Opinion
NO. 02-13-00060-CR
11-13-2014
CURTIS ROSCOE STAFFORD APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1276266D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Curtis Roscoe Stafford of aggravated sexual assault and assessed his punishment at twenty-two years' confinement. The trial court sentenced him accordingly and ordered that he serve the sentence concurrently with a prior 1985 conviction to the date of sentencing but consecutively thereafter. Appellant brings a single issue on appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and reversibly erred by admitting during the guilt phase of his trial not only evidence of the fact of the 1985 aggravated robbery conviction but also details of the underlying facts that include evidence of an aggravated sexual assault that did not result in conviction. We affirm.
Background
The evidence in this case is essentially a swearing match.
The Complainant's Version
The complainant testified that she walked to a convenience store on the January night of the alleged offense and that she asked Appellant for a ride home. Instead of taking her home, he took her to a road that ended at an iron gate with a horseshoe and longhorn design. He stopped the car and got out, saying he had to "go to the bathroom." Instead, he came around to the passenger seat, got into the car, and grabbed her arm. The complainant testified that Appellant ordered her to perform fellatio and pulled out a black .380 Kel-Tec handgun. She complied with his orders. Then he ordered her to pull down her pants and get on top of him. When she complied with that order, he penetrated her vagina with his penis.
The complainant testified that while he assaulted her, Appellant told her that he ought to kill her. She asked him if she could pray. After the assault, he instructed her to clean him up and not to get anything on his clothes. He wanted her to use her mouth, but instead, she used her underwear, pink panties. When she finished cleaning up, she threw the panties out the car window. Appellant drove her to a church and told her to get out and walk in front of the car. Instead, when she got out of the car, she ran until she arrived at home. Her boyfriend was waiting for her, and when he saw her, he asked her what had happened.
The complainant took a shower and went to bed, although her boyfriend told her that she should call the police and go to the hospital. The next morning, she went to the hospital, where medical personnel performed a rape exam. She also spoke with the police.
Appellant's Version
Appellant testified that at around 9:00 p.m. on a January night, he got off work at a car lot in Arlington where he had been employed for about a year and a half. He drove down Riverside Drive, saw a convenience store, and stopped to get some cigarettes. When he got out of the car, the complainant smiled at him. After buying cigarettes, he got back in his car, lit a cigarette, and took a drink of beer. The complainant was still standing there. Appellant rolled down the window and asked her what she was doing. She replied that she wanted to have some fun. He asked her what kind of fun she wanted to have. She did not reply but got into the car. Appellant started driving south on Riverside. The complainant told him to make a right and then a left, and he followed her directions. Appellant stopped the car, and he and the complainant talked for a few minutes. Then, he got out of the car to use the restroom, got back in the car on the driver's side, and pulled a pipe out. The complainant asked him why he was getting in on the driver's side, and he asked her what she meant. She said, "We fixing to take care of business." He got out and got back in the car on the passenger's side. The complainant suggested using crack. She had her own crack pipe, and they both smoked crack. He also offered her some beer, but she said that she did not like beer.
Appellant testified that the complainant got completely naked, he pulled his pants down, and they started having consensual sex. When she was pulling her pants down, he heard something fall but did not pay any attention at that time. While they were having sex, the complainant reached back and tried to pick it up. That was when he saw that it was a small gun. She grabbed it as though she was going to pull it around and point it at him. He pulled her hand back, held her wrist with his right hand, and clutched the gun in his left hand. He threw it under the driver's seat and asked her what she was doing with the gun. He asked if she was trying to rob him. The complainant replied that she was not. At that time, they were finished having sex, and he told her to put on her clothes.
The complainant used her panties to clean up, threw the panties out the car window, and pulled her pants on. She said that she threw her panties away because she did not want her boyfriend to know that she had been out having sex. Appellant paid her $20 before she left. He put it on the dashboard on the passenger side, and she picked it up. The complainant told Appellant that she wanted to be dropped off at a nearby church, and he took her there and left her.
Appellant testified that he made no threats to the complainant at all. He said that he did not remember her crying at all and that she had no reason to cry. He insisted that they had both agreed to have sex and to use drugs. He denied that he had raped her. He threw the gun away in a field across from a motel at an old wrecking yard, Aztec Wrecking Service.
Extraneous Offense
During the State's case in chief, and prior to Appellant testifying, the State called B.C. to testify over Appellant's objection. The trial court gave him a running objection. In the presence of the jury, B.C. testified that on April 3, 1985, she was working at a convenience store as a cashier from 10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. Appellant came into the store about 3:00 a.m., and after talking a bit, he pulled a knife and said that he was going to rob her. He told B.C. to hand him the money from the cash register, and she did. But instead of leaving, he stayed. When a customer came in, Appellant acted like he was her boyfriend. After the customer left, Appellant threatened to kill her with the knife. He made B.C. lie down on the floor behind the counter and sexually assaulted her.
When another customer came in about an issue with the gas pump, B.C. had to go outside, and Appellant went with her. At the first opportunity, B.C. ran across the street to the closest place she could find that was open and asked them to call the police.
This incident occurred almost twenty-eight years before the trial in the instant case and resulted in a judgment of guilt to a charge of aggravated robbery. Appellant was released from the penitentiary on July 9, 2009. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence of the extraneous offense for "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident" only.
Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the trial court's admission of evidence concerning his 1985 aggravated robbery conviction, including details of a related aggravated sexual assault that did not result in conviction. The State argues forfeiture, challenging the sufficiency of the objection, contending that Appellant failed to object when the evidence was offered and that by taking the stand and testifying concerning the 1985 offense, he forfeited any prior objection to testimony about the offense. The State is incorrect.
