In this amicable action for declaratory judgment, submitted on an agreed statement of facts, the trial court was asked to determine whether Fireman's Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey (Fireman's) was liable to its insured, Kenneth J. Sparler, for underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the insurance company, and Sparler appealed. We affirm.

The agreed statement of facts disclosed that Sparler had sustained personal injuries as a result of an intersectional, vehicular accident in which a vehicle operated by Thomas Garber had violated the mandate of a stop sign. Sparler's losses were in excess of forty thousand ($40,000.00) dollars. He settled his claim against Garber for twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars, this being the limit of the liability of Garber's insurance carrier under the terms of its policy. In connection with the settlement, Sparler and his wife executed a general release. Sparler then made a claim against Fireman's, his own insurance carrier, for underinsured motorist benefits. Fireman's denied liability. The parties thereafter commenced an amicable action for declaratory judgment, requesting the trial court to determine whether the insurance policy issued by Fireman's rendered it liable to Sparler for underinsurance benefits, and if so, whether the general release executed in connection with the third party settlement operated to bar Sparler's recovery of such benefits from his own insurance carrier. The trial court held that although the insurance policy did establish Sparler's right to recover underinsurance benefits, he was precluded from recovering the same because of the terms of the general release which he had executed when he settled his third party claim. Therefore, judgment was entered in favor of Fireman's.

On appeal, Sparler contends that because the general release which he had executed in favor of the third party tortfeasor was not intended to affect the contractual liability of Fireman's, the release could not operate to bar his recovery from Fireman's of underinsurance benefits. We agree with this contention.

Written releases are construed according to the rules governing the construction of contracts generally. 76 C.J.S. Release § 38 (1952). A release normally covers only such matters as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the release was given. Estate of Bodnar, 472 Pa. 383, 387, 372 A.2d 746, 748 (1977); In re Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 328 Pa. Super. 442, 456-457, 477 A.2d 527, 534 (1984); Gateway Center Corp. v. Merriam, 290 Pa. Super. 419, 425, 434 A.2d 823, 826 (1981). The intention of the parties to a written release is paramount, and in construing a release, a court should adopt an interpretation which, under all of the circumstances, "ascribes the most reasonable, probable and natural conduct of the parties, bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished." General Mills, Inc. v. Snavely, 203 Pa. Super. 162, 168, 199 A.2d 540, 543 (1964). See: Unit Vending Corp. v. Lacas, 410 Pa. 614, 617, 190 A.2d 298, 300 (1963); Village Beer and Beverage, Inc. v. Vernon D. Cox and Co., 327 Pa. Super. 99, 107, 475 A.2d 117, 121 (1984). Although a court will not relieve the parties of the effect of an improvident contract, it must not allow a "rigid literalness" to be used to create an improvident contract for the parties contrary to their intent. Mowry v. McWherter, 365 Pa. 232, 238, 74 A.2d 154, 158 (1950). Thus, the words of a release "should not be construed to extend beyond the express consideration mentioned so as to make a release for the parties which they never intended or contemplated." Brill's Estate, 337 Pa. 525, 527, 12 A.2d 50, 52 (1940). See: Furtek v. West Deer Township, 19 Pa. D.. C.2d 169, 178, aff'd, 191 Pa. Super. 405, 156 A.2d 581, 585 (1959).

The general release executed by Sparler and his wife in the instant case provided as follows:

That we Kenneth Sparler and Jane Sparler, . . . for the sole consideration of Twenty-Five Thousand dollars ($25,000.00), to us in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby jointly and severally acknowledged, have remised, released, and forever discharged and . . . do hereby remise, release and forever discharge Thomas H. Garber and his . . . successors and assigns . . . and all other persons, firms, and corporations, of and from any and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature, arising from or by reason of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, loss and damage to property, and the consequences thereof, resulting, and to result, from an accident which happened on or about the 30th day of April 1983. . . .

These terms were contained in a standard release form. In the blank space provided on the form for the name of the party being released and discharged, the name "Thomas H. Garber" had been inserted. Although the phrase "and all other persons, firms and corporations" appeared in boiler-plate print following Garber's name, the release did not otherwise suggest or identify Fireman's as a party being released or discharged. The only reasonable interpretation of the release, when it is considered in light of the circumstances surrounding its execution, is that Sparler did not intend to release Fireman's from its contractual obligation. Fireman's was not a party to the release, did not negotiate to reduce any obligations which it might have had under the policy, and paid no consideration to be released from any such contractual obligations. To interpret the release as discharging Fireman's alleged contractual obligations, under these circumstances, would be to insert a benefit for which no separate consideration was paid and which does not appear to have been within the contemplation of the parties.

The trial court's broad interpretation of Sparler's general release was based upon a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorenzo v. General Motors Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.Pa. 1971), appeal dismissed, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). Dorenzo, however, is inapposite to the instant case. There, the party claiming the benefit of the general release was a joint tortfeasor whose alleged liability, like that of the released party, had been premised on a single tortious injury to the plaintiff. Here, however, the party seeking to benefit from the general release is an insurer whose contractual liability is separate and apart from the tortious liability of the released tortfeasor.

This is an important distinction. It was recognized both in Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co., 658 P.2d 863, 39 A.L.R.4th 366 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) and in Bailey v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 497 S.W.2d 816 (Mo.Ct.App. 1973). In Cingoranelli, the plaintiff had been injured when the car in which she was a passenger collided with an automobile driven by Bertha Betonski. The driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff had been riding was insured by St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. (St. Paul). After the plaintiff had agreed to settle her claim for bodily injury against Betonski, the following release was executed:

"I, Mary Cingoranelli, . . . for the sole consideration of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), to me in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have remised, released, and forever discharged, and . . . do hereby remise, release, and forever discharge, Bertha Betonski and . . . her . . . successors and assigns . . . and all other persons, firms, and corporations, of and from any and all claims, demands, rights, or causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature, arising from or by reason of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries, damage to property, and the consequences thereof, resulting, or to result, from a certain accident which happened on or about the 7th day of April 1975, for which I have claimed the said Bertha Betonski to be legally liable, which liability is hereby expressly denied."

Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co., supra 658 P.2d at 864 (emphasis added). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed personal injury protection (PIP) claims against St. Paul under Colorado's no-fault insurance statute. When St. Paul refused payment, the plaintiff commenced an action to recover the PIP benefits. The trial court held that the release of the tortfeasor operated as a total bar to all claims, including that for PIP benefits against St. Paul. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, observing that the plaintiff's PIP claims against St. Paul were "fundamentally distinct in character" from her tort claim against Betonski. Id. 658 P.2d at 868. The PIP claim, the Court noted, was a direct contractual claim against the PIP insurer. Id. 658 P.2d at 867. The only similarities between this claim and the tort claim, the Court said, were purely coincidental; they both arose from an automobile accident, and the ultimate financial responsibility for both rested with St. Paul. Id. 658 P.2d at 868. Therefore, the Court held, "an automobile accident victim's general release of a tortfeasor, in the absence of a specific provision which unequivocally includes PIP claims within the terms of the release, does not operate to release an automobile insurer from its obligation to pay PIP benefits to the injured victim." Id. 658 P.2d at 869.

The plaintiff in Bailey also had been injured as a result of an automobile collision. The plaintiff's medical expenses as a result of the accident were covered by a policy of insurance which had been purchased by her mother from Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (Aetna). Aetna was notified of the collision and of the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff but refused to make payment. Meanwhile, the plaintiff executed a general release in which the driver of the other vehicle and "any and all other persons, firms and corporations" were discharged from "any and all claims, actions, causes of action and expense" arising out of the accident. Aetna thereafter argued that as a result of the general release of the driver, it had been discharged from its obligation to pay the plaintiff's medical expenses. The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the release had not relieved Aetna of its contractual obligation. Recognizing that the intention of the parties was the ultimate test for determining the effect of a release, the Court analyzed the facts underlying the execution of the instrument.

Aetna was not a party to the litigation giving rise to the Release nor was it privy to the defendant tort-feasors. Its obligation to pay medical expenses to Jacquelyn Bailey [the plaintiff] was then in dispute and her claim in the litigation was not only against different persons but was also in tort as distinguished from the present claim on contract asserted against Aetna.

Bailey v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., supra at 820. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded, "[i]t would require a degree of judicial agility of which we are incapable, to read into this Release any intention on the part of plaintiff to release her claim for medical expenses against Aetna under its policy of insurance." Id.

We find the reasoning followed in Cingoranelli and Bailey to be persuasive and, therefore, we adopt it as our own. We conclude that in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, a general release of a third party tortfeasor will not be held to discharge the separate contractual obligation of an insurance carrier to provide underinsurance benefits.

In the instant case, the general release executed by Sparler in favor of the third party tortfeasor did not contain language unequivocally discharging Fireman's from its alleged contractual obligation to provide underinsurance coverage to Sparler. Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court, any right to underinsurance benefits which Sparler might have acquired by virtue of the contract was not relinquished by the release which he had executed in favor of the third party tortfeasor.

Although the trial court's reasoning regarding the release was incorrect, it does not follow that its order disallowing the recovery of underinsurance benefits must be reversed. We are required to affirm the judgment entered by the trial court if it was correct for any reason. E.J. McAleer Co. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 613 n. 4, 381 A.2d 441, 443 n. 4 (1977); Gwinn v. Kane, 465 Pa. 269, 279 n. 12, 348 A.2d 900, 905 n. 12 (1975); Green v. Juneja, 337 Pa. Super. 460, 464 n. 5, 487 A.2d 36, 39 n. 5 (1985); Emerick v. Carson, 325 Pa. Super. 308, 316 n. 2, 472 A.2d 1133, 1137 n. 2 (1984).

Fireman's argued in the trial court and again on appeal that Sparler was not entitled to underinsurance benefits under the terms of its policy. The trial court concluded, however, that there was coverage and that Sparler was entitled to recover the difference between his expenses of forty thousand ($40,000.00) dollars and the twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars which he was able to recover from the third party tortfeasor. The amount of this difference, of course, was fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars. This requires that we examine the terms of the policy.

Part 6 of the policy issued by Fireman's provided for "Uninsured (and Underinsured) Motorist" coverage. The amount of the coverage provided was fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars for each person and thirty thousand ($30,000.00) dollars for each accident. The policy provided:

By "uninsured motor vehicle" we mean a land motor vehicle . . .

(a) with no bodily injury liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident.

(b) with minimum legal liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident as required by law governing the insured auto. However, the minimum is less than the Limit of Coverage of Part 6.

(c) With a bodily injury liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident which is less than the minimum legal Limit of Coverage where the insured auto is principally garaged.

Another provision pertaining to underinsured motorist coverage is found in Subdivision D of Part 6 as follows:

Any amounts payable under Part 6 shall be reduced by all sums (a) paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of someone who may be liable.

Subparagraph (a) of the definitional section by its terms has application to an "uninsured" motor vehicle and not to a vehicle which is "underinsured." It is subparagraphs (b) and (c), rather, which refer to a third party vehicle which, although insured, is underinsured. The third party vehicle was not "underinsured" according to subparagraph (b), because, as the parties have agreed, Sparler received from the third party tortfeasor's insurance carrier a sum greater than the "Limit of Coverage of Part 6" of the Fireman's policy. Because the parties have not stipulated as to the place where the third party vehicle was "principally garaged," however, we are unable to know whether that vehicle, although insured, was underinsured within the meaning of subparagraph (c).

