Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 442672
NEEDHAM, .J.
Stanley Sparks and Linda Sparks appeal from a judgment entered upon the trial court’s grant of the summary judgment motion of respondent Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad). Appellants contend that the trial court erred in sustaining Metalclad’s objections to declarations they filed in opposition to the motion and in concluding that they failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. We will reverse the summary judgment order and vacate the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2005, appellants filed a lawsuit against Metalclad and others, seeking damages for asbestos-related personal injuries and loss of consortium. Essentially, appellants contended that Stanley Sparks (Sparks) was exposed to asbestos-containing thermal insulation materials supplied by Metalclad and others to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNS), when he worked there between 1964 and 1974. Sparks was diagnosed with lung cancer in or around January 2005.
A. Metalclad’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Metalclad sought summary judgment on the ground that appellants could not prove causation, because there was no evidence that Sparks was exposed to any asbestos-containing product for which Metalclad was responsible. Sparks had testified in deposition that he had heard of Metalclad but possessed no information or knowledge that he worked with or around any product distributed, supplied, or manufactured by Metalclad. Although appellants’ written discovery responses asserted that asbestos products were supplied from Metalclad to LBNS when Sparks worked there, Metalclad maintained that they did not set forth facts showing he was actually exposed to those products.
B. Sparks’ Opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion
In opposition to Metalclad’s motion, appellants submitted declarations from Sparks, Charles Ay (Ay), and Kenneth Cohen (Cohen).
Sparks declared that he had worked as a marine machinist at LBNS between 1964-1974 and “on a daily basis . . . worked in close proximity with shipyard insulators who were cutting, handling and installing thermal insulation either on the piers or on the ships.” In particular, while he reviewed the material needed for his own work “[o]n a daily basis during [his] years at [LBNS],” he was “present in the storage areas of piers 1, 2, and 3” where insulation material was stored. This placed him in “close proximity to insulators who were pulling large volumes of pipe insulation and cutting the material into shorter lengths.” The cutting of the material created “significant visible dust,” and his “clothing would become dusty from the insulation particles.” In addition, he was present dozens of times in a storage building at pier 6, sometimes for several minutes up to an hour, where “insulators were cutting and handling various types of thermal insulation.”
Ay’s declaration asserted that the insulation materials stored at LBNS came from vendors including Metalclad. Based on his work as an insulator at LBNS from 1960-1981, Ay had “personal knowledge as to the entities who supplied the shipyard with asbestos-containing thermal insulation.” Although the “main supplier for insulation was the General Services Administration” (GSA), the GSA “frequently” could not provide enough material to the shipyard and, during the Vietnam war, the “shipyard continually could not acquire needed insulation materials from the GSA.” As a result, “large volumes of asbestos-containing” insulation came to the shipyard from outside vendors including, based on his observations, Metalclad, Thorpe, Fenco, and AC&S. Ay “personally observed [Thorpe] and [Metalclad] deliver the most asbestos-containing” insulation “with, at times, daily deliveries.” In addition, Ay personally called or was present when others called Metalclad and other vendors for materials.
Ay also explained how this insulation material wound up in the storage areas mentioned by Sparks: “Through my duties as an insulator and years at Long Beach, I understood the process in-coming insulation materials underwent from arrival at the shipyard to final installation on a ship. Regardless of whether material came from the GSA or an outside vendor, such as Metalclad, the material ended up in the storage areas, Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. All material would come in by train or truck and be placed in Building 131. From Building 131, the materials would move to Building 53 and then to the storage areas at the head of Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. From these storage areas the asbestos-containing thermal insulation supplied by the GSA, and outside vendors such as METALCLAD, would be installed on ships.” In sum, Ay declared: “As an insulator at Long Beach, I observed outside vendors, including METALCLAD, on a daily basis, bringing asbestos-containing [insulation] to the shipyard. All of this asbestos-containing insulation material would be stored on Piers 1, 2, 3, and 6.”
