Summary
noting that “the threat of a civil lawsuit ... [does not] constitute economic duress”
Summary of this case from Cavelli v. New York City Dist. Council of CarpentersOpinion
March 26, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.).
The motion court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff upon its first cause of action and dismissal of defendant's counterclaims was proper. By affirming and ratifying the subject promissory note, defendant waived any claim of economic duress ( see, Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. D'Evori Intl., 163 A.D.2d 26, 30-31; 1163 Realty Corp. v. United Institutional Servicing Corp., 55 A.D.2d 908). Were we, however, to reach the merits of defendant's duress claim, it would suffice to observe that neither the threat of a civil lawsuit nor plaintiff's insistence upon the execution of the promissory note or other loan documents following defendant's defaults constituted economic duress ( see, 805 Third Ave. Co. v. M. W. Realty Assocs., 58 N.Y.2d 447, 452; Friends Lbr. v. Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 886; Shire Realty Corp. v. Schorr, 55 A.D.2d 356, 365; Oleet v. Pennsylvania Exch. Bank, 285 App. Div. 411, 414-415).
Finally, we note that the motion court was correct in ruling that the integration clauses, contained in the 1990 guarantee and the 1991 restructuring documents executed by defendant, function to preclude defendant from relying on any prior written or oral agreements in support of her counterclaims ( see, e.g., Daiichi Seihan v. Infinity USA, 214 A.D.2d 487). We further note that, at all relevant times, defendant was represented by counsel.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Rubin, Andrias and Saxe, JJ.