Opinion
Davidson First Circuit No. 93C-1265. Appeal No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00420.
April 26, 1996.
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, HONORABLE HAMILTON V. GAYDEN, JR., JUDGE.
REVERSED, DISMISSED AND REMANDED
FOR APPELLEE: Helen S. Rogers.
FOR APPELLANT: Lela M. Hollabaugh.
OPINION
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE, CONCURS, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE, FILES SEPARATE OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
The defendant, Brian E. Bacardi, has appealed from a jury verdict and judgment awarding plaintiff, Theresa Stanbury, $211,000 and her husband, John H. Stanbury, $10,000, as damages for alleged malpractice in surgery and treatment of Mrs. Stanbury. The other captioned defendant, Hospital Corporation of America, was dismissed by nonsuit and is not involved in this appeal.
The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs' suit is barred by the one year medical malpractice statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 29-26-116.
The patient first saw defendant on November 22, 1991. On December 11, 1991, defendant performed the following surgical procedures on both feet of the patient:
(a) transpositional osteotomy fifth metatarsal with internal fixation bilateral;
(b) arthroplasty proximal interphalangeal joint third, fourth and fifth bilateral; exostectomy remodeling distal medial fifth bilateral;
(d) middle phalangectomy fourth bilateral;
(e) flex ortenotomy third, fourth and fifth bilateral; and
(f) tenoplasty extensor digitorus longus bilateral.
On December 20, 1991, the surgical dressings were removed from the patient's feet and she was able to observe the outward evidence of the procedures performed on December 11, 1991. The patient was seen by defendant on January 10, 1992, January 17, 1992, February 14, 1992, and March 17, 1992. On April 3, 1992, defendant performed a further surgical procedure to correct a misalignment of the fifth toe on the right foot. On May 5, 1992, defendant removed the sutures from the site of the surgery and informed the patient that there was nothing further he could do to relieve her problems.
This suit was filed on April 30, 1993. The complaint alleged deviation from the recognized standard of acceptable medical practice in the following particulars:
A. Negligently recommending surgery to the plaintiff which was not indicated, given her signs, symptoms and physical condition;
B. Failing to obtain the plaintiff's informed consent to the surgery performed on December 11, 1991;
C. Negligently performing the surgical procedures on December 11, 1991 and April 3, 1992;
D. Performing unnecessary surgery on December 11, 1991 and April 3, 1992;
E. Negligently providing post-surgical care including the failure to maintain antiseptic techniques;
F. Negligently causing an infection to Theresa Stanbury's feet by ignoring basic principles of antiseptic;
G. Ignoring the patient's complaints of pain and infection;
H. Intentionally and falsely preparing his office notes with the intent to conceal from the plaintiff and anyone else her true condition and result.
Defendants' answer included the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
The Trial Court submitted to the jury several issues of fact, including the following:
(a) Did the defendant, Brian Bacardi, deviate from the recognized standard of care for podiatrists in this community by negligently performing the surgical procedures on December 11, 1991, and/or April 3, 1992, on the plaintiff, Theresa Stanbury?
As to this question the foreman of the jury asked the following question and the Trial Judge responded as follows:
MR. ROBINSON: I think the misunderstanding is are we to decide on that question, whether or not during the actual surgery itself, was a mistake made?
THE COURT: Okay. That's what I thought you meant. No, that's not part of the lawsuit. Okay. The lawsuit, "negligent" refers to other acts of alleged malpractice. But as far as the operation itself, that's not part of the lawsuit.
On February 14, 1995, the Trial Court entered a "Final Decree" reciting:
. . . After deliberating on February 1 and 2, 1995, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Theresa Stanbury, on the issues of recommending and performing unnecessary surgery, lack of informed consent and negligently performing surgery, and awarded Theresa Stanbury compensatory damages of Two Hundred Eleven Thousand ($211,000.00) Dollars. The jury also returned a verdict for the plaintiff, John Stanbury, for his claim for loss of consortium in the amount of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars. . . .
Judgment was entered accordingly.
On February 24, 1995, the Trial Court entered an order containing the following:
. . . At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the entire cause on the grounds that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the one year statute of limitations of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict was denied and the Court held that as a matter of law, plaintiff's claim was not barred by the Statute of Limitations of the Medical Malpractice Act.