Ay next detailed the cutting of Metalclad’s asbestos insulation in these areas: “The storage areas on Piers 1, 2, and 3 were fenced in lay down yards which contained a lagging area where all the insulation material coming into the shipyard made its way. I, along with the other Long Beach insulators between the period of 1964-1972, cut asbestos-containing pipe insulation supplied by GSA, METALCLAD and THORPE on a daily basis. The cutting of all asbestos-containing pipe insulation created dust, which settled throughout the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, and 3.” Ay continued: “At the head of Pier 6 existed a small lagging shop where insulation material supplied by all the vendors, including the GSA, METALCLAD AND THORPE, would be stored. In addition to storage inside this enclosed building, a cutting area existed where asbestos-containing pipe insulation supplied by the GSA, METALCLAD and THORPE would be cut prior to being installed on board the ships. The lagging shop on Pier 6 was a very dusty place given all the activity and material cutting.”
Ay confirmed that these storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3, and 6 were the ones to which Sparks had referred in his declaration. Based on the assertions in Sparks’ declaration, Ay observed: “Mr. SPARKS indeed would be in close proximity to insulators like myself, cutting asbestos insulation from the GSA, METALCLAD and THORPE, when he was present in storage areas and especially inside the lagging shop on Pier 6.” Ay further confirmed Sparks’ estimation that “large volumes of materials” from Metalclad and others came into the shipyard and “all of it ended up in the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6.”
Cohen, a retired California OSHA inspector and industrial hygienist, expressed his professional opinion that Sparks was exposed to materials supplied by Metalclad. After setting forth his relevant experience, Cohen explained that a known characteristic of asbestos was its persistence, which is the “ability of asbestos to contaminate an area for long periods of time due to the indestructibility of asbestos fibers.” Having reviewed Sparks’ declaration (that Sparks was present in the fenced-in storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3, and 6 in close proximity to insulators cutting and handling thermal insulation, which created visible or significant dust) and Ay’s declaration (that Metalclad was one of the primary outside vendors used to supplement the supply of insulation materials from the GSA and all such material ended up in the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6, which were dusty with asbestos insulation materials continually being handled and cut), Cohen opined: “Based upon my background, knowledge, training, and experience, and the information referenced above, I can state with reasonable scientific certainty, appropriate to the field of industrial hygiene, that STANLEY SPARKS was exposed to hazardous and unsafe levels of asbestos fibers and dust from multiple sources, including the asbestos-containing insulation supplied by METALCLAD. Mr.SPARKS was exposed to the asbestos fiber and dust which contaminated the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. This dust and fiber would be composed of asbestos from all sources including the GSA, METALCLAD, THORPE, FENCO and AC&S.” (Italics added.) Cohen’s conclusion that Sparks’ exposure came from “all sources”—including Metalclad—was due to his understanding of the well-documented persistence of asbestos.
C. Metalclad’s Reply and Evidentiary Objections
Metalclad disputed that appellants’ evidence showed Sparks was actually exposed to insulation supplied by Metalclad. Metalclad also interposed numerous objections to Ay’s and Cohen’s declarations.
As to Ay’s declaration, Metalclad objected: to the extent Ay purported to offer expert opinion; to Ay’s statement that he reviewed Sparks’ declaration, because Sparks signed his declaration after Ay signed his; and to several statements on the ground they lacked foundation and were irrelevant, speculative, and contradictory to Ay’s testimony in other litigation. In the latter regard, Metalclad urged that Ay’s prior testimony indicated that he had not been responsible for obtaining insulation from vendors, did not know how much insulation was used at LBNS or how much was supplied by Metalclad, and could not distinguish the source of thermal insulation after its initial delivery.
Metalclad objected to Cohen’s declaration in its entirety, and particularly to the conclusion that Sparks was exposed to asbestos from sources including Metalclad, on the ground that Cohen had not actually been to the LBNS storage areas or tested Metalclad insulation and was therefore speculating. In addition, Metalclad objected to portions of Cohen’s declaration on the grounds of hearsay, lack of foundation, speculation, and irrelevance, and contended that Cohen’s declaration should be stricken because it was based on Ay’s declaration, which was inadmissible.
D. Tentative Ruling and Hearing
The trial court’s tentative ruling was to sustain Metalclad’s objections to the declarations of Ay and Cohen and to grant summary judgment. The tentative ruling stated: “Defendant Metalclad Insulation Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. Moving Party Shifted Burden. Plaintiff Fails To Create A Triable Issue Of Material Fact Because Insufficient Competent Evidence. Sustain Objection To Ay And Cohen Declarations. Prevailing Party To Prepare Order.” (Italics added.)