Outside the presence of the jury, Appellant objected to testimony about the 1985 offense under rule 403 on the grounds that "the prejudicial effect far outweighs any probative value." See Tex. R. Evid. 403. He also objected under rule 404(a) that the evidence was being offered to show character conformity and that the offense occurred 28 years before, which we treat, as the trial judge obviously did, as a remoteness objection. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(a). Further, he objected that although he was convicted of the prior aggravated robbery, he was not convicted of the prior aggravated sexual assault. Rather, that offense was dismissed under section 12.45 of the penal code as part of the plea bargain agreement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.45 (West 2011). All these objections were presented to the trial judge, who overruled them and granted the defense a running objection sua sponte. Thus, we conclude Appellant has preserved this issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Sattiewhite v. State, 786 S.W.2d 271, 283 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) (explaining that "as long as the running objection constituted a timely objection, stating the specific grounds for the ruling, the movement desired the court to make (if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context of the running objection) then the error should be deemed preserved by an appellate court").
To be convicted of sexual assault, Appellant must have engaged in the conduct without the complainant's consent. A complainant's lack of consent is the essence of the offense of sexual assault. See Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). "When the defensive theory of consent is raised, a defendant necessarily disputes his intent to do the act without the consent of [the complainant]. His intent is thereby placed in issue." Id.; see Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("In this case, lack of consent is an element of the alleged offense and was hotly disputed. The extraneous-offense evidence in this case was admitted only after appellant testified that his sexual intercourse with the complainant was consensual." (citations omitted)).
The trial court found that Appellant had opened the door to evidence of the 1985 sexual assault and robbery through cross-examination of the complainant by challenging the complainant's credibility, by suggesting that she brought the weapon, and by suggesting that she is a prostitute who was not sexually assaulted but rather engaged in consensual sexual activity. The trial court also held that the 1985 offenses were not too remote because Appellant was released from prison less than ten years earlier, was still on parole at the time of the offense, and was currently in jail because his parole had been revoked.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained the interplay of Rules of Evidence 403 and 404:
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." TEX. R. EVID. 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ." "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." However, Rule 404(b) also provides that extraneous offense evidence may "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]" This list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive, and extraneous-offense evidence may be admissible when a defendant raises a defensive issue that negates one of the elements of the offense. Thus, a party may introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if such evidence logically serves to make more or less probable an elemental fact, an evidentiary fact that inferentially leads to an elemental fact, or defensive evidence that undermines an elemental fact. "Whether extraneous offense evidence has relevance apart from character conformity, as required by Rule 404(b), is a question for the trial court."Martin, 173 S.W.3d at 466 (citations omitted).
The case now before this court does not involve a distinctive course of conduct, and the 1985 aggravated sexual assault is similar to the current allegations only in that a gas station with convenience store was involved. There is no suggestion that the sexual assault the complainant testified to was an accident. But we do not have to determine that the evidence of the 1985 sexual assault was not offered for character conformity. See Tex. R. App. 47.1. Instead, we first address the effect of Appellant's decision to take the stand and subject himself to impeachment.
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained,
The general rule is that error regarding improperly admitted evidence is waived if that same evidence is brought in later by the defendant or by the State without objection. However, error is not waived when the evidence is brought in later in an effort to meet, rebut, destroy, deny or explain the improperly admitted evidence.Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citations omitted). After the trial court admitted the details of the 1985 offense, Appellant's position was that the evidence was improperly admitted and that he needed to take the stand to meet, rebut, destroy, and explain that evidence. He did take the stand and subjected himself to impeachment by proof of his prior felony conviction. While the fact of a prior felony conviction may be admissible, the details of the offense normally are not. Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). But Appellant did not merely meet, rebut, destroy, and explain the details of the 1985 offense. He also testified to many recent additional offenses and bad acts, including fifteen to twenty prostitution offenses by employing the services of prostitutes, drinking beer, using drugs, and seeking prostitutes while on parole. Appellant additionally testified that he was in classes for sex offenders, he participated in AA and NA, and he thought he was in anger control classes.
Without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting details of the 1985 sexual assault, we hold that any error resulting from the admission was harmless in light of Appellant's expansive testimony. Appellant himself testified on direct examination that he was in counseling as a sex offender when he encountered the complainant in the instant case. That alone, in the context of this trial, opens the door to questions about his history of sex offenses. Additionally, implicit in the fact of treatment as a sex offender is the inference that Appellant is a sex offender and was a sex offender before encountering the complainant. Also, the snapshot of his life at the time of the encounter was that of a life out of control, mired in illicit sex, drugs, and alcohol. It is reasonable to conclude that the jury would be more affected by Appellant's conduct and character at the time of the more recent offense than his conduct twenty-eight years ago. Further, his strategy of open honesty with the jury appears to have been reasonably successful. Although the jury was instructed to assess Appellant's punishment at fifteen to 99 years or life, the jury chose to assess a twenty-two-year sentence, which is in the lower range. Finally, the trial court issued a standard extraneous offense limiting instruction. Given our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that any error was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253 (1946)).
Appellant also argues in a subissue that a rule that vigorous cross-examination of the complainant opens the door to otherwise inadmissible extraneous acts of misconduct is an impermissible limitation of his Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. Appellant raises this constitutional complaint for the first time on appeal. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 238-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (requiring timely objection to preserve a complaint for appellate review). Further, the complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court or the error is forfeited. Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Appellant therefore forfeited this complaint.
Conclusion
Because any error in admitting details of the 1985 robbery and sexual assault was harmless and Appellant did not preserve his constitutional complaint, we overrule his sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 13, 2014
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.