By thus interpreting the policy, we do not suggest that the terms "uninsured" and "underinsured" can be used interchangeably. We conclude merely that where, as here, the expressed intent of the parties to an insurance contract is to subsume the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" within a contractual provision which purports to define "uninsured motor vehicle," it is necessary to look to that provision in order to ascertain the meaning of the term "underinsured motor vehicle." The policy issued by Fireman's specifically states that "[t]he term uninsured motor vehicle also includes an underinsured motor vehicle." Because the term underinsured motor vehicle is not otherwise defined in Part 6 of the policy, it is necessary to turn for guidance to the definitional section for an "uninsured motor vehicle." That provision contains two subsections, (b) and (c), which obviously do not describe an uninsured motor vehicle, but which provide generally accepted definitions of underinsurance.
The language of a contract should be given its ordinary and usual meaning unless it is clear that some other meaning was intended by the parties. D'Orazio v. Masciantonio, 345 Pa. 428, 432, 29 A.2d 43, 45 (1943); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wilson, 337 Pa. 333, 338, 10 A.2d 422, 423 (1940); Rothstein v. Aetna Insurance Co., 216 Pa. Super. 418, 423, 268 A.2d 233, 235 (1970). No provision within a contract is to be treated as surplusage or redundant if any reasonable meaning consistent with the other parts can be given to it. See: General Mills, Inc. v. Snavely, 203 Pa. Super. 162, 168, 199 A.2d 540, 544 (1964). Moreover, legal terms of art, as well as common words of accepted usage, are not to be construed in a manner which would render contractual provisions internally inconsistent. See: Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1013 (3d Cir. 1980).
The insurance policy in the instant case was certainly intended to provide underinsurance coverage. According to the terms of the agreement, the definition of underinsured motor vehicles was subsumed in the definition of uninsured motor vehicles. To conclude that the policy does not define underinsurance merely because it fails to contain a separate definitional section for "underinsured motor vehicles," would not only be contrary to the expressed intent of the parties, but would make meaningless surplusage of subsections (b) and (c) and of the contractual provision which states: "The term uninsured motor vehicle also includes an underinsured motor vehicle." By looking to the definitional provision for uninsured motor vehicles to ascertain the meaning of the term "underinsured motor vehicle," we are able to interpret the contractual provisions of Part 6 with internal consistency.

Still, it is clear that Sparler in fact was paid the sum of twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars by or on behalf of the third party tortfeasor. According to the provision contained in Subdivision D of the policy, the twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars received by Sparler by or on behalf of the third party tortfeasor must be set off against any amount payable by virtue of the "Uninsured (and Underinsured) Motorist" coverage provided in Part 6 of the policy. When the twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollar recovery is set off against the fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars which Fireman's agreed to pay to Sparler pursuant to Section 6, it becomes evident that Fireman's has no further liability for underinsured motorist coverage.

We conclude, therefore, that Sparler's claim for underinsured motorist coverage has been precluded not because of the terms of the third party release which he executed, as the trial court concluded, but by the very terms of the policy itself. Because Sparler's third party recovery was in excess of and had to be set off against the underinsured motorist coverage provided by Fireman's policy, the judgment entered in favor of Fireman's was proper and must be affirmed.

The trial court also denied recovery on the grounds that Sparler had settled with the third party tortfeasor without Fireman's consent. Such consent was required by a clause in the policy which provided: "We do not cover . . . (d) any person if that person . . . settles the bodily injury claim without our written consent." In light of our disposition of this case, we need not review the propriety of the court's determination of this issue. We observe, however, that the trial court was not asked by the parties in the action for declaratory judgment to decide this issue. Moreover, the stipulation of facts fails to contain sufficient facts to permit a determination. The statement of agreed facts submitted by the parties to the trial court does not disclose whether Fireman's consented to the third party settlement, or whether, if not, Fireman's was prejudiced by Sparler's settlement of his third party action for policy limits. See: Roberts v. Fireman's Insurance Co. of Newark, 376 Pa. 99, 101 A.2d 747 (1954) (release of third party tortfeasor may discharge insurer if the release defeats or impairs insurer's right of subrogation; a key consideration in determining liability is whether insurer had knowledge of release). See also: Bradford v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 213 Pa. Super. 8, 245 A.2d 748 (1968); Murphy Co. v. Manufacturers' Casualty Co., 89 Pa. Super. 281 (1926).

Affirmed.

POPOVICH, J., files a concurring opinion.

JOHNSON, J., files a concurring opinion in which CAVANAUGH, J., joins.

DEL SOLE, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

POVICH, Judge, concurring:

I concur only in the result, for I believe the Majority has gone astray in its analysis.

The scope of contractual accountability has been recently expounded upon by our Supreme Court in Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983). There, the high court unequivocally wrote that where the terms of an agreement are clear, precise and free from doubt, the signators are bound by its language.

Instantly, Sparler signed a release, in exchange for $25,000 received from a third party tortfeasor, which contained language exonerating not only the third party from further liability but insulated "all other persons, firms and corporations" from exposure because of the execution of the release.

Sparler, being a party to the agreement, could have very easily deleted the language which precipitated the instant declaratory judgment. His failure to excise the wording is now being condoned and viewed with favor by this Court as a mere adoption of a position espoused by two of our sister states distinguishing contractual liability from tortious liability as the foundation for holding the insurer liable because of not being a party to or a beneficiary of the agreement. But for the conclusion that the insurer's set-off clause rendering payment to the plaintiff unnecessary, the insurer would be held responsible for payment.

I find the issue to be a straightforward one. The contract signed by Sparler is not unenforceable because of either a latent or patent ambiguity. Nor is there an allegation that a mistake of fact induced the plaintiff to sign the instrument in question.

To side-step the obligations flowing from the contract, in the face of an otherwise lucid agreement, would be contrary to established principles of contract law requiring that an individual be bound by the terms of an agreement, i.e., pacta sunt servanta. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, Vol. 2, at page 309; Standard Venetian Blind, supra.

Moreover, the Majority's approach to giving effect to the release, save for the verbiage relating to "firms and corporations" being insulated from further liability, is the equivalent of giving only partial effect to the terms of the entire agreement and renders the quoted language pure surplusage. There is no indication that such was the intent of the plaintiff. To do so is mere speculation and surmise.

If a portion of the release is to be neutralized on the ground that it was not the intent of the plaintiff to excuse the insurer from responsibility for paying a claim filed by the plaintiff following the signing of a release, then such a rationale carried to its logical conclusion should hold the entire agreement invalid and not merely portions of it.

To this writer, the agreement contains verbiage which encompasses the insurer and, thus, should be given its clear, unambiguous and lucid meaning. Resorting to the intent of the parties is only necessary where the language to the agreement is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. See Corbin on Contracts § 538.

Further, the Majority attempts to avoid the obvious consequences of the release by arguing that the insurer was not a party to its terms and, therefore, should not be considered to have been a beneficiary of the release. However, the insured's ability to subrogate the claim would be precluded by the release signed by Sparler, an interest which surely would not be advanced by our holding this day, and is ameliorated only by the fact that Sparler's recovery under the release forecloses his recoupment of any additional monies from the insurer because of a set-off clause in the policy.

Thus, given the Majority's ultimate ruling denying the claimant's right to recovery on grounds of set-off under the contract itself, with which I agree, I concur in the result only.