At the ensuing hearing, the court explained its tentative ruling: “[Sparks] didn’t have sufficient competent evidence [to establish a triable issue of material fact], particularly once the Court said I was sustaining the objections relating to Mr. Ay and to Mr. Cohen. [¶] As you know, Mr. Cohen’s declaration relies on Mr. Ay, and if I sustain Ay then you can’t use Cohen. And, the Court concluded that Mr. Ay’s declaration is speculative and so forth. As you know, this is nothing unique in this particular defendant’s motion.” After Sparks’ counsel pointed out that Ay’s declaration was based on his personal observations, the court queried how Ay knew that the insulation material “went on this particular ship?” Sparks’ counsel explained that the question was not whether the material went on a ship, but whether it reached the storage areas where Mr. Sparks was present. The court then asked: “How does Mr. Ay know whether or not Metalclad’s insulation is in a particular storage area?” Sparks’ counsel explained that Ay saw the trucks come in, Metalclad was one of the top suppliers, and the insulation was placed in the storage areas. Metalclad’s attorney replied that Ay was speculating when he testified about the material ending up in the storage areas. The court decided to “stand by the tentative.”
E. Written Order
Metalclad provided to Sparks’ counsel a proposed order, which specified that Metalclad’s objections to the declarations of Ay and Cohen were sustained. Sparks’ counsel approved the form of the order.
The court entered the order, which stated that Metalclad had demonstrated there was no triable issue of material fact as to Sparks’ inability to prove causation. The order explained that appellants had failed to create a triable issue of fact due to “insufficient competent evidence” and advised that “Metalclad’s evidentiary objections to the declarations of Charles Ay and Kenneth Cohen are sustained.” The list of undisputed material facts in the court’s order did not include any reference to any evidence in the Ay Declaration or Cohen Declaration.
Judgment was entered for Metalclad. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we conduct an independent review to determine whether there is a triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860; Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60; Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485.) We construe the moving party’s evidence strictly, and the nonmoving party’s evidence liberally, in determining whether there is a triable issue. (See D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20; Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 (Thomas).)
A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Thomas, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 72.) A triable issue may be demonstrated only by admissible evidence properly presented to the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (b)(3), (p)(2); Santa Ana Unified School Dist. v. Orange County Development Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 404, 411.)
Here, Metalclad targeted the element of causation—specifically, whether Sparks was exposed to asbestos-containing products supplied by Metalclad. (See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 976-977 (Rutherford).) As mentioned, Sparks now contends that the court erred in (1) sustaining Metalclad’s objections to the Ay and Cohen declarations and (2) ruling that Sparks failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to causation. We address each contention in turn.
A. Metalclad’s Objections to Ay and Cohen Declarations
Metalclad objected to the Ay and Cohen declarations on the grounds of speculation and lack of foundation (and improper opinion), as well as irrelevance and hearsay. Appellants insist that these objections should be deemed waived because the trial court did not adequately rule upon them, and in any event the court erred to the extent it sustained the objections.
For purposes of this appeal, the record sufficiently demonstrates the court’s ruling on Metalclad’s objections. During the hearing, the court indicated its tentative ruling was to “sustain[] the objections relating to Mr. Ay and to Mr. Cohen,” because “Mr. Ay’s declaration is speculative and so forth,” and “if I sustain [the objections to] Ay then you can’t use Cohen.” At the end of the hearing, the court announced it would “stand by the tentative.” In addition, the court’s written order specified that “Metalclad’s objections to the declarations of Charles Ay and Kenneth Cohen are sustained” and omitted any reference to the Ay Declaration or Cohen Declaration in the evidence supporting the list of undisputed material facts. It therefore appears that the trial court sustained all of Metalclad’s objections to Ay’s declaration, and either declined to consider Cohen’s declaration due to the inadmissibility of Ay’s declaration or sustained all of the objections to Cohen’s declaration as well. We next review these rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People ex rel Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639).
