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concluding that "[t]he question of whether the City intentionally delayed plaintiff's arraignment is one of intent" and "a question for the trier of fact"
Summary of this case from Roland v. City of New YorkOpinion
98 Civ. 3356 (HR)
January 22, 2003
OPINION ORDER
The City of New York (the "City" or "defendant") moves for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) dismissing Anette Sorensen's ("plaintiff') claim of false imprisonment under New York law. Plaintiff cross-moves for leave to conduct additional discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) on the issue of the City's intent with respect to any delay in her arraignment and regardless of whether the Court grants or denies defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in detail below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied and plaintiffs cross-motion is granted. A trial on plaintiffs false imprisonment claim will be held on April 28, 2003 at 9:30 A.M. Forty-five days of discovery is provided, to begin on or before February 17, 2003.
That Rule provides, in pertinent part, that
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any pay. . . . For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this action are set out at length in my prior decisions and familiarity therewith is assumed. See, e.g., Sorensen v. City of New York, 1999 WL 199066 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1999) ("Sorensen I"); Sorensen v. City of New York. 1999 WL 511923 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) ("Sorensen II"). That said, I think it is necessary to provide a summary of the long and winding procedural history of this case.
Plaintiff commenced this action against the City and other individually named defendants on May 11, 1998 based on claims of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violation of her constitutional rights, arising from a well-publicized incident involving her baby that was left outside a restaurant where she the father of the child were drinking or eating or both. On July 20, 1999, I granted the City's motion for partial summary judgment only with respect to plaintiffs claims of malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent prosecution. See Sorensen II. The balance of the motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial before a jury on December 6, 1999. Following a five-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict on December 14, 1999 in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $6,400 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. Shortly thereafter, defendants moved under Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law to set aside the award of punitive damages. Plaintiff also moved under Rule 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law against all defendants with respect to her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, unconstitutional strip search, and Vienna Convention violations, or, in the alternative, for a new trial under Rule 59 wherever the jury found for defendants. By memorandum and order dated October 16, 2000, I granted defendants' motion with respect to the Vienna Convention and punitive damages and granted plaintiffs motion with respect to claims of false imprisonment and unconstitutional strip search against the individually named defendants. Specifically, I concluded that plaintiff did not need to prove intent to delay her arraignment in order to prevail on her common law claim of false imprisonment. See Sorensen v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1528282, at * 12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000) ("Sorensen III"). I ordered a new trial for the purpose of determining damages, if any, incurred by the plaintiff during the delay in her arraignment. See id. at 13. Moreover, I granted plaintiffs motion for a new trial on damages with respect to the strip search claims against the two individually-named defendants, Maria Rios and Sheryl Williams.
In granting the City's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' "negligent prosecution" claim, I stated that
[t]o the extent that plaintiffs have asserted a state law claim for negligence prosecution, that claim must fail as there is no cause of action in the New York [sic] sounding in negligent prosecution. Sorensen II, at *4
Rios and Williams filed an interlocutory appeal on October 24, 2000 on the issue of whether they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiffs section 1983 strip search claim, as the jury had concluded. At the same time, the City moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) to certify for appeal that portion of the Court's October 16, 2000 memorandum and order with respect to whether an "intent to delay arraignment" was an element of false imprisonment under New York law. Additionally, defendants collectively sought a stay of further proceedings pending a decision by the Second Circuit on the qualified immunity issue. By memorandum and order dated December 11, 2000, 1 denied defendants' motion for certification but granted their motion for a stay. Although I refused to certify the issue relating to a false imprisonment claim under New York law, I reconsidered, sua sponte, my October 16, 2000 decision with respect to that question. See Sorensen v. City of New York, 2000 WL 1808560, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000) ("Sorensen IV"). More precisely, I stated that
[i]n this case, . . , the plaintiff was not falsely arrested, and thus her confinement was privileged but for the delay in her arraignment. Here then the question of intent is directed to the delay in plaintiffs arraignment. The harm upon which plaintiffs claim is based is more than mere confinement, the harm here is the intentional delay. Accordingly, plaintiff must prove that defendant City of New York intended to delay her arraignment in order to prevail upon retrial of her false imprisonment claim. Id.
A year and half later, on July 30, 2002, the Second Circuit affirmed my denial of qualified immunity on the ground that the strip search of persons arrested for misdemeanors was unconstitutional. See Sorensen v. City of New York, 2002 WL 1758432, at *1 (2d Cir. July 30, 2002) ("Sorensen V"). At long last, then, the matter has returned to me to determine whether the plaintiff can prevail on the issue of an intent to delay her arraignment and thus her claim for false imprisonment. The City has moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff cannot prove an intent to delay on the part of the City. I disagree.
II. ANALYSIS 1. Summary Judgment Standard
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."' Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992)). The court resolves all ambiguities and draws all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide. Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523.
2. Plaintiffs False Imprisonment Claim
In order to prevail on a claim for false imprisonment under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant had intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. See Sorensen III (citing Broughton v. State, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93 (N.Y. 1975) (other quotation and citation omitted)).
