Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000565-MR
03-18-2016
KEITH A. SORRELS APPELLANT v. RHONDA PURNELL SORRELS APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Mary Janice Lintner Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: B. Mark Mulloy Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-500197 OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING BEFORE: JONES, MAZE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Keith A. Sorrels, appeals from the February 25, 2014, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division, denying his motion to enter a Supplemental Decree requiring de novo review of maintenance to be paid to Appellee, Rhonda Sorrels, beginning on or after January 1, 2019. Because we find this matter not ripe for review, we VACATE the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division and REMAND this matter to the trial court with direction to dismiss this action, without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Keith Sorrels ("Keith") and Rhonda Purnell Sorrels ("Rhonda") had been married for thirty-five years. On January 19, 2012, Rhonda filed a petition for dissolution of marriage with the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division Five.
At the time of her petition, Keith was 57 years old and was employed in sales and earning approximately $218,000 per year. Rhonda, who was 56 years old at the time, was enrolled at Sullivan University, in its interior design program. Rhonda had not been employed outside the home since the parties' now adult children were young.
Rhonda graduated from Sullivan University's interior design program several months after the parties' divorce was completed.
A trial date of December 14, 2012, was set. The day before their scheduled trial date the parties reached an agreement which substantially resolved all substantive issues. The parties appeared before the trial court on December 14, 2012, and recited their agreement on the record. According to that agreement, Keith agreed to pay maintenance to Rhonda in the amount of $65,000 per year for three years beginning in January 2013. Then, beginning in January 2016, Keith would pay Rhonda $60,000 a year for three years. Finally, regarding any maintenance payments beginning on or after January 1, 2019, the following language was recited before the trial court by Rhonda's counsel, Mr. Mark Malloy:
Effective January 1, 2019, which would be six (6) years out, and Janice [counsel for Keith] and I will be artful how we craft this, maintenance does not terminate but it is the expectation of the parties at this point in time that it may be modifiable. We are not creating any presumptions but at that juncture, Judge they will each have just had their 64th and 63rd birthdays respectively. Next week Rhonda will be 57. Next week Keith one day later will be 58. So it doesn't terminate. Of course it is always subject to modification. We are articulating that they understand that at 64 and 63, there might be different life circumstance that might prompt a review, might not prompt a review, but the maintenance is not going to change unless somebody effectively makes an effort to make it change . . .
On April 9, 2013, the trial court dissolved the party's marriage by entry of Decree of Dissolution ("Decree"). The Decree also allowed the parties the opportunity to tender a supplemental decree incorporating a writing consistent with the terms of the parties' agreement. Subsequently, Keith filed a motion asking the trial court to enter a Supplemental Decree. Rhonda objected to the motion on grounds that the Supplemental Decree provided for de novo review of maintenance effective on or after January 1, 2019.
On January 10, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At that hearing, Rhonda argued "that it was her understanding in December 2012 that any change in Keith's maintenance obligation would require 'a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable' as set forth in KRS 403.250." In the alternative, Keith maintained:
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
that because maintenance is modifiable under the statute at any time, a significant change in circumstances could result in a reduction in Keith's maintenance obligation prior to 2019, he anticipated a less stringent standard of review in 2019. There would be no reason for the parties' settlement to draw a line for review in 2019 if Keith's only right to modification was the one afforded to him in the statute.
By order rendered February 25, 2014, the trial court found in favor of Rhonda based on the parties' settlement agreement which was previously read into the record on December 14, 2012. Specifically, the trial court stated as follows:
The Court finds that the parties' settlement agreement as recorded on December 14, 2012, does not specifically provide for a change of the standard of review for a maintenance award after January 1, 2019. In the absence of such express language, the statutory standard of review continues to apply. This Court's decision in no way interferes with the parties' ability to reach a private agreement about the amount and duration of Keith's obligation to pay maintenance to Rhonda after January 1, 2019.