Further, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the following issues:
1. Negligently providing post-surgical care, including the failure to maintain antiseptic techniques;
2. Negligently causing an infection to Theresa Stanbury's feet by ignoring basic principles of antiseptic;
3. Ignoring the patient's complaints of pain and infection;
4. Intentionally and falsely preparing his office notes with the intent to conceal from the plaintiff and anyone else her true condition and result. The Court was of the opinion that defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on these issues was well taken.
Defendant also moved for a directed verdict on the issue of negligently performing the surgical procedures on December 11, 1991 and April 3, 1992. The Court was of the opinion that defendant's motion on this issue was not well taken and was overruled.
At the close of all of the proof, the defendant moved for directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff failed to present competent expert testimony concerning the standard of care for podiatrists practicing in the Nashville, Davidson County community during the years 1991 and 1992.
The Court was of the opinion that this motion was not well taken and it was denied.
On appeal to this Court, defendant states the issue as follows:
Whether the Trial Court erred in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on the statute of limitations and holding as a matter of law that plaintiffs' cause of action was not time barred.
It is undisputed that this suit was filed more than a year after all services rendered by defendant except the final office visit on May 5, 1992. Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist that the statute of limitations had not expired on April 30, 1993, when this suit was filed, upon theories of continuing treatment and fraudulent concealment. In support of these theories, plaintiffs cite the following:
1. Defendant continued to treat Mrs. Stanbury to and including May 5, 1992, when he removed the sutures from her last surgery.
2. On May 5, 1992, defendant told the patient that healing would take about a year. In this respect, Mrs. Stanbury testified:
Q. Did Dr. Bacardi talk to you about how long it was going to take you to recover after he did surgery on your right toe?
A. Only at the last visit where he decided that I wasn't pleased with it so he didn't like my response and he just said, "You've got to give it at least a year and then worry about it."
. . . .
Q. Now, at this last office visit, did you complain to Dr. Bacardi about what was going on?
A. Oh, yes. Of course.
Q. And what did he tell you about what to expect from your feet?
A. He said that I was trying to resolve something that needed more time. Needed time. To give yourself a year and see what you feel after that.
. . . .
Q. Well, was there any length of time mentioned or any indication given by him of how long you were going to be off work?
A. Not until after everything was done. When he said he couldn't do nothing for me he said, "Give it a year and see if you're happy then."
Defendant testified as follows:
Q. Dr. Bacardi, you're telling the jury from here to here is straight?
A. I also said that the digit is bandaged purposely in some over-correction at the time of surgery, and that's routine with the little toe, because they do tend to pull back in towards the fourth.
Sometimes we get that pulling in of the fifth toe towards the fourth toe down the road, a half year or a year later. That's not unusual. And what we do during the surgery is to bandage that toe in a little over-correction purposely. And as time goes on, you will see the toe remains straight.
No other evidence is cited or found which would defeat the defense of statute of limitations.
T.C.A. Section 29-26-116 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Statute of limitations. — Counterclaim for damages. (a) (1) The statute of limitations in malpractice actions shall be one (1) year as set forth in § 28-3-104.
(2) In the event the alleged injury is not discovered within the said one (1) year period, the period of limitation shall be one (1) year from the date of such discovery.
(3) In no event shall any such action be brought more than three (3) years after the date on which the negligent act or omission occurred except where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant in which case the action shall be commenced within one (1) year after discovery that the cause of action exists.
"Discovery" means the discovery of the existence of a right of action, that is, facts which would support an action for tort against the tortfeasor. Such facts include not only the existence of an injury, but the tortious origin of the injury. Hathaway v. Middle Tenn. Anaesthesiology, Tenn. App. 1986, 724 S.W.2d 355.
This rule was previously followed by Tennessee Courts, Teeters v. Curry, Tenn. 1974, 518 S.W.2d 512, 93 A.L.R.3rd 207; but was codified by the quoted section of the Code. Housh v. Morris, Tenn. App. 1991, 818 S.W.2d 39.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' action is that, on December 11, 1991, defendant performed surgery negligently, without actual or informed consent, and without advising the patient of the lengthy recovery period to follow the surgery. The evidence is uncontradicted that plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered facts supporting each of these complaints more than a year prior to the institution of this suit on April 30, 1993.