JOHNSON, Judge, concurring:

I agree with the majority that Sparler's third party recovery was in excess of, and had to be set off against, the underinsured motorist coverage provided by Fireman's policy. Haegele v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 330 Pa. Super. 481, 490-93, 479 A.2d 1005, 1010-11 (1984); Votedian v. General Acc. Fire Life Assur. Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 13, 19-20, 478 A.2d 1324, 1328 (1984). I also agree that we are required to affirm the trial court's judgment if it was correct for any reason.

Since the amount of the third party recovery exceeded the amount Fireman's agreed to pay, Fireman's has no further liability and that should end the matter. I, therefore, would not reach or seek to determine whether a general release of a third party tortfeasor would discharge the obligations of an insurance carrier under its policy.

CAVANAUGH, J., joins.

DEL SOLE, Judge, concurring and dissenting:

I join the Opinion by my distinguished colleague, Judge Donald E. Wieand, insofar as it reviews the effect of a written release executed in favor of a tortfeasor and how that release would apply to contractual claims arising under an insurance policy issued to the releasor.

With the greatest respect to my colleague, Judge Popovich, I believe that his analysis, if accepted, would represent a drastic change in the law of Pennsylvania. Certainly, one could extend his analysis to claims against accident and health insurers, hospitalization carriers and others similarly situated because of the nature of the language in the third party tortfeasor release. Since this is not, and never has been, the law of the Commonwealth, I believe that Judge Wieand's Opinion correctly disposes of the release issue.

My disagreement with the majority Opinion centers on its discussion of underinsurance coverage in this case. First, it must be pointed out that there is no clear cut definition of the term "underinsured motorist" within the policy issued by the defendant. Rather, the policy states: "[t]he term 'uninsured' also includes an underinsured motor vehicle." Absent any definition of "underinsured" in the terms of the policy, the majority refers back to the definition of the term "uninsured" in its analysis. The policy states:

By "uninsured motor vehicle" we mean a land motor vehicle . . .

(a) with no bodily injury liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident.

(b) with minimum legal liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident as required by law governing the insured auto. However, the minimum is less than the Limit of Coverage of Part 6.

(c) with a bodily injury liability bond or policy applying at the time of the accident which is less than the minimum legal Limit of Coverage where the insured auto is principally garaged.

The record clearly reveals that the vehicle involved in the collision with the Appellant was not an uninsured motor vehicle as that term is defined in subparagraph (a). The stipulated set of facts indicate that Appellant received the policy limits on the vehicle. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the vehicle was insured and therefore subparagraph (a) does not apply. Likewise, I agree with the Majority's finding that under the facts presented in this case subparagraph (b) does not apply.

With regard to (c) the majority improperly concludes that we need to know the state of residence of the third party vehicle. The majority in arriving at this conclusion misreads the term "insured auto". The term "insured auto" used by defendant in the policy, is clearly defined on page 4 of the policy as the vehicle shown on the Coverage Data Page, a newly acquired vehicle, a trailer, or a temporary substitute vehicle. The insured auto in this case is Appellant's vehicle which is principally garaged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Thus, the majority's conclusion that we cannot determine whether there was coverage since we do not know where the third party tortfeasor's vehicle was garaged, is incorrect. The location where the third party tortfeasor's vehicle is garaged is of no import relative to the definition of uninsured motorist as provided in the instant policy.

Not only do I believe the Majority incorrectly interpreted the language of subsection (c), but in my view neither subsections (a), (b) or (c) apply to the question at hand. The issue in this case in its simplest form is whether or not there was underinsured motorist coverage under the terms of this policy and, if so, how would that provision apply in this case. The policy itself does not provide a definition of "underinsured vehicle". Compare Votedian v. General Acc. Fire Life Assur., 330 Pa. Super. 13, 478 A.2d 1324 (1984) ftn. 1 (where the policy at issue defined the term underinsured vehicle.) As recited, the only applicable language in the policy states: "The term uninsured motor vehicle also includes an underinsured motor vehicle.". Unlike the majority I do not read this statement to provide that the terms uninsured and underinsured can be used interchangeably. The terms refer to two distinct situations. In Votedian v. General Acc. Fire Life Assur., supra., this court held:

Underinsured motorist coverage is not the same as uninsured motorist coverage. The Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act does not require underinsured motorist coverage . . . Our legislature did not intend to provide additional insurance to those who although they suffered severe injury had recourse to at least the legal minimum of insurance through the other motorist.

The legislature has not by statute established a policy which compels the writing of underinsured motorist coverage. An insurance company is wholly free to issue a policy of automobile liability insurance which contains no protection whatsoever against underinsured motorists. Although companies, for an additional premium, may undertake to write such coverage, the underinsured motorist feature is purely optional. An insured may purchase such coverage or he may decline to pay the premium charged therefor and accept a policy which contains no such coverage. When underinsured motorist coverage is included, the terms and limitations thereof are not controlled by statute or by public policy but by the agreement reached by the parties. That agreement, as expressed in the policy of insurance, may place limitations upon underinsured motorist coverage, subject only to the requirement that the limitation be clearly worded and conspicuously displayed.

The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, enacted February 12, 1984 and effective October 1, 1984, requires that future motor vehicle liability insurance policies contain both uninsured and under insured motorist coverage. See: 75 Pa. C.S. § 1731(a).

330 Pa.Super. at 18-19, 478 A.2d 1324. (citations omitted).

In the policy issued by defendant uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is provided in Part 6, yet the term underinsured is not defined in the glossary or in Part 6. To the average individual the term underinsured motorist coverage obviously would refer to a situation where a third party tortfeasor lacks sufficient insurance limits to satisfy the insured's claim and the insured is able to collect the difference from its carrier up to the limits of the policy. Even the general assembly in the new Act defines an underinsured motor vehicle as "[a] motor vehicle for which the limits of available liability insurance and self-insurance are insufficient to pay damages." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. If the defendant wished to proscribe a different definition to the term "underinsurance" than what is commonly used, the defendant should have specifically and clearly given such a definition in the agreement. Under the instant policy the insured is lead to believe he is being afforded the extra protection of underinsurance coverage, however the majority would rule that the definition which the policy provides for the term uninsured also applies to the term underinsured. The majority would find the coverage to be one in the same. I cannot subscribe to the majority's interpretation which would, in defining the term underinsured, deviate from the generally accepted definition and which would do so absent a clear indication in the policy of such an intention.

