Opinion
Docket No. 24326
Filed August 20, 1998 The decision of the District Court is affirmed. See Stanley v. McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630, August 1, 2000. Petition for rehearing filed August 22, 2000.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. D. Duff McKee, District Judge.
Order denying motion for post-judgment interest on award of attorney fees, affirmed.
Lojek Strother, Chartered, Boise, for appellants. Donald W. Lojek argued.
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow McKlveen, Chtd., Boise, for respondents.
Warren E. Jones argued.
John S. Stanley appeals claiming the district court erred in denying Stanley's motion for post-judgment interest on his award of attorney fees from the date of the original judgment.
We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case comes before us for the third time. In the first appeal, we held that the district court did not properly calculate attorney fees and costs, and the case was remanded for a recalculation. Stanley v. McDaniel, 128 Idaho 343, 913 P.2d 76 (Ct.App. 1996) ( Stanley I). On remand, the district court recalculated the fees and awarded $15,208.30, the identical amount it had awarded in the first instance.
The underlying facts of the lawsuit were summarized in Stanley v. McDaniel, Docket No. 23299 (Ct.App. August 12, 1997) as follows: Stanley brought a wrongful termination action against the John H. Harland Company (Harland). The majority of his claims were dismissed by summary judgment, as was his wife's loss of consortium claim. The only remaining issue before the jury was Stanley's claim for wages under the [Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.]. The jury awarded Stanley $15,208.30, which was doubled under the liquidated damages provisions of the FLSA. Stanley sought his attorney fees and costs as authorized by the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although Stanley requested $43,527.50 in fees and $3,620.25 in costs, the district court only awarded $15,208.30 in fees and $2,265.29 in costs.
Stanley appealed a second time. In an unpublished opinion, we held that the district court erred calculating the "lodestar" because the court made improper deductions from the number of hours submitted by Stanley's counsel. Stanley v. McDaniel, Docket No. 23299 (Ct.App. August 12, 1997) ( Stanley II). We calculated the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Stanley, taking into account those adjustments properly made by the district court, and added back amounts that had been incorrectly deducted by the district court. We vacated the district court's order and remanded for the entry of an award of attorney fees to Stanley in the amount of $31,180.
On remand, the district court entered an order awarding attorney fees to Stanley in the amount of $31,180. Stanley moved for an amended judgment, requesting post-judgment interest on the award of attorney fees from the date of the original judgment. The district court denied Stanley's motion. Stanley appeals.
II.
DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law
The first issue is whether federal or state law governs the post-judgment interest request by Stanley. Stanley asserts that because his claim in the underlying lawsuit was grounded in federal law, and post-judgment interest is substantive, federal law applies.
McDaniel asserts that because Stanley brought his action in a state court and post-judgment interest is procedural, state law applies.
We recognize Stanley has cited several federal cases supporting his position that the right to an award of post- judgment interest arising under a federal statute is a matter of federal, not local, law. On review, however, we conclude that the cases Stanley has cited refer to pre-judgment interest, not post-judgment interest, and are therefore not controlling.
In Idaho, substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. Floyd v. Board of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 234, 238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1998). Among the rights characterized as substantive are those which are contractual or vested in nature. Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct.App. 1988). Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be remedial or procedural. Id. Matters of procedure are governed by state law. Stobie v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 95 Idaho 666, 668 n. 2, 518 P.2d 1, 3 n. 2 (1973).
Generally, substantive laws cannot be applied retrospectively. See Coburn v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 86 Idaho 415, 420, 387 P.2d 598, 601 (1963). Idaho case law provides that post-judgment interest runs on a judgment only at such a rate as the law provides. Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 777, 37 P.2d 407, 412 (1934). Idaho case law also provides that once the statute is amended and becomes effective, the rate of post- judgment interest on an outstanding judgment changes accordingly. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990); Idaho Gold Dredging, 54 Idaho at 778, 37 P.2d at 412. See also Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 665 P.2d 1056 (1983). Thus, legislative changes in the post-judgment statute affect outstanding judgments only from the date of enactment.
Moreover, it has long been recognized that post-judgment procedures, such as collection and renewal, and also the enforcement of state court judgments are governed by state law. Indeed, even a foreign judgment filed with the clerk of the district court of this state is subject to the same procedures as a judgment of an Idaho court. I. C. § 10-1302; Westmark Fed. Credit Union v. Smith, 116 Idaho 474, 476, 776 P.2d 1193, 1995 (1989). The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 463, 680 P.2d 1355, 1363 (1984).
