Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-000466-MR
02-01-2013
REBEKAH SPENCE APPELLANT v. DAVID SPENCE APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Rebekah E. Spence (now Alcorn), Pro se Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Marie Brannon Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SQUIRE N. WILLIAMS JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-01370
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: NICKELL, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. VANMETER, JUDGE: Rebekah Spence appeals pro se from the Franklin Circuit Court order permitting David Spence to claim one of the parties' minor children as a dependent for 2010 federal and state tax purposes. Finding no abuse of discretion or error, we affirm.
During Rebekah's and David's marriage they had two daughters, Kayla and Raven. After filing for divorce, the parties entered into a mediation agreement which stated that "[Rebekah] will claim Raven as a dependent tax exemption in 2010, David will claim both children for the 2011 tax year, for 2012 onwards [Rebekah] will claim Raven and David will claim Kayla each year until Raven cannot be claimed, at which point the parties will alternate claiming Kayla." The parties were divorced and the mediation agreement was incorporated into the approved settlement agreement. On February 1, 2011, David moved the trial court to compel compliance with the mediation and settlement agreements, alleging that Rebekah had claimed Kayla as a dependent for the 2010 tax year, thereby preventing him from doing so. The trial court ordered that David be allowed to claim Kayla as a dependent for 2010 federal and state tax exemptions, including dependency exemption, earned income credit, and head of household. This appeal followed.
A provision that allows a parent to claim a child as dependent for tax purposes is considered by Kentucky courts as an element of maintenance or support. See Williams v. Williams, 554 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Ky. App. 1977). As such, a trial court has broad discretion to allocate tax exemptions between the parties. Marksberry v. Riley, 889 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. App. 1994). A trial court should "be guided in the exercise of its discretion by making an allocation which will best maximize the benefit of the exemption and the 'amount available for the care of the children.'" Pegler v. Pegler, 895 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ky. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Factual findings made in this determination are reviewed for clear error. CR 52.01.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rebekah first argues the trial court erred by finding that she claimed Kayla as a dependent. From our review of the record, the trial court did not make such a finding. David alleged that Rebekah had claimed Kayla as a dependent on her 2010 tax returns, thereby preventing him from doing so. After allocating the tax deduction to David, the trial court stated that if Rebekah claimed Kayla as a dependent on her 2010 tax returns, she would need to amend those returns to comply with the order. As a result, we find no merit to this claim of error.
Rebekah also argues the trial court abused its discretion by permitting David to claim the earned income credit for 2010. She claims the mediation and settlement agreements only provided for the parties to claim the children as dependent exemptions, and that the earned income credit should be treated separately. We do not read these prior agreements so narrowly. Rebekah was allowed to claim Raven as a dependent for the 2010 tax year per the mediation agreement. The trial court permitted David to do the same in regards to Kayla. Neither agreement specifically addressed earned income credit. Instead, the trial court exercised its discretion in ordering that David be allowed to claim earned income credit for 2010. Rebekah does not allege that any inequity or detriment to the children was caused by the trial court allocating the earned income credit to David for the 2010 tax year. As such, the allocation was not an abuse of discretion. See Brausch v. Brausch, 265 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Ky. App. 2008) (holding that allocation of dependency exemptions is left to the discretion of trial courts, which should seek to balance the equities between the parties).
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Rebekah E. Spence (now Alcorn),
Pro se
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Marie Brannon
Frankfort, Kentucky