Turning to the "set-off" provision contained in the policy, we find:

Any amounts payable under Part 6 shall be reduced by all sums:

(a) paid because of bodily injury by or on behalf of someone who may be liable. (Emphasis added).

The majority interprets this language and concludes that Appellant, who has received $25,000.00 from the third party tortfeasor which amount is in excess of the coverage limits, is not entitled to $15,000.00 due to this set-off language. In Votedian, the set-off provision stated: " 'limit of liability shall be reduced . . .' by payments made". Votedian v. General Acc. Fire Life Assur., 330 Pa.Super. at 20, 478 A.2d 1324. The court in Votedian found this language to be clear and unambiguous and to require the Appellees $30,000.00 liability limits to be reduced by the sum previously paid on behalf of the tortfeasor legally responsible for Appellees damages. The policy in the instant case provides a set-off for "amounts payable under Part 6" unlike the policy in Votedian which required a set-off from the "limits of liability". While the "limits of liability" in this case are $15,000.00, the "amounts payable under Part 6" are defined in part 6 B of the policy which provides:

We will pay damages which a Covered Person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an [underinsured] motor vehicle because of bodily injury

(a) sustained by a Covered Person; and

(b) caused by an accident.

(Emphasis added.)

In contrast to Votedian the set-off in this case is to be taken from the damage figure, not the figure which represents the limits of liability.

The parties have stipulated that the insured's damages were in excess of $40,000.00. Under the terms of the policy, this amount "shall be reduced by" $25,000.00, the sum paid by the third party tortfeasor. In this case the difference of $15,000.00 equals the liability limits under the policy and, therefore, I believe Appellant is entitled to collect $15,000.00 from the carrier under the terms of the policy.

Reports of cases decided by the Superior Court in which the order, decree, judgment or decision of the court below was affirmed or otherwise disposed of without opinion or without extended opinion.

Notice to the Bar

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, commencing with cases heard or submitted during the March 1979 session, adopted a practice whereby some cases are affirmed per curiam, without a published opinion. However, a memorandum opinion has been prepared and filed by the Superior Court in most of these cases and copies of the memorandum opinion have been forwarded to the chief counsel for the parties and to the lower court. These memorandum opinions contain the rationale of the Superior Court in reaching its decision. Copies of these memorandum opinions may be procured by members of the Bar or any member of the public at the prothonotary's office of the Superior Court in the district in which the case arose. These memorandum opinions are not to be considered as precedent and cannot be cited for any purpose.

