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Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Apr 9, 1986
787 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1986)

Summary

holding that a plaintiff who filed a second EEOC charge on the same facts as her first denied one could not revive the expired claim through the later charge

Summary of this case from Smith v. Harrison House

Opinion

No. 1015, Docket 85-7934.

Argued April 8, 1986.

Decided April 9, 1986.

Soso Liang Lo, pro se.

Richard Schoolman, New York City, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MINER, Circuit Judges.


Appellant filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against defendant in 1978. She received her Notice of Right to Sue on February 9, 1979. However, she failed to bring an action within the next 90 days. Having failed to initiate a timely action after the first Notice, appellant secured a second Notice of Right to Sue on November 30, 1979 and brought the present action in February, 1980. The second Notice is concededly based upon a charge involving exactly the same facts as the first Notice. We hold that whether the present action is time barred must be determined with reference to only the first Notice of Right to Sue. Otherwise, the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) would be meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased. See Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Dowdell v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 107, 115-16 (M.D.Ga. 1981).

Because none of the other issues in this case are of any jurisprudential consequence whatsoever, we dispose of the remainder by summary order under our Rule § 0.23.


Summaries of

Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Apr 9, 1986
787 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1986)

holding that a plaintiff who filed a second EEOC charge on the same facts as her first denied one could not revive the expired claim through the later charge

Summary of this case from Smith v. Harrison House

holding that action was barred by time limitations where plaintiff, having failed to initiate a timely action within 90 days of receipt of first EEOC letter, secured a second letter based upon a charge involving exactly the same facts

Summary of this case from Johnson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco

holding that the 90-day limitations period would be "meaningless" if "potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased"

Summary of this case from Howard v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Accts

holding that where a Title VII plaintiff receives two right-to-sue notices based on the same factual allegations, the first issued notice controls for timeliness determinations

Summary of this case from Jones v. Bellevue Hospital Center

finding that where a plaintiff failed to timely bring suit on his first EEOC complaint, a subsequent EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter did not revive claims asserted in the first case

Summary of this case from Walthour v. Potter

finding plaintiff's Title VII claim to be untimely where the facts alleged in the second EEOC charge were the same as the first EEOC charge and plaintiff previously failed to file action based upon right to sue letter from first EEOC charge

Summary of this case from Ordway v. Lucero

denying claims where second notice-of-claim was based on same facts as first notice-of-claim

Summary of this case from Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein

affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff when she obtained a second "right-to-sue" letter after her time to file under a first letter expired

Summary of this case from Harrison v. Potter

requiring that where the allegations presented in serial EEOC charges are identical, a plaintiff must commence an action within 90 days of receiving the first EEOC right-to-sue letter

Summary of this case from Melie v. EVCI/TCI College Administration

In Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1986), the plaintiff filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC against Pan American in 1978.

Summary of this case from Wilkens v. Toyotetsu America, Inc.

reiterating older acts in a newer EEOC charge does not remove the time bar of the older claims

Summary of this case from Walker v. Arkansas Department of Corrections

allowing a second administrative complaint to revive time-barred discrimination allegations would render the 90-day time limitation meaningless

Summary of this case from Bailey v. Reynolds Metals Co.
Case details for

Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:SOSO LIANG LO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Date published: Apr 9, 1986

Citations

787 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1986)

Citing Cases

Brown v. Mabus

In support of its position, the Navy cites Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827…

Washington v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

It is widely accepted that a plaintiff cannot revive claims stemming from an expired administrative charge in…