Opinion
Civil No. 02-4801 (JRT/JSM)
March 29, 2004
Daniel S. Rethmeier, St. Cloud, MN, for plaintiff
Lonnie F. Bryan, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff James Snyder ("Snyder") brings this action against the Commissioner of Social Security seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. In a report and recommendation dated February 10, 2004, United States Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, deny defendant's motion for summary judgment, and remand this case to the Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings. This matter is before the Court on defendant's objections to the report and recommendation.
The Court has conducted a de novo review of defendant's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
BACKGROUND
Snyder filed the current application for disability insurance benefits on April 6, 2001, claiming that he is completely unable to work because of back, neck, leg, and hand pain. He asserts that he has been disabled since November 3, 1998. The Social Security Administration denied Snyder's claim initially and on reconsideration. Snyder then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ evaluated Snyder's claim according to the sequence required by social security regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At steps one through three, the ALJ determined that Snyder has not engaged in substantial gainful employment since November 3, 1998, and is severely impaired by reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD"), degenerative disc disease and headaches, but that his impairments do not meet or equal a listing under Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4.
The Eight Circuit has summarized this analysis as:
The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment — one that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.Kerns v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464, 466 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fines v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1998)).
The ALJ then proceeded to step four and determined that Snyder retains the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of light work with standing and walking 6 hours of an 8 hour day; lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently; no repetitive rotation, flexion or fixed posturing of the neck; no repetitive fine fingering or gripping; no exposure to extremes of temperature or humidity; no heights, ladders, ropes, or scaffolding; and only occasional bending, stooping, crouching, crawling, twisting, or reaching overhead. As part of this determination, the ALJ considered both the objective medical evidence and the subjective complaints expressed by Snyder. The ALJ determined that Snyder's subjective complaints of severe back pain were not entirely credible. The ALJ noted that Snyder had not recently received treatment for his alleged back pain, a one-year-old medical opinion imposing significant restrictions on Snyder's activities was not substantiated by medical evidence, and Snyder had testified that he visits relatives, drives a car, exercises 15 minutes per day, cooks and washes the dishes, helps his children with homework and takes them to the park. The ALJ concluded that Snyder would be unable to perform any of his past relevant work.
At the final step of the evaluation, the ALJ determined that Snyder is a younger individual, with limited education and no transferable skills, who can nevertheless perform other light work, including assembler, hand packager, cashier, or parking lot attendant, that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Snyder is not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act and denied his application.
Snyder's request for further review was denied by the Social Security Administration Appeals Council and the ALJ's opinion became final at that time. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. He then sought judicial review of the decision, contending that the ALJ's finding regarding his residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole because the ALJ failed to accept the opinions of his treating physician, improperly discounted Snyder's subjective complaints of pain, and offered and relied on a flawed hypothetical. The Magistrate Judge determined that the ALJ properly considered the opinion of Snyder's treating physician, but failed to adequately consider Snyder's subjective complaints of back and neck pain and based the hypothetical on a potentially incorrect understanding of Snyder's pain. The Magistrate Judge accordingly recommended that Plaintiff's motion be granted in part and denied in part, defendant's motion be denied, and the matter be remanded to the ALJ for further consideration.
ANALYSIS
The Court may reject the Commissioner's decision only if it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. Richardson v. Per ales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 2000). In determining whether evidence in the record is substantial, the Court considers "evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it." Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not preclude the decision from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
The Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation, contending that the ALJ properly considered and discounted Snyder's subjective complaints of back pain, regardless of any failure to detail her reasons for doing so. The Commissioner argues that although "specific articulation of credibility findings is preferable," the lack thereof "does not require reversal so long as the ultimate finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record."
As the Magistrate Judge noted, in order to discredit a Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, "the ALJ must make an express credibility determination detailing his reasons for discrediting the testimony." dine v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1991); Ricketts v. Secretary of H.H.S., 902 F.2d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1990); Thomason v. Apfel, 1999 WL 33657676, *12-13 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 15, 1999). "When rejecting a claimant's complaints of pain, the ALJ must make an express credibility determination, detailing reasons for discrediting the testimony, must set forth the inconsistencies, and must discuss the Polaski factors." Beckley v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1060 (8th Cir. 1998); Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998). "Merely quoting Polaski is not good enough, especially when an ALJ rejects a claimant's subjective complaints of pain." Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1995).
In Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065 (8th Cir. 2000), the court found that although the ALJ had not explicitly articulated his credibility determination, he did so implicitly by evaluating the claimant's testimony under the Polaski factors and by identifying inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and evidence in the record. 221 F.3d at 1068. In that context, the court determined that "[a]lthough specific articulation of credibility findings is preferable, . . . the lack thereof . . . constitute[s] a deficiency in opinion-writing that does not require reversal because the ultimate finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. (citation omitted).
In this case the Magistrate Judge dstermined that the ALJ implicitly considered and properly discounted Snyder's subjective complaints concerning his RSD and hand pain, but failed to properly consider Snyder's complaints of debilitating back and neck pain. This Court agrees. In her opinion, the ALJ cited Polaski, but did not then explicitly discuss Polaski's factors. Similarly, the ALJ declared Snyder's daily activity inconsistent with his testimony that he is in constant disabling pain, but did not detail those inconsistencies. Perhaps most seriously, the ALJ stated that Snyder "did not allege back pain as the reason he was unable to work." This statement is clearly contradicted by Snyder's testimony that the middle of his back "hurts constantly," his lower back "shoots pains down [his] legs," and the back pain is "constant," "there all the time," causes "problems sleeping at night," and requires him to "take the medication."
In light of the lack of explicit discussion of the Polaski factors, and clear discrepancy between the ALJ's recollection of Snyder's back pain complaints and Snyder's testimony regarding his back pain, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did not adequately evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints of neck and back pain. The ALJ's express dismissal of Snyder's back pain as part of his alleged disability indicates that any reasoning the ALJ did include in the opinion likely does not apply to Snyder's complaints of back and neck pain. The Court therefore cannot consider the ALJ's opinion regarding Snyder's other complaints substantial support for her apparent decision to discount Snyder's complaints of back and neck pain. It is not this Court's role to substitute its opinion regarding Snyder's credibility for that of the ALJ. Cline, 939 F.2d at 566. Therefore, the Court will remand this action to the ALJ for consideration of Snyder's subjective complaints of back and neck pain.
Any ALJ may rely on testimony from a vocational expert based on a properly phrased hypothetical question. Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996). A proper hypothetical question includes limitations mirroring those of the claimant. Id. In light of the Court's determination that the ALJ may not have adequately considered Snyder's complaints of back and neck pain, the hypothetical originally proposed to the vocational expert may also have been incorrect. Thus, if the ALJ finds Snyder's complaints of back and neck pain credible, the ALJ should make any necessary adjustments to the hypothetical, and solicit new testimony from a vocational expert as to Snyder's continuing ability to perform any jobs existing in the national economy.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES defendant's objection [Docket No. 25] and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 24]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or remand [Docket No. 20] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Consistent with this Opinion, the motion for summary judgment is denied, but granted as to the alternative relief for a remand.
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 22] is DENIED.
3. The case is REMANDED to the Administrative Law Judge for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.