Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG09431416.
SIMONS, J.
Cross-complainants Robert G. Souza and Leilani M. Souza (the Souzas) appeal an award of attorney fees to cross-defendants William Webb Farrer and the Law Offices of William Webb Farrer (collectively, Farrer). The Souzas brought a malicious prosecution claim against Farrer, but Farrer prevailed on a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) and was subsequently granted attorney fees of $13,900. The Souzas contend the trial court abused its discretion because there is insufficient evidence to support the size of the award. We affirm.
SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57, fn. 1.)
All undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Much of the factual background is derived from allegations made in the Souzas’ cross-complaint.
On January 30, 2008, the Souzas contracted with Western Wall Systems, Inc. (WWSI), to supply and install stucco, drywall, and stone work in their home. The relationship dissolved acrimoniously; the Souzas complained about unsatisfactory installation, and WWSI claimed that payments had not been made. On October 20, WWSI recorded a mechanic’s lien on the Souzas’ home that included an invoice for materials that were custom made but not delivered or installed in the home. In November, WWSI retained Farrer to provide legal services to resolve the ongoing dispute. Farrer concluded that the mechanic’s lien, including the amounts for custom materials not actually delivered, was legally tenable and filed a lawsuit on behalf of WWSI and against the Souzas for breach of contract and foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien.
On July 30, 2009, the Souzas prevailed on a motion to expunge the lien because it included charges for undelivered and uninstalled materials. On November 2, the Souzas filed the cross-complaint at issue and, in the third cause of action, stated a claim for malicious prosecution against Farrer.
On January 6, 2010, Farrer filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking to strike the Souzas’ cross-complaint. On February 11, the trial court granted the motion, dismissing the third cause of action against Farrer. We upheld that decision in Souza v. Farrer (Feb. 8, 2011, A127939 [nonpub opn.]). On February 24, Farrer moved for attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute and relied, in part, on a declaration of his lawyer, Kevin Cifarelli, that calculated the fees for legal services. The Souzas objected to the Cifarelli declaration. On June 2, the court overruled the objections and awarded Farrer fees incurred in litigating the anti-SLAPP motion in the amount of $13,900. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).)
A fraud claim had already been dismissed on February 1, 2010.
The court ruled: “[Farrer was] the prevailing part[y] on [its] special motion to strike and [is] entitled to recover [its] reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. ([§] 425.16[, subd.] (c)(1).) In addition to the Cifarelli declaration presented in support of this motion, the Court has made an independent review of the file in this action including the cross-complaint, the briefs, evidence and objections presented in the underlying [section] 425.16 motion, the Court’s internal notes regarding this matter, and the amounts of initial appearance and filing fees. [¶] Based upon all of the above, the nature and level of complexity of the underlying matter, and the Court’s experience as an attorney and judge, and good cause appearing, the Court concludes that the reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees is” $13,900.
DISCUSSION
A determination of reasonable attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228 [“An appellate court will interfere with that determination only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.”].) The trial court judge is accorded great deference as “the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’... [Citations.]” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
The Souzas argue the trial court abused its discretion because its attorney fee determination relied solely upon the Cifarelli declaration. “The only evidence offered in support of the fee motion was the declaration of... Cifarelli [that] consists of a bare bones narrative which fails to provide sufficient detail to inform the court or [the Souzas] of the time it took to perform various tasks or which attorney did the work.” Specifically, the Souzas criticize the declaration because, though it states that Attorney Ronald Mallen also worked on the case, Mallen filed no declaration. Further, appellants argue “Cifarelli provided no redacted time records or even any time summaries to reveal how much time was spent on the... tasks for which the attorneys were awarded... $11,040. Without this information it is impossible to know if the time spent on various tasks was reasonable....”
Substantial Evidence Supports the Award of Attorney Fees
In Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, the court discussed the type of evidence sufficient to support an award of attorney fees. The “[p]laintiff complains that counsel did not state the total number of hours nor substantiate the hours or amounts with copies of time records or copies of billing statements. Counsel’s declaration and verified cost memorandum were, however, made under penalty of perjury. Mathematical calculation could show the number of hours was between 90 and 103. The work done was described. The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, it cannot be said in this particular case that the absence of time records and billing statements deprived the trial court of substantial evidence to support an award; we do not reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1587.)
The Cifarelli declaration is sufficient to support the award. It provides the names and hourly fees charged by the two attorneys who worked on the anti-SLAPP motion. It relates that, in addition to his personal observations, the declarant relied on conversations with Mallen and the declarant’s review of “all of the time entries for legal fees billed to our clients arising from this lawsuit.” The declaration then goes on to detail the precise work performed by counsel. Fees were set out for general categories of work performed (e.g., Farrer “incurred $3,700 in fees for my office’s review of the... litigation file... and research in preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion”).
To the extent the Souzas contend that Cifarelli relied on inadmissible hearsay to support those aspects of the declaration that described work performed by Mallen, we disagree. Cifarelli states that he relied not only on conversations with Mallen, but also the law firm’s time records as well. The Souzas, in their briefing, never suggest that those records were not business records admissible under Evidence Code sections 1270 and 1271, and they provide no authority that would support an argument that Cifarelli could not properly summarize those records in his declaration.
In addition to the Cifarelli declaration, the trial court independently reviewed its file and internal notes and relied on its experience in evaluating the fee request. No abuse of discretion has been shown.
The Souzas also allege the award is unreasonable because it is higher than the fees claimed by other parties to this litigation who prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motions. We disagree. First, the Souzas have provided no record of what attorney fees were actually awarded to those other parties; they provide only declarations in support of the other motions for attorney fees. Second, the Farrer anti-SLAPP motion was brought first, allowing the later filings to benefit from Farrer’s attorneys’ research and drafting.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Farrer shall recover appellate costs, including reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the trial court. (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1446.).
We concur: JONES, P.J., NEEDHAM, J.
Because of the nature of our ruling, we need not address Farrer’s contention that the record is inadequate for appellate review.