In this case, plaintiff was held for forty-two hours prior to being arraigned. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that an arrestee has a federal constitutional right to be arraigned within forty-eight hours, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 63 (1991), New York has set a more stringent limit by providing that a time period over twenty-four hours is both unreasonable and violative of N.Y. C.P.L. Section 140.20(1). See Sorensen III, at *12 (quotations and citations omitted).
As to intent, the City maintains that it is beyond dispute that plaintiff has adduced no evidence whatsoever of a City employee intentionally delaying her arraignment, and points, for instance, to the fact that plaintiff failed to provide any testimony during her deposition — that took place on November 4th and 6, 1998 — suggesting that any employee of the City intended to delay her arraignment. Defendant states that
[o]nly twice in her deposition does plaintiff mention the timing of her arraignment. In both instances plaintiff gives hearsay testimony that unidentified officers, who are neither identified as New York City Correction Department Officers, nor as New York City Police Officers, nor as State Court Officers, informed her that the timing of her arraignment was dependent on the State Judge. (Def. memorandum of law at 3).
In addition, defendant adverts to the fact that during the trial plaintiff neither testified nor adduced evidence in support of the contention that any employee of the City intentionally delayed her arraignment. See id. Defendant states, in highly conclusory fashion, that plaintiff will be unable to prove at trial that the City intended to delay her arraignment because she provided no evidence, either during deposition or trial, in support of this contention.
Plaintiff, not surprisingly, argues that there is substantial testimony that strongly suggests that City employees did intend to delay plaintiffs arraignment. Specifically, plaintiff points to the manner in which plaintiff was treated during the forty-two hours spent in custody, claiming that such evidence indicates that the delay was intentional. For instance, although plaintiff attempted to procure the assistance of City employees five times in order to get before a judge, she was repeatedly told by them that it was not within their powers to assist her. (Fraenkel Decl. Ex. D, Sorensen Dep. 195-96). In addition, plaintiff was allegedly kept waiting much longer for her arraignment than other prisoners in the cell. (Id. 195). In response to defendant's contention that plaintiff failed to provide any testimony either at deposition or at trial demonstrating an intent to delay an arraignment on the part of the City, plaintiff argues that because the very issue of intent to delay was "not clarified until after the trial, it is not surprising that neither Sorensen nor defendant asked questions in pre-trial discovery or at trial specifically to illuminate [it]." (Pl. memorandum of law at 11). Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that plaintiff also moves for additional discovery with respect to this limited issue.
It is well-settled that questions of intent in a variety of contexts cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See. e.g., Halperin v. Halperin, 215 B.R. 321, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (intent to defraud an issue of fact not suited to motion for summary judgment); Cedarwood Land Planning v. Town of Schodack, 954 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (questions of "`motivation, intent, or some other subjective fact are particularly inappropriate for summary judgment"') (quoting Orange Lake Assocs, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 825 F. Supp. 1169, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994))); Amin v. Quad/Graphics. Inc., 929 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("summary judgment ordinarily is inappropriate [in cases where a defendant's intent is in issue] because direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind is generally unavailable to a plaintiff');Vanni v. City of New York, 1988 WL 1956, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1988) (whether a delay in arraignment of more than thirty-six hours was "unnecessary" as provided under N.Y. C.P.L. Section 140.20 was "a question of fact based on all the circumstances and therefore not susceptible to summary judgment").
The question of whether the City intentionally delayed plaintiffs arraignment is one of intent and therefore cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, even notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff has not yet conducted discovery with respect to the question of intent, I find that she has adduced enough evidence to create genuine issues of material fact with respect to this issue. As I made clear inSorensen III, "[p]laintiff was held for a clearly unreasonable 42 hours without being arraigned." Sorensen III, at *12. While an intent to delay calls into play a much higher standard of proof than a "clearly unreasonable" standard, it is beyond peradventure that the intent of those individuals who created the "clearly unreasonable" situation in the first instance is a question for the trier of fact.
3. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Additional Discovery Under Rule 26(b)(1)
I agree with plaintiff that additional discovery is warranted in this case only with respect to the limited issue of whether or not the delay in plaintiffs arraignment was intentional. At the time that this case went to trial on December 6, 1999, the issue of intent to delay as an element had not been briefed by either side. It was only after my decision in Sorensen IV that this element appeared to be necessary. Accordingly, I disagree with defendant that plaintiffs request for additional discovery with respect to this issue "is merely a request to go on a classic discovery `fishing expedition"' (Def.'s reply memorandum at 6) and conclude that such limited discovery is necessary prior to trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied and plaintiffs cross-motion for leave to conduct additional discovery up to and until April 1, 2003, with respect to the issue of intent, is granted. A trial on the false imprisonment claim, which will require plaintiff to prove that the City intentionally delayed her arraignment, will begin on April 28, 2003 at 9:30 A.M. The parties are reminded to follow my rules as to pre-trial papers and motions.