517 A.2d 198-209

DOCKET TITLE NUMBER DATE DISPOSITION Adams v. Sumner ..............02872PHL85 09/08/86 Vacated and Remanded Ainsworth v. Moses ...........00174PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Apartment Builders v. Small ..01558PGH85 09/23/86 Affirmed B.L.T. Corp. v. Brooks .......00810PGH85 09/25/86 Affirmed Bacco v. Bacco ...............00026PGH84 09/10/86 Quashed Bailey v. Tucker .............00939PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Barrett v. Reddington ........03190PHL85 09/17/86 Affirmed Brown v. Thomas ..............00181PHL86 09/15/86 Affirmed Blair v. Blair ...............00414PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Brownfield v. Friend .......00070PGH86 09/03/86 Affirmed Brubaker Motors v. Nat'l R.R..02058PHL85 09/05/86 Affirmed Carney v. Allstate Ins. .....00257PHL86 09/30/86 Affirmed Cary v. Cary .................01238PHL85 09/08/86 Quashed Cassady-Pierce v. Lorey ......00121PGH86 09/08/86 Affirmed Cator v. Mickle-Milnor .......00238PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Chatmon v. Pennzoil Co. ......00430PGH86 10/01/86 Affirmed Ciuccoli v. Gordon's Jewelry .00237PHL86 09/12/86 Affirmed Coccia v. Coccia .............03224PHL85 09/11/86 Affirmed Colonial Mortgage v. N. Canton......................00216PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. Nat'l v. Scibelli........00590HBG85 08/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Adams, G. ............01019PGH85 09/04/86 Quashed Com. v. Adams, T. ............02672PHL85 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Albert ...............02784PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Anderson .............02033PHL84 10/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Astolas ..............00234PGH86 10/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Atkins ...............00333PHL83 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bailey, C. ...........02994PHL85 09/29/86 Reversed Com. v. Bailey, T. ...........02788PHL85 09/08/86 Affirmed Com. v. Baker ................00833HBG85 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Barlow ...............00742PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bashore ..............03216PHL85 08/06/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bates ................00320PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Beckman ..............00156HBG86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Benn .................00104PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Berryman .............00960PGH85 09/17/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Best .................02557PHL85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Best-Bey .............02093PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Betrand ..............02713PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Biauce ...............00933PGH85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Boyle ................00662PHL83 08/08/86 Affirmed Com. v. Brewer ...............00633HBG85 09/23/86 Affirmed Com. v. Brown, D. ............00977PGH85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Brown, E. ............00130PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Brown, G. ............00127PHL83 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Brown, G. ............00093PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bryant, W. ...........00670PHL83 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bryant, W. ...........00859PHL86 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Buchanon .............03331PHL84 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Buckno ...............02852PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Bullock ..............00152PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Butler ...............02476PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Byrd .................02195PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Campbell .............00446PHL85 10/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Caraballo, H. ........00021PGH86 09/02/86 Remanded Com. v. Carabello, J. ........02884PHL83 09/19/86 Affirmed Com. v. Cataleno .............01574PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Chisholm .............01639PHL82 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Chrzanowski ..........00464PHL86 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Citak ................00484PGH86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Clancy ...............00752PHL83 09/05/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Clark, J. ............02725PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Clark, M. ............00207HBG86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Clarke ...............01549PGH85 09/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Coffield .............02589PHL85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Collins ..............00464PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Conroy ...............01225PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Cook .................00976PGH85 09/23/86 Affirmed Com. v. Coolbaugh ............00205PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Cope .................00103PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Cruz .................02785PHL85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Dash .................00909PGH84 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. David ................00692PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Davis ................02818PHL84 09/23/86 Affirmed Com. v. Delozier .............00482PGH82 09/18/86 Vacated Com. v. Dixon ................00637PHL86 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Dominquez ............00194HBG86 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Donovan ..............00120HBG86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. D'Orazo ..............01030PHL85 10/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Douglas ..............01917PHL83 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Dubose ...............01486PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Dunn .................00477PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Durham ...............00043PHL86 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Durie ................02744PHL85 09/08/86 Affirmed Com. v. Ehritz ...............02107PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Elea .................00650PGH85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. English ..............00322PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Evans, C. ............00898PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Evans, M. ............00101PHL86 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Farano ...............03099PHL85 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Farkas ...............00158PGH85 09/02/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Feigley ..............00102HBG86 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Finn .................00911PGH85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Flowers ..............00732PHL86 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Ford .................03164PHL82 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Franklin .............02974PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Fredin ...............00847HBG85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Fries ................00816HBG85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Fuller, A. ...........00026PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Fuller, R. ...........00624PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Gallo ................01129PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Garcia ...............01175PHL83 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Gelnett ..............00732PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. George ...............03102PHL85 09/15/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Gibson ...............00793PGH85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Glass ................00623PGH83 09/23/86 Vacated, Reinstated and Affirmed Com. v. Glasshofer ...........01851PHL85 09/23/86 Affirmed Com. v. Goldberg .............00387PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Goodroe ..............01499PHL85 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Goska ................01110PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Granger ..............01770PHL84 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Green ................00575PHL85 08/04/86 Affirmed Com. v. Greer ................00766HBG85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Griffin ..............01287PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hammie ...............00086PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Harp .................00521PGH85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Harris, R. ...........00303PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Harris, S. ...........00038PHL84 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Helms, A. ............01035PHL85 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Helms, A. ............01036PHL85 09/26/85 Affirmed Com. v. Helms, A. ............01037PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Henderson ............03241PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hileman ..............00755PGH85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hill .................02677PHL83 09/08/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hockman ..............00068HBG86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hodge ................00226PHL86 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hoover ...............00015HBG86 10/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hopkins ..............02067PHL84 09/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Huntley ..............02710PHL85 09/19/86 Affirmed Com. v. Hurst ................00691PHL86 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Isaac ................02769PHL84 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Jacobs ...............02174PHL85 