Opinion
1:21-cv-169
05-20-2022
DWAYNE STAATS, Plaintiff v. GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE JOHN CARNEY, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that Plaintiff Dwayne Staats' motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 5] be granted. It is further recommended that Counts One, Three, Five, portions of Count Two, and all claims against Defendants John Carney, Tom Wolf, and Claire DeMattis be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Motion to proceed in forma pauperis
Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis averring that he is unable to pay the filing fee associated with this case. Based upon this averment and a review of his in forma pauperis application [ECF No. 5] and prisoner trust fund account statement [ECF No. 6], the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff is without sufficient funds to pay the costs and fees of the proceedings. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted.
B. Background
Plaintiff, an inmate formerly confined at SCI-Albion, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following individuals: Delaware Governor John Carney; Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf; Delaware Department of Corrections (DOC) Commissioner Claire DeMattis; Pennsylvania DOC Secretary John Wetzel; and the Superintendent of SCI-Albion, Michael Clark. ECF No. 1-2 at 2-3.
According to Plaintiff, Defendants Carney, Wolf, Wetzel, and DeMattis negotiated an “interstate compact contract” (ICC) in 2017 whereby Delaware agreed to pay $30 million to the state of Pennsylvania to house 300 inmates for three years. ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. Plaintiff was one of the Delaware inmates transferred to Pennsylvania pursuant to that agreement. Plaintiff explains that Delaware entered into a settlement agreement with a prison advocacy group in 2016 guaranteeing certain rights to prisoners in solitary confinement, such as a minimum number of recreational hours, and asserts that his transfer to Pennsylvania was orchestrated to ensure that he would not receive the benefits of the 2016 settlement. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Since his transfer, Plaintiff contends that he has been improperly and continually housed in solitary confinement without meaningful review or an opportunity to challenge his placement. Id. ¶¶ 22-27.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of his transfer to Pennsylvania pursuant to the ICC and his continued placement in solitary confinement. Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania statutory and common law.
C. Standard for review
Because he is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D 'Agostino v. CECOMRDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfiilly pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
D. Analysis
Applying the principles above, the Court finds that several Defendants and claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915. The Court will address each below.
1. Fifth Amendment (Count One)
The first count of Plaintiff s proposed complaint asserts that Defendants violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by: (1) drafting regulations and policies governing placement in restricted housing without following state law; and (2) by negotiating a contract to place him in solitary confinement “without it being authenticated by the proper authorities.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15-17. However, it is axiomatic that “[t]he limitations of the [F]ifth [A]mendment restrict only federal governmental action ..Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983). There is no dispute that none of the Defendants are federal actors.
Consequently, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Fifth Amendment claim against them pursuant to Section 1983. See, e.g., Carson v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 972102, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot maintain a Fifth Amendment claim against [state actors] pursuant to Section 1983.”); Leventry v. Watts, 2007 WL 1469038, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2007) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment restricts the actions of federal officials, not state actors.”). Count One must be dismissed in its entirety.
2. Cruel and unusual punishment (Count Two)
Plaintiff next presents an Eighth Amendment challenge to both the constitutionality of his transfer to Pennsylvania and his continued placement in solitary confinement upon his arrival. Plaintiff contends that his transfer amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because he was “shipp[ed] to PA knowing that [Pennsylvania's] RHU only allots 5 hrs of unstructured recreation per week.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.
By way of background, an interstate corrections compact “is an agreement between states, enacted by statute in each participating state, that authorizes the transfer of one State's prisoner to another State's prison.” Archy v. Troxler, 2021 WL 75739, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2021). “Statutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other states.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 246 (1983).
Critically, “[t]he Interstate Corrections Compact is not a federal law and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert a claim based upon an alleged violation of the Interstate Corrections Compact.” Archy, 2021 WL 75739, at *3 (collecting cases). Nor does a prisoner have a constitutional right to a change of his custodial location by reason of an ICC. Id. (citing Wilson v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 394, 1986 WL 18052 (4th Cir. 1986)). Rather, “nothing in the Interstate Corrections Compact ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. (collecting cases). See also Olim, 461 U.S. at 250-251 (“Confinement in another State ... is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose”) (internal quotations omitted). As such, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to remain incarcerated in Delaware. The portion of Count Two challenging his transfer should be dismissed.
