this case. Board v. Patton, 62 Mo. 444; State ex rel. Board of Education of Moberly v. Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 163; State ex rel. Van Brown v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569, 8 S.W. 718; James C. McGrew v. Railroad Co., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S.W. 1076; Sec. 11, Art. X, Const. of Mo. Patterson Consolidated District was organized on May 24, 1923; in 1925 the Legislature enacted what is now Section 9358, Revised Statutes 1929, providing, "Whenever any consolidated district votes one hundred cents on the one hundred dollars assessed valuation," etc., which said statute, when construed with Section 9194, Revised Statutes 1929, coupled with the legislative grant to classify schools, the Legislature by strong implication classified the Patterson District as a consolidated district coming under the constitutional proviso authorizing the district to increase its rate of taxation to one dollar on the $100 assessed valuation. Secs. 9194, 9358, R.S. 1929. (4) Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a more definite and comprehensive way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy; but to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them the special will prevail over the general statute. By Section 9194 the Legislature classified schools in a general way, but by Section 9358 the Legislature had in mind that any consolidated school may be classified as authorized to vote an increase in levy to one dollar on the $100 valuation. State ex rel. American Central Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 280 S.W. 418; 36 Cyc. p. 1151; Secs. 9154, 9358, R.S. 1929; Laws 1925, p. 330. (5) The verdict and judgment of the trial court sitting as a jury are conclusive as to the facts, and were for the right party. (6) The agreed statement of facts, and the statutes of Missouri in reference to consolidated schools as a whole, and the law applicable to this case, show that the Patterson Consolidated School District did not exceed its authority under the Constitution to vote the increase in levy in controversy; but that it had a right to do so; and the statement of facts shows that Patterson is on all fours with Avalon as a town. It is conceded that Avalon ( 4 S.W.2d 436, referred to in appellants' brief as the Avalon case) could legally vote a levy of one dollar, and, if so, the Patterson Consolidated District was classified as coming in that favored class, when the statutes are read as a whole and harmonized. Secs. 9154, 9358, R.S. 1929; Laws 1925, p. 330; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 263 Mo. 689; State ex rel. Reynolds v. Rickenbrode, 4 S.W.2d 436, 319 Mo. 486; Secs. 9325-6, R.S. 1929; Art. IV, Ch. 57, R.S. 1929.
Action to collect a school tax on personal property of defendant in Patterson Consolidated School District in Wayne County, with interest, penalties and costs. The organization of the district and assessment of the property are not challenged. At a school election the district voted to levy a tax of one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation of property for school purposes. Under said authority, a tax of $8.58 was levied on property of defendant. He paid $5.85, the amount due under a levy of sixty-five cents on the hundred dollar valuation of his property, and refused to pay the balance.
The petition to recover the balance alleged to be due is conventional. The answer alleges that the district was limited by the Constitution to a levy of sixty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation for school purposes, and that the attempted levy of one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation was in violation of Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. Judgment was for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed.
It follows that defendant contends that a levy of more than sixty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation of his property could not be made under the Constitution. The pertinent part of said section of the Constitution follows:
"For school purposes in districts composed of cities which have one hundred thousand inhabitants or more, the annual rate on property shall not exceed sixty cents on the hundred dollars valuation and in other districts forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation:
" Provided, The aforesaid annual rates for school purposes may be increased, in districts formed of cities and towns, to an amount not to exceed one dollar on the hundred dollars valuation, and in other districts to an amount not to exceed sixty-five cents on the hundred dollars valuation, on the condition that a majority of the voters who are tax-payers, voting at an election held to decide the question, vote for said increase."
The above provisions limiting the rate of taxation are self-enforcing. However, the Legislature may, within the terms of said section of the Constitution, enact legislation classifying school districts. In this connection it should be stated that the validity of no statute is challenged in this proceeding. The Legislature has classified school districts as follows:
"First, all districts having only three directors shall be known as common school districts; second, all districts outside of incorporated cities, towns and villages, which are governed by six directors, shall be known as consolidated school districts; third, all districts governed by six directors and in which is located any city of the fourth class, or any incorporated town or village, shall be known as town school districts, and fourth, all districts in which is located any city of the first, second or third class, shall be known as city school districts." [Sec. 11123, R.S. 1919, Sec. 9194, R.S. 1929.]
On May 24, 1923, the Patterson Consolidated School District was organized under Sections 11257, 11258, 11259, Revised Statutes 1919 (Secs. 9351, 9352, 9353, R.S. 1929). It is governed by six directors. The organization was made by consolidating Patterson, Woods, Camp Creek, Damen, Ring Creek and Cherry Grove common school districts, none of which at the time of the consolidation, nor prior thereto, had an enumeration of two hundred children of school age. At that time and at all times prior thereto the village of Patterson, with a population of seventy-five, was the only village, town or city within the limits of the territory comprising the consolidated district. It was never incorporated, but a plat of the village was made on May 25, 1861, and filed in the office of the circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of deeds of said county on May 27, 1861.
The filing of the plat in the recorder's office of the county authorized the Patterson Common School District to organize as a town or city school district under the provisions of Sections 11236, 11237, Revised Statutes 1919 (Secs. 9325, 9326, R.S. 1929). However, it was never so organized. It is clear from the facts above stated that the Patterson Consolidated School District falls under class two of the classification statute. After its organization and with the village of Patterson within the consolidated district, it could have organized as a town or city district under Section 11257, Revised Statutes 1919 (Sec. 9351, R.S. 1929), and Sections 11236, 11237, Revised Statutes 1919 (Secs. 9325, 9326, R.S. 1929). However, it was never so organized.
Thus it appears that by organization under Sections 11257, 11256, 11259, Revised Statutes 1919, and by classification under Section 11123, Revised Statutes 1919, which was in force at the time of the consolidation, the Patterson Consolidated District is not a city or town district. It is one of the "other districts" as that term is used in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. It follows that the rate of taxation for school purposes in said districts cannot exceed sixty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation of the property in the district.
Plaintiff cites Section 9358, Revised Statutes 1929 (Amended Laws 1925, p. 330), as authorizing any consolidated school district to levy one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation.
The section makes provision for State aid when certain conditions exist. It provides that whenever any consolidated district votes one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation and certain conditions exist, State aid will be apportioned to the district.
From this, plaintiff argues that any consolidated district is authorized to vote a levy of one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation. We do not think so. The section also provides that whenever any consolidated district votes sixty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation and certain conditions exist, State aid will be apportioned to the district, but in an amount less than the aid apportioned if the district was a city or town district and voted one hundred cents on the one hundred dollar valuation. The section makes provision for aid to town consolidated districts and also makes provision for aid to a mere consolidation of common school districts.
Plaintiff also cites State ex rel. Reynolds v. Rickenbrode et al., 319 Mo. 468, 4 S.W.2d 436. That case was ruled on different facts and under a different statute.
The judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered. All concur.