Opinion
Case No.: 20-cv-2161-GPC-KSC
02-01-2021
JOSEPH SOMMER, an individual, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; CITY CHEVROLET OF SAN DIEGO, a California corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Defendants.
ORDER:
(1) DISMISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION; AND
(2) DISMISSING THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AND STRIKING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
[ECF Nos. 5, 6, 10, 11]
Before this Court are Motions to Dismiss the Second and Seventh Causes of Action in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), and Motions to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC, filed by Defendant General Motors, LLC ("GM") and Defendant City Chevrolet of San Diego ("Chevrolet"). Based on the FAC, the moving papers, and applicable law, the Court DISMISSES the Second Cause of Action WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Seventh Cause of Action WITH PREJUDICE, and STRIKES Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Plaintiff may amend the complaint.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns an alleged defect of a motor vehicle that Plaintiff purchased in May 2012. On November 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC. The FAC generally alleges: (1) violations of various warranties (both implied and express); (2) failures to repair, replace, and/or make restitution; (3) conversion; and (4) negligence. ECF No. 3. One of the forms of relief sought is punitive damages based on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. Id. at 12, 14.
On December 16, 2020, GM filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second and Seventh Causes of Action ("1st MTD"), and a Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC ("1st MTS"). ECF Nos. 5, 6. Plaintiff filed Oppositions to both Motions on December 29, 2020. ECF Nos. 8, 9. On January 6, 2021, GM filed its respective Replies. ECF Nos. 13, 14.
On January 4, 2021, Chevrolet filed a Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action ("2d MTD"), and a Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from the FAC ("2d MTS"). ECF Nos. 13, 14. On January 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed Statements of Non-Opposition to Chevrolet's Motions. ECF Nos. 15, 16.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
GM moved to dismiss the FAC's Second Cause of Action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). 1st MTD 5, ECF No. 5; Reply 1st MTD 2-3, ECF No. 13. The Second Cause of Action alleges that Defendants breached the implied warranty of fitness, specifically the "implied warranty that the Subject Vehicle would be fit for Plaintiff's particular purpose." FAC 6-7, ECF No. 3. Because the FAC does not allege sufficient facts to establish the requirements for a valid claim for a breach of implied warranty of fitness, the Court GRANTS GM's Motion to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action. At the same time, since Plaintiff could potentially cure the defects, the Court also GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, i.e. whether the complaint lacks either a cognizable legal theory or facts sufficient to support such a theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing the motion, the Court "must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," but it need not accept legal conclusions. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court agrees with GM that the Second Cause of Action, breach of the implied warranty of fitness, fails to meet the standard to survive the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For a valid implied warranty of fitness claim under California law, Plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) the purchaser at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular purpose, (2) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of this particular purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish goods suitable for the particular purpose, and (4) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 25 (1985) (citing Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 341 (1972)); accord T & M Solar & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Lennox Int'l Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 855, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2015); cf. S. California Stroke Rehab. Assocs., Inc., v. Nautilus, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (adding the fifth element of "the product failed to suit buyer's purpose and subsequently damaged the buyer"). See generally Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook § 9:4 (discussing the four previously mentioned elements); Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 1232 (discussing the similar "Essential Factual Elements" for "Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose").
The FAC lacks factual descriptions that correspond to any of the above elements, a requirement for a legitimate implied warranty of fitness claim. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the vehicle "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." FAC ¶ 12, ECF No. 3. For the purposes of an implied warranty of fitness, a "particular purpose" means "a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business." T & M Solar, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (quoting Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1295 n.2 (1995)). The vehicle's "purpose of providing transportation" is not considered a particular purpose. Am. Suzuki, Cal. App. 4th at 1295 n.2.
Plaintiff's Opposition fails to address the specific requirements to establish an implied warranty of fitness. Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish T & M Solar does not guide the Court, as the legal standard provided by that case (for an implied warranty of fitness) still stands. Plaintiff refers to California Civil Code Section 1794(a), but this provision only discusses the ability to bring an action for breach of "any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract." Plaintiff has failed to plead adequate facts that Defendants breached the implied warranty of fitness, i.e. one of the bases to seek action pursuant to Section 1794(a).
Plaintiff presents an alternative standard and cites to Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, 19 Cal. App. 5th 1234, 1246 (2018), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 22, 2018). This case discusses the implied warranty of merchantability, which is Plaintiff's First Cause of Action. Id. ("Here the alleged wrongdoing is a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability imposed by the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act . . . ."). The implied warranty of merchantability is a different basis of liability from the implied warranty of fitness. See Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1295 n.2 (1995) (discussing how "ordinary purposes" go to "the concept of merchantability").
Plaintiff also requested a leave to amend. "Courts are free to grant a party leave to amend whenever 'justice so requires,' Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and requests for leave should be granted with 'extreme liberality.'" Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that an amendment can save the complaint. Id. (citation omitted). Since an amendment could potentially cure the defects raised by this Order, leave to amend is appropriate.
For example, the FAC states that the purchased vehicle was "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes," FAC ¶ 12, ECF No. 3 (emphasis added), which could mean that other purposes exist.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action in the FAC, which alleges conversion. Relatedly, Defendants have moved to strike the FAC's requested relief of punitive damages, in which the only basis for such relief is grounded in conversion. 1st MTD, ECF No. 5; 1st MTS, ECF No. 6; 2d MTD, ECF No. 13; 2d MTS, ECF No. 14. While Plaintiff initially contested GM's Motions on this issue, see Opp'n 1st MTD 3-6, ECF No. 8; Opp'n 1st MTS, ECF No. 9, the recently filed Statements of Non-Opposition indicate that such is no longer the case. ECF Nos. 15, 16. With all parties in agreement, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Seventh Cause of Action in the FAC, and STRIKES Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Second Cause of Action, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Seventh Cause of Action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court STRIKES Paragraph 8 in the Prayer Section of the FAC ("8. For punitive damages in the amount of at least $100,000.").
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which addresses the deficiencies discussed in this Order on or before February 22, 2021. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court VACATES the hearing on this matter scheduled for February 5, 2021.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: February 1, 2021
/s/_________
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
United States District Judge