Appellants contend that Metalclad’s objections were waived because the trial court stated that it “follows Biljac.” (See Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1410 (Biljac). Biljac held that a trial court could forego ruling on evidentiary objections in a summary judgment proceeding and merely assure the parties that it would not rely on inadmissible evidence. (Id. at pp. 1419-1420 & fn. 3.) Appellants acknowledge that the court did not actually follow this procedure of simply disregarding inadmissible evidence, but instead summarily sustained all objections without specificity. They urge that this, like the procedure in Biljac, is inconsistent with Demps v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 564 (Demps), which stated: “a trial court presented with timely evidentiary objections in proper form must expressly rule on the individual objections and [if it] does not, the objections are deemed waived and the objected to evidence included in the record.” (Id. at p. 578.) Because we conclude that Metalclad’s objections to the critical passages of Ay’s and Cohen’s declarations lacked merit, we need not and do not consider whether they should be deemed waived under Demps.
1. Ay Declaration
Metalclad argued, and the trial court apparently ruled, that Ay lacked personal knowledge to declare that insulation products from Metalclad were present at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. (See Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) We disagree.
In the first place, Ay’s declaration demonstrated sufficient personal knowledge to testify that Metalclad delivered insulation materials to LBNS. Ay stated in his declaration that, based on his work as an insulator at LBNS from 1960-1981, he had “personal knowledge as to the entities who supplied the shipyard with asbestos-containing thermal insulation.” Whether or not he was the one who actually ordered the insulation, the fact that he worked as an insulator provides some factual predicate for his claim of personal knowledge. Based on this personal knowledge, Ay declared that “large volumes of asbestos-containing” insulation came to the shipyard from outside vendors. Moreover, based on his own observations, Ay averred that the outside vendors supplying these “large volumes” of insulation included Metalclad. In fact, he “personally observed” Metalclad and another vendor deliver “the most asbestos-containing” insulation “with, at times, daily deliveries.” Ay also personally called or was present when others called Metalclad and others for materials. He declared: “As an insulator at Long Beach, I observed outside vendors, including METALCLAD, on a daily basis, bringing asbestos-containing [insulation] to the shipyard.” (Italics added.) For admissibility purposes, there was a sufficient showing that Ay had personal knowledge of Metalclad providing insulation materials to the LBNS.
Ay also demonstrated personal knowledge from which it could be inferred that the materials Metalclad delivered to LBNS ended up in the storage areas at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. Ay explained that, through his work, he understood the process by which all insulation materials delivered to LBNS went from the shipyard to Building 131, then to Building 53, and on to the storage areas at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. From this testimony, upon personal knowledge, of the process by which all insulation was stored, it could be inferred that the Metalclad insulation was in fact stored in the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6.
Because of his personal knowledge of the customary storage locations of all insulation material delivered to LBNS, including that supplied by Metalclad, it was unnecessary for admissibility purposes for Ay to be able to tell whether a particular piece of insulation, after it reached its final destination, was from Metalclad or another vendor. Thus, it is immaterial to this appeal that Ay had conceded in other cases his inability to distinguish the source of the thermal insulation material after its initial delivery to LBNS.
Furthermore, Ay had personal knowledge to state that the cutting of the asbestos insulation in these storage areas created dust. Ay averred in his declaration: “I, along with the other Long Beach insulators between the period of 1964-1972, cut asbestos-containing pipe insulation” provided by Metalclad and others “on a daily basis,” which created dust that “settled throughout the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, and 3.” He also declared that the “small lagging shop” at Pier 6 included a cutting area where asbestos-containing pipe insulation supplied by Metalclad and others would be cut, and the lagging shop “was a very dusty place given all the activity and material cutting.”
In sum, as to Ay’s assertions that dust from Metalclad’s insulation was present in the storage areas at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6, Metalclad’s personal knowledge objections under Evidence Code section 702 lacked merit. The remainder of Metalclad’s objections, at least as to this critical evidence, were meritless as well.