We find persuasive the line of authority from other jurisdictions that post-judgment interest is a procedural matter. E.g., Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F.2d 1413, 1424 (10th Cir. 1990) (Imposition of post-judgment interest on attorney fees is a procedural matter.); Nissho- Iwai Co. v. Occindental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (Post-judgment interest is "better characterized as procedural because it confers no right in and of itself. Rather, it merely follows and operates on the substance of determined rights. Post-judgment interest is designed to compensate 'a successful plaintiff for the time between his entitlement to damages and the actual payment of those damages by the defendant.'"); Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1988) (Post-judgment interest "serves a salutary housekeeping purpose for the forum by creating an incentive for unsuccessful defendants to avoid frivolous appeals and by minimizing the necessity for court- supervised execution upon judgments."); California Fed. Sav. Loan Assoc. v. Los Angeles, 902 P.2d 297, 301 (Cal. 1995) (citation omitted) ("The judgment rate of interest is a 'judicial tool' for enforcing judgments because it reduces the incentive to delay payment."); Fontaine v. Ebtec. Corp., 613 N.E.2d 881, 892 (Mass. 1993) (Post-judgment interest on Federal law claims was a procedural matter to be governed by state law.). Furthermore, we note that the federal post-judgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961, specifies that this "section shall not be construed to affect the interest on any judgment of any court not specified in this section." 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(4). State courts are not specified under the federal statute as being subject to its provisions. See Budish v. Daniel, 631 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Mass. 1994). See generally I.C. § 28-22-104.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that post-judgment interest is properly characterized as a procedural matter. Because Stanley's action was brought in an Idaho state court, we will apply Idaho law.
B. Post-Judgment Interest
We next address whether post-judgment interest should be awarded from the date of the original judgment or from the date of the district court's order awarding attorney fees following our opinion in Stanley II. In reaching our decision on this issue, we find the Long v. Hendricks trilogy illustrative of the proper analysis to be conducted.
In Long, following a bench trial, Long was awarded damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Long appealed, claiming, in part, that the trial court's award for lost wages was inadequate. Long also sought to recover additional medical expenses. This Court agreed with Long on these issues and remanded for further proceedings. Long v. Hendricks, 109 Idaho 73, 705 P.2d 78 (Ct.App. 1985). On remand, Long requested that any additional special damages be added nunc pro tunc to the original judgment for the purpose of post-judgment interest accrual. The district court denied the request and entered a supplemental judgment for additional damages for lost wages and medical expenses. The effect of the district court's decision was that Long received post-judgment interest on the added sums only from the date of the supplemental judgment and not from the date of the original judgment. Long appealed the district court's decision denying his request. On appeal, this Court stated the general rule that "postjudgment interest will run on the entire final judgment whether the judgment is modified upward or downward." Long v. Hendricks, 114 Idaho 157, 161, 754 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ct. App. 1988) ( Long II) (as modified by the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling on review in Long v. Hendricks, 117 Idaho 1051, 793 P.2d 1223 (1990) ( Long III)), citing Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Palermo, 360 P.2d 76 (Cal. 1961). This Court then stated, however, that courts have denied post-judgment interest on an added sum during the interjudgment period when the amount was not ascertainable prior to the proceedings on remand. Long II, 114 Idaho at 161, 754 P.2d at 1198, citing Yeager Gardens Acres, Inc. v. Summit Constr. Co., 513 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1973). Based on the Yeager Gardens Acres approach, this Court affirmed the district court's denial of interjudgment interest stating that the added sums were not ascertainable prior to the proceedings on remand.
A petition for review was granted in Long II and the case was heard by the Idaho Supreme Court. Long III, 117 Idaho 1051, 793 P.2d 1223. The Supreme Court agreed with this Court's decision regarding the interjudgment interest on the added sums for lost wages based on the reasons given in the Court's Long II opinion. Long III, 117 Idaho at 1054, 793 P.2d at 1226.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the additional amount of medical expenses was liquidated. Id. at 1055, 793 P.2d at 1227. The Supreme Court therefore held that under the authorities cited by the Long II Court, Long was entitled to post-judgment interest on the additional medical expenses from the date of the original judgment. Id.
Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Long III, we conclude that whether Stanley is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment is based on whether the attorney fees were capable of ascertainment at that time. As concluded by this Court in Stanley I, in the district court's original judgment, the district court abused its discretion in arriving at the amount of the attorney fees award. Consequently, the Stanley I Court remanded the case to the district court for a redetermination of the attorney fees within the district court's discretion. Thus, we conclude that the amount of the attorney fees was not ascertainable at the date of the original judgment.
We do recognize that there is a Court of Appeals' decision that is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Long III. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594, 596, 733 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct.App. 1987). Based on our review, we find Long III controlling in this case.
Following remand, the district court again ordered an award of attorney fees. The case was appealed, and this Court held for the second time that the district court erred in arriving at the amount of the attorney fees award. Rather than remanding to the district court for a second redetermination of the amount of attorney fees, this Court calculated the amount of the attorney fees award. Therefore, the amount of the attorney fees award was not ascertainable until the Stanley II Court set the amount at $31,180 and the district court entered an order reflecting this award. Based on the circumstances of this particular case, post-judgment interest on the attorney fees award therefore can accrue only from the date of the district court's order awarding attorney fees following Stanley II. Thus, although based on a different legal theory, Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.App. 1990), we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Stanley's motion seeking post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment. C. Attorney Fees
The district court denied Stanley's motion on the basis that under Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 917 P.2d 737 (1996), the district court did not have any jurisdiction to enter an order nunc pro tunc because the previous judgment, having been vacated by Stanley II, no longer existed. The district court therefore held that post- judgment interest could only accrue from the entry of a new judgment. Based on our disposition of Stanley's issue, we express no opinion on the correctness of the district court's analysis.
Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal. Based on our review, we conclude that no attorney fees are to be awarded.
III.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's order denying Stanley's motion seeking post-judgment interest. Costs to respondent McDaniel. No attorney fees on appeal.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge Pro Tem SWANSTROM, CONCUR.