Opinion
00 CV 3517 (HB).
February 9, 2001.
OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Chanardai Sookdeo-Ruiz ("Ruiz") brought this lawsuit against her former employer, GCI Group, Inc. ("GCI"), alleging that she was terminated as a consequence of her pregnancy and thus in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 20002e-2 ("Title VII"), Section 296 of the New York Executive Law ("Executive Law"), and Section 8 of the New York City Administrative Code, § 8-101, et seq ("Administrative Code"). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 29 U.S.C. § 1161, et seq. ("COBRA"). Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to both claims. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted with respect to plaintiffs discrimination claims and denied with respect to plaintiffs COBRA claims.
BACKGROUND
The facts are uncomplicated and for the most part undisputed. Ruiz worked for Grey Healthcare Group ("GHG") in the public relations department from May 1997 until it was acquired by GCI in January, 1999. She continued to work for GCI until April, 1999 when GCI terminated her. During her employment, her role changed some but essentially she was hired as a billing coordinator and was fired as a billing coordinator. In this position, Ruiz tabulated time charges forwarded by employees to ensure coordination between the time charges and the estimated amounts to be paid under the contracts between defendant and its clients.
At first plaintiff worked on only one major account but eventually that account departed, and she was given a group of smaller accounts and more responsibility after the merger in January, 1999.
Plaintiff received her initial performance review in early December 1997, some nine months after her job began. It suggested that she needed to improve her listening skills, that on occasion she failed to meet deadlines, and that she was inflexible with respect to adapting to new methods. It is undisputed as well that the second and only other written evaluation, rendered in October 1998, commented on both strengths and weaknesses and scored the plaintiff at 3.033 on a scale where 1 was the worst and 5 was the best score. As plaintiff herself opines, it was a rating just ever so slightly better than good. However, plaintiff also testified that it was "not the greatest" evaluation. This second evaluation prompted plaintiffs supervisor, Galvin, to advise her that she needed to be more efficient and learn to handle multiple tasks at one time. However, even after the evaluation and Galvin's advice, defendant claims that plaintiff failed to improve her performance.
As a consequence of these concerns, Galvin talked with other executives about discharging the plaintiff. In fact, during February of 1999, Galvin allegedly talked with Barbara Anderson at Trandon Associates, Inc., a job search firm, regarding a replacement for plaintiff.
On January 1, 1999, GCI acquired the public relations arm of GHG, and GCI required the billing department, which included the plaintiff, to change its methods of processing bills. As a result, plaintiffs job soon included handling, that is, tracking and billing, all public relations accounts and any new business, undisputedly a somewhat larger task. Unfortunately during this period after the merger the feedback on plaintiffs competency was at best mixed. Various account executives told Galvin that they would prefer to keep and do their own work rather than giving it to the plaintiff since they could handle the work more expediently and would not have to spend time reviewing plaintiffs errors.
On March 11, 1999, plaintiff told Galvin that she was pregnant. Interestingly, during the same conversation, Galvin announced to the plaintiff that she too was pregnant. Approximately three weeks after the pregnancy conversation, on March 30, defendant placed plaintiff on probation for her allegedly poor work performance. In the probation report, defendant listed 13 or more areas and told the plaintiff that she must improve with respect to each of them in order to continue in her position. Allegedly plaintiff did not improve in these areas, and she was terminated on April 13, 1999.
Plaintiff, however, contends that poor performance was not the gravamen of her termination pointing to her score on the October evaluation, the fact that she received positive feed back from the account team, had been told on occasion that she was doing a great job, had never been told by Galvin that she was in danger of losing her job, and had even been given additional tasks to say nothing of a 6.7% raise in 1998.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no disputed issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995). On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). On the other hand, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather the party must enumerate "specific facts and circumstances supported by deposition, affidavits based on personal knowledge, and admissions," and cannot rely on conclusory allegations or denials. General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1452 (2d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to oppose successfully a summary judgment motion; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs pregnancy-related claim and her COBRA claim, and I will consider each in turn.
A. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff alleges that as a consequence of her revealing to her supervisor in March of 1999 that she was pregnant defendant placed her on probation three weeks later and fired her a month after that.
The framework for analyzing summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases has most recently and perhaps most clearly been explained in James v. New York Racing Association, 233 F.3d 149 (2nd Cir. 2000). I am guided by that decision here. In James, an age discrimination case, the court evaluated its holding in Fischer v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) in light of the Supreme Court's most recent employment discrimination case, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, (2000). The Second Circuit concluded that Fischer was in harmony with the standard laid out in Reeves. Thus, the question here is what do these cases stand for and what does that portend for this motion.
The James court began by reinforcing the application of the now familiar balancing test first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The initial step in the test is to determine whether plaintiff alleged a prima facie case.
This requires no evidence of discrimination. It is satisfied by a showing of "membership in a protected class, qualification for the position, an adverse employment action," and preference for a person not of the protected class.James, 233 F.3d at 153-54. Thereafter, and assuming that plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a proposition not free from doubt in this case, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant to show that it had a legitimate business reason for the determination. of course, if the defendant does not come forward with reasons for its action, then plaintiff prevails. Id. at 154. In James, both the plaintiff and defendant met their respective burdens at these preliminary stages. The plaintiff then offered evidence of pretext to undermine the defendant's proffered reason for plaintiffs termination. Thus, the issue was whether the plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to require the court to deny summary judgment and allow the case to proceed to trial.
The court explained that after an employer asserts a legitimate reason for plaintiffs termination, the "presumption completely drops out of the picture [and] the employer will be entitled to summary judgment . . . unless plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination." Id. In other words, "a case under Title VII becomes like any other case in that the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must have evidence from which the factfinder can reasonably find the essential elements of the claim." Id. at 154. Applying this standard to its facts, the James court concluded that, despite evidence of an occasional disparaging comment about older employees, plaintiff had pointed to no evidence supporting its allegation that defendant terminated him for a discriminatory purpose and granted summary judgment. Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Assuming plaintiff met her prima facie burden, defendant then offered a legitimate reason for her termination, namely that she was an unsatisfactory employee. However, plaintiff alleges that the doubts she has raised about defendant's proffered reasons for her termination entitle her to proceed to trial. This is clearly not plaintiffs automatic entitlement under James rather I must evaluate plaintiffs claims as I would any other summary judgment motion, to determine if a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that defendant's decision to put her on probation was a sudden and disproportionate response to the concerns expressed in her evaluations and by her superiors. However, she has failed to offer a shred of evidence that defendant had a discriminatory motive. In fact, plaintiff cannot point to a scrap of paper, a message, a conversation, or even an inappropriate remark to show that her termination was as a result of her pregnancy or that the defendant discriminated against her because she was pregnant.
By contrast, defendant has offered both evidence of plaintiffs inadequate performance and of the fact that 12 other women employees went on maternity leave between April, 1998 and June, 2000 without negative repercussions. True, plaintiff conjectures that the timing of the supervisor's pregnancy vis-a-vis hers supports her claim since there was a risk that their leave time might closely follow one another, however this conclusory allegation does not suffice. It is particularly significant that plaintiff has failed to substantiate this allegation with any evidence that her role and her supervisor's role are such so that even if their leaves overlapped it would create a significant problem for the defendant. In short, there is simply no evidence of intentional discrimination, and I conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude otherwise.
B. Plaintiff's COBRA claim
As to the COBRA claim, it appears that issues of fact abound. A recent amendment to the complaint seems to frame the issue but documents and testimony are required to reach a decision. That branch of the motion for summary judgment must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment on the Title VII claim is granted. The COBRA claim will proceed to trial on Monday, February 25, 2001, at 9:30 am.