As stated above, the complaint alleged the performance of unnecessary surgery. There is expert evidence that at least some of the surgery was unnecessary, but the claim for same is barred unless saved by the "discovery rule." No evidence is cited or found that plaintiff did not discover or should not reasonably discovered that the surgery was unnecessary at least one year before this suit was filed. The brief of appellee does not rely upon this aspect of the rule.
There is no evidence that any fact necessary to support plaintiffs' suit was fraudulently concealed from them at such a time and under such circumstances as would extend the statutory time for bringing suit until April 30, 1993.
Plaintiffs rely upon the "continuing treatment doctrine." In Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10; 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966), a surgeon left a surgical sponge imbedded in the patient and thereafter continued to treat the unhealed incision without probing the incision for a foreign object. The Trial Court directed a verdict for the surgeon on the ground of the statute of limitations. This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial stating:
Bearing in mind that there is evidence in this case to indicate that the professional relationship between the decedent and the defendant, Dr. J. W. Osborne, did not cease until the discovery of the imbedded sponge in May, 1961, or sometime after that, it is our view that the evidence is such that the question of whether or not this professional relationship did continue until within one year of the filing of the suit is one that should have been submitted to the jury, and, if found by the jury that said relationship continued until within the statutory period of one year, the question of liability for negligence would have been for the jury to decide.
Frazor, 57 Tenn. App. at 20.
In Frazor, the negligence included failure to discover the cause of the unhealed wound. So long as Dr. Osborne continued as the treating physician, his duty to discover and his failure to discover continued. Thus, under the circumstances of Frazor, the continuance of the physician relationship resulted in the continuance of the negligent failure to discover the sponge.
No such set of circumstances are shown in the present case. The professional relationship did continue, but there is no evidence that the negligence, if any, of defendant continued into the one year period preceding the filing of this suit. The only professional services rendered within one year preceding suit was the removal of sutures on May 5, 1993; and there is no showing of any negligence in the removal of the sutures, or, for that matter, in the performance of the last surgery on April 3, 1992, which included the insertion of the sutures which were removed on May 5, 1992.
The opinion in Frazor contains some language which may be interpreted as supporting a rule that no statute of limitations or malpractice begins to run until the termination of the doctor-patient relationship. This Court does not so interpret such language which referred only to breach of duties (such as duty to discover) which continued so long as the physician continued to treat the disorder which resulted from the continued failure to discover the cause.
Moreover, since the recognition of the continuing treatment doctrine in Frazor, its applicability has been eroded or entirely eliminated by the above cited statute and subsequent decisions.
In Housh v. Morris, supra, this Court affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice suit and said:
Since the holding in Frazor, our courts have adopted and continuously applied the "discovery rule." This rule is codified and made applicable to malpractice actions by T.C.A. § 29-26-116. The present action is governed by T.C.A. § 29-26-116.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the Trial Court erred in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations.
The judgment of the Trial Court in favor of both plaintiffs is reversed and vacated, and plaintiffs' suit is dismissed at their cost. The cause is remanded to the Trial Court for entry in conformity with this opinion and such other proceedings as may be necessary.
Reversed, Dismissed and Remanded.
_______________________________________________ HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION
_____________________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE, CONCURS
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE, FILES SEPARATE
OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
OPINION
CONCURRING IN PART DISSENTING IN PART
I concur with the majority's decision that Theresa Stanbury's lack of informed consent claim is time-barred. However, I have prepared this separate opinion for two reasons. First, the majority has erroneously dismissed Ms. Stanbury's claims regarding advising and performing unnecessary surgery which stand on a footing different from her lack of informed consent claim. Second, it is time to hold unequivocally that the continuing treatment doctrine has been completely subsumed into the discovery rule.
I.
Ms. Stanbury is an assembly line worker at Saturn Corporation in Columbia. In 1991 she developed a corn on the fifth toe of her right foot that caused her discomfort when she was required to stand for ten hours during her shift. A physician removed the corn and recommended that she consult a podiatrist. Accordingly, Ms. Stanbury met with Dr. Brian Bacardi on November 22, 1991. After a cursory examination, Dr. Bacardi recommended a minor surgical procedure to prevent her fifth toe on her right foot from laying on top of her fourth toe. Dr. Bacardi assured Ms. Stanbury that her recovery time would be short and that her work schedule would not be interrupted.