Metalclad objected to Ay’s declaration to the extent he proffered an expert opinion, but Ay did not purport to give any expert opinion. Metalclad’s objection that Sparks signed his declaration after Ay signed his own declaration is also unavailing: while the timing of Sparks’ signature might be relevant to the credibility of Ay’s assertion that he had reviewed Sparks’ declaration, it does not render inadmissible Ay’s assertion that Sparks would “be in close proximity to insulators like myself, cutting asbestos insulation from [Metalclad and others] when he was present in storage areas and especially inside the lagging shop on Pier 6.” The predicate for Ay’s statement was his own personal knowledge of the storage areas and the fact that Sparks was indeed present in those areas: the fact of Sparks’ presence in those areas was undisputed, and remained so regardless of when Sparks signed his declaration or whether Ay actually reviewed it. Moreover, even if Ay’s assertion that Sparks was in close proximity to insulators were stricken, the underlying fact was still before the court, because Sparks stated in his own declaration that he was in “close proximity to insulators who were . . . cutting the [insulation] material into shorter lengths,” which created “significant visible dust” to the point his “clothing would become dusty.” (Italics added.)
Metalclad also objected to some of Ay’s statements on the ground they lacked foundation and were irrelevant, speculative, and contradictory to deposition testimony Ay had given in other litigation. For example, Metalclad argued, Ay’s prior deposition testimony indicated that he had not been responsible for obtaining insulation from vendors and did not know how much insulation material was used at LBNS or how much was supplied by Metalclad. Ay’s prior deposition testimony does not directly contradict his declaration on salient points, and it merely goes to the weight of the evidence in his declaration, not its admissibility.
Metalclad also provided deposition testimony in which, according to Metalclad, Ay admitted there was no way to tell whose insulation materials were installed on a specific ship. This of course has nothing to do with whether Mr. Sparks was exposed to Metalclad insulation in the storage areas. It nonetheless found its way into the court’s order as an undisputed material fact.
2. Cohen Declaration
Metalclad asked the trial court to strike Cohen’s declaration because it was based on Ay’s declaration, which, Metalclad urged, was inadmissible. Because Ay’s declaration (and particularly the portions on which Cohen relied) was not inadmissible, this argument provides no basis for ruling Cohen’s declaration inadmissible.
Metalclad’s other objections to material portions of Cohen’s declaration are also without merit. For example, Metalclad objected to Cohen’s opinion that Sparks was exposed to asbestos from sources including products supplied by Metalclad, because Cohen had not actually tested insulation supplied by Metalclad or personally examined the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. As an expert witness, however, Cohen may base his opinion on matters outside his personal knowledge, including relevant treatises, studies, and facts stated in declarations. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)
B. Triable Issue of Material Fact
We next consider whether the admissible evidence appellants submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion demonstrated a triable issue of fact material to causation.
Metalclad spends pages of its respondents’ brief urging that it successfully shifted the burden to appellants to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact, based on Sparks’ deposition testimony and discovery responses. Appellants did not even raise this as an issue in their opening brief, and we need not address it further.
To show causation in this context, appellants had to provide evidence of a threshold exposure to Metalclad’s asbestos-containing products and a reasonable medical probability that the exposure was a substantial factor in bringing about Sparks’ injury. (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 982.) It is not enough to produce just “some evidence” of exposure; the evidence “must be of sufficient quality to allow the trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1105.)
Appellants provided sufficient evidence of Sparks’ exposure to asbestos-containing material supplied by Metalclad. According to the admissible portions of Ay’s declaration, storage areas at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6 contained dust from the cutting of insulation materials supplied by Metalclad and others. “[L]arge volumes of asbestos-containing” insulation came to LBNS from Metalclad and others, “with, at times, daily deliveries” from Metalclad and Thorpe. Based on the storage process at LBNS, all such insulation materials, including those delivered by Metalclad, wound up in the storage areas at Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. Insulators cut asbestos-containing pipe insulation supplied by Metalclad and others on a daily basis in these storage areas, creating dust. According to Sparks’ declaration, he was in the storage areas of Piers 1, 2, and 3 “[o]n a daily basis” for ten years, in such “close proximity to insulators” cutting insulation that his clothing became dusty from insulation particles. He was also inside the lagging shop at Pier 6 dozens of times, where insulators were cutting thermal insulation and generating dust. From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sparks was exposed to asbestos-containing materials supplied by Metalclad.
