Opinion
UWYCV146025264S
01-29-2016
Breianna Sniffen, PPA Alyssa Sniffen et al. v. Oscar Santos, Jr. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS #134
Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, J.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs filed a complaint on October 8, 2014 with a return date of October 28, 2014. The plaintiffs named three defendants, Oscar Santos, Jr., Karla Santos, and Jennings Oil Company. Two of the defendants have filed this motion to dismiss as noted below.
FACTS
The plaintiffs, Breianna Sniffen through her mother Alyssa Sniffen have filed an amended complaint against the defendants, Oscar and Karla Santos on April 6, 2015. The plaintiffs allege the following facts. On August 1, 2013, the minor plaintiff was on premises owned and controlled by the defendants when her feet were burned by scalding hot water from the bathroom faucet. As a result of the negligence of the defendants, the minor plaintiff suffered injuries, and the parent plaintiff incurred expenses for medical care and treatment. The parent plaintiff alleges that immediately after the incident, she entered the bathroom and witnessed her daughter's skin peeling off from the burns. As a result of the incident, the parent plaintiff suffered emotional distress. The plaintiffs seek monetary damages.
The complaint also names as defendant Jennings Oil Company. The motion to dismiss has been filed by the defendants Oscar and Karla Santos, therefore for purposes of this memorandum, the term, " defendant" will be used in reference to Oscar and Karla Santos only.
On April 28, 2015, the defendants filed a petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The defendants' petition named the plaintiffs as creditors. The Bankruptcy Court set August 3, 2015 as the deadline for filing a proof of claim. Notice of the bankruptcy was mailed to the plaintiffs on May 1, 2015 and was filed with this court on May 5, 2015. On August 28, 2015, the defendants' bankruptcy case was discharged by order of the Bankruptcy Court.
On September 16, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint on the ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion with various exhibits including a list of creditors, the bankruptcy petition, notice of bankruptcy, proof of claims, discharge order, and final decree from the Bankruptcy Court. On November 6, 2015, the plaintiffs submitted an objection to the defendants' motion and an accompanying memorandum. The matter was heard at short calendar on November 9, 2015. The defendant submitted a reply to this objection on November 12, 2015.
DISCUSSION
" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mark v. Neundorf, 147 Conn.App. 485, 489, 83 A.3d 685 (2014). " [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction . .., once raised, either by a party or by the court itself . . . must be answered before the court may decide the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 283, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
" It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Ins., 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2014). " If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651-52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
In the present action, the defendants argue that the order and final decree of the Bankruptcy Court discharging the plaintiffs' claim have divested this court of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants reason that since the plaintiffs failed to seek relief from the bankruptcy stay, file a proof of claim, or object to the discharge of their claim, the Bankruptcy Court discharge operates as an injunction against the commencement of this action. The plaintiffs counter that this court retains subject matter jurisdiction because the purpose of bringing this claim is to recover from the defendants' insurance carrier and not the defendants. In response, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to name an insurer in the present action.
" Federal preemption implicates the court's jurisdiction." (Citation omitted.) Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Realty P'ship, L.P., 86 Conn.App. 596, 601, 862 A.2d 368 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 909, 870 A.2d 1079 (2005). " Congress has given the United States district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters arising under title 11 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Through the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Congress has provided a comprehensive federal system of penalties and protection to govern the orderly conduct of debtors' affairs and creditors' rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Chelsea G.C.A. Realty P'ship, L.P., supra, 86 Conn.App. at 602.
A " claim" is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as a " right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). " Congress intended by this language to adopt the broadest available definition of claim . . . By this broadest possible definition . . . [. . . the Bankruptcy Code] contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case . . ." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lightowler v. Continental Ins. Co. supra, 255 Conn. at 648. " [A] claim will be deemed pre-petition when it arises out of a relationship recognized in, for example, the law of contracts or torts. A claim exists only if before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the relationship between the debtor and the creditor contained all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation-a right to payment-under the relevant non-bankruptcy law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 647.
" [U]nder 11 U.S.C. § 727, a debtor whose bankruptcy petition satisfies the requirements of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code generally is entitled to the discharge of any debt that arose prior to the filing of the petition. The discharge of a debt pursuant to § 727 triggers the operation of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 524, which shield the debtor from any personal liability for that debt by affording the debtor the right to an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lightowler v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 255 Conn. at 644-45. Several Superior Court decisions, including one from this court, have found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over pre-petition claims where the plaintiff did not file a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court. Dab Three, LLC v. LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06-5004236-S, (September 29, 2015, Arnold, J.); Rentas v. White, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 05-4003165S, (June 2, 2010, Marano, J.) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 32, 34); Leserra v. Garcia, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 01 0185531-S, (March 3, 2010, Brazzel-Massaro, J.); Santiago v. Kmart Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-03083402, (May 28, 2004, Ronan, J.T.R.).
In the present case the plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to file a proof of claim in the defendants' bankruptcy case. Therefore, the issue now before the court, as presented by the parties, is whether the plaintiffs may initiate an action against the defendants for the sole purpose of establishing liability in order to collect from the defendant's insurer. Notably, " 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) expressly provides that the relief accorded the debtor under the provisions of § 524 does not extend to other parties . . . Thus, the purpose of [§ ]524 of the Bankruptcy Code is to protect the debtor and not to shield third parties as such as insurers who may be liable on behalf of the debtor . . . [Nevertheless, ] [t]he fresh-start policy is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured . . . Furthermore . . . a claimant is not barred from obtaining a judgment against a discharged debtor solely for the purpose of establishing the debtor's liability when . . . a judgment against the debtor is a prerequisite to recovering against the debtor's insurer . . . It bears emphasis, however, that [t]his exception to the permanent injunction under [§ ]524(a) is necessarily conditioned upon the debtor's being exempted from any exposure to personal expense or liability, resulting from the creditor's action, which would imperil [his or her] fresh start." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lightowler v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 255 Conn. at 645-47.
Title 11 of the United States Code § 524(e), provides in relevant part that the " discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt."
Title 11 of the United State Code, § 524(a), provides in relevant part that " [a] discharge in a case under this title . . . (2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived . . ."
In Lightowler, the court held " a claimant is not barred [under the bankruptcy statute] from obtaining a judgment against a discharged debtor solely for the purpose of establishing the debtor's liability when . . . a judgment against the debtor is a prerequisite to recovering against the debtor's insurer." Id., 646. In the Superior Court case of Dab Three, LLC v. Land America Financial Group, Inc., supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06-5004236-S and Rentas v. White, supra, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 32, the plaintiffs claimed that, although a proof of claim was never filed in the defendant's bankruptcy case, under Lightowler, they still should be permitted to proceed against the defendants to recover from the defendants' insurance carriers. This court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, noting " [a] significant distinction between Lightowler and the present case is that in Lightowler, the defendant's insurer was also a named defendant in the lawsuit, " and in both cases, no insurer was named as a co-defendant. Dab Three, LLC v. Land America Financial Group, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No, CV 06-5004236-S, Rentas v. White, supra, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 34.
In the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to name the defendants' insurance carrier as a party in this action. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not identified any insurer or alleged that such coverage exists. Thus, when the Bankruptcy Court granted the defendants discharge, the plaintiffs' claims were extinguished, and therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.