Opinion
A162804
01-31-2022
In re T.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. RAUL C., Defendant and Appellant. SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Solano County Super Ct. Nos. J44030, J44031 J45079, J45080)
Rodríguez, J.
Raul C. (father) appeals from a dispositional order denying him reunification services for his four children based on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that his youngest child - then four-month-old V.C. - suffered severe physical abuse while in his care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(5), (6).) We affirm. 1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. We retain jurisdiction to resolve this appeal notwithstanding the transfer of the dependency proceedings to Sacramento County. (In re Lisa E. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 399, 403-405.) We grant the Solano County Health and Social Services Department's (Department) unopposed motion to augment the record with documents reflecting the children's placement as of August 2021. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a).) We mention family members who are not parties to this appeal only when necessary.
BACKGROUND
Sandra C. (mother) has seven children, including four children with father who are the subject of this appeal: T.C., U.C., R.C., and V.C. (collectively, children). The family's relationship has been marred by father's domestic violence against mother, and by his physically abusive approach to parenting. Father's extensive criminal record includes several domestic violence convictions. In 2018, some of the children were declared dependents based on sustained allegations that, as relevant here, parents committed acts of domestic violence against one another in view of T.C. and U.C. Parents received family maintenance services; the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in 2019.
In October 2020, the Department filed a petition alleging the children - all of whom were under four years old - came within section 300. According to the Department, mother left V.C., then four months old, with father for several hours; when she returned, V.C. was" 'acting weird and not responding, '" and she was later hospitalized for "non-accidental injuries" including "retinal hemorrhaging, brain bleed and loss of oxygen." The Department alleged V.C. was at "substantial risk of serious physical harm and/or neglect" (§ 300, subd. (e)) and that the other children were at risk of similar abuse. (Id., subd. (j).)
Father offered varying accounts of how the injury occurred, but eventually claimed he accidentally dropped V.C. and that she hit her head on the floor. One of mother's older children, 13-year-old G.R., was "scared for her baby sister" as she had seen father "get mad and carry [V.C.] super aggressively and hold [V.C.'s] mouth closed" when she cried. Mother's 12- 2 year-old daughter, J.R., told the Department she had watched father - on more than one occasion - "grab the [children] and shove them in a pillow when they cry."
The juvenile court detained the children and placed them with paternal grandparents. The Department recommended bypassing reunification services for father based on V.C.'s traumatic brain injury and father's history of domestic violence. At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, mother described the physical abuse she suffered at the hands of father. Mother opined father was not a "safe" person and that no amount of services would make him so. The social worker - who testified as an expert in forensic social work - concurred. He testified father had failed to offer a "reasonable explanation" for V.C.'s injury and, as a result, there were no services the Department could offer "to alleviate the safety issues" pertaining to V.C. or "her siblings because they're [at] such a young age."
Father testified he had "a bond" with the children and gave them "a lot of love." He had begun taking anger management and parenting classes. Counsel for father urged the juvenile court to offer father reunification services because father had an "overwhelmingly positive" relationship with the children and was "willing to engage" in services. According to father's counsel, V.C.'s injury was a "one-time event." Counsel also reasoned that denying services would put father in an "untenable situation" because the children were placed with paternal grandparents.
The juvenile court deemed the children dependents under section 300, subdivisions (e) and (j). It denied father reunification services as to V.C. based on a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that she "was inflicted with grave injury," and that father bore primary responsibility for that injury and for the domestic violence in his relationship with mother. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) 3 The court denied father reunification services as to T.C., U.C., and R.C., finding it was not in their best interest to have contact with father and that reunification services were not appropriate "for the same factual basis as the Court found" for V.C. (Id., subd. (b)(6).)
DISCUSSION
Father's sole argument on appeal is the juvenile court erred by denying him reunification services. We are not persuaded.
" 'As a general rule, reunification services are offered to parents whose children are removed from their custody in an effort to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. . . .' [Citations.] Section 361.5, subdivision (b) sets forth certain exceptions-also called reunification bypass provisions-to this 'general mandate of providing reunification services.' [Citations.] [¶] Section 361.5, subdivision (b) 'reflects the Legislature's desire to provide services to parents only where those services will facilitate the return of children to parental custody.' [Citations.] When the court determines a bypass provision applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that reunification services would be' "an unwise use of governmental resources." '" (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112; In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23-24.)
Section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (6) set forth the relevant reunification bypass provisions. Subdivision (b)(5) allows a juvenile court to deny a parent reunification services when the court has "taken jurisdiction over the child under section 300, subdivision (e), finding that the child was under five years old and suffered severe physical abuse because of the conduct of the parent." (In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1145 (A.E.); § 300, subd. (e) [defining "severe physical abuse"].) Subdivision (b)(6) permits 4 a juvenile court to deny a parent reunification services when a child's sibling has been adjudicated a dependent under section 300, subdivision (e), and "the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent." (A.E., at p. 1141; § 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
Once the juvenile court finds the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5)" 'circumstances to be supported by clear and convincing evidence, the juvenile court is prohibited from granting reunification services "unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent." '" (A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1145-1146; § 361.5, subd. (c)(3).) Where the subdivision (b)(6) bypass provision applies, the juvenile "court 'shall not order' reunification services 'unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.'" (A.E., at p. 1141; § 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
The parent has the burden to show" 'reunification would serve the best interests of the child.'" (In re I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) In making the best interest determination, the juvenile" 'court considers the parent's current efforts, fitness, and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds; and the child's need for stability and continuity.'" (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1124 (Jennifer S.); § 361.5, subd. (i) [listing factors].) "[A]t least part of the best interest analysis must be [based on] a finding that further reunification services have a likelihood of success." (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228.) We review the best interest determination for abuse of discretion. (Jennifer S., at pp. 1124-1125.) 5 An abuse of discretion occurs when the court exceeds the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the evidence, we cannot substitute our decision for that of the lower court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Father concedes V.C. was under five years old and that she suffered severe physical abuse within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (e) while in his care. Nor does father dispute the juvenile court's finding that he bore primary responsibility for V.C.'s injury. Instead, father argues it was in the children's best interest to offer him reunification services. The juvenile court found otherwise and did not abuse its broad discretion in so concluding. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1124-1126.)
Before the juvenile court was evidence that father was willing to engage in services, and he shared a bond with the children. But also before the court was evidence of father's extensive history of domestic violence and numerous examples of his physically abusive approach to parenting. Mother - who had been the victim of father's violence - testified father was not a "safe" person and that he would "never change," even if he completed coursework on domestic violence. The Department's expert testified reunification services would be ineffectual because father failed to take accountability for the severe injury V.C. suffered in his care. On this record, the court was well within its broad discretion to conclude father failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification services would be in the children's best interest. (In re I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 28 [record supported juvenile court's finding that it was not in the children's best interest to provide reunification services]; Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125; In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077-1078 [reunification 6 services not in children's best interest where parent refused to acknowledge the abuse].)
Father suggests it was in the children's best interest for him to receive reunification services because the children were placed with paternal grandparents. This contention is unavailing in light of evidence that, as of August 2021, the children were no longer in that placement.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order as to father is affirmed. 7
WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P. J., Petrou, J. 8