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Johnson, M. ..........02726PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Johnson, W. ..........00087PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Jones, S. ............01613PGH85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Jones, T. ............00921PGH83 09/10/86 Affirmed Com. v. Jones, W. ............00031HBG86 09/22/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kearney ..............00430PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kearns ...............00229HBG86 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kemp .................01358PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kepner ...............00862HBG85 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. King .................00852PHL85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Knox .................01186PGH83 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kocher ...............03185PHL84 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kruszewski ...........01239PGH85 09/02/86 Remanded Com. v. Kuykendall ...........00009HBG86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Kysor ................01464PGH85 09/02/86 Remanded Com. v. Labiaux ..............00156PGH86 09/17/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lafty ................02728PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lapolt ...............00480HBG85 09/17/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lattanzi .............00131PGH86 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lauterio .............03235PHL85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lawrence .............00041PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lawton ...............00310PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lee ..................03274PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Leftenant ............01642PHL82 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lepore ...............00492PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lewis ................00875PGH82 09/10/86 Affirmed and Remanded Com. v. Long .................02850PHL84 09/24/86 Affirmed Com. v. Love .................01500PHL85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lunan ................00410PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lutz .................01121PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Lyon .................00125HBG86 09/17/86 Affirmed Com. v. Malloy ...............01430PGH85 09/17/86 Reversed and Remanded Com. v. Martino ..............02735PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Mapp .................02723PHL85 09/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Matteson .............01197PGH85 09/15/86 Vacated and Affirmed Com. v. Mays .................00326PHL84 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. McAfee ...............00836HBG85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. McClendon ............00422PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. McClure ..............03244PHL85 09/05/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. McCoy ................00324PGH86 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. McCray ...............00301PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. McGrath ..............00309PHL86 09/16/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. McGrogan .............01098PGH85 09/04/86 Affirmed Com. v. McGroggan ............02341PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. McGuire ..............00503PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. McManus ..............03259PHL85 09/05/86 Reversed, Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Meier ................00038PGH86 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Melchor ..............02600PHL82 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Michuk ...............01605PGH85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Miller, D. ...........00305PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Miller, D. ...........01327PGH85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Miller, W. ...........00843HBG85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Milligan .............00832PGH85 09/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Mininall .............00965PHL85 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Miranda ..............00815PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Mooney ...............01566PGH85 09/10/86 Vacated and Affirmed Com. v. Moore, E. ............02557PHL84 08/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Moore, M. ............01329PHL83 09/11/86 Reversed and Remanded Com. v. Murray ...............00919PHL83 09/18/86 Reversed and Remanded Com. v. Murtha ...............00124PHL86 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Norman ...............01900PHL85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. O'Hara ...............01099PGH85 09/10/86 Vacated, Remanded and Affirmed Com. v. Oliphant .............02680PHL85 09/04/86 Affirmed Com. v. Parran ...............00441PGH86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Perry ................00296HBG86 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Phillips, A. .........00934PGH85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Phillips, K. .........02792PHL85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Pitt .................02900PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Portee ...............00322PGH82 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Powell ...............01594PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Prioleau .............00299PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Purdie ...............01136PHL83 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Randolph .............00913PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Raspatello ...........00030PGH86 09/29/86 Vacated Com. v. Ray ..................02861PHL85 09/24/86 Affirmed Com. v. Reavis ...............02724PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Redavid ..............00214PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Reese ................00437PGH85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Robinson .............02032PHL83 09/23/86 Affirmed Com. v. Rodriquez ............00403PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Rodweller ............00235PHL86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Rule .............02773PHL85 07/28/86 Affirmed Com. v. Russell ..........00497PHL84 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Ryan .............00664PHL86 09/24/86 Affirmed Com. v. Saleem ...........03146PHL85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Sanders ..........00972PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Santiago .........01490PGH85 09/02/86 Remanded Com. v. Scales ...........00840HBG85 09/30/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Schreffler .......00784HBG85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Scone ............00661PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Shermanski .......00796PHL86 09/04/86 Affirmed Com. v. Shiffler .........00499PGH85 09/22/86 Affirmed Com. v. Silver ...........03231PHL83 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Simmons ..........00758PHL84 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smalley ..........00065PGH86 09/12/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Smith, C. ........01517PGH85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smith, J. ........02428PHL85 09/22/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smith, R. ........00647PHL85 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smith, W. ........01585PHL85 08/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smith, W. ........00798PGH85 09/15/86 Quashed and Remanded Com. v. Smith, W. ........02165PHL85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Smith, W. ........01282PGH84 10/01/86 Affirmed Com. v. Spolnick .........01283PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Strawbridge ......00189HBG86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Suarez ...........00692HBG85 09/30/86 Affirmed Com. v. Sullivan, J. .....01230PGH85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Sullivan, L. .....01372PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Summers ..........00415PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Sutton ...........01818PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Com. v. Sweesy ...........01625PGH85 09/08/86 Affirmed Com. v. Swindle ..........03345PHL83 09/05/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. Sylvester ........00231HBG85 09/24/86 Reversed Com. v. Taylor, L. .......00198PHL86 09/19/86 Affirmed Com. v. Taylor, R. .......00167PHL86 09/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Tennyson .........00820PGH85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Theodosiadias ....00381PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Thevenin .........00027PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Thomas, D. .......01298PGH85 08/20/86 Vacated Com. v. Thomas, G. .......02115PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Thompson, J. ....01213PGH85 08/18/86 Affirmed Com. v. Thompson, W. .....01620PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Tide .............02862PHL85 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Tinson ...........01555PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Tolles ...........00911PHL86 09/22/86 Affirmed Com. v. Trader ...........00135PHL81 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Treftz ...........00081PGH86 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Troutman .........00152HBG85 09/11/86 Affirmed Com. v. Tucker ...........01852PHL83 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Valcano ..........03087PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed Com. v. Valentin .........01347PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Vecchia ..........01563PHL82 09/22/86 Affirmed and Dismissed Com. v. Velez ............02283PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Walentukonis .....00413HBG85 