Keith filed a CR 52 and CR 59 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's order on March 7, 2014. That motion was denied by the trial court on March 20, 2014. It is from the above orders that Keith now appeals to this Court.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, the terms of a settlement agreement "are enforceable as contract terms." KRS 403.180(5); see also Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003). "[T]he construction and interpretation of a contract, including questions regarding ambiguity, are questions of law to be decided by the court[.]" Frear, 103 S.W.3d at 105 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Keith argues that the trial court erred when it imposed on the parties' settlement agreement a standard of review that was different from the standard of review that they agreed on with respect to the modification of the maintenance award beginning on or after January 1, 2019. Specifically, he maintains that the parties' settlement agreement established "different life circumstances" as the standard for modification of maintenance beginning after December 2018 and that the trial court clearly erred when it supplied a missing term in which the parties did not agree. He further argues that the trial court erred when it failed to hear extrinsic evidence regarding the ambiguous term of the parties' settlement agreement.
We find the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine if an ambiguity existed within the parties' settlement agreement regarding the standard of review applicable to any award of maintenance beginning January 1, 2019.
In Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733 (Ky. 2007), the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed three types of jurisdiction, personal, subject-matter, and jurisdiction over a particular case, that must be present in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a case. Most relevant here is the Court's discussion regarding the third type of jurisdiction and a court's power to decide a particular case. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court stated:
Finally there is jurisdiction over the particular case at issue, which refers to the authority and power of the court to decide a specific case, rather than the class of cases over which the court has subject-matter jurisdiction." Milby [v. Wright], 952 S.W.2d [202] at 205 [(Ky.1997)]. This kind of jurisdiction often turns solely on proof of certain compliance with statutory requirements and so-called jurisdictional facts, such as that an action was begun before a limitations period expired. "[A]lthough a court may have jurisdiction over a particular class of cases, it may not have jurisdiction over a particular case at issue, because of a failure by the party seeking relief to comply with a prerequisite established by statute or rule." Petrey v. Cain, 987 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1999). Jurisdiction over a particular case can perhaps be the most difficult of the jurisdictional ideas, as it also includes, or at least relates to, concepts such as ripeness and failure to state a claim, which are usually discussed in terms of their jurisdictional effect, although without specific reference to particular-case jurisdiction. E.g., Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 275-76 (Ky.App.2005) ("Because the Appellants' claims were filed before they were ripe, the circuit court has no jurisdiction over the instant case.").Id.
Moreover, it is well settled in Kentucky that a court cannot render advisory opinions as to matters that have not yet ripened into concrete disputes. Id. at 739. Furthermore, a court must refrain from deciding "speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties." Commonwealth ex rel. Watkins v. Winchester Water Works Co., 197 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Ky. 1946); see also Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962).
In this case, we find there is no present actual controversy presented by the adverse parties. Here, the trial court certainly had jurisdiction over the parties and was free to accept and enter the Decree. The initial settlement agreement was read into the record on December 14, 2012, and set out the terms of the agreement at least through December 2018. However, at anytime, even prior to December 2018, the parties' settlement agreement could be changed by either party pursuant to KRS 403.250. To illustrate this point, it is possible that Rhonda may remarry prior to January 1, 2019, or either party may be deceased prior to January 1, 2019, or even the law may change, essentially nullifying the parties' current settlement agreement, prior to January 1, 2019.
KRS 403.250 Modification or Termination of Provisions for Maintenance and Property Disposition Provides: (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6) of KRS 403.180, the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance may be modified only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable. The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state. (2) Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance. --------
Undoubtedly, any number of possibilities may exist that would substantially affect the parties' settlement agreement between now and January 1, 2019. Thus, it would be impossible for this Court, or any other court, to decide if an ambiguity exists with respect to a term not presently in effect. Therefore, because Keith's claim regarding the standard of review for maintenance payments on or after January 1, 2019, was not ripe, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we VACATE the February 25, 2014, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division and REMAND this matter back to the trial court with direction to dismiss this action, without prejudice.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Mary Janice Lintner
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: B. Mark Mulloy
Louisville, Kentucky