Opinion
99-CIV-1791(KMW)
February 21, 2001
ORDER
Plaintiff moves the Court for partial summary judgment. Defendants Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. and Sea-Land Service, Inc. cross-move for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both parties' motions.
I. Background
General Electro Mechanical ("GEM") arranged with Transway Freight Systems, Inc. ("Transway"), a freight forwarder, for a trans-ocean shipment of machinery. See Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Statement ["Pl.'s Stmnt"] at ¶ 5. Transway contracted with Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. ("Hanjin") to be the ocean carrier. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 5. Hanjin retained Sea-Land Service, Inc. ("Sea-land") as the terminal operator and stevadore for its carrier. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 2.
The machinery was packed in skidded wooden crates and secured on ocean flat rack containers. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 6. The flat rack containers were then transported and delivered to the Sea-land Terminal in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 7. At the time that the shipment was delivered to the Sea-land Terminal, Sea-land's receiving clerk executed a dock receipt for the containers. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 8. The dock receipt stated:
Received the above described goods or packages subject to all the terms and conditions of the undersigned's regular form of dock receipt and bill of lading which shall constitute the contract under which the goods are received, copies of which are available from the carrier on request and may be inspected at any of its offices.
See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 9; Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ["Pl.'s Aff."], dated Mar. 10, 2000, at Ex. 1. Below this language, the receipt has the words "For the Master," followed by a signature line for the "Receiving Clerk." See Pl.'s Aff. at Ex. 1. To the left of the receiving clerk's signature line, the receiving clerk stamped the receipt with a stamp that contained Sea-land's name, the word "Received," and the date. See id.
Prior to being loaded on the ship, while at the Sea-land Terminal, one of the flat rack containers, containing two skidded wooden crates, was damaged. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶¶ 3, 10. As a result of the damage, St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. ("plaintiff"), which had insured the shipment, paid $81,904.74 to GEM for its losses. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 1. Plaintiff then brought this action against defendants for recovery of the damages. Defendants Hanjin and Sea-land answered that if either or both of them are found liable for the damage to the cargo that their liability is limited to $500 per package, pursuant to the limitation of liability provision of Hanjin's bill of lading. See Pl.'s Stmnt at ¶ 4. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment arguing that defendants Hanjin and Sea-land are not entitled, as a matter of law, to a limitation of liability based on Hanjin's bill of lading. Defendants cross-moved for partial summary judgment that their liability is limited as a matter of law.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, a court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d. Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party therefore must show that there are no such genuine issues of material fact to be tried, and that she or he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Citizens Bank v. Hunt, 927 F.2d 707, 710 (2d Cir. 1991). The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," which includes identifying the materials in the record that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue to be tried. See id. Although the court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citations omitted). If the party has set forth sufficient facts to substantiate the elements of the claim, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
B. Liability
The Court finds that genuine disputes of material fact over whether Hanjin's bill of lading governs Hanjin's and Sea- land's liability for the pre-loading accident preclude summary judgment in this case. The parties agree that no bill of lading was issued for the cargo and that the governing document is the dock receipt that was issued when Sea-land received the cargo at its terminal. Such a dock receipt can make the provisions of an unissued bill of lading govern the liability of a stevadore, if the dock receipt indicates that the parties intend to incorporate the terms of the bill of lading into the dock receipt. See Berkshire Knitting Mills v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 846, 848 (S.D.N Y 1965) (citations omitted); accord Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 1990 WL 3926, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16). However, there is a dispute over whether such an agreement existed in this case. Defendants argue that the language in the dock receipt indicates that the liability for the damage that occurred on the dock prior to the loading of the ship is governed by the terms and conditions of Hanjin's regular form of bill of lading. The dock receipt refers to the "undersigned," which defendants argue refers to the signature block which is set up "For the Master", which they argue refers to the Master of the Hanjin vessel. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the liability is not limited by the terms and conditions of Hanjin's bill of lading. Plaintiff argues that the dock receipt is not clear as to whose regular bill of lading terms were incorporated by the language of the dock receipt. Plaintiff argues that Sea-land is the party that stamped on the signature line and therefore represents "the undersigned." According to plaintiff, the dock receipt either incorporated Sea-land's bill of lading or the meaning of the agreement is ambiguous. In support of its position, plaintiff points to both the language of the agreement in the dock receipt and the testimony of Hanjin's general manager, Carmine Ruggiero, who stated in a deposition that the document "doesn't specifically identify who the undersigned is." See Statement of John A. Orzel, dated Mar. 27, 2000, at Ex. B (77:15-16). The Court finds that the resolution of this dispute is best left to the finder of fact.
The Court also finds that this dispute over which party's bill of lading governs liability is material because Hanjin's and Sea-land's bills of lading set forth different provisions that would affect the amount of liability in the action. Defendants argue that Hanjin's bill of lading applies the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. § 1301, et. seq., liability limitations to stevadore and terminal operators; while plaintiff argues that Sea-land's bill of lading does not extend COGSA to the pre-loading accident at issue in this case.
III. Conclusion
Because a dispute exists over which party's bill of lading applies and because the dispute is material, the Court denies both parties' motions for partial summary judgment. The Court directs the parties to submit a joint pre-trial order by March 21, 2001. This case shall be deemed ready for trial on March 22, 2001.
SO ORDERED