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Wall .............02463PHL85 10/03/86 Affirmed Com. v. Watson ...........00056PGH85 09/05/86 Vacated and Remanded Com. v. West .............00275PHL83 09/12/86 Affirmed Com. v. Weston ...........00483PGH85 08/25/86 Affirmed Com. v. Whitley ..........00452PGH83 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Wildonger ........00007PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Com. v. Williams, R. .....02732PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. v. Williams, S. .....03050PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Wilson ...........03497PHL83 09/05/86 Affirmed Com. v. Wood .............00050PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Woodrow ..........01687PHL83 10/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Wright ...........00144HBG86 09/15/86 Affirmed Com. v. Yankee ...........03251PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed Com. v. Yeakel ...........00074PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. ex rel Kelly v. Kelly ..................02806PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Com. ex rel Upper Franklin v. Bear .......00041HBG86 09/25/86 Affirmed Continental v. PA Manf. ..01291PGH85 09/08/86 Affirmed County of Delaware v. Callaghan ..............02454PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Crull v. Reliance Ins. ...02929PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Davis v. Davis ...........01155PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed and Remanded Davis v. Kozemchak .......01041PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed D'Emilio v. State Farm ...00156PHL86 09/12/86 Reversed Dependable v. Lindner ....00138PHL86 10/02/86 Affirmed Dobyrdnia v. Dobyrdnia ...00555PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Dopudja v. Greyhound .....00166HBG85 09/05/86 Affirmed Equibank v. Robinson .....00096PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Favasuli v. De Frank .....00890HBG85 09/19/86 Affirmed Fritz v. Fritz ...........00954PGH85 09/03/86 Vacated and Remanded Foss v. Booth ............00208PHL86 09/09/86 Affirmed Fugo v. Simmons ..........03090PHL85 09/19/86 Affirmed Gallo v. H.L. Balsinger, Inc. ........01074PGH85 09/03/86 Affirmed Gee v. Gee ...............02302PHL85 09/12/86 Affirmed Girard v. Girard .........00020HBG86 09/25/86 Affirmed Girty v. Girty ...........01601PGH85 08/08/86 Affirmed Goodwin v. Rodriguez .....03180PHL85 09/12/86 Affirmed Gottwald v. Gottwald .....01222PHL85 09/05/85 Vacated and Remanded Grauer v. Vandegrift .....00201PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Gresham v. Yellow Cab ....01235PHL85 09/22/86 Affirmed Grosshanten v. Oaklyn Consol. ................01823PHL85 09/15/86 Affirmed Grove v. Grove ...........00716HBG85 09/08/86 Reversed and Remanded Hall v. Hall .............00202HBG84 09/30/86 Affirmed Hamilton v. Drespling ....01257PGH85 09/18/86 Affirmed Hecker v. Hecker .........00060PGH86 10/01/86 Affirmed Howell v. Belmont ........0089HBG86 09/30/86 Affirmed Hudak v. Hudak ...........00941PGH85 10/02/86 Reversed and Remanded Hurlock v. Kerr ..........00176PHL86 09/16/86 Affirmed Ind. Valley v. Rosen .....02445PHL85 09/05/86 Quashed and Affirmed In re Adopt. of Gary S. ..00281PHL86 09/24/86 Affirmed In re Adopt. of J.A.S. ...03029PHL85 08/04/86 Affirmed In re Commitment of Banks 02345PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed In re Estate of Kob ......00880HBG85 09/19/86 Affirmed In re S.D.A. .............00412HBG85 09/02/86 Affirmed In re Fulton .............00374PGH85 09/22/86 Affirmed In re The matter of Culver .................01647PGH85 09/26/86 Quashed In re Westmoreland County Tax Bureau ......00079PGH86 09/08/86 Transferred to Commonwealth Court Internat'l Blind Bowlers v. Progressive Blind Bowlers ................02716PHL85 09/22/86 Reversed and Remanded In the interest of Alonzo D. ..............02676PHL85 09/26/86 Affirmed In the interest of Fassette ...............01370PGH85 09/26/86 Affirmed In the interest of D.O. ..00023HBG86 09/05/86 Affirmed In the interest of Richard M. .............01539PGH85 09/15/86 Vacated and Affirmed In the interest of Thompson ...............00028PHL86 09/29/86 Affirmed In the interest of T.Y. ..00022HBG86 09/05/86 Reversed and Remanded In the matter of Ferrante 00067PGH86 09/19/86 Affirmed and Reversed J.H. Beers v. Sondra, Inc. ...................00049PHL86 09/12/86 Affirmed Jackson v. Jackson .......00655PGH85 09/23/86 Affirmed Johnston v. Women's Services ...............01455PGH85 10/03/86 Affirmed Kerlin v. Kerlin .........02885PHL85 09/15/86 Quashed King v. King .............00777PHL83 09/29/86 Affirmed Kinley v. Gentzyel .......00488HBG85 09/05/86 Affirmed Kuritz v. Kuritz .........02422PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Knox v. Scott ............01081PGH85 10/03/86 Remanded and Affirmed Kolbes v. Kolbes .........01001PHL85 09/30/86 Affirmed in part and Remanded in part Lamond v. Lamond .........02711PHL85 08/21/86 Affirmed Lamond v. Lamond .........02575PHL85 08/21/86 Quashed Land v. Zamir ............02610PHL85 09/11/86 Reversed and Remanded Landino v. BIL-JAX Scaffolding ............03202PHL85 09/11/86 Affirmed Lauck v. Lebanon News ....00441HBG85 08/20/86 Reversed and Remanded Little v. Dollar Bank ....01317PGH85 09/15/86 Affirmed Long v. Long .............00460HBG85 09/25/86 Affirmed Maggiani v. The Korman Corp. ..................00186PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Mainhart v. Boro of Freeport ...............01583PGH85 09/12/86 Affirmed Mancini v. Mancini .......02008PHL85 10/01/86 Affirmed Martin v. Martin .........00744HBG85 09/30/86 Affirmed and Quashed McCall v. Reachard .......00076HBG86 09/05/86 Affirmed McCauley v. McCauley .....00717HBG85 09/02/86 Affirmed and Remanded McDonough v. DiRienzo ....02123PHL85 09/02/86 Affirmed McSherry v. Allstate Ins. ...................01561PHL85 09/04/86 Affirmed Meyer v. Campo ...........01624PHL85 09/02/86 Quashed Miller v. Harman .........02433PHL85 09/24/86 Affirmed Minisci v. Bruce Realty ..00323PHL86 09/02/86 Affirmed Minneman v. Romano .......00234PHL86 10/03/86 Affirmed Mitchell v. Lord .........01311PGH85 09/11/86 Affirmed Morgan v. Paoli Mem. Hosp. ..................02702PHL85 08/07/86 Reversed Myrick v. SEPTA ..........02912PHL85 09/12/86 Affirmed New Shawmut v. Nat'l Fuel ...................00157PGH86 09/12/86 Quashed and Remanded Oliver v. Temple Mutual ..00651PHL83 09/02/86 Affirmed Ondulich v. Dist. Attorney of Westmoreland County ....00017PGH86 09/25/86 Vacated and Reinstated Oswald v. Oswald .........03182PHL85 08/06/86 Affirmed Pyfer v. Pyfer ...........00095PHL85 09/18/86 Affirmed, Reversed and Remanded Quinn v. Kostelnik .......02521PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Randano v. Acorn Co. .....02440PHL85 09/05/86 Affirmed Rockwood Holding v. Ingram .................01378PGH85 09/18/86 Affirmed Rooney v. Kemper Group Ins. .............02130PHL85 08/07/86 Affirmed Rose v. Lorence ..........00419PGH86 09/29/86 Affirmed Ross v. Ross .............00851PGH85 09/18/86 Affirmed Rovers v. Inter-County Health .................02829PHL85 09/25/86 Vacated and Remanded Schwartz v. Schwartz .....02152PHL85 09/22/86 Affirmed Shaffer v. Laborers' .....01442PGH85 08/06/86 Affirmed Shepherd v. Flisak .......00689PHL86 09/23/86 Remanded Sigman v. Friedman .......03122PHL85 09/15/86 Reversed and Remanded Sinz v. Hartung ..........02271PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Skrapits v. Capobianco ...00155PHL86 09/03/86 Affirmed Slye v. Slye .............00308HBG85 09/12/86 Affirmed Smith v. Phl. Marine Trade ..................00296PHL86 09/10/86 Affirmed Snyder v. Snyder .........00056PHL86 09/05/86 Affirmed Solvino v. Merchants Bancorp ................03096PHL85 09/02/86 Vacated and Remanded Stauffer v. Metro. Edison .................02969PHL85 09/29/86 Affirmed Sterling v. Sterling .....01809PHL85 10/02/86 Affirmed Stoltzfus v. Ulrich Supply .................03247PHL85 09/09/86 Affirmed Strasser v. Dynamic Classics ...............00428PGH85 09/23/86 Affirmed Tenny v. Mihalich ........00710HBG85 09/23/86 Reversed and Remanded Thompson v. State Farm ...02009PHL85 09/08/86 Affirmed Thorp v. Starr-Kerr ......01480PGH85 09/05/86 Affirmed Throop v. State Farm .....01374PGH85 09/02/86 Reversed and Remanded Total Energy v. West End Coal ...............03169PHL85 09/04/86 Affirmed Trotz v. Lawruk ..........01451PGH85 09/23/86 Affirmed Walker v. Ohio Casualty ..03066PHL85 08/20/86 Affirmed Walleigh v. Walleigh .....00632PHL86 09/08/86 Affirmed Webb v. Keystone Ins. ....00385HBG85 10/03/86 Affirmed Webb v. Consol. Rail Corp. ..................03064PHL85 10/02/86 Affirmed Webb v. Polidor ..........00071PHL86 10/03/86 Affirmed Wedner v. Verderame ......01578PGH85 09/02/86 Affirmed Weisberger v. Weisberger 00997PHL86 09/24/86 Affirmed Wellons v. Garvin ........00069PHL86 09/05/86 Dismissed and Reinstated Wiest v. Wiest ...........00808HBG85 09/17/86 Affirmed Wojciechowski v. Murray ..01130PHL86 10/01/86 Affirmed Yaffa v. Clark Equip. Comp. ..................03173PHL85 09/19/86 Affirmed Young v. Connecticut Gen. Life ..............01210PGH85 09/10/86 Affirmed

Petition for allowance of appeal denied January 27, 1987

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 14, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1

Petitions for reargument denied September 12, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 15, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 15, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 1, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 24, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 20, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied October 24, 1986

Petitions for reargument denied September 30, 1986

Zlakowski v. Com. of Pa. Dept. of Transportation 00444PHL86 09/15/86 Affirmed

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Summary

Opinion

Notice to the Bar

517 A.2d 198-209

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Case Details

Citations

Citing Cases

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Summary

Opinion

Notice to the Bar

517 A.2d 198-209

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Sparler v. Fireman's Ins. Co.

Case Details

CitationsCopy Citations

Citing Cases

Citations