Ms. Stanbury signed two consent forms prior to her December 11, 1991 surgery. One document on Dr. Bacardi's stationery entitled a "Surgery Informer" contained a brief discussion of the general risks and complications of surgery but did not identify the nature of the surgery Dr. Bacardi planned to perform. The second document was a Centennial Medical Center form entitled "Consent for Operation, Administration of Anesthesia, and Other Procedures." In the space provided for describing the operation to be performed, someone hand wrote: "Bilateral Osteotomy, Bilateral Repair Tailor Bunion, Bilateral Arthroplasty, Bilateral Realignment Digit 4 and 5, Bilateral Removal 5th Toenail." Ms. Stanbury insists that no one explained the nature of these procedures and that she did not know that she had consented to surgical procedures on both her feet or to anything other than the minor procedure Dr. Bacardi had described in his office several weeks earlier.
Dr. Bacardi performed extensive surgery on both feet while Ms. Stanbury was under a general anesthetic. During the mid-afternoon, Ms. Stanbury was released from the hospital in a wheelchair with both feet heavily bandaged. Ms. Stanbury described her feet as "[t]wo big white blobs." When Dr. Bacardi removed the surgical dressing during her first office visit on December 20, 1991, Ms. Stanbury stated that she was in "complete and utter shock" and that she "couldn't believe all that had been done. There were so many stitches and so many things, it was just unbelievable." She also noticed that the fifth toe on her right foot was not touching the floor but rather was sticking straight up in the air.
Ms. Stanbury had four more office visits with Dr. Bacardi between January 10 and March 17, 1992. On April 3, 1992, Dr. Bacardi performed additional surgery to attempt to correct the misalignment of the fifth toe on Ms. Stanbury's right foot. During a post-operative office visit on May 5, 1992, Dr. Bacardi informed Ms. Stanbury that there was nothing more he could do for her and that it would take approximately one year for her feet to fully heal.
Ms. Stanbury and her husband filed a malpractice action against Dr. Bacardi and Hospital Corporation of America on April 30, 1993. They alleged that Dr. Bacardi had been negligent in advising her to have surgery, in performing the surgery itself, and in providing her with post-operative care. They also asserted that Dr. Bacardi had performed unnecessary surgery, that he had failed to obtain her consent to the surgery he performed on December 11, 1991, that he had ignored her complaints of pain and infection, and that he had falsified his office notes to conceal Ms. Stanbury's real condition. Dr. Bacardi responded by denying wrongdoing and by asserting that all the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court directed a verdict for Dr. Bacardi at the close of the plaintiffs' proof on the theories of negligent post-operative care, ignoring Ms. Stanbury's complaints of pain and infection, and intentionally falsifying his office notes. It submitted the issues concerning lack of informed consent, advising and performing unnecessary surgery, and negligently performing the surgery to the jury. During the jury's deliberations, however, the trial court withdrew the claim for negligently performing the surgery from the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Ms. Stanbury $211,000 and Mr. Stanbury $10,000.
II.
Until December 1974, negligence actions against health care providers, like all other actions for injuries to the person, were required to be filed within one year after the date of the wrongful act that caused the plaintiff's injury. Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 135, 67 S.W.2d 140, 141 (1934); Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 364-65, 2 S.W.2d 100, 103 (1928); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304. The two most common exceptions to this rule involved continuing torts and the fraudulent concealment of the injury.
The facts of this case do not support Ms. Stanbury's claim that Dr. Bacardi fraudulently concealed her injury. It was evident to Ms. Stanbury as soon as she regained consciousness that Dr. Bacardi had performed surgery for which she had not consented. There was no way that Dr. Bacardi could have concealed from Ms. Stanbury that he had operated on her left foot in addition to her right foot.
The Eastern Section of this court adopted the continuing tort principle in 1938 in a case involving an employee who became disabled by breathing chemical particles in his employer's plant over an extended period of time. Noting that the employer had a duty to protect its employees from breathing these particles, the court held that the employer had committed "one continuous tort, beginning with the employment and ending only at the time of total disability of the employee and the termination of his employment." Tennessee Eastman Corp. v. Newman, 22 Tenn. App. 270, 279, 121 S.W.2d 130, 135 (1938). Accordingly, the Eastern Section held that the employee's action against the employer was timely since it was filed within one year of the onset of his disability and the termination of his employment. Tennessee Eastman Corp. v. Newman, 22 Tenn. App. at 279, 121 S.W.2d at 135.