As will be discussed more fully below, the portion of Count Two challenging Plaintiffs continuing placement in solitary confinement should be permitted to go forward.
3. Equal protection (Count Three)
Plaintiff next maintains that Defendants violated his right to equal protection “when he was transferred to PA in an interstate compact and housed in conditions they knew the District Court of Delaware already ruled was cruel and unusual.” Id. ¶ 32(a). He also alleges that his equal protection rights were violated because he was the only one of the 300 prisoners transferred to Pennsylvania that was placed in solitary confinement upon arrival. Id. ¶ 32(b).
To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must ordinarily allege “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015)). Although Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he was treated differently than other inmates in the prison, he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that this difference in treatment resulted from his race, religion, or other prohibited consideration. This deficiency is fatal to his claim.
To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to proceed under a “class of one” equal protection theory, he must establish that: “he was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination ... [and] that his treatment was not ‘reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests.'” Brayboy v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6018863, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2018) (quoting Hollands Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692, 701 (D. Del. 2009)). In the specific context of prison discipline, this means that he must “demonstrate disparities in [treatment] that are not reasonable related to legitimate state interests.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 775 (3d Cir. 1979). Plaintiff has made no attempt to satisfy his pleading obligation in this regard. As such, his equal protection claim must be dismissed.
4. State law violations (Count Five)
In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated assorted Pennsylvania state statutes, failed to adhere to state regulations, and violated DOC procedures. Similar claims are sprinkled throughout his complaint. See, generally, ECF No. 1. None are cognizable in a § 1983 action. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, “[t]he plain language of section 1983 ... solely supports causes of action based upon violations, under the color of state law, of federal statutory law or constitutional rights.” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). Thus, § 1983 “does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes [because] a state statute cannot, in and of itself, create a constitutional right.” Id. Moreover, “[a]s many courts have held, corrections officials cannot be held liable for failing to conform to procedures outlined in inmate handbooks and other internal prison procedures.” Bowman v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 3258946, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2020) (citing cases). All of Plaintiff's claims based solely on violations of state statutes, constitutional provisions, regulations, and policies must be dismissed.
5. Personal involvement
Should this Report be adopted, the sole remaining claims in this action will be Plaintiff's allegations in Counts Two and Four that he was improperly placed in in long-term solitary confinement while incarcerated at SCI-Albion. However, because neither of the surviving claims adequately alleges the personal involvement of Defendants Carney, Wolf, and DeMattis, those Defendants should be dismissed from this action.
It is axiomatic that a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirkv. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). Despite this requirement, there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that Camey, Wolf, or DeMattis had any role in assigning Plaintiff to the restricted housing unit at SCI-Albion. Plaintiff s allegations in this regard center entirely on policies implemented by Wetzel and decisions made by Clark. Aside from a conclusory averment that Camey and DeMattis transferred him to Pennsylvania knowing that he would be placed in solitary confinement, there is no plausible allegation concerning any other Defendant with respect to this claim. Camey, DeMattis, and Wolf should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
6. Summary
In short, several Defendants and claims should be dismissed from this action prior to service. Specifically, the Court should dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim at Count One, the portions of the Eighth Amendment claim at Count Two that challenge Plaintiffs transfer to Pennsylvania, the equal protection claim at Count Three, and the state law violations alleged in Count Five and throughout the complaint. Moreover, with respect to the surviving claims, Defendants Carney, Wolf, and DeMattis should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement. Each of these claims should be dismissed, with prejudice, and the Clerk should be directed to terminate Carney, Wolf, and DeMattis from this action.
Should this Report and Recommendation be adopted, the lone remaining claims in this action will be Plaintiffs Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Wetzel and Clark with respect to his placement in solitary confinement.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e): (1) the Fifth Amendment claim at Count One; (2) the portions of the Eighth Amendment claim at Count Two that challenge Plaintiff's transfer to Pennsylvania; (3) the equal protection claim at Count Three; (4) the state law violations alleged in Count Five and throughout the complaint; and (5) all remaining claims against Defendants Carney, Wolf, and DeMattis.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).