Opinion
No. CV02-0517329S
October 22, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On September 30, 2002, the plaintiff, Stanislaw Karas, acting as Administrator of his father Jan Karas' estate, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, alleging that the decedent's estate is due proceeds from an underinsured motorist policy issued by the defendant to the decedent's sister, Weronica Wrona, who is not a party to this action.
On August 14, 2003, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
The undisputed facts relevant to the disposition of the defendant's motion for summary judgment are as follows: On May 31, 2001, the plaintiff's father was killed by a drunk driver while pushing his bicycle along Cedar Street in Newington, Connecticut. At some time prior to the accident, the defendant provided an underinsured motorist policy to Wrona, the decedent's sister. The coverage agreement provided, in relevant part, that the defendant "will pay compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the owner or driver of an . . . underinsured motor vehicle . . ." (Nationwide Policy, U1). The policy defined a relative as "one who regularly lives in your household and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption . . . A relative may live temporarily outside your household." (Nationwide Policy, D1).
The sole issue before this court is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the decedent's place in his sister's household, such that the court cannot grant summary judgment on his lack of coverage under the underinsured motorist insurance policy.
DISCUSSION CT Page 12123
In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's decedent was an insured, and therefore concludes that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In support of its motion, the defendant has submitted an authenticated copy of the underinsured motorist insurance policy issued to Wrona, as well as certified transcripts of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and of Walter Chudy, Wrona's live-in companion.Based on the evidence proffered, the defendant maintains that the decedent, while living under the same roof as the insured, did not live in the same household. The defendant relies on the following facts to support its assertion: The decedent lived in a basement apartment separate from the rest of his sister's house, he had his own entrance, kitchen, bathroom, bedroom and living room, and allegedly paid rent to his sister. The defendant further asserts that the decedent did his own grocery shopping, prepared his own meals, almost always ate separate from Wrona and Chudy, and used a calling card or pay phones when placing telephone calls.
In the plaintiff's memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue regarding whether the decedent was living in the same household as Wrona. The plaintiff argues that the appropriate analysis to determine residency requires several factors to be considered, including, but not limited to, those the defendant conclusively relies on. Furthermore, the plaintiff contends that there is a factual dispute as to whether or not the decedent actually paid rent. In support of his contentions, the plaintiff has presented several pieces of evidence, including a zoning certificate of occupancy issued by the Town of Newington establishing that Wrona's home is a single-family dwelling, a certified copy of the assessor's record card for the insured's property disclosing that the home was a single living unit, sworn affidavits by Wrona and the plaintiff attesting that the deceased lived in the same household as Wrona, the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and Chudy, and samples of business mailings sent to the decedent at Wrona's address.
The zoning certificate of occupancy has not been properly authenticated as required by Practice Book § 17-46. The defendant, however, has not contested the submission of said evidence. Therefore it is within the judicial authority's discretion to consider the document for purposes of the motion for summary judgment.
The pieces of mail submitted by the plaintiff have not been properly authenticated as required by Practice Book § 17-46. However, because the defendant does not dispute the assertion that the decedent only had one address, which was the same as the insured, and has not objected to the submission of such pieces of mail, the evidence should be considered nonetheless.
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc., 252 Conn. 789, 792, 749 A.2d 1144 (2000). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).
"The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gould v. Mellick Sexton, 263 Conn. 140, 146, 819 A.2d 216 (2003). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
"The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn. App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).
"When the language of [an insurance] policy is plain and unambiguous the terms must be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griffith v. Security Insurance Co., 167 Conn. 450, 453, 356 A.2d 94 (1975). "In defining `resident of the same household,' our courts have construed the term `household' in accordance with its ordinary, dictionary meaning . . . The 1991 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary defines household as `[a] domestic establishment including the members of a family and others who live under the same roof.' Thus, the definition of household reveals two primary characteristics: a close, familial relationship and joint occupation of a dwelling." (Citations omitted.) Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 35 Conn. App. 581, 585, 646 A.2d 166 (1994), on appeal after remand, 240 Conn. 309, 692 A.2d 399 (1997). "[A] trier of fact must determine where an individual resides by analyzing the facts unique to each case . . . In undertaking this analysis, the trier of fact must consider a conglomeration of factors . . . These factors include: the intent of the individual; the frequency of contact between the individual and other household inhabitants; the frequency with which the individual spends time at the household; the maintenance of a separate residence for the individual; whether the individual is emotionally and financially capable of establishing and maintaining a residence independent of the household; the location of personal belongings; the location of and address used for personnel and business records; the address at which mail is received; and the address used for formal purposes such as voting, licenses, and income tax filings." (Citations omitted.) Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 240 Conn. 309, 314-15, 692 A.2d 399 (1997). See also Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 590 A.2d 957 (1991). "[T]he description of a household and the determination of who resides in that household are decisions to be made upon consideration of the factual circumstance involved in each case." Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 240 Conn. 315.
"[S]ummary judgment procedure is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 111, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).
Our appellate court has held that even in the face of significant evidence that the decedent was not a resident of the plaintiff's household, the motion for summary judgment must be denied if the plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to support a determination in his favor. See Remington v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 35 Conn. App. 581. In Remington, the decedent and plaintiff lived separately at times, yet visited each other often and spoke by telephone several times each day. The plaintiff kept some of her late husband's clothes at her home for the decedent's use. She also maintained one of the bedrooms at her home as the decedent's although others used the room. The plaintiff received the decedent's unemployment checks at her home as well as the majority of his mail. Although the decedent used the plaintiff's home as his permanent residence, he was registered to vote at his apartment address, and listed his apartment address on his federal tax return. See id., 584. The court concluded that such facts could lead a reasonable trier of fact to determine that the plaintiff and the decedent were members of the same household within the meaning of an automobile insurance policy. See id.
Our appellate court has also found that where an individual shared facilities with an insured, used the insured's automobile, lived in the same physical premises, and shared a mailing address, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the individual lived in the household with the insured for purposes of an uninsured motorist policy. See D'Addio v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn., 30 Conn. App. 729, 735, 622 A.2d 609, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 903, 625 A.2d 1375 (1993).
Similarly, in the instant case, the plaintiff has proffered evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to determine that the insured and the decedent were members of the same household. The plaintiff has alleged that the decedent and the insured shared the same mailing address, the decedent maintained no other residence, he kept all of his personal belongings in the house, and he received business mail at the insured's address, including correspondence from the State of Connecticut.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and consistent with the Remington precedent, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the decedent's residence. The evidence presented by the plaintiff, in conjunction with the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from that evidence, is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent was a resident in his sister's household, and is capable of supporting a determination in the plaintiff's favor by a reasonable trier of fact. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
So ordered.
HENRY S. COHN, JUDGE.