Twenty-two years later, the Middle Section of this court extended the continuing tort principle to medical malpractice actions. In a case involving a surgical sponge that was negligently left in a patient's body for ten years, the court held that the statute of limitations would be tolled for the duration of the doctor-patient relationship when the plaintiff proved continuing negligent treatment by the physician. Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10, 19-20, 414 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (1966). Accordingly, the continuing tort principle became known as the continuing treatment doctrine in the context of medical malpractice cases.
At about the same time, other victims of malpractice were urging the courts to adopt a discovery rule that would delay the accrual of the cause of action until a plaintiff discovered his or her injury. This court repeatedly declined to depart from the traditional rule that a medical malpractice plaintiff's cause of action accrues on the date that the wrongful act causing the injury occurs. Clinard v. Pennington, 59 Tenn. App. 128, 136, 438 S.W.2d 748, 752 (1968); Hall v. De Saussure, 41 Tenn. App. 572, 580, 297 S.W.2d 81, 85 (1956).
The Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the discovery rule on December 9, 1974, in a medical malpractice case where the continuing treatment doctrine was unavailable because the doctor-patient relationship had terminated approximately three years before suit was filed. The Court held that a cause of action for medical malpractice "accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury." Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974). The Court did not address the relationship between the newly adopted discovery rule and the continuing treatment doctrine. However, Justice Harbison's separate concurrence implied that the statute of limitations continued to be tolled as long as the doctor-patient relationship continued even if the patient discovered the injury. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d at 518.
Approximately six months later the General Assembly included the Teeters v. Currey discovery rule in the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975. Now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a)(2) (1980), the legislative version of the discovery rule provides that "[i]n the event the alleged injury is not discovered within the said one (1) year period, the period of limitation shall be one (1) year from the date of such discovery." Thus, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is tolled during the period that the plaintiff has not discovered that a wrong has occurred. Hoffman v. Hospital Affiliates, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tenn. 1983). Discovery takes place when the plaintiff is aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that he or she has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct. Roe v. Jefferson, 875 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tenn. 1994). These facts include the occasion, the manner, and the means by which the breach of duty that produced the injury occurred and the identity of the person who breached the duty. Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tenn. 1982); Hathaway v. Middle Tenn. Anesthesiology, P.C., 724 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986).
Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 299, § 15(a), 1975 Tenn. Pub. Acts 662, 671.
The courts did not address the relationship between the discovery rule and the continuing treatment doctrine until 1986 when the Eastern Section of this court heard an appeal involving the dismissal of a malpractice action for the over prescription of addictive drugs. Even though the patient filed suit within one year after the professional relationship with his physician ended, the Eastern Section held that the continuing treatment doctrine was inapplicable because another physician had informed him more than one year before the suit was filed that he was taking too many drugs. French v. Fetzer, C.A. No. 43, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1986). The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the patient's application for permission to appeal and later issued a per curiam opinion affirming the Eastern Section's decision, stating: "we find there is no question but that plaintiff had actual knowledge of his malpractice claim no later than February, 1982 . . . and that the subsequent treatment of plaintiff by defendant was in fact a continuation and did not involve new or different drugs." French v. Fetzer, C.A. No. 43, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. June 22, 1987) (per curiam opinion not for publication).
Three years later, the Western Section of this court addressed the relationship between the discovery rule and the continuing tort principle in a case involving an employee who claimed to have been injured by prolonged use of a defective tractor. The Western Section stated
We believe that the "continuous tort" doctrine must be applied in conjunction with the "discovery rule." Thus, in a case involving a continuing tort, the cause of action accrues at the time the professional relationship or course of treatment is terminated unless, under the "discovery rule," the cause of action is deemed to have accrued at a different point in time. A plaintiff is not entitled to a new limitations period to begin with the appearance of each new injury or complication.
Kenton v. United Technology, Shelby Law No. 71, slip op. at 6 (Tenn.Ct.App. March 26, 1990) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). Accordingly, the court held that the employee's suit was barred because he had discovered his injury more than one year before filing suit.
One year later, the Middle Section of this court recognized similar reasoning in a medical malpractice case. The court held that the jury should decide whether "the plaintiff knew of the malpractice for a period prior to suit exceeding the statutory limitations period." Higgins v. Estate of Crecraft, App. No. 01-A-01-9008-CV-00311, slip op. at 13 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 21, 1991) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). The Western Section reached a similar result three months later in a case involving lack of informed consent for hip replacement surgery. Housh v. Morris, 818 S.W.2d 39, 43-44 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991).
