Opinion
CASE NO. 5:09 CV 0827, CASE NO. 5:06 CR 0239.
June 22, 2009
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Michael Lashawn Spragling's motion pursuant to U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct Petitioner's sentence of 262 months imprisonment. ECF 304. The United States of America opposes. ECF 308. Respondent has not replied. For the reasons discussed infra Petitioner's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2006, a federal grand jury in Cleveland, Ohio returned an indictment charging Petitioner and others with various drug, firearm, and money laundering offenses. Specifically, Petitioner was charged with:
Count 1: conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B);
Count 2: conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and 1 kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A);
Count 3: engaging in a financial transaction with proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(I); and
Count 4: the unlawful possession of a prohibited firearm, that is a machine gun, not registered to the defendant under the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, in violation 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d) and 5871.
The indictment stemmed from an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation, directed by DEA-Akron. A Title III wiretap of Spragling's Nextel telephone produced evidence of Petitioner's involvement in marijuana and cocaine/heroin trafficking. On April 5, 2006, $104,040 in U.S. currency was retrieved from a vehicle occupied by Petitioner and others during a "drive-by" surveillance of the "The Spot," the location believed by investigators to be a stash location for drugs and money. Thereafter, OCDETF investigators seized personal documents relating to Petitioner, an additional $32,000 in U.S. currency, two heat sealers with plastic bags, blue painter's tape identical to that found around the money in the vehicle, a STEN-type machine gun and silencer, five additional firearms and ammunition, and a bullet proof vest.
On October 2, 2006, Petitioner's jury trial commenced before this Court. The following day (October 3, 2006), Petitioner entered guilty pleas to all four charged counts pursuant to a written plea agreement. ( See Appendix 1, outlining ECF 132: Plea Agreement at pages 8-19). The written plea agreement applied a total offense level of 38. The government agreed to recommend a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility to level 36. The parties agreed that the Court could consider the appropriateness of a three level reduction under the totality of the circumstances.
At the outset of the proceedings before this Court, Petitioner was represented by Attorneys Robert C. Meeker and Michael B. Bowler. On November 2, 2006, Attorneys Meeker and Bowler filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel after being discharged by Petitioner. On December 5, 2006, this Court granted the motion to withdraw, and appointed Roger K. Davidson as new counsel for Petitioner.
On December 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se letter/motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On December 14, 2006, this Court denied Petitioner's motion to withdraw the pleas. On December 19, 2006, Davidson was replaced newly retained counsel, Paul F. Adamson.
On December 27, 2006, Petitioner's sentencing hearing was conducted. The revised Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), dated December 22, 2006, contained offense level calculations consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, except that it did not grant Petitioner a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The PSR further found Petitioner to be a criminal history II for total offense level of 38. The PSR indicated Petitioner's advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) range to be 262-327 months. This Court sentenced Petitioner to 262 months incarceration, five years of supervised release following imprisonment, and a $400 special assessment. On January 11, 2007, Attorney Adamson filed a notice of appeal of the judgment entry of conviction and sentencing entered on January 2, 2007 on behalf of Petitioner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's appeal. See United States v. Spragling, 279 Fed. Appx. 370, 2008 WL 2224807 (6th Cir. 2008).
On or about April 9, 2009, Spragling filed a motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
In support of Petitioner's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Petitioner raises three issues. First, Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that defense counsel failed to ensure that petitioner received and reviewed a copy of the PSR report in a timely manner. Second, Petitioner argues defense counsel failed to present credible evidence to the Court showing that petitioner was not part of the conspiracy that the government charged in the indictment. Third, Petitioner argues defense counsel failed to raise Petitioner's sentencing issue on appeal, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Petitioner's sixth amendment rights.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Two components must be met before granting a convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient which requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That is, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Lockart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993); accord United States v. Cox, 826 F.2d 1518, 1525 (6th Cir. 1987). Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, producing a result that is unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687.
In regard to the first component articulated in Strickland, scrutiny of defense counsel's performance must be "highly deferential." A reviewing court must ensure that "every effort is made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. Accordingly, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978). Therefore, the petitioner bears the heavy burden of proving that his counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not considered strategy. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986).
As to the second component, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Consequently, relief does not necessarily follow under Strickland when a defendant is able to overcome the "highly deferential" presumption of adequate assistance.
1. Petitioner's first claim presented in support of a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fails to demonstrate that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require a reversal of his conviction.
In this case, Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that defense counsel failed to ensure that petitioner received and reviewed a copy of the PSR report in a timely manner. Petitioner received a copy of his PSR on the day of sentencing. Petitioner argues that he did not have adequate time to review and object to the PSR, and that had more time been given he could have "prepared a much more thorough and complete challenge" to the PSR's inaccuracies.
However, Petitioner fails to identify the inaccuracies, and also fails to establish they had any effect on his sentence. At sentencing, Petitioner affirmatively stated that he had reviewed the PSR. Moreover, Petitioner failed to make an objection about having inadequate time to review or object to material in the PSR. Nor did Petitioner attempt to make any corrections to the PSR.
Petitioner fails to meet either prong of the standard articulated in Strickland. First, "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Attorney Adamson filed a comprehensive set of objections to the PSR, which were included in the revised PSR and challenged the criminal conduct attributed to Petitioner, as well as the resulting U.S.S.G. sentencing computation. The objections raised by Attorney Adamson in regard to the PSR fall "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; Catches, 582 F.2d at 453.
Even if Petitioner could establish the first prong of the standard articulated in Strickland, Petitioner also has the burden of satisfying the second prong of the test set forth in Strickland for his claim to succeed. Under the second prong, a petitioner must prove that he was prejudiced by the conduct of defense counsel. Here, Petitioner must prove that he was prejudiced by the sentencing court's reliance on erroneous information. See, e.g., United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1987); Inzone v. United States, 707 F. Supp., 107, 110-111 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). However, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that any erroneous information was included in the PSR, and therefore fails to meet the second prong of the test articulated in Strickland. Therefore, the first issue raised by Petitioner in support of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion fails to pass muster under the first and second prongs of the two-part test articulated in Strickland.
2. Petitioner's second claim presented in support of a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fails to demonstrate that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require a reversal of his conviction.
Petitioner argues that his counsel, Attorney Adamson, failed to present credible evidence to the Court showing that Petitioner was not part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Again, Petitioner fails to meet either prong of the standard articulated in Strickland.
To prevail on this second claim under the first prong of Strickland, "the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. After Petitioner admitted to the criminal conduct in the written plea agreement and during the plea colloquy, and this Court did not permit a withdrawal of the plea, there was no longer an opportunity for Attorney Adamson to present evidence to the court showing that petitioner was not part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. A defendant "[o]rdinarily . . . is stuck with the representations that he makes in open court at the time of the plea." United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 351 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir. 2003).
Nevertheless, Attorney Adamson attempted to no avail on appeal to vacate the conviction and/or obtain a re-sentencing of Petitioner. Additionally, Attorney Adamson objected to paragraphs 12-24 of the PSR in which the Probation Officer summarized Petitioner's criminal conduct. In regard to this second claim, the objections raised by Attorney Adamson in regard to the PSR and the appeal he sought were "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; Catches, 582 F.2d at 453. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing "to present credible evidence to the Court showing that defendant was not part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment" fails to meet the first prong set forth in Strickland.
The result of the proceeding could not be expected to have been different even if Attorney Adamson had produced more evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner was not part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment because the plea agreement was voluntarily given and with no other infirmity. ( See Appendix 1, outlining ECF 132: Plea Agreement at pages 8-19). Therefore, Petitioner fails to meet the second prong of the test articulated in Strickland and his second claim fails.
3. Petitioner's third claim presented in support of a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fails to demonstrate that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require a reversal of his conviction.
Petitioner argues that defense counsel's failure to raise petitioner's sentencing issue on appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Rights. Petitioner argues that Amendment 709 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, effective November 1, 2007, removed his 2003 conviction for non-support of dependents from the classification of offenses for which a "criminal history point" could be assessed. Petitioner argues that as a result of this amendment, the two points assessed under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 for committing the instant offense while under a criminal sentence (probation) should be eliminated. Consequently, Petitioner claims that had counsel appealed this issue, it would have resulted in making him a Criminal History Category I (235-293 months) instead of Criminal Category II (262-327 months).
To satisfy the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland, a petitioner must prove that he was prejudiced by the conduct of defense counsel. That is, in order to be entitled to relief, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
In regard to this third claim, Attorney Adamson has made no such errors. The amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 went into effect after Petitioner's sentencing. Although the amendment went into effect during the pendency of Petitioner's appeal, it was not made retroactive. Moreover, Amendment 709 only affects "some misdemeanor and petty offenses," not Petitioner's fifth degree felony non-support conviction. Therefore, Attorney Adamson was not professionally deficient in failing to raise this issue on appeal. See generally Wilson v. McMacken, 786 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1986).
Because Amendment 709 is not retroactive, Petitioner's claim fails to satisfy the second prong of Strickland because he cannot "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Yet, Attorney Adamson did assert several viable arguments on appeal which would have resulted in a reduced sentence for Petitioner had he prevailed. Attorney Adamson's arguments were the following: (1) the trial court erred in determining the applicable guideline range at sentence by failing to award a reduction for Petitioner's Acceptance of Responsibility; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was unreasonable and greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although rejected by the Sixth Circuit, the arguments made by Attorney Adamson fall "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; Catches, 582 F.2d at 453. Therefore, Petitioner does not meet the burden of proving that his counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381. Nor does Petitioner demonstrate that but for the alleged unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
III. CONCLUSION
Petitioner's three claims supporting his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his 262 month prison sentence fail to satisfy the two-part test articulated in Strickland. First, Petitioner has failed to prove that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. Second, at no point in Petitioner's three claims is it demonstrated that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, producing a result that is unreliable. Id. Therefore, Petitioner's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.
The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Entry to the Petitioner at his address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX 1 WAIVER OF APPEAL, DEFENSES, AND COLLATERAL ATTACK RIGHTS
16. The defendant acknowledges having been advised by counsel of his rights, in limited circumstances, to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally through a post-conviction proceeding, including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The defendant expressly waives those rights except that the defendant reserves the right to appeal his Criminal History Category, and any sentence to the extent it exceeds the maximum of the sentencing range determined under the advisory sentencing guidelines as contemplated in this plea agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall act as a bar to the defendant perfecting any legal remedies he may otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack respecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.17. In the event the defendant's guilty pleas are withdrawn, rejected, vacated, or reversed at any time, the United States will be free to prosecute the defendant for all charges of which it has knowledge. In such event, the defendant waives any objections, motions, or defenses based upon the Statute of Limitations, the Speedy Trial Act, or constitutional restrictions on bringing charges.
FACTUAL BASIS FOR GUILTY PLEA
18. The defendant agrees that if this matter were to proceed to trial, the United States through Court authorized Title III wiretap interceptions, witnesses, and other tangible evidence could prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment and that these facts accurately outline his readily provable offense conduct:
Count 1
A. During a period from April 2005, to January 2006, the exact dates being unknown, in the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, Jamie Del Rio, and others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire and agree to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).
B. In furtherance of the goals thereof, and to conceal the existence of the conspiracy, the defendant and others performed overt acts including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) On or about April 4, 2005, at 1613 Maxen Avenue, Akron, Ohio, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING possessed approximately 19 pounds of marijuana (one bale and at least 4 pounds packaged in individual gallon freezer bags) which was contained within a 55 gallon barrel. In addition, there were three other identical — but empty — barrels at the location, empty marijuana bale wrappings, over 25 boxes of gallon freezer bags, and three scales.
(2) On or about October 23, 2005, at approximately 7:51 p.m., in a telephone conversation, Jonathan Foreman and Jamie Del Rio referenced MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING. Del Rio stated that a shipment of marijuana would be forthcoming in about two weeks.
(3) On or about December 21, 2005, at approximately 6:32 p.m., in a telephone conversation, Jamie Del Rio and MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING discussed a shipment of marijuana that Del Rio would send for arrival in Ohio a day or two after New Years.
(4) On or about January 1, 2006, at approximately 7:58 p.m., in a telephone conversation, Jamie Del Rio informed MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING that "the girls" (marijuana) will be sent on Monday, and will be in Ohio on Friday or Monday at the latest.
(5) On or about January 7, 2006, at approximately 9:26 p.m., in a telephone conversation, Jonathon Foreman and MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING discussed obtaining a U-Haul truck, "not in either one of our names . . . that would come back to us or whatever, in case anything would ever happen."
(6) On or about January 7, 2006, at approximately 9:31 p.m., in a telephone conversation, Jamie Del Rio told MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING that he (Del Rio) explained the details of the marijuana shipment to Jonathan Foreman. Del Rio added that his people have a California Drivers License and they needed someone to rent a U-Haul truck in Ohio.
(7) On or about January 10, 2006, a U-Haul truck rented to "Henry Spragling" was present at Watkins Motor Freight Lines, Garfield Heights, Ohio.
(8) On or about January 10, 2006, at Watkins Motor Freight Lines, Garfield Heights, Ohio, law enforcement seized approximately 455 pounds of marijuana in three 55 gallon barrels and one 40 gallon barrel. Subsequent intercepted telephone calls confirmed the marijuana to be the shipment from Del Rio to MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING.
Count 2
A. During a period beginning at least as early as February, 2005, to April 2006, in the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, Jonathon Foreman, Anthony Groce, Jerome Spragling, Reginald Johnson, and others, did knowingly and intentionally conspire and agree to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). It was part of the conspiracy that MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING arranged to have cocaine and heroin "imported" into Akron, Ohio, from California/Mexico, for distribution to other persons.
B. In furtherance of the goals thereof, and to conceal the existence of the conspiracy, the defendant and others performed overt acts including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) From at least late 2004/early 2005 to the Spring of 2006, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING regularly received multi-kilograms shipments of cocaine and amounts of heroin from/through Joe Diaz for further distribution.
(2) During 2005, Jonathon Foreman obtained a total of at least 20 kilograms of cocaine from MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, which was then distributed to various persons from Akron and East Liverpool, Ohio.
(3) In September and October of 2005, law enforcement seized 3 kilograms of cocaine which Jonathon Foreman had delivered to third parties in Akron, Ohio.
(4) On October 18, 2005, law enforcement purchased 1/4 kilogram of cocaine from Jonathon Foreman. Shortly before the transaction was consummated, Foreman telephonically contacted ("chirped") MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING with regard to the distribution. Immediately prior to the transaction being consummated, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING arrived at the location in his green Chevrolet Tahoe. Foreman met with SPRAGLING in the Tahoe, before walking directly to the cooperating witness and delivering the 1/4 kilogram of cocaine.
(5) On December 7, 2006, at approximately 11:01 am, in an intercepted telephone conversation (Session No. 1423), Anthony D. Groce and Michael Lashawn Spragling discussed the amount of money made from a cocaine transaction on December 6, 2005.
(6) On December 10, 2005, at approximately 2:07 p.m., in a intercepted telephone conversation, Joe Diaz asked MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING if he wanted one kilogram or two kilograms of heroin. Diaz stated he'd see SPRAGLING in a couple of days.
(7) On December 14, 2005, at approximately 12:19 pm, in an intercepted telephone conversation (Session Nos. 2701-03), Anthony D. Groce and MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING discussed an amount of money Groce owed SPRAGLING for a previous cocaine transaction. Groce told SPRAGLING that he currently was holding an eighth kilogram of cocaine plus 4 single ounces of cocaine that previously was provided by SPRAGLING.
(8) On December 15, 2005, "Bobo" (Robert Giovanni Flores) met with MICHAEL SPRAGLING at Akron, Ohio, and received from him $26,084.00 in U.S. currency which was proceeds of unlawful drug trafficking in cocaine and/or heroin.
(9) On December 19, 2005, law enforcement seized $212,860.00 from Robert Giovanni Flores in Cleveland, Ohio. [Note: the money was in a vehicle registered to Sarah Guidino.]
(10) On December 19, 2005, in a series of intercepted telephone conversations, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING and Joe Diaz discussed the seizure of the currency from "Bobo" (Flores). Diaz told SPRAGLING that he hadn't "recovered from last year's bull shit." [Note: In December of 2004, law enforcement in Missouri seized approximately $481,000 from a west bound vehicle registered to Sarah Guidino].
(11) On December 26, 2005, at approximately 4:16 pm, in an intercepted telephone conversation (Session Nos. 5597 and 5601), Anthony Groce informed MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING that Groce needed a quarter kilogram of cocaine for a customer.
(12) On April 5, 2006, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING left 153 The Brooklands, Akron, Ohio, in possession of $104,040 in U.S. Currency.
Count 3
(1) On December 15, 2005, "Bobo" (Robert Giovanni Flores) and MICHAEL SPRAGLING conducted a financial transaction at Akron, Ohio, in that Flores knowingly received from SPRAGLING $26,084.00 in U.S. currency which were proceeds of unlawful drug trafficking.
(2) MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING and Robert Flores conducted the financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, that is drug trafficking.
Count 4
(1) On or about the April 5, 2006, at 153 The Brooklands, Akron, Ohio, shortly after MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING left the premises with $104,040.00 in U.S. currency, law enforcement seized a firearm as defined in 26 USC 5845(a), to wit, a (homemade) 9 mm. Sten-type machinegun, no serial number, with silencer, as well as other personal items belonging to MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, who knowingly possessed the firearm at that location. The unlawful characteristics of the firearm were confirmed by testing conducted by an ATF Firearms Examiner.
(2) The National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record does not reflect registration of that firearm to MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING.
The defendant, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, acknowledges that the above outline of his conduct does not set forth each and every act he committed in furtherance of the offenses to which he is pleading GUILTY, and that the government could prove other acts evidencing his criminal conduct.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
19. The defendant, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, acknowledges that his offer to plead guilty is freely and voluntarily made and that no threats, promises, or representations have been made, nor agreements reached, other than those set forth in this agreement, to induce him to plead guilty. The defendant further declares that he is not now on or under the influence of any drug, medication, liquor, or other intoxicant or depressant, which would impair his ability to fully understand the terms and conditions of the plea agreement.
20. The defendant, MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING, further acknowledges that he has discussed this case and the plea agreement with his attorneys in detail and has been advised by his attorneys of the constitutional and other rights of an accused, the factual basis for and the nature of the offenses to which the guilty pleas will be entered, possible defenses, and the consequences of the guilty pleas, including sentencing ramifications. The defendant further declares that he is fully satisfied with the effort, assistance and counsel provided by his attorneys.
21. The defendant and his legal counsel further acknowledge that no assurances, promises, or representations have been given by the United States or by any of its representatives which are not contained in this written agreement. This plea agreement sets forth the full and complete terms and conditions of the agreement between the defendant and the government.12-3-06 Michael spragling
____ Date MICHAEL LASHAWN SPRAGLING Defendant