In addition, Cohen opined that, based on his professional background, knowledge, training, and experience, he could state with “reasonable scientific certainty, appropriate to the field of industrial hygiene,” that Sparks “was exposed to hazardous and unsafe levels of asbestos fibers and dust from multiple sources, including the asbestos-containing insulation supplied by METALCLAD.” (Italics added.) Cohen concluded: “Mr. SPARKS was exposed to the asbestos fiber and dust which contaminated the storage areas on Piers 1, 2, 3 and 6. This dust and fiber would be composed of asbestos from all sources including the GSA, METALCLAD, THORPE, FENCO and AC&S, ” given the persistent nature of asbestos under the circumstances. (Italics added.)
Sparks established, by admissible evidence, a triable issue of material fact as to causation.
Metalclad’s protests to the contrary are unpersuasive. It urges that Ay did not know whether Metalclad’s insulation was present at the storage areas at the exact time Sparks was there. Cohen, however, explained that the persistent nature of asbestos meant that asbestos dust from insulation supplied by Metalclad would have been in those areas when Sparks was present on a daily basis. Metalclad also argues that Ay does not declare that he saw insulation supplied by Metalclad transported from Building 131 to Building 53 and then to the storage areas, that he saw Metalclad trucks make deliveries of insulation to storage areas or the lagging shop, or that he used insulation supplied by Metalclad in Sparks’ presence. Further, Metalclad argues from Ay’s prior testimony that Ay does not know how much insulation material was used at the shipyard or how much of it came from Metalclad. Far from demonstrating that there is no triable issue of material fact, Metalclad’s arguments merely confirm that there is a dispute on matters relevant to causation.
Metalclad argues that declarations from Ay and Cohen were deemed speculative in Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96. Andrews, however, involved different declarations in a vastly different context. (Id. at pp. 108-113 [expert declarations did not contain sufficient facts to establish that the defendant’s products contained asbestos or that asbestos fibers had been released into the air and remained on the ship for nearly two decades until plaintiff came onboard].)
The cases on which Metalclad relies are distinguishable. In Dumin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 650, plaintiff alleged that he was exposed to Kaylo insulation distributed by Owens-Corning Fiberglas (OCF) during his service on the U.S.S. Pocono in 1953-1954, on the theory that OCF had supplied Kaylo to the shipyard where the ship was home-ported. (Id. at p. 656.) It was uncertain, however, whether Kaylo product was at the shipyard at the relevant time; if it was, there was no testimony about its prevalence compared to other insulation products; another company besides OCF had distributed Kaylo; and there was no evidence of how often the ship even came to port or took on insulation supplies. (Id. at pp. 653, 656.) Here, by contrast, there was evidence that Sparks was exposed every day for 10 years to asbestos insulation being cut in storage areas, and during that decade Metalclad was a supplier of substantial amounts of insulation, which by its nature persists in storage areas like the ones Sparks frequented. Unlike the plaintiff in Dumin, therefore, appellants provided evidence from which a jury could reasonably find causation. On this basis, Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 is distinguishable as well. (See id. at pp. 1420-1421 [insufficient evidence that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from defendant’s insulation materials provided to his ship on a fill-in basis, where the fill-in product was used on only a small fraction of ships, comprised an even smaller fraction of the insulation that was installed, and other products were supplied].)
Metalclad’s reliance on Smith v. ACandS, Inc. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 77 is also misplaced. There, exposure was not established by evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant contracting company might have been at the same plant for the same four-month period, because there was no evidence that the plaintiff was near the contractor’s employees when they were installing asbestos materials. Here, by contrast, Sparks provided evidence that he was present, and in close proximity, when other workers were cutting asbestos products in the storage areas Sparks frequented for years.
Lastly, Metalclad argues that, where there are multiple suppliers of a product, a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment when suing only one of the suppliers, without evidence that it is more likely than not that the defendant was the one who supplied the product. (Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 868, 874.) In Garcia, however, the plaintiff had alleged injury from a single saber, and there were multiple sabers that could have caused the injury. Here, appellants do not allege a one-time injury from a single source, but cumulative injury from multiple sources.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is vacated and the order granting summary judgment is reversed. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur SIMONS, Acting P. J., STEVENS, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the California Constitution.