Two years later, the Middle Section invoked the continuing treatment rule to save a patient's cause of action against her psychiatrist from a summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations. Roe v. Jefferson, App. No. 01-A-01-9212-CV-00476, slip op. at 17 (Tenn.Ct.App. April 16, 1993). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision because it found that the patient had discovered the psychiatrist's wrongful conduct before their professional relationship ceased and more than one year before suit was filed. Roe v. Jefferson, 875 S.W.2d at 658. The Western Section applied the Roe v. Jefferson holding when it held that a patient's malpractice action against her psychotherapist accrued when she discovered that the defendant's conduct was wrong, not when her relationship with the defendant ended. Clifton v. Bass, 908 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995).
The cases decided since 1986 indicate that the continuation of a professional relationship no longer plays a role in determining when a cause of action for professional malpractice accrues. The Tennessee Supreme Court removed any doubt about this when it held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when a client learns of his or her injury and that the injury was caused by the lawyer's negligence. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 28 (Tenn. 1995). Accordingly, the Court held that clients must sue their lawyers for malpractice within one year after discovering their injury, even if their lawyer is still representing them. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d at 30.
The rule in both medical and legal malpractice actions is now the same. Notwithstanding the existence of an ongoing professional relationship, a cause of action for professional malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient or the client discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that he or she has been injured by the negligent conduct of his or her lawyer or health care provider. The fact that the lawyer or health care provider continues representing or treating the client or patient will not toll the running of the statute of limitations once the injury has been discovered.
III.
Deciding that Ms. Stanbury's lack of informed consent claims were untimely cannot end our inquiry in this case. Ms. Stanbury also claimed that Dr. Bacardi performed the surgery on her feet in a negligent manner, that he negligently advised her to undergo unnecessary surgery, and that he performed unnecessary surgery on her feet. I will take these claims in turn.
A. Negligent Performance of Surgery
Ms. Stanbury claimed that Dr. Bacardi performed the surgery on her feet in a negligent manner. The trial court declined to grant the doctor's motion for a directed verdict on the issue at the close of Ms. Stanbury's proof; however, it effectively withdrew the issue from the jury after deliberations began when the jury requested clarification of portions of the verdict form. While I have serious misgivings about the manner in which the trial court disposed of this issue, the trial court's conduct was, at most, harmless error.
During its deliberations, the jury sought clarification concerning question three on the verdict form that asked "Did the Defendant, Brian Bacardi, deviate from the recognized standard of care for podiatrists in this community by negligently performing surgical procedures on December 11, 1991, and/or April 3, 1992, on the Plaintiff, Theresa Stanbury?" The trial court agreed with the jury's characterization that this question concerned "the fact that surgery was performed, not how it was performed, not how successful it was." The trial court also instructed the jury that "as far as the operation itself, that's not part of the lawsuit."
Considering the record as a whole, I am unable to find any proof presented by Ms. Stanbury tending to show that Dr. Bacardi performed her surgery in a negligent manner. The only expert testimony remotely addressing this issue was that of Dr. James Rogers, a board certified podiatrist, who testified on Ms. Stanbury's behalf. Dr. Rogers stated that there was a misalignment of the bone where Dr. Bacardi performed the arthroplasty on Ms. Stanbury's right foot that did not exist before the surgery, but he did not opine that the misalignment was caused by Dr. Bacardi's negligent surgical technique.
Dr. Rogers's testimony does not establish that Dr. Bacardi performed the surgery negligently. Finders of fact cannot infer negligence from a bad result. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lawrence, 720 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986); Redwood v. Raskind, 49 Tenn. App. 69, 75-76, 350 S.W.2d 414, 417 (1961); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(d) (1980) (the jury in a malpractice action shall be instructed that injury alone does not give rise to a presumption of the defendant's negligence). Thus, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff cannot establish a doctor's negligence merely by showing that an operation produced a bad result, Butler v. Molinski, 198 Tenn. 124, 133-34, 277 S.W.2d 448, 452 (1955), or even that aggravation followed the doctor's treatment. Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. Long, 190 Tenn. 434, 440, 230 S.W.2d 659, 662 (1950).
