Opinion
No. 31094.
March 12, 1934.
INSURANCE.
Death from accidental taking of poisonous drug, including carbolic acid, held result of "external, violent and accidental means," within double indemnity clause in fraternal life policy.
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Chickasaw County.
T.L. Haman, of Houston, for appellant.
The evidence going to establish suicide is so strong that no other reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom than that of suicide.
Presumptions are indulged only to supply facts, but one presumption may not be built on another presumption to win a point.
22 C.J. 82, 83, 94 and 95.
For the purpose of considering the right of appellant in its requested peremptory instruction the proposition is narrowed to the question whether from the evidence a reasonable inference can be drawn that deceased took up the bottle of carbolic acid by mistake for either the bottle of Dobell's solution or the bottle of listerine for gargling purposes and accidentally kept a sufficient quantity in his mouth to poison him by absorption, or accidentally swallowed it.
Life Casualty Co. v. Andrews, 149 Miss. 306, 115 So. 548, 551; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Jefcoats, 143 So. 842.
The theory of appellee is supported by mere conjecture.
Knights of Honor v. Fletcher, 78 Miss. 377, 29 So. 523; 52 C.J. 1182, 1183.
The instructions given in behalf of appellee were erroneous and misleading to the jury and not cured by other instructions given.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Jefcoats, 143 So. 842.
We think that, taking all the facts and surroundings as shown by the evidence, into consideration, they point unerringly to suicide, and that only such conclusion can reasonably be drawn.
Cox v. Turner, 97 So. 721, 133 Miss. 378; Columbus G. Ry. v. Buford, 116 So. 817, 150 Miss. 832; M. O.R.R. v. Johnson, 141 So. 581.
The bodily injury of which deceased of the case at bar died was effected through internal means. The poison as a means of death acted internally, and was administered internally.
Pervanger v. Union Casualty Surety Co., 37 So. 461; 85 Miss. 31; Ferris v. Southern Surety Co., 103 So. 259, 157 La. 909.
J.H. Ford, of Houston, for appellee.
The presumption of law is against suicide, but such presumption is not conclusive; it is only prima facie; it may be overcome by the evidence. In order, however to justify the court in taking the issue of suicide, or not, from the jury, and directing a verdict in favor of suicide, the evidence going to establish suicide must be so strong as that no other reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom than that of suicide. If the evidence is such although it is without conflict, that two reasonable inferences can be drawn therefrom, one in favor of suicide, and the other against, then, plainly, it is a question for the jury.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Jeffcoats, 143 So. 842; Life Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Andrews, 149 Miss. 306, 115 So. 548; Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Fletcher, 78 Miss. 377, 29 So. 523.
That death by poisoning, gas, etc., does come within the meaning of the clause of the policy by the unanimous holding of the courts, with the possible exception of the one judge in the Louisiana case, is seen by reference to 1 C.J. 431, et seq., par. 78, and note 14, especially (i); 14 R.C.L. 1249 and 1250, par. 427.
Healey v. Mutual Accident Assn., 133 Ill. 556, 25 N.E. 52, 23 A.S.R. 637, 9 L.R.A. 371; Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N.Y. 473, 20 N.E. 347, 8 A.S.R. 758, 3 L.R.A. 443.
When the circumstances of death are such that it might have resulted from negligence, accident, or suicide, the presumption is against suicide.
4 Cooley's Brief on Ins. 3255; 7 Cooley's Brief on Ins., p. 3255.
While in an action on an accident policy the burden is on the plaintiff to show that death was caused by an accident, yet where it is doubtful from the evidence whether death was caused by an accident or by suicide, a presumption arises that an accident, and not suicide, was the cause of death.
14 R.C.L. 1236, 1237.
This is a suit on a life insurance policy for one thousand dollars with a double indemnity clause providing for an insurance of two thousand dollars in event the death of the insured "resulted, directly and independently of all other cause, from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accident means, . . . this double indemnity shall not apply if the member's death resulted from self-destruction." By another condition of the policy it was to be void in event of the death of the insured by his hand or act within two years of the date of its issuance.
The insured died within two years of the issuance of the policy, and the jury were warranted in believing that he came to his death by accidentally swallowing carbolic acid.
The evidence supports the verdict, and the instructions when read together seem to correctly announce the law of the case as to presumptions and burden of proof, as set forth in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Jefcoats, 164 Miss. 659, 143 So. 842.
The only contention of the appellant which requires a specific response is that death from the accidental taking of a poisonous drug is not within the double indemnity provision of the policy. That such a death is within that provision of the policy is supported by such a legion of authority as to make a citation thereof unnecessary.
Affirmed.