Opinion
97 CIV 4661 (RCC)
June 6, 2001
Opinion
Elena Spina ("Plaintiff") brought this case pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1967, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq., alleging sexual harassment against Our Lady of Mercy Medical Center ("OLMC"), Percy Sajid ("Sajid"), and Kathryn DeVito ("DeVito"), (collectively "Defendants"). Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery in connection with her lawsuit. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks discovery relating to other incidents of alleged sexual harassment, including information concerning the termination of Arkady Shear ("Shear"), a former employee of OLMC. (Pl.'s Mem. at 1-2.) For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
The parties appeared before the Court for a status conference on July 30, 1999, at which time Plaintiff made the same request of the Court as forms the basis of this motion. At that time, the Court questioned the relevancy of the requested discovery, and denied Plaintiffs application. The Court permitted the parties to brief the issue for further review by the Court, resulting in the instant motion.
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is proper in federal court pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code Section 1331. Plaintiff's state law claims are properly in federal court based on pendant jurisdiction, pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code Section 1367. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued Plaintiff a Right to Sue letter, pursuant to Title VII, on June 6, 1997.
Background
Plaintiff was employed by OLMC as a night shift office clerk, from September 1995 until December, 1996. Defendant Sajid was the manager with supervisory authority over Plaintiff during her shift. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Sajid "deliberately and with [OLMC's] actual knowledge, continuously subjected Plaintiff [to] unwanted, unsolicited, and offensive conduct premised upon gender." (Comp. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff claims that she expressed her discomfort to Sajid and DeVito, who was the Director of Medical Records for OLMC and the employee in charge of personnel decisions at the time. She claims that DeVito advised her that such conduct by Sajid was cultural and that DeVito would take no action. As a result of Sajid's conduct, Plaintiff claims to be depressed, disabled and unable to work.
Arkady Shear was employed by OLMC in a variety of capacities for approximately six years. Shear's employment was terminated on March 29, 1994, approximately 18 months before Plaintiff was hired by OLMC in September 1995. Plaintiff alleges that Shear was discharged after OLMC's Human Resources Department investigated complaints of sexual harassment made by a female employee against him. Plaintiff seeks "[d]ocuments including but not limited to any complaints, statements, grievance forms, correspondence, memoranda, and notes related to events leading to and including the termination of Arkady Shear." (Pl.'s Mem. at 1-2.)
In support of Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not properly address alleged complaints about Shear prior to his termination. Plaintiff relies on information obtained from Linda Sikios ("Siklos"), Plaintiff's sister and a former supervisor in OLMC's Medical Records Department. Plaintiff alleges that Sikios and other unidentified complainants were the victims of harassment by Shear. Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court, directing Defendants to produce information regarding the reasons for Shear's termination, including whether his termination was a result of any alleged complaints about his behavior, and any OLMC procedures followed to effect his termination. Defendants object to such production.
Discussion
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. The Second Circuit clarified that the proper inquiry in determining whether "workplace harassment was severe or actionable depends on the totality of the circumstances." Cruz v. Coach Stores. Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000). The focus of the inquiry is "on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole." Id. In Burlington Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court held that an employer may be subject to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 765. The Court did offer employers an affirmative defense to a claim of vicarious liability if the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior, and if the plaintiff/employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm. Id. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to discover other instances of harassment by the same defendant, as well as by others, because the additional discovery may lead to admissible evidence which will demonstrate that "the defendant hospital's sexual harassment policy and procedures are inadequate," thus preventing Defendant OLMC from taking advantage of this affirmative defense. Plaintiff seeks to prove that Defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly sexually harassing behavior.
Defendants respond that the discovery sought by Plaintiff is overbroad and seeks irrelevant material. Defendants note that Spina and Shear never worked together at OLMC, and that Shear was discharged 18 months before Spina was ever hired. Defendants represent that they do not believe that Spina and Shear ever met or came in contact with one another while working at OLMC.
Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery is governed by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that any party:
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 26(b)(1). While the Supreme Court has mandated that Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) be construed broadly, see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978), courts should not allow parties to "roam in the shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so." Evans v. Calise, No. 92 Civ. 8430, 1995 WL 312468, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1995) (citations omitted). Here, this is exactly what Plaintiff appears to attempt to accomplish. While the law requires that the discovery sought must be "reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence" Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), Plaintiff's request in the instant matter is merely a fishing expedition. "Where a plaintiff fails to produce any specific facts whatsoever to support a[n] . . . allegation, a district court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit discovery . . ." Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
Here, Plaintiff fails to produce any specific facts to support the allegation that Defendants "failed in their duty to correct a sexually hostile work environment." (Pl.'s Mem. at 6.) In fact, the evidence that the Plaintiffs themselves proffer seems to indicate the opposite. Plaintiff and Defendants concede that Shear was terminated for sexual harassment. At the very least, this indicates that Defendants do, in fact, address sexual harassment complaints. Further, all Plaintiff offers in support of her suppositions is the testimony of Plaintiffs sister, who indicates that she had complained about Shear's conduct, but that "the managers failed to act on this complaint." Id. at 2. Siklos further indicated that other women may have made complaints though she was not able to identify other complainants. None of the allegations made by Siklos about Shear rises to the level of a "specific fact" and none of the allegations have any connection to this case.
OLMC has already provided Plaintiff with a copy of Mr. Sajid's disciplinary records and performance evaluations. OLMC has also provided Plaintiff with a copy of its policy against sexual harassment. Further, Defendants' witnesses have testified about other allegations of sexual harassment in Plaintiff's department, including an incident involving Mr. Sajid, which predated Plaintiff's employment with OLMC. The Court finds that Plaintiff has been provided with all required discovery that is relevant to her case, and has made no showing that the discovery sought is in any way relevant or necessary to her case. Furthermore, the Court finds that if the Court were to compel such a production, where there is no connection between the events of this case and the information sought, it could have a chilling effect on an employer's readiness and willingness to take action in harassment or discrimination cases, for fear of any documentation being used against them. This could contradict the purpose of the protections provided by Title VII and could diminish the effectiveness of anti-discrimination and antiharassment policies. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion to compel production of additional discovery is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.