B. The Unnecessary Surgery Claims
Ms. Stanbury also claimed that Dr. Bacardi negligently advised her to undergo surgery for the corn on her right fifth toe and that he also performed unnecessary surgery elsewhere on both of her feet. Dr. Bacardi asserted that these claims, like the informed consent claims, were time-barred because Ms. Stanbury filed suit more than one year after her surgery. Dr. Bacardi's argument is without merit because the running of the statute of limitations with regard to Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims involves facts and criteria that are quite different from those involved with the informed consent claims.
The majority has decided to dismiss Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims because she "does not rely upon this aspect of the rule" in her brief and because she cited no evidence that she "did not discover or should not reasonably [have] discovered that the surgery was unnecessary at least one year before this suit was filed." I find this reasoning both curious and entirely unpersuasive for three reasons. First, Dr. Bacardi, as the party seeking to dismiss Ms. Stanbury's claims based on the statute of limitations, had the burden of demonstrating that Ms. Stanbury's claims were time-barred. Second, Dr. Bacardi's statute of limitations argument with regard to Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims is legally wrong. Third, Ms. Stanbury, as the appellee, is under no obligation to respond to arguments not made by the appellant.
We must deal with this issue head on because the jury's damage award is based on a general verdict that could have been based on its conclusion that Ms. Stanbury had not consented to all the surgery that Dr. Bacardi performed or that Dr. Bacardi had recommended and performed unnecessary surgery or both. Thus, even if Ms. Stanbury's informed consent claims are time-barred, she may still be entitled to recover on the unnecessary surgery claims unless they too are time-barred.
Disposing of the statute of limitations issue with regard to Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims requires an understanding of the nature of the claims themselves. Ms. Stanbury claimed that Dr. Bacardi deviated from the standard of care for podiatrists by failing to follow a conservative treatment regime before recommending surgery on both her feet. Given that her chief complaint was pain associated solely with her right fifth toe, she presented expert testimony that Dr. Bacardi should have first attempted to alleviate her symptoms using conservative treatment measures such as shaving the corn, wearing wider shoes, or using shoe padding.
A doctor cannot be held responsible for choosing between two or more recognized courses of treatment. McPeak v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 33 Tenn. App. 76, 79, 229 S.W.2d 150, 151 (1950). Presuming a careful diagnosis, a doctor's honest mistake in electing to perform surgery is a matter of judgment upon which a negligence action ordinarily cannot be predicated. Burnett v. Layman, 133 Tenn. 323, 328, 181 S.W. 157, 158 (1915). Both of Ms. Stanbury's experts testified, however, that performing surgery on Ms. Stanbury without first attempting more conservative treatments was not a recognized alternative treatment regime. Thus, electing to perform surgery without first attempting more conservative treatments was a deviation from the standard of care for podiatrists and was also prima facie evidence of Dr. Bacardi's malpractice.
The statute of limitations on Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims could not have started to run until she discovered or reasonably should have discovered "the occasion, the manner, and the means by which a breach of duty occurred that produced [her] injuries." Roe v. Jefferson, 875 S.W.2d at 656. Thus, Ms. Stanbury would have had to discover that her surgery was unnecessary before her cause of action accrued. The fact that Ms. Stanbury was asymptomatic except for the corn on her right fifth toe is not, in and of itself, evidence that the surgery was unnecessary. Since Ms. Stanbury was a lay person, I would find that she did not discover that Dr. Bacardi had performed unnecessary surgery until another competent health care provider informed her that her surgery had been unnecessary.
Thus, unlike the majority who are content to dismiss the entire case on statute of limitations grounds, I would hold that Ms. Stanbury's unnecessary surgery claims were timely. Prior to April 30, 1992 — one year before the filing of the complaint — Ms. Stanbury knew that Dr. Bacardi had performed more surgery than she had consented to and that she had experienced unanticipated complications. She had no reason to know that the surgery that Dr. Bacardi performed on her right fifth toe or elsewhere on either of her feet was unnecessary. Thus, even though the statute of limitations on her informed consent claim had started to run, the statute of limitations on her negligent surgery claims had not.
IV.
I would find that the trial court committed reversible error by submitting Ms. Stanbury's time-barred informed consent claims to the jury. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment, but unlike the majority, I would not dismiss Ms. Stanbury's suit in its entirety. Since her unnecessary surgery claims are not time-barred, I would remand them for a new trial on these claims alone. She is not entitled to a second bite at the apple with regard to all the other theories of recovery that either were time-barred or were not proven during the first trial.
________________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE